Mr. Speaker, I would actually like to begin where I was going to conclude with my speech, after hearing the, frankly, rather arrogant question coming from the parliamentary secretary.
We all know what the government does in committee time after time after time. Any amendment, however well framed, is voted down by the majority. There is almost a zero per cent passage rate of NDP, Liberal or independent members' amendments in committee in this Parliament, so to pretend that the fact of the writing of a few amendments by the opposition in this process would have made an iota of difference is the height of arrogance.
I would also like the House to know that in this context, most of the opposition witnesses were in the last two days, the majority on the last day. The majority on the committee voted to make sure that the amendments from the opposition came in three and a half hours after the session. Can we imagine, in the context of a complex bill like this, putting together well-crafted amendments when put up against an artificial deadline like that? This is the behaviour of the government in that committee. Committees do not function in any kind of straightforward or good-faith legislative manner.
I would like to address how far Bill C-42 diverges from and does not respect the recommendations from Justice O'Connor and the Arar commission for a proper review mechanism for the RCMP. Most of the other interventions have talked about other areas of the bill and other issues, but I would like to talk about how the bill does take a small step in the direction of the Arar commission recommendations, but ultimately stops far short. This is consistent with how the government has truly resisted appropriate oversight mechanisms for any body that deals with policing or security matters.
For example, in another bill that is before the House now, Bill S-7, Combating Terrorism Act, Conservatives have stoutly resisted any form of serious oversight or monitoring. In my speech on that bill, I will go into some detail on that. In each case, the NDP has proposed more than a dozen carefully considered amendments that would help make good on the Arar commission's exhaustive second report on a review mechanism, yet every one was voted down or ruled out of order.
This is consistent with the general approach of the government to the Arar commission. I had the fortune to be in the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security when the Minister of Public Safety appeared to defend the report called “Building Resilience against Terrorism”, and I asked him what the government's intention is with respect to the recommendations on a review mechanism coming out of the Arar commission report. It was absolutely clear from his response that the government has no interest in that report or using it as any kind of a reference point, baseline or road map. Bill C-42 has made that completely clear.
I will proceed as follows. I will provide a short overview of what the Arar commission did recommend by way of review mechanisms, and then I will look at how Bill C-42 on at least four points does not take those recommendations at all seriously.
The report I am referring to from the Arar commission is called “A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities”. Before proposing the exact mechanisms, Justice O'Connor, who is of the Ontario court of appeal, outlined reasons for the inadequacy of existing accountability and review mechanisms for the RCMP's national security activity. In general, he pointed out that there has been an evolution and a deepening of the RCMP national security role, despite the fact that CSIS itself was peeled off from the RCMP at some point. Obviously in the post-2001 climate, we know that to be true and why that is true. He emphasized three elements.
First of all, there has been enhanced and deepened information-sharing with other countries and among federal, provincial and municipal agencies, and increased integration and national security policing. We know that information-sharing was at the heart of what happened to Mr. Arar.
Second, he talked about comparative and other Canadian experience with both policing and security intelligence review that led him to conclude that there was the “inability of a complaint-based approach to provide a firm foundation for ensuring that the often secret national security activities respect the law and rights and freedoms”.
Third, he said that the existing Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP has encountered “difficulties in obtaining access to information from the RCMP”. We will see that this is the understatement of the century when we look at some of the testimony.
For the information of the parliamentary secretary, I did read the blues and I did consider the testimony of various witnesses, including Mr. Kennedy, the former head of the CPC, whose testimony is irrefutable. The government did everything it could in committee to try to underplay and deflect the impact of that testimony.
Justice O'Connor recommended a number of features that the new review mechanism would have.
First, it must be authorized to conduct self-initiated reviews in the same way and to the same extent as SIRC, the Security Intelligence Review Committee that oversees CSIS. He talked about the need for these reviews not just at the time when activities were deepening, but in the context in which national security activities by definition were conducted in secret and received little by way of judicial scrutiny or other independent scrutiny. He emphasized how a self-initiated review had to be linked to the criterion of independence from the RCMP and the government in the right of access to information and to initiate those reviews.
The second feature that he felt would be important was that the body had to have investigative powers similar to those that public bodies had under the Inquiries Act. He emphasized a few things. Some of them are in the bill, such as the right to subpoena documents and compel testimony. Also, the review body has to have the right to decide what information is necessary and not have barriers put in front of it in making that decision or accessing the information.
Third, he stated:
—the review mechanism must not be hampered by jurisdictional boundaries. It must be able to follow the trail wherever it leads, to ensure full and effective investigation or review of the RCMP's national security activities.
With those principles in mind he went on to recommend a new independent complaints and national security review agency for the RCMP that would replace the CPC and would also take on the role he recommended for overseeing the Canadian Border Services Agency, the CBSA.
He went on to talk about the need for coordination across the various bodies, this new body he recommended, the existing SIRC, Security Intelligence Review Committee, and the commissioner for the CSE, the Commissioner for the Canadian Security Establishment, who also has broader and wider powers than what is found recommended in Bill C-42.
What is in Bill C-42 that falls far short of these recommendations?
The first major problem is that Bill C-42 does not give the new review body uninhibited access to information that the body deems necessary and relevant. In committee the Conservatives tried to avoid acknowledging that the bill would give the power to the RCMP commissioner to prevent examination and review of a broad range of privileged information. From lots of experience, we know how various bodies, including the RCMP, have abused the claim of privilege.
Mr. Kennedy, the former head of the CPC, noted in testimony before the committee, the findings of former Supreme Court Judge John Major in the Air India inquiry, who experienced first-hand the abuse of privilege by the RCMP.
Mr. Kennedy stated:
—with reference to the privilege. Justice Major, whom I talked to, was scathing in terms of his comments that the RCMP over-claimed privilege, concealed information from him, and in some case a witness who wanted to testify, they claimed they needed the information for investigative purposes which wasn't true.
The second major problem is that the RCMP commissioner can force the chair of the new recommended body, the CRCC, to suspend an investigation by means of a simple request in a letter on the grounds that it would compromise an ongoing investigation. Mr. Kennedy commented how this completely gutted the credibility of this body in the eyes of the public. It completely undermines any sense of independence of the body.
The third major problem is that the bill is largely void of timeframes within which the RCMP must respond to requests and findings of this new review body. As Mr. Kennedy said:
Inordinate and unjustifiable delay was the hallmark of the RCMP during the four-plus years that I was chair of the Commission for Public Complaints...
There was one fourth major problem, but perhaps a question will elicit that.