Debates of March 20th, 2017

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act

[Ali Ehsassi, Liberal, Willowdale, ON]

Mr. Speaker, there were many consultations that went on. On top of that, we have parliamentary groups that looked into this issue. As I highlighted during my portion of the speech, there were many recommendations that were adopted and are very much reflected in the legislation that stands before the House. Many things were considered and many changes were made to the legislation.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, with the passage of this legislation, we know that Canada would be the fifth country of the Five Eyes that will finally have a parliamentary oversight committee, something that has already been put in place in New Zealand, Australia, England, and the United States. It is something that will help and assist in protecting Canadians' rights and freedoms, which is very important. I am wondering if the member could provide his thoughts in regard to the historic significance of passing this legislation.

[Ali Ehsassi, Liberal, Willowdale, ON]

Mr. Speaker, as I noted in my speech, there was a gaping hole, and it was incumbent upon our government to act on its platform and also to scrutinize regimes that were in place among our five allies. In doing so, we have come up with legislation which very wisely enhances our national security, provides a role for Parliament, and ensures that we are not unduly infringing civil liberties.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague very much for his presentation.

I also thank my colleague, the hon. member for Parry Sound—Muskoka, the official opposition critic for public safety, for his outstanding work on this very important issue.

I was prepared to speak to Bill C-22 in a perfectly normal debate in keeping with the standard procedures of the House. Unfortunately, today, we have all once again witnessed, as we have on a number of occasions, the government's willingness to shorten debate so that all those who have things to say on Bill C-22 cannot do so.

This is surprising in the case of a bill sponsored by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. The minister has previously had a very different view of the contribution of parliamentarians here in the House, if we go by a short article from 2013 on the website of the minister, who was then a member of Parliament. I will quote two short excerpts in English; it will be easier.

The piece is entitled Ideas For Making Our Democracy Stronger, and the paragraph that caught my attention reads as follows:

Ministers wanting to advance policy initiatives should be required to convince not only cabinet colleagues, but also backbenchers. They should not simply rely on the Whip to enforce support–they should earn it by merit.

However, what we are seeing today is quite the opposite. Not only is the whip being used, but so is the Leader of the Government in the House to move Bill C-22 quickly through all stages in the House.

In the same piece, when the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness was a member of Parliament, he says:

Restrictions are needed on the use of ancient but recently-abused Parliamentary tools such as Omnibus Bills, Closure Motions to terminate debates, and Prorogation. They have their place, but should be confined to their original purpose and intent.

Once again, what we are seeing today is completely the opposite. Those are the very words of the minister who is sponsoring Bill C-22.

Bill C-22 was introduced in the House of Commons last June 16, in order to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. Let us recall that the establishment of a parliamentary oversight committee was a promise made by the Liberals. Clearly, it is important to make sure that our national security bodies are properly examined. We must absolutely ensure that this committee has the tools it needs to do its work.

However, we know that the Prime Minister has already appointed a member of his caucus, the member for Ottawa South, as chair of that committee, even though the legislation has not yet passed. A gag was used today. A committee chair was appointed. There is no legislation in place, but we already know the name of the chair of a committee that does not exist.

The government is breaking a well-established tradition of our parliamentary system by imposing a chair the way it did. Committee chairs have always been elected by the committees themselves, not imposed by the Prime Minister's Office. The Liberals promised Canadians during the election campaign that they would form a committee of parliamentarians on national security. They said, promised and repeated that this committee would be non-partisan. Bill C-22 does not create a committee of parliamentarians. It is not neutral nor is it non-partisan. It is controlled by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.

We have to realize that the Liberal government is much better at making speeches and symbolic gestures than it is at taking real action. However, in finest federal Liberal tradition, they promise one thing in a campaign and do the opposite once ensconced on the government benches. This is called being partisan. It reeks of partisanship.

Bill C-22 imposes many barriers on the committee's ability to access information or call witnesses. This, also, is unlike similar committees that operate effectively in allied countries, such as the United Kingdom. The official opposition presented motions to amend Bill C-22 to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security in December.

On the issue of a non-partisan committee, we would expect some of the opposition's recommendations to be accepted, but all of the official opposition's proposed amendments were rejected. We only wanted to ensure that the composition of the committee is not partisan and that its chair and its members are not appointed by the Prime Minister.

Clearly, as we now know, that recommendation was not accepted. The committee should be established by Parliament and be accountable to Parliament, not just to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Public Safety. However, the Liberal government is not listening.

We also wanted to remove the many blocking mechanisms in Bill C-22 that limit the committee's access to information and power to call witnesses. Once again, the Liberal government has said no. We wanted to ensure the committee's annual reporting process to Parliament will be more transparent. The Liberal government has decided otherwise. This is what sunny ways look like. This government is becoming a master in the art breaking promises.

The Liberals promised a modest deficit. If we were to give them a report card today, they would get a failing grade. The same goes for electoral reform. The Minister of Public Safety even talks about this in the fascinating piece I just read from. I quoted a few passages, but I will refrain from quoting it any further. I will have other opportunities to do so. The issue of electoral reform was a monumental failure, even though the Liberals spent hundreds of thousands of dollars consulting Canadians. They ignored the results of those consultations. They simply went ahead and did what they wanted anyway.

There is no denying that the Prime Minister's sunny ways have also failed when it comes to transparency and accountability. If I were a teacher, I would be forced to write “fail” in big red letters on this government's report card.

On September 30, 2016, which was not so long ago, the Liberal member for Willowdale stated the following in this House:

In keeping with our government's commitment to evidence-based decision-making, Bill C-22 notably aligns Canada's security regime with accepted international best practices. As colleagues before me have highlighted, Canada is currently the only member of the Five Eyes alliance lacking a security oversight committee that grants sitting legislators access to confidential national security information.

Many of my colleagues have demonstrated in the House that the government has failed to do this. It has not kept its promise to align this committee with the best practices of our allies, including Great Britain. Will the member for Willowdale vote against the wishes of the Prime Minister's Office and honour the promise he solemnly made to his own constituents?

On September 28, 2016, the member for Montarville, who is now on the back benches but was then parliamentary secretary to the Minister of Public Safety, said the following in the House:

The bill before us would establish a committee with nine members. Seven of the committee members would be drawn from the House of Commons, and of these seven, only four can be government members. Two members would be drawn from the other place. This committee will be different from other committees and offices established to review security and intelligence matters.

A little further on in his speech, which was probably prepared by officials from the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and edited by the Prime Minister's Office, he added:

Robust powers are given to this committee, its members, and its secretariat. The committee will be able to access any information it needs to conduct its reviews, subject to some specific and reasonable limits.

The powers conferred upon the executive, meaning the ministers of the Liberal government, are huge. For instance, subclause 8(2) of the bill states:

If the appropriate Minister determines that a review would be injurious to national security, he or she must inform the Committee of his or her determination and the reasons for it.

In language that everyone can understand, that means that a minister can decide what the committee will study. I am not sure that that is what voters voted for on October 19, 2015.

In conclusion, I invite my Liberal colleagues and all members to assert their independence with respect to the Prime Minister's cabinet and his staff. They already did so in the not too distant past when voting on Bill S-201. I believe that the members opposite are capable of doing it again if they can muster the courage.

I invite them to vote against Bill C-22 and not to renege on the promise they made to their respective constituents in the last election campaign.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, this is one piece of legislation where the Conservative Party has clearly demonstrated that once again it is out of touch with reality or, more important, it is out of touch with Canadians.

I have listened to the debate. We have had ministers, parliamentary secretaries to those ministers, the critics of both the NDP and the official opposition, and the leader of the Green Party engage in this debate. There has been opportunity for well over 100 people to get engaged in this debate to date. In fact, 40-plus members have had speeches of 10 minutes or more on the issue.

The Conservatives have made it very clear. Contrary to what Canadians want, they do not support parliamentary oversight. They are voting against the legislation, which is no surprise. When they brought in Bill C-51, they refused to bring in parliamentary oversight. Now, in opposition, they are asking why the Prime Minister has this kind of control.

I would ask the member this. First, could he explain for Canadians why the Conservatives do not support a parliamentary oversight committee? Second, why do they not recognize that this is one of the most robust pieces of legislation of the Five Eyes countries to ensure a strong independence for a parliamentary oversight committee? For example, when we compare New Zealand, the prime minister is the chair of the committee, and there are many other examples I could give.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Mr. Speaker, the only good thing about time allocation is that the parliamentary secretary's speeches will be shorter.

Honestly, we are not against parliamentary oversight. However, that is not what Bill C-22 provides. In fact, the bill provides for oversight by the Prime Minister's Office, and we find that deplorable. That is not what the Liberals promised during the election campaign.

The Liberals promised that a committee accountable to Parliament would provide oversight, and not a committee supervised by the person appointed by the Prime Minister and the PMO.

[Scott Duvall, NDP, Hamilton Mountain, ON]

Mr. Speaker, my colleague has pointed out many of the concerns that we on the NDP side have, and I thank him for that. However clause 8 of the bill states that a cabinet minister can halt an investigation into his or her own department for security reasons. However, it offers no way to test whether this fact is merely covering up a sloppy management or even a scandal. In the member's view, is this adequate to ensure Canadians get all the facts with respect to the government's handling of security?

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for the question.

That is in fact one of our concerns. If a minister can decide what will or will not be reviewed at a committee responsible for oversight of the minister's actions, then we have a real problem. That was not what Canadians expected when they were promised that a committee made up of parliamentarians would oversee operations.

[Earl Dreeshen, Conservative, Red Deer—Mountain View, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I believe it was the Prime Minister's father who said that MPs were nobodies 50 yards from the House of Commons. This is an opportunity for us to perhaps reflect on what we will be in the House of Commons if we only take our instructions from the Prime Minister's Office.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Mr. Speaker, we might draw a parallel with the Liberal Party nomination process during the election. When the Prime Minister goes against his own riding associations, if he does that kind of thing within his own family, imagine what he could do in the House of Commons, which is made up of opposition parties that do not think the way he does.

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Mr. Speaker, it gives me great pleasure to rise to speak to this bill.

There are few responsibilities more important to government than ensuring the safety of the Canadian population while at the same time ensuring the protection of its rights as enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This became a dominant theme in the last campaign, and we said that these two issues are not mutually exclusive. They are not things that are traded off against each other. They are things that must be considered equally and simultaneously, and both must be done with full force and effect.

What we see in Bill C-22 is the beginning of an effort to finally address some major problems we have within our security and intelligence framework, the biggest one being oversight.

I go back to my time on the other side of the aisle as critic for public safety and national security, and harken back to the reports of Justice Iacobucci and Justice O'Connor and the imperative nature of oversight in ensuring that our security and intelligence agencies are operating effectively and within the proper bounds of Canadian law. Unfortunately, over the last decade, despite many recommendations from parliamentary committees, these recommendations languished and were not acted upon, which meant that these key provisions were not put into effect.

Why is that required? Let us look at the fact that right now the oversight for our security and intelligence, if it exists, exists in silos. For example, the RCMP public complaints commission looks at the RCMP but is not able to follow evidence as it pertains to or deals with other agencies. CSIS has SIRC. To take the other extreme, the Canada Border Services Agency has no form of oversight.

Right now, the parliamentary committee, in an all-party way, is very effectively looking at our national security framework. A piece of the answer that we have seen in other jurisdictions and that has been talked about in many of the recommendations I spoke to earlier is the need to have a parliamentary committee made up of members of the House that would be able to follow information no matter where it goes. There may be a single incident involving intelligence that moves from the RCMP to the Canada Border Services Agency and that is also involved with immigration and many other agencies.

This new committee would have the power to look into all corners of security and intelligence. From the government's perspective, it was incredibly important to bring it in early and set it up. I am very encouraged that the bill is before the House, and I am anxious for this new committee to get to work.

Even before the committee saw this, experts rang in on the efficacy of what was proposed. Of course, we improved it, but it is a good idea to take a look at what some experts were saying about the state of the bill in its improvement, the leap forward that we made even prior to the amendments made at committee stage.

Craig Forcese, a professor of law at the University of Ottawa and a renowned expert in this area, said, “this will be a stronger body than the U.K. and Australian equivalents, and a dramatic change for Canadian national-security accountability”. He went on to call it “a good bill” and gave it “a high pass”.

His colleague Wesley Wark said, “I fully support Bill C-22”. He noted some improvements, but he basically issued a warning not to let perfect be the enemy of the good.

The Canadian Civil Liberties Association supported the bill, saying, “This new accountability mechanism is crucial”.

In the media, there were many positive comments. The Toronto Star said that this is “an important first step toward accountability” and that it “would provide an essential check” on the security establishment. That was before the committee made its recommendations.

In the Commonwealth, we have gone much further. This is particularly noteworthy given the fact that the testimony the committee heard from the United Kingdom, for example, was to go slowly at the beginning because the committee, as it establishes itself and its work, needs to earn the trust of both the Canadian public and the institutions it is reviewing.

Notwithstanding that, we thought we would start aggressively, start ahead of everyone else in the Commonwealth, because we recognize, particularly with the dearth of action over the last decade, that there is an imperative nature to get these oversight mechanisms that had been ignored in place.

In the course of testimony, the committee did what it should do. It reviewed the material, heard from expert witnesses, and made a number of recommendations. The government was happy to get behind and support a number of those recommendations which are reflected in the bill that is before the House today. I will run through some of those quickly.

There is a whistle-blower clause requiring the committee to alert the appropriate minister and Attorney General if it uncovers something that may be illegal. There is a requirement that the annual report indicate where redactions have been made and why. The chair only votes to break ties; in other words, the chair does not have a double vote. It limits a minister's authority to determine that an examination would be injurious to national security and therefore outside the committee's mandate to ongoing operations, and requires the minister to alert the committee when the operation is no longer ongoing or when examining it would no longer pose a national security problem. Finally, it allows the committee access to information about ongoing defence intelligence activities in support of military operations, privileged information under the Investment Canada Act, and information collected by FINTRAC. That is all in the amendment to clause 14.

It can be seen that a great number of recommendations that were made by the committee were accepted by the government and are reflected in the bill. I think they are important improvements. They certainly go well beyond the standard that we see in any other Commonwealth country. I will come to an examination of those in a minute, but let us take a look quickly at some of the clauses that were rejected.

Reinserting in clause 14 giving information about human intelligence sources and witness protection was rejected, and I think for very sensible grounds. If somebody is in a witness protection program, as an example, we do not want to be sharing that name any more than is absolutely necessary. Even for the agencies that are sharing that information, not everybody in those agencies has access to it. We want to limit how much those names go out. That just makes prudent and good sense.

There is also restriction around information on ongoing law enforcement investigations. This is to avoid perceptions of political interference in an ongoing criminal investigation. This does not mean after the investigation that they cannot look into what has transpired to ensure that everything was as it should be, but when that matter is ongoing and current, certainly there is cause for concern around whether or not that would constitute interference and whether or not police would have to divert resources, to pull it off a case in order to work with the committee, so retrospectively instead of while it is ongoing.

Briefly I want to talk about some of the differences, because they are important, about Canada and some of our Commonwealth comparators. If we look at Britain, for example, in order to look beyond MI6, MI5, or GCHC, a memorandum of understanding is actually required between the committee and the Prime Minister. In Australia there is a limit strictly to statutory reviews of legislation and administration and expenses of particular agencies. It would actually be a parliamentary resolution or a ministerial referral to look at any other issue. It would require that level of depth, but that is not the case here. There are no such restrictions. There is the ability for the committee to look in every corner.

With respect to access to information, every single one of the Commonwealth partners, and I will not list them all but I can say the U.K., New Zealand, Australia and so forth, all put in restrictions around information sharing that deal with operational sensitivity and things that pose a threat to national security.

Much has been made of this, but the fact remains, obviously, that there needs to be the ability for the minister to protect national security when it is appropriate, and if there is a disagreement between the committee and the minister, then there is the ability for the committee to file a report of all the accumulated instances where they feel the government has not provided that information, and that could be aired publicly. Of course, that committee would have a very strong pulpit from which to speak.

The bottom line is that the bill is the beginning, an incredibly important first step on a journey ensuring we have appropriate oversight for our security intelligence framework. I look forward to this bill passing and for the work to come that we committed to in the platform.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I congratulate my friend and hon. colleague, who is now the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety. I certainly hope that his experience as parliamentary secretary for public safety will not be as frustrating as it was to be parliamentary secretary for democratic institutions. I highly doubt that the government plans to pull the plug on this legislation in the next 24 hours, so it is bound to be a bit more rewarding.

All levity aside, I support this bill. It is an important piece of legislation. It is absolutely the case that when Mr. Justice O'Connor and others testified in hearings on Bill C-51 in the 41st Parliament, the failure of Canadian governments over time to have parliamentary oversight of security operations and security entities was drawn to our attention numerous times. He quoted Craig Forcese, who is one of Canada's leading experts, as is Kent Roach. They would prefer to see additional improvements to this bill, as would I, but I appreciate that important amendments were accepted at committee.

Would the parliamentary secretary be able to give us an update on what is being done to remedy the egregious multiple affronts to security and safety in Canada that came forward in Bill C-51? I opposed Bill C-51, not primarily because it offended Canadian civil liberties, although it does, but because it created silos in the views of people like Mr. Justice O'Connor, where CSIS would have information and have no obligation to share it with the RCMP and no obligation to share it with CSEC. Really, Bill C-51 makes us less safe, and the faster we can get rid of all of its various elements, potentially other than part 2, the better off we will all be.

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I share my hon. colleague's concerns. Before I address the concerns as they relate to Bill C-51, I will speak to the bill that is in front of us, Bill C-22. It is important to note that there would be a five-year mandatory review. While we are ahead of the Commonwealth and while we think, after the committee's recommendations and the listening that we did across the country, that we have a very good bill, there is a mandatory review process to make sure we could look at how effective this committee is being and how we could improve it. We do not hold this out as perfection, but we do feel that this is the right place to start.

On the issue of changes and when we can expect them, the committee at this very moment is considering a report on the security and intelligence framework. We want to hear from that committee. It has done incredibly important work. It has heard from witnesses across the country. That committee report is going to be a very important input into the minister's overall process on responding. We have very clear platform commitments on what we feel needs to be changed and improved to get right that simultaneous work that needs to be done to protect Canadians and also to ensure that their rights are also protected.

The committee report is coming out. I would expect action by the government very shortly thereafter, informed by that process.

[Karine Trudel, NDP, Jonquière, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I listened closely to my colleague's speech. He spoke several times about the importance of the committee. Canadians want a watchdog with sharp teeth. It is important to have a properly formed committee.

The new committee must also have full access to classified information, have adequate resources, enjoy some autonomy, and be able, within reason, to share with Canadians its actions in an instructive and transparent manner.

I would like to know my colleague's thoughts on this and especially on the importance of restoring Canadians' trust in our security and intelligence community. I want to know what my colleague thinks, but personally I believe that there needs to be true parliamentary oversight.

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax, ON]

Mr. Speaker, parliamentary oversight is essential. I certainly pushed for it as a critic. We ran on it in the last election. We are delivering it here in Bill C-22. It is a massive step forward.

As I said, we have not held this out as the sole component of the solution. There are other pieces that are coming. I referenced the committee's work and impending legislation that the government will table as well. However, the spirit of what the member asked is dead on: the importance of oversight, the importance of rigorously maintaining that protection of Canadian rights as guaranteed under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. We are also ensuring at the same time that our security and intelligence apparatus has the tools it needs effectively to keep Canadians safe.

[Raj Grewal, Liberal, Brampton East, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is an honour to rise today in support of Bill C-22, an act to establish a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians.

After second reading consideration and committee scrutiny, we now have the opportunity to review the bill at report stage. The robust parliamentarian process has served us well. The bill has been carefully studied by members on all sides of the House. Advice has been heard from expert witnesses and the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security has proposed amendments.

As the legislation stands today, it will move our country toward a more accountable and effective national security system. As many have said today and prior to today, the legislation is long overdue. We have heard stakeholders call it “crucial” and affirm that it will establish a committee in Canada that is stronger than its international counterparts. It will fill a significant gap that has existed in Canada for far too long. It will enable us to achieve our twin objectives of ensuring that our national security agencies are working effectively to keep Canadians safe and that the rights and freedoms of Canadians are protected.

Creating a new national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians honours a major commitment of the government to Canadians. The committee will be an enormously important addition to our parliamentary landscape. It will have: extraordinary access to classified information in order to closely examine intelligence and security operations; enhanced scrutiny of national security and intelligence activities; a broader mandate than counterparts in other modern democracies; the ability to set its own agenda fully independent of government; the responsibility to report annually to Canadians through Parliament; and the power to examine activities government-wide, including ongoing operations.

As the legislation stands now, the committee will meet the dual objectives we set long ago, which is to ensure our national security apparatus is working to keep Canadians safe and secure, while protecting the rights and freedoms of Canadians.

When the bill was first introduced, it proposed a stronger committee than those that existed with many of our international allies. With amendments, the scope, authorities, and access we are proposing for the committee will be broadened even further. The government has indicated that it will accept most of these amendments.

With respect to scope, for example, we agreed with the committee that the committee must be empowered to review national security and intelligence operations. As amended, that will include the operation of crown corporations. Further, as amended, if the minister determines that the examination will be against national security, his or her power to delay it will be limited to the period of time during which the operation is under way. Afterward, the committee can review the operation.

Another important amendment is whistle-blower protection that will require the committee to inform a minister and the attorney general about any national security or intelligence activity undertaken by a department that may not comply with the law. Like my colleagues, I was pleased that this amendment was widely endorsed. I also agree that the chair of the committee should be given a vote only in the case of a tie. I also agree with many of the changes regarding access to information exemptions for the bill initially proposed.

With the recent amendments, for example, the committee will now be able to receive information about ongoing defence intelligence activities that support military operations. It will also have access to relevant information collected by the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada and to privileged information under the Investment Canada Act.

The government has also agreed to amend the legislation so that reasons must be given for any redaction. Indeed, the government has been open to reasonable amendments throughout the parliamentary process.

We have not only conducted a careful examination of this crucial legislation, but we have also benefited from many years of consideration in creating this committee and from long collaboration with our international partners. Every other member of the Five Eyes alliance, including Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, has a legislative body with access to classified information to oversee security and intelligence matters.

Canada has tried to create a committee for over a decade now. It is time we give Canadians and parliamentarians the mandate to review these activities that we all want and need. Today, we are all taking one step closer to bringing this important new body into existence. We are closer to a system in which parliamentarians are better able to hold the government to account. We are closer to ensuring that concrete actions are taken when deficiencies and problems with our security framework and operations are identified.

Having learned from some of the best practices of our allies, we are closer to a truly developing a Canadian approach to national security accountability. This is a significant step forward for Canada. The legislation before us is as bold and progressive as it is thoughtful and balanced.

I am very proud to be part of the legislature that will, hopefully, at long last, put this critical accountability mechanism in place. I thank all members and parties for their support, advice, scrutiny, and debate in creating a better bill. I encourage all colleagues to support the passage of this important legislation.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Mr. Speaker, the reality is that this bill has more holes in it than a jar of olives. If we look at the provisions, there are so many things that are distant from the spirit about which the member talked. He talked about this providing genuine oversight, but he should know that all the power remains in the hands of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister appoints all the members of the committee and the Prime Minister has complete control over the information that goes forward.

The bill is very clear that it is not a parliamentary committee. It is, as it happens, a committee of parliamentarians, but it is not a parliamentary committee in any of the senses in which we understand that.

I wonder if the member could comment on some of those holes and whether he is really satisfied that this satisfies the Liberals' election commitment. I do not think it does at all.

[Raj Grewal, Liberal, Brampton East, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the hon. member for making the analogy to a jar of olives. As I know, he is an afficionado of olives. On our recent trip to Israel, we learned a lot about them.

However, getting to the member's question, I want to reiterate that our government is making an historic commitment to Canadians to fulfill an election promise. However, it is not just our commitment. Other governments have tried to set up this committee, which we have needed for quite some time now, to ensure there is independent oversight over our security and intelligence. Just like our allies in the Five Eyes, every other country already has this committee. We are setting one up to ensure we protect Canadians. At the same time, we are ensuring that our rights and freedoms, which as Canadians we cherish so much, are protected.

I truly believe in Bill C-22, and I encourage the member opposite to support it.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Mr. Speaker, one of the issues we will vote on with Bill C-22 is an amendment I have made. As members know, and the Speaker has accepted it for a vote, it is a deletion to retain the powers of parliamentary privilege for members of Parliament on the committee. It is an attempt, even at this late stage, to have the bill respect parliamentarians and their ability, having taken the oath of confidentiality, to be responsible for the secrecy that is required of them in this very important committee for senators and members of Parliament.

I note that the New Zealand legislation does not require its members of parliament to give up their parliamentary privileges in order to serve on their committee for security operations. Would my hon. colleague please consider voting for my amendment to delete that provision?

[Raj Grewal, Liberal, Brampton East, ON]

Mr. Speaker, Bill C-22 and the government's commitment to setting up this committee, which is independent of government, is extremely important, especially if we look at the current security landscape in the world we live in today.

Canadians expect their government to ensure they are protected. The first job of any government is to protect its citizens. The committee will be able to do that. It will ensure that Canadians are safe and secure, while at the same time protecting their rights and freedoms.

I look forward to the committee being set up. I look forward to parliamentarians of all political parties serving on it and ensuring they carry out their mandate to protect Canadians.

[Karine Trudel, NDP, Jonquière, QC]

Mr. Speaker, let me cut to the chase.

Why are there no ways to settle certain disputes confidentially? For example, a Federal Court judge could be called upon to conduct regular assessments of the warrants for secret information. A minister can actually decide whether to retain the information or not.

[Raj Grewal, Liberal, Brampton East, ON]

Mr. Speaker, the bill clearly states that the minister will have the prerogative to ensure that national security is still maintained, which is an important piece of the bill. It also states that after the national security risk has passed, the committee has the opportunity to revisit the minister's decision.

Again, Bill C-22 and this new committee will have the balance that we are trying to achieve, which is ensuring we are keeping Canadians safe while at the same time protecting the rights and freedoms we cherish so much.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure for me to join this very important debate about the structures we have in place for oversight of our intelligence and law enforcement activities. Unfortunately, we are doing so again under the gun of closure. This is at a time when the government is contemplating changes to our parliamentary rules that it would like to move forward without even working with other parties. It would in effect make closure automatic on bills that it brings forward. This is some of the context in which we see a limiting of discussion here today. At the same time, this is an important discussion that I am very glad to be able to participate in.

In general, when we think about the oversight mechanisms that exist for our intelligence agencies, we can have expert oversight, oversight by externally appointed experts who have specific knowledge in this area, and parliamentary oversight, which is oversight by elected officials. There are pros and cons to both of these options, and certainly they can exist in tandem with one another.

For a long time in Canada, we have had a strong system of expert oversight. What the government is doing with the legislation is bringing in something that Liberals are calling parliamentary oversight. However, in effect, and I will get into the details, this is not meaningful parliamentary oversight. It does not achieve many of the advantages of expert oversight, but it also does not achieve the advantages that might be associated with a more genuine parliamentary oversight model. This is the objection that I have to the legislation.

If we were going to bring in a more genuine parliamentary oversight structure similar to some of the private members' bills that Liberal MPs, such as the member for Malpeque, have at different times proposed, we would find our caucus more sympathetic to those kinds of arguments. However, we are seeing something that does not at all capitalize on those advantages, because it leaves control in the hands of the Prime Minister. At the same time, it does not entail some of the advantages that exist in the structure of an executive oversight system.

Would it not be perverse if in a bill that was supposed to be about strengthening Parliament, we actually saw a bill that created all the tools for strengthening and deepening the grasp of the Prime Minister over the direction of Parliament? That is exactly what we see here. It is legislation that tightens the control and the power of the Prime Minister's Office, nominally about parliamentary oversight, but that actually has many of the opposite effects.

Let us review what was committed to by the party in government. The Liberals' election commitment was, “We will create an all-party committee to monitor and oversee the operations of every government department and agency with national security responsibilities.” What we had in this election commitment was the implication of all-party inclusion, meaningful review of past operations, and oversight of present operations. It would be ongoing oversight as well as a review of past operations.

What we have, though, is nothing in the legislation to guarantee that all parties would be represented, because we do not have a committee that takes on the traditional form of a parliamentary committee. The way our committees normally function is that the leaders of parties nominate members of their parties to be members of those committees, and the committee is laid out in proportion to representation in the House. Since we are talking about a joint committee, it is probably in proportion to representation in this and the other place.

In fact what we have is the government creating a committee where the Prime Minister gets to choose all of the members. Yes, it says that only a certain number can be members of the government, but it does not prescribe the distribution of opposition members. It does not say that the distribution should be reflective of the House.

It is conceivable that the government could appoint independents who have recently departed from the Liberal caucus to this committee. I do not know how likely that is, but there are no protections in the legislation to ensure there is meaningful representation of all party perspectives. Even when members of opposition parties are appointed, again, those appointments are fundamentally at the pleasure of the Prime Minister, who designates the chair. In fact, long before this legislation has been passed, the Prime Minister had already publicly designated the person he is going to select as chair, which I think shows a great lack of respect for this institution.

In terms of the appointment process, in terms of the distribution process, in terms of the lack of formal consultation requirement for the Senate or any clear definition of what consultation with other parties would look like in the process of those appointments, we see legislation that is about strengthening the power of the Prime Minister over the process of intelligence review. That is not at all in keeping with what many would have thought was the spirit of that Liberal election commitment. It is, in many ways, moving in the opposite direction of what it purports to be doing.

There are not only limitations that ensure the control of the Prime Minister in the process of appointing members of the committee, but there are also significant problems with the way in which the information is handled. Ministers, as per one of the amendments that is going to be reintroduced, as well as the Prime Minister, can choose to exclude certain information on a variety of different bases.

What jumped out at me when I read the legislation initially, and members can look at it, is subclause 21(5), which states:

If, after consulting the Chair of the Committee, the Prime Minister is of the opinion that information in an annual or special report is information the disclosure of which would be injurious to national security, national defence or international relations or is information that is protected by litigation privilege or solicitor-client privilege or, in civil law, by immunity from disclosure or the professional secrecy of advocates and notaries, the Prime Minister may direct the Committee to submit to the Prime Minister a revised version of the annual or special report that does not contain that information.

In principle, I think members would be supportive of the idea that information which would be injurious for national security should be excluded from public release. However, when the section is so general as to include the possible exclusion for information that would be injurious to international relations, I would submit that almost anything that would come out of this committee could potentially be injurious to international relations. However, the adjudication of that process is not independent. It is not subject to the knowledge and expertise of the committee. It is simply up to the Prime Minister . If he says he does not want that section included because it could be injurious to international relations, perhaps this might be more an issue of “injurious to the reputation of the government”, and that would be a motivating basis for excluding that information.

I posed this question to the House leader when we initially debated the bill at second reading. The House leader asserted at the time that the committee report would be provided to the Prime Minister for the sole purpose of ensuring that it does not contain classified information. In reality, though, the subclause is very clear, in black and white, that it allows exclusions on the basis of international relations as well as a range of other criteria, and that the determination of what would be included and excluded is solely at the discretion of the government.

We had a concern raised today about disclosing certain information to the committee. It was raised by the Minister of Public Safety, who effectively said that there is more risk of this information leaking out if more people have access to this information, and that is why certain information should be excluded from being shown to the committee. At the same time as saying that, there is nothing in this legislation that requires the individuals appointed to the committee, or even the individual who is appointed chair, to have experience handling and dealing with classified information.

This comes back to the central point, which is that we have a choice between expert oversight or parliamentary oversight, or some combination thereof. However, effectively this bill would not provide the advantages of either. It would not require that those appointed to the committee have some experience with the handling of classified information, which would build some expertise and experience into the question of the handling of that classified information. It would not give the committee the level of independence that it should have by leaving aspects of the appointments as well as the management of information to the Prime Minister. Effectively, it would tighten the control of the Prime Minister's Office over what really should be a parliamentary function.

It is for these reasons that I will be disagreeing with the government on amendments coming forward, and likely, unless we see what we want in the amendments, voting against the bill.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, I have found that the Conservatives are trying to find a reason to justify their vote on this particular piece of legislation. It really does not make much sense when we listen to one member versus another member. At the core, the Conservatives appear to be in opposition of having a parliamentary oversight committee. I think the Canadian public would be best served if the Conservatives would be straightforward as to whether they support a parliamentary oversight committee today, because we know that yesterday they did not.

The second issue that I take some exception with is that the member makes reference to the fact that we could be doing more. He used the example of the Prime Minister making appointments. In New Zealand, which is one of the Five Eyes countries, the prime minister is actually on the committee. If we look at the committee that we are talking about today in this legislation, the number of Liberal MPs that would sit on the committee would be a minority of the overall membership of the committee.

Therefore, I ask the member this. Do the Conservatives support parliamentary oversight today? Also, what other amendments would they like to see that would make it more robust?

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I am happy to go through the points that the member made. He said that it was about the overall principle of parliamentary oversight. We are at report stage. We are not just talking about the principle of the bill, we have to get into the details. I think it is important for members to analyze, think about, and understand some of the problems with the details. It is not good enough that in principle the government has said that it wants to move in a certain direction, because, as I have argued, the details point in a very different direction.

With respect to parliamentary oversight, as I said clearly during my speech, I see advantages to the expert oversight model and advantages to the parliamentary oversight model. However, the legislation we have in front of us does not create a genuine system of parliamentary oversight because the Prime Minister still holds all the cards. We are not talking about a parliamentary committee, we are talking about a committee of parliamentarians.

On the member's point about Liberal MPs forming a minority, I think that is clear sleight of hand, because the government appoints all the members and it gets to appoint some senators. Therefore, if it appoints quasi-independent senators, who we all know are perhaps not as independent as the claim might be, we are obviously still in a position of the Prime Minister holding the cards. If there were advice sought from the Senate about how to appoint if Senate caucuses had input, if Senate appointments were reflective of the distribution of the Senate, then we would not have that problem. However, this is not a typically structured joint committee of the two Houses. It is a committee of parliamentarians chosen entirely by the Prime Minister and serving at the pleasure of the Prime Minister. I think we need to dig into those details and discuss those details.

In terms of amendments, we have amendments coming forward tonight. I think some of the amendments that we are proposing are very good, and some of the government House leader's amendments are not so good. Therefore, if the member wants to know what we are proposing, I would encourage him to vote with us this evening.