Mr. Speaker, the existing tax convention with the Republic of Madagascar, which was signed at Antananarivo on November 24, 2016, contains an interesting element that is not systematically included in other agreements. That is what I want to focus on here.
I would like to draw the attention of the House to article 25 of the convention, which has to do with the exchange of tax information. The wording of that article is consistent with the standard established by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development or OECD, on the exchange of tax information. Article 25 provides for the automatic sharing of the tax information set out by the OECD to address base erosion and profit shifting. The information is automatically transferred on both sides, and that is a very good thing. In other words, Canada receives all of that information automatically.
We could relate that to Quebec's single tax return proposal. With an information exchange agreement like the one in this bill and with the co-operation of Ottawa, Quebec could have access to all of that information. Such a convention is therefore fully compatible with the much-talked-about proposal for a single tax return administered by Quebec, which we recently discussed here in the House.
The wording based on the OECD standards is used in a number of Canada's information exchange agreements. Unfortunately, however, it is not used in most of the agreements Canada signed with tax havens. I find that extremely disappointing.
Take Barbados for example. In the Canada-Barbados tax treaty, paragraph II(3) states that, “The existing taxes to which the Agreement shall apply [only] are, in particular: in the case of Canada: the income taxes imposed by the Government of Canada, (hereinafter referred to as “Canadian tax”)”.
A bit further, article XXVIII, which deals specifically with information sharing, states that the only information that Barbados is entitled to share within the meaning of the treaty are “taxes covered by this Agreement insofar as the taxation thereunder is in accordance with this Agreement.”
In other words, it can share information only with Ottawa, it can share information regarding federal tax only, and it cannot possibly share any information that would allow the application of any Quebec tax law that is not an exact copy of federal tax law. The Canada-Barbados tax treaty therefore prevents Quebec from having access to tax information if its tax legislation differs from federal legislation. However, it is an old treaty from the 1980s. Let us look at another tax information exchange agreement concluded with another tax haven. One example that comes to mind is the 2011 agreement with Bahamas.
Article 3(1) indicates that the exchange of information, for the purposes of the agreement, pertains only to “existing taxes imposed or administered by the Government of Canada”. I repeat, “imposed or administered by the Government of Canada”, meaning the federal government. The same is true of the agreement with Barbados.
To summarize, when Canada signs information exchange agreements with countries that are not tax havens, in this case Madagascar, it has access to all of the information available, and that information can be used by Quebec, even if its tax law differs from Ottawa's, as long as the federal government co-operates.
On the other hand, when Canada signs information exchange agreements with tax havens, such as Barbados or the Bahamas, Canada no longer has access to all of the information available. The only information that can be obtained is what is specifically requested by Ottawa, according to its tax law, the wording of which conflicts with the OECD standards. This prevents Quebec from waging an effective war on tax havens and makes its single tax return proposal difficult to implement. I believe that the federal government, regardless of the party in power, did that deliberately.
Obviously, Canada does not want to share information about tax havens with Quebec, even though the current agreement with Madagascar shows that it is entirely possible to do so. This clearly shows that it is possible to reach agreements that are compatible with Quebec's single tax return proposal. The problem is that we cannot tax income if we do not know that it exists.
In his testimony on this topic before the public finance committee of Quebec's National Assembly on September 15, 2016, tax expert André Lareau said right off the bat that we cannot control what we cannot see.
Access to tax information is crucial for the enforcement of the Income Tax Act. To that end, the federal government has entered into nearly 100 tax treaties and more than 20 tax information exchange agreements, which, despite their serious flaws, all include provisions related to the sharing of information. Without those provisions, the government would not have the information it needs to enforce its own legislation. Treaties are the cornerstone of international taxation.
The tax information sharing provisions in these treaties contain many flaws. For instance, they do not provide for automatic sharing of information. Requests must be very precise and refer to specific information on a clearly identified taxpayer, which makes it impossible to go after a taxpayer if we do not have details about their activities in tax havens. Above all, they pertain only to income tax collected by the Government of Canada and existing taxes established or administered by the Government of Canada.
In other words, only Ottawa can request tax information from other countries because only Ottawa signed the treaties, and it can only request that information for the purpose of enforcing federal tax law. Current agreements with tax havens explicitly forbid foreign countries from exchanging tax information except for the purpose of enforcing federal tax law. That works as long as Quebec's tax law is essentially the same as federal law, but if Quebec's law ever differed from federal law, the Government of Quebec would not have access to the information it would need to enforce its law. Basically, Quebec is free to come up with its own tax system, but if it exercises that freedom, it will no longer be able to enforce its law. Regardless of whether we have a single tax return, if Quebec wants to go after tax havens more vigorously than Ottawa, it will not be able to, because it does not have access to the information. Where agreements relate to tax havens, it does not have access to the information. Where agreements relate to countries that are not tax havens, like this agreement, it will have access to all the information. That is frustrating and outrageous.
Therefore, even though Quebec has autonomy in matters of international taxation, it is subject to restrictions. Quebec has autonomy on condition that it does the same thing as Ottawa. For all international aspects of Quebec taxation, including tax havens, this is unfortunately the crux of the problem, regardless of what the Constitution states. This agreement shows that we can do things differently.
I sincerely hope that all tax information exchange agreements with tax havens will be reviewed and amended to incorporate the wording based on the OECD standard that is used in this agreement with Madagascar. That was the main point that I wanted to raise.
In my opinion, part of the reason for this new treaty is that, since the early 2000s, there has been a resurgence in oil development and uranium, ilmenite, nickel and even niobium mining. These are important areas of investment for Canada's oil and mining companies. This treaty will also include a foreign investment protection agreement, which has been signed but not yet implemented. That agreement contains a provision similar to what is found in NAFTA chapter 11, which protects foreign investment. It could effectively allow western oil companies and mining companies from Toronto and elsewhere in Canada to plunge Madagascar into bankruptcy. That is well known.
With this kind of investment protection provision, the foreign entity, the Canadian firm in this case, will have the power to take the Madagascar government to court over any changes in legislation or regulations that could reduce future profits. If environmental standards were implemented by the government, the Canadian company's profits might suffer and it could sue the government.
A standard to protect mining workers would do the same. The Canadian mining company could take the Madagascar government to court. However, that country's economy is struggling even more than those of developed countries, so a court case could bankrupt the government, which is a big problem.
The government boasts about establishing progressive agreements and partnerships that respect workers' rights and environmental rights. We do not know whether that is the case in the information exchange agreements currently being discussed. However, the problem is with the foreign investment protection agreement, which has been signed and will be implemented at some point in the future. I hope there will be an amendment.
With that, I conclude my speech.