Mr. Speaker, I am glad to be here today to bring some comfort to the member's troubled mind.
Canada's ability to prevent, prepare for and respond to an outbreak of avian influenza is a key priority for us. Regarding the source of avian influenza in the most recent outbreaks in British Columbia, extensive testing of the commercial poultry farms within three kilometres of the infected flocks has not found another flock that may have been the source of the low-pathogenicity virus. Broader surveillance of commercial poultry flocks is set to start within the next week.
At this point in time, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency is looking at the wild bird population, which is the natural reservoir of all avian influenza viruses, as the most likely source. However, the investigations are ongoing, and until our investigations and sampling procedures are complete, we will not be able to state with certainty a probable source of the virus.
In previous avian influenza outbreaks in Canada, extensive testing was done in the domestic poultry population, with no further detection of the virus. As a result, a wildlife reservoir was determined to be the most probable source of this virus.
This government takes avian influenza and the associated risks to animal and human health very seriously and is well prepared to react quickly in these cases. Response protocols have been developed and allowed rapid reaction regarding the current findings. The response is focused on containing and eliminating the virus in order to avoid spread. Cooperation between federal and provincial jurisdictions, including diagnostics support, public health protection, and environmental assessments related to containment and disposal, has been of the highest order.
I would like to give a few details of the restrictions that have been put in place. In order to limit any potential virus spread, the CFIA has applied restrictions on the movement of poultry and poultry products from commercial poultry operations within a three-kilometre radius of the two infected premises and all contacts outside the three-kilometre radius that have been assessed as high risk due to the movement of people, products and equipment. All premises with birds within three kilometres of each infected premises, and all quarantined locations, will also be monitored for signs of illness for a minimum 21-day period following the last possible date of exposure.
The respect of the international community for the integrity and competence of the CFIA's management of these detections is reflected in the decision of the vast majority of countries to limit any trade restrictions to either the three-kilometre surveillance zone or the province of British Columbia.
Avian influenza preparedness and effective response is a top priority for this government. We have developed, in consultation with the poultry industry, a comprehensive and robust avian influenza surveillance program for domestic poultry. This is key to the CFIA's avian influenza strategy and to maintaining Canada's reputation as a credible participant in avian influenza preparedness, our access to international markets, and consumer confidence in our poultry products.