Mr. Speaker, I will be splitting my time with the hon. member for Scarborough Southwest.
Bill C-26 demonstrates that the committee process in this House can actually work, when a bill starts out as reasonable in its aspirations and its general content. I will speak mostly to the self-defence provisions, which have not been getting as much attention during this debate, and I hope to have time to speak to citizen's arrest. If not, I am happy to answer questions.
The NDP worked in good faith within the committee and advanced a number of amendments, two of which were accepted. We feel that the legislation could be better yet, especially, from my point of view, on the citizen's arrest portions. However, we also feel that it has been somewhat improved and that, in general, it started out as worthy legislation. For that reason, we believe this bill should be supported, as my colleagues have been indicating.
With respect to the legislation that was originally tabled, I must commend the parliamentary secretary, the member for Moncton—Riverview—Dieppe, for his speech on December 1, 2011, when he introduced the bill. His speech was a model of thoughtfulness, tightness and elegance of exposition and, indeed, care taken to explain the bill's purpose and its relationship to the existing law and to the general principles of criminal law. That speech should be taken seriously when the legal profession begins to interpret Bill C-26, when it becomes part of the Criminal Code, with respect to the provisions on self-defence of the person, defence of property and citizen's arrest.
What is very interesting about both the reforms in Bill C-26 and the speech of the parliamentary secretary is the contrast with the approach of the current Criminal Code provisions. This is partly due to the origin of the current provisions in one of the original versions of the Criminal Code well over a century ago. However, the present Criminal Code provisions are best characterized as a patchwork quilt of relatively detailed provisions that are responding to a range of concrete situations. Partly because of that level of detail, these provisions have for some time been criticized, decried by some as needlessly complex and increasingly confusing, as we have had layer upon layer of judicial interpretation over the years.
The Bill C-26 provisions are, in contrast, a model of simplicity and distillation to the core principles in their essence. I dare say that their formulation owes a lot, although I cannot say this is for sure the case, to the civilian tradition within our multi-juridical heritage, with its preference for unifying principle and generality when we are codifying the core areas of the law.
A passage from the parliamentary secretary's speech speaks to this approach. When the hon. member for Moncton—Riverview—Dieppe spoke to the self-defence provisions in Bill C-26, he stated in part:
If we were to ask ordinary Canadians if they think self-defence is acceptable, they would say that it is acceptable when their physical integrity or that of another person is threatened. I think they would also say that the amount of force used should be reasonable and should be a direct response to the threat.
The reforms proposed in Bill C-26 are centred on those basic elements. Because of the general nature of these ideas, one law based on these fundamental principles should be able to regulate all situations that arise involving defence of the person. We simply do not need different regulations for every set of circumstances. All we need is a single principle that can be applied to all situations.
There is a lot of merit in the conceptual clarity and the focus on unifying principle that is represented by that passage. However, the common lawyer in me does worry a bit if the idea of “a single principle” is seized upon to the exclusion of what he also mentions, which is “all situations”.
General principles only live and breathe and become coherent in the real world where, hopefully, most Canadians live--when they are brought to bear on concrete situations to allow more nuanced rules to emerge gradually. It is for this reason that it is a virtue of the new proposed clause 34 in Bill C-26 on self-defence that it is grounded in a general idea, that of reasonableness of response, but this is also expressed, which is important, as “reasonableness in the circumstances”. That is proposed paragraph 34(1)(c). However, it is all the better that proposed subclause 34(2) then goes on to list nine factors that are relevant to the contextualized approach to the general principle of reasonableness.
The NDP was very concerned that these factors would themselves be principled and at the same time useful for real-world decision-making of ordinary citizens, then of police and prosecutors and, finally, of judges in their exercising of judgment as to whether a self-defence situation has arisen. In particular, an NDP amendment that was accepted modified the chapeau for proposed subclause 34(2) and that amendment is most welcome. It appears before the list of the nine factors and states:
In determining whether the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances, the court shall consider the relevant circumstances of the person, the other parties and the act, including, but not limited to, the following factors....
That sets up well the various factors. This phrasing interacts with factors (e), (f) and (f.1) in the provisions to provide a good basis for the criminal law to be responsive to the very particular challenges of applying self-defence in the context of abusive relationships, which is an area I know many members in the House have some concern about, especially where women have been subjected to patterns of violence and psychological abuse by their male partners. I think it is important to recognize that the parliamentary secretary himself, in his speech on December 1, recognized this when he said:
Another factor is whether there were any pre-existing relationships between the parties, including any history of violence and abuse.
This last factor is particularly important in cases where a battered spouse must defend against an abusive partner. As the Supreme Court has noted in the landmark case of Lavallee, it is sometimes difficult for a jury of citizens to understand how a battered spouse might stay in an abusive relationship or how the person might come to understand the patterns of violence of the person's partner. These cases do not arise often but when they do, sensitivity to these factors is crucial.
Having praised the parliamentary secretary's speech on December 1, I would also like to add that the response speech from the previous justice critic, the member for St. John's East, was also a model of constructive and thoughtful parliamentary engagement. While he expressed general support and appreciation for the intent behind the bill, he also raised questions aimed at ensuring that during the committee process, the overhauled existing provisions of the Criminal Code did not throw the proverbial baby out with the bathwater. In that respect, he said:
We need to examine it [Bill C-26] very carefully. We need to ensure that by making changes, we are not throwing away 100 years of precedent and all the advice that the courts have given. If we are starting off with a blank slate and a whole new law, it may take another 10 or 20 years of case law to understand what that means. Do we really need to go down that road?
I will end by saying that it is really important to understand that there is a conundrum built into law reform. Do judicial interpretation and the perceived understandings of the law go by the wayside when new law is enacted, especially when such detailed provisions are replaced by general provisions in criminal law? It must surely be the case that we, and by “we” I mean citizens and the legal profession, do not reinvent the law of self-defence from a whole cloth. We must engage with what was the living law under the old provisions and forge a new living law under the new ones that is in communication with what went before it.