Mr. Speaker, one of the things we have not touched in the debates is how investor-state agreements operate to create regulatory chill. I will give my friend, the member for Essex, a chance to think about this.
I have seen what happens first-hand under chapter 11 of NAFTA. Under Prime Minister Chrétien, the government avoided the decision of the arbitration panel by making, and we cannot call it out of court because it is not a real court, a settlement provision. It took the money that was paid to Ethyl Corporation, a manufacturer of leaded gasoline and this toxic replacement of manganese-based gasoline, as I recall it was $12 million at the time, out of the A-based budget of Environment Canada, just to add extra punishment to the regulators who thought it was important to protect the environment.
For many years, and I think to this day, the effect of that was regulators were afraid to take action against toxic chemicals. Action that was being promoted at one point by Health Canada to get rid of carcinogenic chemicals used in people's backyards for the purpose of having a nicer looking lawn was blocked when the trade minister contacted the health minister to say that everybody could be sued by U.S.-based chemical manufacturers over the loss of profits, even if it was in the interest of Canadian public health.
That is called “regulatory chill”. No one sees it, we cannot document it, but yet another investor-state agreement will increase the number of times Canadian regulators do not act because they are worried about being sued.