Mr. Speaker, trade between Canada and Europe is already free. There are very few tariffs between Canada and the members of the European Union, which raises the question of why we need a comprehensive economic and trade agreement. However, if we are to evaluate this agreement as a trade deal, a logical starting point is to examine the current pattern of trade between Canada and the European Union.
In 2015, Canada exported $38 billion of merchandise to the European Union and imported $61 billion of merchandise from the EU. This imbalance meant a trade deficit of $23 billion.
An implication of this is that if CETA functioned as advertised and boosted bilateral trade flows, it would increase our trade deficit with the European Union. For example, a 10% increase in bilateral trade would boost exports by $4 billion and imports by $6 billion. That would raise our trade deficit with the EU by $2 billion, which is a subtraction from Canadian output and employment.
The economic models that were used to argue for CETA simply assumed balanced trade and full employment, but of course we know those assumptions are not realistic in the real world. Furthermore, these models take no account of Brexit. The United Kingdom has voted to leave the European Union, which is of course very consequential for CETA. The United Kingdom is the only major European economy with whom Canada is running a trade surplus.
In 2015, Canada exported $16 billion of merchandise to Britain and imported $9 billion. If we looked at the remaining European Union countries, Canada exported only $22 billion of merchandise and imported $52 billion. In other words, Canada imported more than twice as much as we exported to the European Union, excluding the United Kingdom, and that means a trade deficit of $30 billion with what remains of the EU.
In that scenario, a 10% increase in bilateral trade would boost our exports by just $2 billion and would increase our imports by $5 billion. That would raise Canada's trade deficit with what remains of the European Union by $3 billion, an even larger subtraction from Canadian output and employment.
When we look at the actual trade flows between Canada and the EU, particularly the EU excluding the United Kingdom, there is very little reason to believe that CETA could increase Canadian output and employment; but even if it did, CETA also makes it easier for European companies to bring in temporary foreign workers. Even if there were some increase in employment in Canada, there is absolutely no guarantee that it would go to Canadian workers.
Beyond trade, I think it is important to recognize that CETA has many other provisions that have nothing to do with free trade. As other New Democrats have mentioned in this debate, CETA would increase the duration of pharmaceutical patents. That is the opposite of trade liberalization. It is a restriction that would make it harder for generic drug manufacturers and harder to have competition in pharmaceuticals and it would boost the price of those medications for consumers.
Another aspect of CETA that is very controversial and has very little to do with trade is the investor-state dispute provisions. These provisions have been watered down somewhat to try to make CETA more palatable to Wallonia and other areas of Europe that were concerned, but nevertheless there still are investor-state provisions, and CETA for the first time extends these to the municipal level of government.
The question I would ask is, why do we need these provisions at all in CETA? The origin of investor-state provisions was in NAFTA where Canadian and American investors may have had doubts about the Mexican judicial system. However, clearly Canada has a well-functioning court system. Clearly, Europe has a trustworthy judicial system. Why is it even necessary to set up a special tribunal process that is only accessible to foreign investors? Why can Canadians not use the European court system, and why can European investors not use the Canadian court system? We really have not heard an answer to this question from the government side.
It is worth reviewing some of the outrageous cases that have been brought against Canada under the investor-state provisions of NAFTA. If we go back to the 1990s, there was the Ethyl case, in which Canada tried to ban a gasoline additive, MMT, that was already banned in the United States. However, the American producer of it sued Canada under NAFTA, and the Canadian government not only lifted the ban, but also paid $13 million U.S. in compensation.
More recently, we had the AbitibiBowater case, where AbitibiBowater, a Canadian pulp and paper company, shut down its last remaining mill in the province of Newfoundland and Labrador. The provincial government reclaimed water rights that it had given to AbitibiBowater to operate those mills. The company, which had registered itself in the United States, was able to present itself as an American investor and sued Canada under NAFTA for the loss of these water rights that it was no longer even using. What happened? The Canadian government paid AbitibiBowater $130 million in compensation.
To talk about an even more recent case, Lone Pine Resources is an Alberta-based oil and gas company that registered itself in Delaware and then used NAFTA to sue Canada because of Quebec's ban on fracking. Lone Pine Resources is claiming $250 million in compensation.
What we see in all of these cases is that companies are abusing the investor-state provisions of NAFTA to directly challenge democratic laws, regulations, and public policies that arguably interfere with their potential future profits. Given the bad experience we have had with the investor-state provisions of NAFTA, it is totally unclear why Canada is pushing to include these provisions in CETA. Again, it is not just a matter of re-including in CETA what is already in NAFTA. CETA actually goes farther, in the sense that it imposes this regime on municipalities, something that NAFTA and previous trade deals did not do. There is a real objection to the investor-state provisions in CETA, notwithstanding the government's efforts to water them down somewhat.
In conclusion, there is no case for CETA as a trade deal, if we look at the actual trade flows between Canada and what is left of the European Union after Brexit. Furthermore, there are many negative non-trade aspects of CETA, such as more temporary foreign workers, longer pharmaceutical patents, and more of these outrageous investor-state disputes. For all of these reasons, the NDP is opposing Bill C-30.