With regard to the policies and practices concerning treatment of persons under the control of Canadian forces in Afghanistan in any part of the period from September 12, 2001, to present: (a) were each of Canada’s Defence Intelligence, Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, and the Canadian Security Establishment amongst the intelligence agencies based at Kandahar Air Field (KAF) base; (b) what other intelligence agencies, Canadian or non-Canadian, were based at KAF or operated out of KAF without being based there; (c) is the government aware of a military facility in Kandahar commonly known as Graceland and, if so, what sort of facility was, or is, it, and what institutional actors operated, or operate, from this facility; (d) is the government aware of a military facility in Kandahar commonly known as Gecko and, if so, what sort of facility was, or is, it, and what institutional actors operated, or operate, from this facility; (e) how do, or did, the facilities and the institutional actors operating from Gecko and Graceland (i) relate to each other, (ii) interact; (f) on what date did Canadian special forces, including JTF2, first arrive in Afghanistan and, if they have left, on what date did they leave Afghanistan; (g) if Canadian special forces, including JTF2, are currently in Afghanistan, whether as units or as individual personnel, in what capacity are they in Afghanistan; (h) has Canada ever transferred persons under its control to Afghan authorities with the knowledge that some of those persons would or could end up being held in the facilities of National Directorate of Security (NDS) Kabul; (i) does the government know of cases of persons under initial Canadian control who ended up being held in the facilities of NDS Kabul, whether under the control of NDS or whether under the control of one or more other Afghan or non-Afghan intelligence agencies and, if so, (i) how many, (ii) which other intelligence agency or agencies; (j) did Canada ever seek to trace persons who had been either detained by or otherwise under the control of Canadian special forces, including JTF2, and who Canada knew or suspected had ended up at NDS Kabul facilities and, if so, (i) for what reasons was tracing undertaken, (ii) how many persons did Canada seek to trace, (iii) what were the results of the efforts in terms of the number of persons who were located versus determining that persons were not traceable; (k) is the government familiar with the term, whether formal or informal, of “amplifying orders” being used in the Canadian military context, and, if so, what does this mean; (l) in the period in question (2001 to present), did General Rick Hillier ever issue “amplifying orders” that related, directly or indirectly, to the policy or practice of handing over persons under Canada’s control in Afghanistan to agents of another state, whether Afghan or non-Afghan and, if so, for each set of amplifying orders, (i) what were the dates of the orders, (ii) what previous orders, rules of engagement or other documents were being amplified, (iii) what was the content of the amplifying orders; (m) in relation to the May 25, 2006, capture of “11 suspected Taliban fighters” referenced at page 96 of Ian Hope, Dancing with the Dushman: Command Imperatives for the Counter-Insurgency Fight in Afghanistan (Canadian Defence Agency Press, 2008), could the government set out the manner in which each of these 11 persons controlled by Canadian forces were processed, including what is known about each’s subsequent trajectory after passing from the control of Canada until the point at which the government may have lost track of their whereabouts; (n) at any period and, if so, which periods, did the Canadian government consider that there were one or more categories of persons who Canada passed on to either Afghan or American authorities but who were not categorized as detainees, and did such categories have a designation, whether formal or informal; (o) were there persons under the control of Canadian forces who were transferred to Afghanistan, but who were not treated by Canada as covered by the provisions of the 2005 and 2007 Canada-Afghanistan Memorandums of Understanding on detainee transfer and, if so, on what basis were transfers of such persons not deemed covered by the agreements; (p) were there persons under the control of Canadian forces who were transferred to Afghanistan but whose existence and transfer was not made known to the International Committee of the Red Cross and, if so, on what basis was the Red Cross not informed; (q) during the 2011 Parliamentary process in which a Panel of Arbiters decided what information could be released to Parliament, were documents withheld from this process by the government if they concerned the transfer of persons that were not treated by Canada as covered by the provisions of the 2005 and 2007 Canada-Afghanistan Memorandums of Understanding on detainee transfer; (r) between September 12, 2001, and the entry into effect of the 2005 detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding, (i) how many detainees were transferred to US authorities, (ii) to which US authorities, (iii) how many detainees were transferred to Afghan authorities, (iv) to which Afghan authorities, (v) how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, were transferred to US authorities, (vi) to which US authorities, (vii) how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, were transferred to Afghan authorities, (viii) to which Afghan authorities; (s) between the entry into effect of the 2005 detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding and the entry into effect of the 2007 detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding, (i) how many detainees were transferred to US authorities, (ii) to which US authorities, (iii) how many detainees were transferred to Afghan authorities, (iv) to which Afghan authorities, (v) how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, were transferred to US authorities, (vi) to which US authorities, (vii) how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, were transferred to Afghan authorities, (viii) to which Afghan authorities; (t) between the entry into effect of the 2007 detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding and the present date, (i) how many detainees were transferred to US authorities, (ii) to which US authorities, (iii) how many detainees were transferred to Afghan authorities, (iv) to which Afghan authorities, (v) how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, were transferred to US authorities, (vi) to which US authorities, (vii) how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, were transferred to Afghan authorities, (viii) to which Afghan authorities; (u) before General Rick Hillier signed the 2005 detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding with Afghan Defence Minister Wardak, did General Hillier call or attempt to call the Canadian Defence Minister Graham from Afghanistan, in order to seek Graham’s authorization for Hillier to sign; (v) at the time of the signing of the 2005 detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding between Afghan Defence Minister Wardak and Canadian General Hillier, was the Ambassador of Canada to Afghanistan in the room when the document was signed and thus an eyewitness to each man signing the document; (w) have Canadian special forces, whether JTF2 or other, ever participated in operations designed to obtain control over or custody of persons in Afghanistan as a result of information, instructions or orders originating from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or another US intelligence agency and, if so, in what periods and resulting in how many captures; (x) if not, have Canadian special forces participated alongside or in coordination with United States special forces for such capture operations in Afghanistan where it is known or reasonably assumed by Canada that the US special forces are acting on information, instructions or orders originating from the CIA or another US intelligence agency; (y) have there ever been and are there now Canadian military special forces in Pakistan; (z) have Canadian special forces, whether JTF2 or other, ever participated in operations designed to obtain control over or custody of persons in Pakistan as a result of information, instructions or orders originating from the CIA or another US intelligence agency and, if so, in what periods and resulting in how many captures; (aa) if not, have Canadian special forces participated alongside or in coordination with US special forces for such capture operations in Pakistan where it is known or reasonably assumed by Canada that the US special forces are acting on information, instructions or orders originating from the CIA or another US intelligence agency?
