Mr. Speaker, I thank you for giving me the opportunity to share my thoughts on Bill C-14.
I had the privilege of sitting on the Special Joint Committee on Physician-Assisted Dying. Along with the members of the committee, made up of 11 of our colleagues and five senators, I believe I can say that I was right in the thick of things, when it came to testimonies and opinions from the various stakeholder groups, experts, and everyday citizens.
The debate on medical assistance in dying is an emotional one. That is because it deals with the last of the taboos of any society, namely to plan one's own death and, in a way, to get help organizing it.
Whether you are religious, secular, atheist, philosophically liberal, or ideologically conservative, every opinion on medical assistance in dying matters. In the wake of the Carter decision, the diverging opinions and our deepest moral values now seem to torment us. Either side of the argument on medical assistance in dying is a source both for concern and for hope. This issue leaves no one indifferent, but above all stirs the most sincere and honest emotions.
That is where we run the risk of losing sight of the purpose of the debate. In fact, medical assistance in dying, regardless of our personal values, is not something that any of us must impose on or deny anyone else. I urge all my colleagues to keep in mind that medical assistance in dying is now an individual right recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada, a right that is no one's business but the individual's and, at the same time, a right that does not force anyone to compromise their deepest individual moral convictions.
Morality, taboos, planned death and the emotions this stirs must not cloud the rationale of the Carter decision. If we eliminate our individual morality from the analysis of the Carter decision, then it is rather simple.
First of all, two sections of the Criminal Code are affected, namely section 14 and paragraph 241(b). These provisions prohibit a person from counselling or aiding another person to commit suicide.
Second, as a result of these Criminal Code provisions, a person suffering from a grievous and irremediable illness could prematurely end their life, knowing that no one could help them die when they are no longer able to commit suicide because of the progression of the illness. In short, the prohibition in the Criminal Code provisions I mentioned could lead a person with an irremediable illness to take their own life early, even though they are still enjoying a certain quality of life, because they foresee that they will no longer be able to do so themselves at a later date.
Third, section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms states that everyone has the right to life. In Carter, the Supreme Court cited this principle in stating that a person suffering from a terminal illness cannot be deprived of this right. In other words, medical assistance in dying will maximize the time the person has left to live. That is the objective of Bill C-14, which amends the Criminal Code of Canada in order to allow medical assistance in dying.
In its wisdom and with a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of Canada is showing us the way so that we can amend section 14 and paragraph 241(b) of the Criminal Code, which currently violate the right to life, liberty and security of the person guaranteed by section 7 of our charter.
The principles in Carter that must guide us in developing Bill C-14 are found in paragraph 127 of the decision, a paragraph that I invite my colleagues to read carefully because it will require our attention when we debate this matter.
The Supreme Court of Canada stated:
[These sections] are void insofar as they prohibit physician-assisted death for a competent adult person who (1) clearly consents to the termination of life; and (2) has a grievous and irremediable medical condition (including an illness, disease or disability) that causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the circumstances of his or her condition.
Also in paragraph 127, the Supreme Court of Canada stated:
The scope of this declaration is intended to respond to the factual circumstances in this case. We make no pronouncement on other situations where physician-assisted dying may be sought.
I will support this bill at second reading, but I must confess that I hope the committee can re-examine the bill and try to fine-tune it, because I have some concerns.
For example, this bill may suggest a rather restrictive approach with respect to Carter, especially since the bill contains words that are not in this decision. For example, subsection 241.2(2) states: “A person...[has] a serious and incurable illness, disease or disability”. The word “incurable” never appears in the Carter decision, and that may seem a bit too restrictive.
The bill also refers to an “advanced state of irreversible decline in capability”. The words “advanced” and “decline” do not appear in the Carter decision and could be interpreted as rather restrictive language.
Another one of my concerns has to do with the fact that, right now, this bill seems to disregard any advance requests for medical assistance in dying. Since the Carter decision suggests that there may be other requests in other exceptional circumstances, I believe that it is quite likely that people with a grievous and irremediable medical condition may also experience a deterioration of their cognitive and intellectual faculties.
I think that perhaps the committee should re-examine the possibility of an advance request so that someone with Alzheimer's or brain cancer, for example, is not prevented from giving informed consent to medical assistance in dying the second time because of the deterioration of his or her mental and cognitive abilities.
On page 6 of the bill, in paragraph 241.2(3)(h), it reads:
immediately before providing the medical assistance in dying, give the person an opportunity to withdraw their request and ensure that the person gives express consent to receive medical assistance in dying.
It seems that this paragraph is rather strict, given that people who are terminally ill could lose consciousness or that their intellectual faculties could be impaired because they are being heavily medicated. They therefore might not be able to consent to the medical assistance in dying the second time.
Those are some of my thoughts on the bill. I hope that the committee responsible for studying it will reflect on these comments.