Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to speak on behalf of the Bloc Québécois about Bill S-3, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (investigative hearing and recognizance with conditions).
People listening to us need to understand that the Bloc Québécois opposes the principle underlying Bill S-3. The Bloc Québécois has taken a responsible approach to analyzing this issue. All legislative measures concerning terrorism must strike a balance between safety and respect for other basic rights.
That was the principle guiding the Bloc Québécois in its involvement in the review of the Anti-terrorism Act and its application, a review called for in the act itself. Between December 2004 and March 2007, the Bloc Québécois heard witnesses, read briefings, and interviewed specialists, civil society representatives and law enforcement agencies.
During the Subcommittee on the Review of the Anti-terrorism Act's specific study of the two provisions in Bill S-3, the Bloc Québécois made its position on investigative hearings and recognizance with conditions clear. The Bloc Québécois felt that the investigative process needed to be better defined.
In our opinion, it is clear that “this exceptional measure should be used only in specific cases in which it is necessary to prohibit activities where there is imminent peril of serious damage, and not in the case of misdeeds already committed”.
We were also firmly opposed to section 83.3, dealing with preventive arrest and recognizance with conditions. Not only do we feel that this measure is of little, if any, use in the fight against terrorism but, more importantly, there is a very real danger of its being used against honest citizens.
The Bloc Québécois finds that a terrorist activity deemed dangerous can be disrupted just as effectively, and in fact more effectively, by the regular application of the Criminal Code, without the harmful consequences that a preventive arrest can trigger.
Therefore, we recommended abolishing this approach, and we won our point on February 27, 2007. Today, our position has not changed.
The investigative process should only be reinstated if major changes are made to it, which Bill S-3 does not do. Moreover, preventive arrests have no place in the Canadian justice system, given their possible consequences and the fact that other provisions which are already in place are just as effective.
Bill S-3, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (investigative hearing and recognizance with conditions) was introduced and read for the first time on October 23, 2007. This bill seeks to reinstate two provisions of the Anti-terrorism Act that were abolished when their sunset clause was allowed to expire. The vote on the sunset clause took place on February 27, 2007.
I was a member of the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities in 2001, when we passed the Anti-Terrorism Act, which provided for a five-year review. It is during that five-year review that the vote on the sunset clause was held, again on February 27, 2007, and that is when Parliament decided not to extend that clause.
Sections 83.28 and 83.29 of the Criminal Code, which were abolished following the vote on the sunset clause, dealt with investigative hearings. Under these provisions, a peace officer could, after obtaining the attorney general's prior consent, ask a provincial court judge, or a superior court judge, to make an order for the gathering of information.
If granted, the order required the person named therein to appear before a judge, to be questioned and to produce everything in his or her possession. The person named in the order had the right to retain a lawyer, and was supposed to answer questions put to him or her, but could refuse if answering a question would disclose information protected by any law relating to non-disclosure of information or to privilege. The presiding judge was to rule on any refusal to answer. The person was not to be excused from answering questions or producing things on the ground that it might incriminate him or her. Essentially, individuals were to be deprived of their right to remain silent.
However, no information or statement obtained during an investigative hearing could subsequently be used directly or indirectly in any other criminal proceedings, other than a prosecution for perjury or giving contrary evidence. Investigative hearings were not useful. They were never even used, thus proving that section 83.28 was not necessary.
Moreover, as part of a regular investigation, the police can already question witnesses and carry out search warrants to obtain documents.
Bill S-3 seeks to reintroduce this mechanism, section 83.28, which was abolished by the vote against the sunset clause, in a nearly identical form.
With respect to recognizance, arrest and detention, section 83.3 of the Criminal Code addressed recognizance with conditions, with the prior consent of the Attorney General. A peace officer who believed that a terrorist activity was about to be carried out and who suspected that the imposition of a recognizance with conditions on a person, or the arrest of a person, was necessary to prevent the carrying out of the terrorist activity, could lay an information before a provincial court judge. The judge could order the person to appear before him or her. A peace officer could arrest the person without a warrant if the arrest was deemed necessary to prevent the terrorist activity from being carried out.
The person detained was to appear before a provincial court judge within 24 hours or as soon as possible thereafter. Then a show-cause hearing was to take place to determine whether the person should be released or further detained. The hearing could not be delayed longer than 48 hours.
If the judge determined that it was not necessary to have the person sign a recognizance, the person was to be released. If, however, the judge determined that the person did have to sign a recognizance, then the person was required to keep the peace and comply with the other conditions that had been imposed for up to 12 months. If the person refused to sign the recognizance, the judge could order that the person be incarcerated for up to 12 months.
This provision was never used. Section 83.3 was added to the Criminal Code but, five years later, when it was abolished, it had never been used.
That is not surprising, because police officers could and still can use other Criminal Code provisions to arrest someone about to commit an indictable offence.
Section 495 of the Criminal Code states:
(1) A peace officer may arrest without warrant
(a) a person...who, on reasonable grounds, he believes...is about to commit an indictable offence;
Section 495 already existed. There is a good reason why the police never made use of the new provisions in section 83.3, which is why it was allowed to expire in 2007.
The dissenting opinion in the report of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security gives the following explanation with regard to section 495 of the Criminal Code:
The arrested person must then be brought before a judge, who may impose the same conditions as those imposable under the Anti-terrorism Act. The judge may even refuse bail if he believes that the person’s release might jeopardize public safety.
Section 495 already enables the police to make preventive arrests. There was therefore no need for section 83.3.
The dissenting opinion goes on about section 495 of the current Criminal Code:
If police officers believe that a person is about to commit an act of terrorism, then they have knowledge of a plot. They probably know, based on wiretap or surveillance information, that an indictable offence is about to be committed. Therefore, they have proof of a plot or attempt and need only lay a charge in order to arrest the person in question. There will eventually be a trial, at which time the arrested person will have the opportunity to a full answer and defence. The person will be acquitted if the suspicions are not justified or if there is insufficient proof to support a conviction. It seems obvious to us that the terrorist act thus apprehended would have been disrupted just as easily as it would have been had section 83.3 been used. However, it is this provision that is most likely to give rise to abuses. It may be used to brand someone a terrorist on grounds of proof that are not sufficient to condemn him but against which he will never be able to fully defend himself. This will prevent him from travelling by plane, crossing the border into the United States and probably from entering many other countries. It is very likely that he will lose his job and be unable to find another. One could compare this situation to that of Maher Arar upon his return from Syria before he was exonerated by Justice O’Connor...If this new and temporary provision of the Criminal Code were used, it would be a judicial decision to impose conditions because of apprehended terrorist activity. The general public would see that person as almost certainly, if not definitely, a terrorist. Terrorist movements often spring from and are nourished by profound feelings of injustice...The fight against these injustices is often conducted in parallel by those who want to correct the injustices through democratic means— The former made a positive contribution to the transformation of the societies in which we live today. They are often the source of many of the rights that we enjoy.
It is inevitable that political activity will bring the first and second groups together. Very often, the former will not even be aware that the latter are involved in terrorism. The planning of terrorist activity is by its nature secret.
...
In order to determine whether a person is part of a terrorist network, security officers make use of electronic surveillance, but, as we saw in the Arar case, they also monitor the contacts of someone—
Now, to be able to order incarceration and, subsequently, the imposition of conditions of release, it is sufficient that the judge be convinced “that the detention is necessary in order to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, having regard to all the circumstances, including the apparent strength of the peace officer’s grounds...and the gravity of any terrorist activity that may be carried out.”
In other words, the apprehension of serious terrorist activity and grounds that appear founded will suffice—
It should also be noted that the person arrested need not be the one that is thought likely to commit a terrorist act, but only and simply a person whose arrest “is necessary to prevent the carrying out of the terrorist activity.”
There is an important nuance there that is both astonishing and disturbing. It can include innocent people who are unaware of the reasons for which terrorists are soliciting their aid in a planned activity while concealing the real reasons they are asking for aid.
Some see in the reference to section 810 of the Criminal Code an indication that our criminal law already uses a procedure similar to that set out in section 83.3. While there is a similarity in the procedure followed, there is a very big difference in the consequences of applying these two sections.
Under the current section 810, a person can be summoned before a judge, but not arrested. The judge can order that person to enter into a recognizance to keep the peace.
The judge cannot commit that person to a prison term unless the person refuses to sign the recognizance, after listening to all the parties and being satisfied by the evidence adduced that there are reasonable grounds for the fears.
If the person signs the recognizance and respects the conditions, he or she remains at liberty, will not be sentenced and will thus have no criminal record.
...
This provision and section 83.3 that we [rejected] are very different in nature and have radically different consequences.
There is also no comparison between the impact that the use of section 83.3 and section 810 would have on someone’s reputation.
When the decision is made to depart from the fundamental principles underlying our system of criminal law, there is always a risk that these measures will later be applied in a manner totally different from those foreseen. That was the case with the imposition of the war measures act in 1970, which saw the incarceration, among others, of a great poet, a pop singer, numerous relatives of people charged with terrorist activities and almost all the candidates of a municipal political party.
In light of this analysis, we have decided not to support the extension of these provisions. First, it is of little, if any, use. These two sections went unused during the five years they were in effect. Second, there is a very real danger that this provision might be used against honest citizens.
A terrorist activity deemed dangerous can be disrupted just as effectively, and in fact more effectively, by the regular application of the Criminal Code.
That is why I have taken the time to explain sections 83.28 and 83.3 of the Criminal Code: Bill S-3 is practically identical to the two measures that were eliminated, namely investigative hearing—sections 83.28 and 83.29 of the Criminal Code—and recognizance with conditions, which is similar to section 83.3 which was eliminated. If we count technical amendments, such as minor clarifications, there are still only three substantial amendments.
They amended the investigative procedure in order to standardize it. The previous investigative procedure depended on whether or not the terrorism offence had already been or would be committed. If the terrorism offence had not yet been committed, the judge had to be convinced—along with other criteria—“that reasonable attempts have been made to obtain the information” outside of the investigative procedure. This was not required for offences that had already been committed.
Bill S-3 standardizes the procedure and requires “that reasonable attempts have been made to obtain the information by other means” through investigative hearings in both cases.
The second minor amendment concerns the limit on detention. Bill S-3 adds a limit on detention when someone who is under investigation is being detained because there is a risk that they will evade service of the order or because they did not attend the examination.
An examination of the review in committee led to the following. Aside from the fact that the Attorney General of Canada and, in the case of section 83.3, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, must include in their annual report on the use of the two provisions their opinion on whether the provisions should be extended, the most important amendment is to ensure that the provisions will be subject to a comprehensive review, before the sunset clause expires, either by a Senate committee, a House committee or a joint committee that Parliament or one of its houses will have designated or created for this purpose. Within one year after the committee starts the review, it must submit its report to Parliament, along with recommendations on whether the provisions should be extended.
In short, not only were the comments of the Bloc Québécois not taken into account, but neither were the numerous recommendations by the two committees, both House and the Senate, who seriously examined the issue. The Conservative government prefers to do whatever it likes, forgetting that in a democratic and free society, there must be a real balance between ensuring safety and respecting other fundamental rights.
The Bloc Québécois has been acting in this responsible manner since 2001. I was on the Standing Committee on Transport when the Anti-terrorism Act was passed and we were the ones who presented the famous sunset clause to ensure that there would be a five-year review. In 2007, Parliament decided to abolish these provisions because they were never used. Again, the Conservatives do not care about the different committees and recommendations from all the experts and they decide to restore measures that had been abolished by this Parliament in 2007.
Perhaps I should read from the Bloc Québécois dissenting opinion.
The Anti-terrorism Act, a measure adopted rather quickly following the events of September 11, 2001, required its provisions to be reviewed three years after the bill became law.
The Subcommittee on the Review of the Anti-terrorism Act was responsible for reviewing the legislation, as a five-year review was required. In October 2006, the subcommittee of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security tabled an interim report specifically on the two measures contained in Bill S-3. Although the Bloc Québécois agreed with some of the subcommittee's findings, it felt that the two provisions should not be kept as they were worded then.
The Bloc Québécois explained its reasoning by signing a dissenting opinion, which I will now read.
From the outset, it must be understood that this is a preliminary report that addresses only two sets of provisions in the Anti-terrorism Act; namely, those pertaining to investigations and preventive arrests as provided for in sections 83.28, 83.29 and 83.3 of the Criminal Code, as amended by section 4 of the Anti-Terrorist Act.
We concur with the description of the specific historical context that led to the adoption of the Anti-terrorism Act.
We also agree with most of the recommendations made in the majority report of the Committee, which aim to provide better guidelines for the investigation process. This exceptional measure should be used only in specific cases in which it is necessary to prohibit activities where there is imminent peril of serious damage, and not in the case of misdeeds already committed.
We, like other members of the Committee are also of the opinion that another review of the provisions ten years after their coming into force is needed and would make it possible to better assess whether the provisions should be extended or allowed to expire.
We would have preferred a three-year period; however, we are willing to support the opinion of the majority...
However, we do not agree with the Committee members’ opinion regarding the preventive arrests provided for in section 83.3 of the Criminal Code, as introduced in the Anti-terrorism Act. Our reasons are as follows.
Terrorism cannot be fought with legislation; it must be fought through the efforts of intelligence services combined with appropriate police action.
There is no act of terrorism that is not already a criminal offence punishable by the most stringent penalties under the Criminal Code. This is obviously the case for pre-meditated, cold-blooded murders; however, it is also true of the destruction of major infrastructures.
Moreover, when judges exercise their discretion during sentencing, they will consider the terrorists’ motive as an aggravating factor. They will find that the potential for rehabilitation is very low, that the risk of recidivism is very high... This is what they have always done in the past and there is no reason to think they will do differently in the future.
Thus, given this representation by our members on the sub-committee, it is important that Parliament understand that the Bloc Québécois will vote against Bill S-3, which seeks to reintroduce measures abolished by the House in 2007. The Bloc Québécois continues to have an advantage over the other parties in this House. We are always responsible and true to ourselves.