Debates of Feb. 9th, 2011

[Don Davies, NDP, Vancouver Kingsway, BC]

Madam Speaker, the government's own documents estimate that 4,000 new prisoners will enter Canadian prisons in the next two to three years in the federal system. It is hiring 3,300 new staff. In that 3,300 staff, the documents show that it will hire 10 psychologists, one per province, and there is already a deficit of psychologists. That is the government's commitment to mental health.

This week even more individuals came out against the government's crime agenda. More than 550 physicians, social workers and researchers signed a letter to the Prime Minister expressing their opposition to the government's approach to crime. These health and social policy experts say that the Conservative approach is not scientifically grounded and will actually harm community safety.

The Conservative plan disproportionately affects aboriginals and young people. The lack of addictions and mental health treatment in prisons means putting more people behind bars for longer. This will do nothing to reduce the rate of crime.

How much expert evidence will it take for the government to recognize that its plan is unacceptably expensive, ineffective and will do nothing to make our communities safer?

[Dave MacKenzie, Conservative, Oxford, ON]

Madam Speaker, through the whole six minutes of my colleague's talk I never heard the name “victim” mentioned once.

Let me clarify that this government, through Correctional Service Canada, is committed to achieving the best standard of care and correctional results for federal offenders with mental health needs. We aim to protect all Canadians, which includes ensuring the safe and effective treatment of mentally ill offenders both within correctional facilities and in communities across Canada.

Through its mental health care strategy, Correctional Service Canada is improving the continuum of care for offenders by identifying and assessing the mental health needs of offenders and admission to a federal correctional facility, to treating those needs through mental health care services and programs within correctional facilities and ensuring that this care is carried out into the community once the offender is released.

As a result of these measures, Canadians can feel safe and secure knowing that the mental health needs of federal offenders are being addressed through Correctional Service Canada's national mental health strategy.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Madam Speaker, I rise tonight to ask further about a question I asked during question period on October 26, 2010, regarding the procurement of Chinook helicopters and other helicopters, the Cyclones, by the Department of National Defence and in relation to the Auditor General's report of fall 2009.

There is a familiar story here. The Auditor General reported that in 2006, based on meetings and discussions with Boeing and the market analysis, National Defence formally concluded that Boeing's Chinook was the only existing western certified helicopter in production capable of meeting its needs. It convinced Treasury Board that it was buying an off-the-shelf product and got approval for it. As a result, a sole-source contract was agreed upon, an ACAN, advance contract award notice, approved by Public Works and Government Service Canada, to proceed to buy the Chinooks.

The reality was the government did not really know at the time it would use the Chinooks for. The Auditor General said that after the ACAN was posted, the government negotiated with Boeing, looked at a schedule to produce these aircraft and had to develop a detailed statement of work. In order to do that, it had to know precisely what type of missions the helicopter would support, what it wanted the helicopter to do and the technical specifications needed to achieve it.

The Auditor General said that the evidence on the file was that there were uncertainties both before and after the decision that the Chinooks were the only ones we needed, such as which type of operations would be supported, whether land, maritime or special operations, what mission systems would be needed, the minimum number of helicopters and whether the helicopter would be located on one or two operating bases.

The actual specifications were not decided upon until 2009. Does that sound familiar? We have a situation with the F-35s. The Department of National Defence has decided the only military jet to meet Canada's needs is the F-35. When was that decision made? It was made about a month or so after the Minister of National Defence said in the House that there would be a fair, open and transparent process of competitive bidding. In fact, probably a month or two after, finally the statement of operating requirements, which is basically the first step in a bidding process, was decided upon by the Department of National Defence. All of it was done in the wrong order.

The Auditor General, to go back to the Chinooks and the process, said that the manner in which the advance contract award notice was given did not comply with the applicable regulations and policies and in her opinion the process was not fair, open or transparent. All of this is required, including a whole series of challenges and reviews that must go on before spending of this nature is approved.

We see the same thing here. The Auditor General called the projects undertaken by the Department of National Defence high risk. It resulted in a doubling of the expected costs to $11 billion. We have the same kind of risks with the F-35s. We do not know how much it will cost. We do not have a fair, open and transparent process.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence]

Madam Speaker, I would like to thank the member for St. John's East for giving me the opportunity to bring further clarity to this issue.

First, as a key component of our Canada first defence strategy, the Chinook helicopters are the right aircraft for the Canadian Forces and will provide our men and women in uniform with an essential capability they need to carry out their important work either here, at home or overseas. The Chinooks currently deployed to Afghanistan have proven invaluable to the mission and are saving lives every day.

Second, to say that the department broke any rules on sole sourcing is patently false. The advanced contract award notice, or ACAN, is a fair, open and transparent procurement instrument that fully complies with Treasury Board rules.

Furthermore, Treasury Board accepted that full estimates for in-service support of the Chinooks were not available when it authorized definition work to begin. These costs cannot be fully known until the aircraft are in service. The department provided complete estimates before Treasury Board gave its implementation approval and the procurement took place within well-established Treasury Board guidelines.

As indicated in the report of the Auditor General, the Department of National Defence agrees with the recommendations and is taking action to address each one. Now that we have addressed the situation with the Chinook, I would like to talk about the procurement of the F-35.

The member opposite would like to try to compare the acquisition process of the Chinook with that of the F-35, but in this respect there is no comparison. The choice of procurement process is guided by the operational requirements of the equipment being sought by the Canadian Forces.

The F-35 procurement is a unique situation because of our membership in a partnership of nations committed to acquiring a common next generation fighter for the 21st century. Experts within the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence have rigorously examined all available aircraft in terms of capability, cost and industrial opportunities, and this review concluded that the F-35 was the only aircraft that met all the Canadian Forces' mandatory capabilities for a next generation fighter.

In total, 10 countries have followed the same process and come to the same conclusion: the F-35. This is not a coincidence. As such, we have committed $9 billion to the acquisition of 65 F-35 Lightning II joint strike fighters, an amount that includes not only the cost of the aircraft, but all of the associated weapon systems, supporting infrastructure, initial spares, training simulators, contingency funds and project operating costs.

Canada is purchasing the most cost-effective variant of the aircraft at the peak of production when the costs are projected to be at their lowest. We currently estimate the cost per aircraft to be in the mid-$70 million U.S. range. In 2016 dollars, the unit cost of buying new F-35s is only slightly more than the unit cost paid for the CF-18s in the 1980s.

We expect the life cycle cost of the joint strike fighter to be similar to that of the CF-18 fleet, approximately $250 million to $350 million annually. Canada's cost for aircraft is not expected to change as a result of the extension of the development phase since the U.S. has been absorbing all of those costs so far.

DND continuously strives to capture lessons learned in undertaking complex acquisitions. Procurement of major military platforms is a complex process that evolves over time. Some who are now commenting have simply not kept up with that evolution.

We have taken a number of steps in recent years to improve and streamline the defence procurement process, allowing us to introduce and replace new capabilities faster than ever before, while also ensuring best value for money. As a matter of fact, we have reduced the implementation time to about half of what it was previously.

As always, the government continues to ensure that we procure the best equipment for our Canadian Forces so they can achieve mission success while ensuring that Canadian taxpayers get the best deal for their money.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Madam Speaker, I certainly agree with the parliamentary secretary that the Chinooks in use in Afghanistan have been very useful, but they were actually off the shelf. They were used Chinooks bought from the Americans that have been very useful and now are military surplus because we are looking for a buyer for them. We spent $286 million on them. They served our purpose and now we are selling them. There is nothing wrong with that. This is a different process altogether.

As for the F-35s, other than Lockheed Martin that produced them, no one was ever looked at in terms of the specifications. After the SOR was developed in 2010, we had the other manufacturers before us at the defence committee. They said they had never been consulted or even asked whether they could meet the operational requirements. There were no detailed discussions with all of the manufacturers after the SOR was determined.

What the minister is saying is not correct. In fact, to go back to the Chinooks, the Auditor General happened to disagree totally with what the hon. member just said and what Treasury Board officials say. We have a serious problem with the procurement policies. The parliamentary secretary and the government need a reality check on procurement.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Madam Speaker, we are very careful about the people whom we employ to look at these projects. We have some of the best minds, the most experienced people with the most expertise, military and civilian, who looked at all the other airplanes and spoke with us.

Of course, the other manufacturers are going to say they can meet the requirements. They are salesmen. That is what they do. That is why we hire people who can examine it and give us the kind of advice we need with no agenda. Their only agenda is to give the Canadian Forces the best equipment they can at the best price. By the way, it also gives Canadian industry the best possible opportunities for participation to create jobs for the next 20, 30, 40 years.

We are going to fly this airplane until past 2050. We have an obligation to give the Canadian Forces the best equipment possible to do the jobs we give them, and that is what we are doing.

[The Acting Speaker, NDP, Denise Savoie]

The hon. member for Nanaimo—Cowichan is not present to raise the matter for which adjournment notice has been given. Accordingly, the notice is deemed withdrawn.

The motion to adjourn the House is now deemed to have been adopted. Accordingly, this House stands adjourned until tomorrow at 10 a.m., pursuant to Standing Order 24(1).

(The House adjourned at 8:06 p.m.)