Craig Scott on Questions Passed as Orders for Returns

With respect to the government’s investigation of potential human rights abuses related to the transfer of Afghan detainees from the custody of Canadian Forces to the government of Afghanistan, especially the National Security Directorate (NDS): (a) do the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister automatically receive either copies of or briefings on the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)’s annual human rights reports on Afghanistan; (b) if so, has this practice of automatically receiving copies or briefings always existed; (c) if not, when did this practice start; (d) once knowledge of human rights abuses within the NDS became known, did the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and/or the Minister of Defence order copies of or briefings on the DFAIT annual human rights report on Afghanistan; (e) if not, does the practice of not reading or being briefed on the DFAIT human rights report on Afghanistan continue to this day; (f) following the April 23, 2007, Globe and Mail article by Graeme Smith on transferred detainees as victims of mistreatment within NDS facilities, did the government seek to verify the alleged experiences of the people interviewed by Smith and, if so, (i) what precise measures were taken, (ii) by whom, (iii) for how long and until when did these measures last; (g) consistent with the book The Savage War by Murray Brewster (page 276), did lawyers representing the government while simultaneously representing military police involved in the Military Police Complaints Commission’s hearings on Afghan detainees “t[ake] their direction from senior levels inside the civil service”, and, if so, (i) did this include one or more officials within the Privy Council Office (PCO), (ii) is this normal practice, (iii) what are the guidelines for how Department of Justice lawyers receive direction from outside the Department of Justice, particularly from PCO officials; (h) in relation to Afghan detainee issues, have government lawyers ever received instructions, directions or representations from staff, at any level, within the Prime Minister’s Office; (i) did Amnesty International suggest to NATO and/or the government that one way to ensure no torture of detainees would occur would be to embed soldiers or military police in Afghan facilities and, if so, (i) was this option considered (ii) why was it not adopted if it was considered; (j) why did the government decide to approach the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) to start monitoring transferred detainees under the December 2005 arrangement, leading to the February 20, 2007 agreement with AIHRC; (k) did the government do an assessment of AIHRC’s capacity to engage in this role and, if so, what were the results of this assessment; (l) with respect to the testimony of David Mulroney before the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan that Canada could not find evidence of former Kandahar Governor Khalid having a detention facility in or next to his compound, exactly what efforts were undertaken to investigate this matter, (i) by what actors, (ii) using what methods, (iii) on how many occasions; (m) did the government of Canada ever receive information from the AIHRC conveying a belief that Khalid operated a private jail and, if so, did the AIHRC also convey a belief that mistreatment of prisoners took place there; (n) for what reasons was the government of Canada unable to verify whether such a jail existed; (o) when the head of the AIHRC, Canada’s partner in monitoring detainees, “estimated publicly... that approximately one-third of the prisoners handed over ended up being tortured” (Brewster, The Savage War, page 67), (i) what was the government’s response to this information, (ii) was this deemed a credible estimate and, if not, why not; (p) after the statement in (n) was made, was it the government’s policy that it was lawful to transfer detainees; (q) did any communications occur within the Canadian Forces or the government about the concerns expressed by military police official Major Kevin Rowcliffe about the torture of detainees and what actions did the government take in response to Major Rowcliffe’s testimony before the Military Police Complaints Commission; and (r) has either DFAIT or PCO ever conducted an analysis or assessment of the NDS and, if so, what was the subject-matter of the analysis or assessment?