Debates of Nov. 16th, 2020

(Return tabled)

Question No.11

[Bob Saroya, Conservative, Markham—Unionville, ON]

With regard to recruitment and hiring at Global Affairs Canada (GAC), for the last 10 years: (a) what is the total number of individuals who have (i) applied for GAC seconded positions through CANADEM, (ii) been accepted as candidates, (iii) been successfully recruited; (b) how many individuals who identify themselves as a member of a visible minority have (i) applied for GAC seconded positions through CANADEM, (ii) been accepted as candidates, (iii) been successfully recruited; (c) how many candidates were successfully recruited within GAC itself; and (d) how many candidates, who identify themselves as members of a visible minority were successfully recruited within GAC itself?

(Return tabled)

Question No.12

[Bob Saroya, Conservative, Markham—Unionville, ON]

With regard to the government projections of the impacts of the COVID-19 on the viability of small and medium-sized businesses: (a) how many small and medium-sized businesses does the government project will either go bankrupt or otherwise permanently cease operations by the end of (i) 2020, (ii) 2021; (b) what percentage of small and medium-sized businesses does the numbers in (a) represent; and (c) what is the breakdown of (a) and (b) by industry, sector and province?

(Return tabled)

Question No.13

[Tim Uppal, Conservative, Edmonton Mill Woods, AB]

With regard to government contracts for services and construction valued between $39,000.00 and $39,999.99, signed since January 1, 2016, and broken down by department, agency, Crown corporation or other government entity: (a) what is the total value of all such contracts; and (b) what are the details of all such contracts, including (i) vendor, (il) amount, (iii) date, (iv) description of services or construction contracts, (v) file number?

(Return tabled)

Question No.14

[Tim Uppal, Conservative, Edmonton Mill Woods, AB]

With regard to government contracts for architectural, engineering and other services required in respect of the planning, design, preparation or supervision of the construction, repair, renovation or restoration of a work valued between $98,000.00 and $99,999.99, signed since January 1, 2016, and broken down by department, agency, Crown corporation or other government entity: (a) what is the total value of all such contracts; and (b) what are the details of all such contracts, including (i) vendor, (ii) amount, (iii) date, (iv) description of services or construction contracts, (v) file number?

(Return tabled)

Question No.18

[Kelly McCauley, Conservative, Edmonton West, AB]

With regard to public service employees between March 15, 2020, and September 21, 2020, broken down by department and by week: (a) how many public servants worked from home; (b) how much has been paid out in overtime to employees; (c) how many vacation days have been used; and (d) how many vacation days were used during this same period in 2019?

(Return tabled)

Question No.20

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

With regard to Order in Council SOR/2020-96 published on May 1, 2020, which prohibited a number of previously non-restricted and restricted firearms, and the Canadian Firearms Safety Course: (a) what is the government’s formal technical definition of “assault-style firearms”; (b) when did the government come up with the definition, and in what government publication was the definition first used; and (c) which current members of cabinet have successfully completed the Canadian Firearms Safety Course?

(Return tabled)

Question No.21

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

With regard to defaulted student loans owing for the 2018 and 2019 fiscal years, broken down by year: (a) how many student loans were in default; (b) what is the average age of the loans; (c) how many loans are in default because the loan holder has left the country; (d) what is the average reported T4 income for each of 2018 and 2019 defaulted loan holder; (e) how much was spent on collections agencies either in fees or their commissioned portion of collected loans; and (f) how much has been recouped by collection agencies?

(Return tabled)

Question No.22

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

With regard to recipients of the Canada Emergency Response Benefit: what is the number of recipients based on 2019 income, broken down by federal income tax bracket?

(Return tabled)

Question No.23

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

With regard to accommodating the work from home environment for government employees since March 13, 2020: (a) what is the total amount spent on furniture, equipment, including IT equipment, and services, including home Internet reimbursement; (b) of the purchases in (a) what is the breakdown per department by (i) date of purchase, (ii) object code it was purchased under, (iii) type of furniture, equipment or services, (iv) final cost of furniture, equipment or services; (d) what were the costs incurred for delivery of items in (a); and (d) were subscriptions purchased during this period, and if so (i) what were the subscriptions for, (ii) what were the costs associated for these subscriptions?

(Return tabled)

Question No.24

[John Nater, Conservative, Perth—Wellington, ON]

With regard to the responses to questions on the Order Paper earlier this year during the first session of the 43rd Parliament by the Minister of National Defence, which stated that “At this time, National Defence is unable to prepare and validate a comprehensive response” due to the COVID-19 situation: what is the Minister of National Defence’s comprehensive response to each question on the Order Paper where such a response was provided, broken down by question?

(Return tabled)

Question No.25

[Tamara Jansen, Conservative, Cloverdale—Langley City, BC]

With regard to the transfer of Ebola and Henipah viruses from the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) to persons, laboratories, and institutions in China: (a) who in China requested the transfer; (b) other than the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which laboratories in China requested the transfer; (c) for the answers in (a) and (b) which are affiliated with the military of China; (d) on what date was the WIV’s request for the transfer received by the NML; (e) what scientific research was proposed, or what other scientific rationale was put forth, by the WIV or the NML scientists to justify the transfer of Ebola and Henipah viruses; (f) what materials were authorized for transfer pursuant to Transfer Authorization NML-TA-18-0480, dated October 29, 2018; (g) did the NML receive payment of $75, per its commercial invoice of March 27, 2019, for the transfer, and on what date was payment received; (h) what consideration or compensation was received from China in exchange for providing this material, broken down by amount or details of the consideration or compensation received by each recipient organization; (i) has the government requested China to destroy or return the viruses and, if not, why; (j) did Canada include, as a term of the transfer, a prohibition on the WIV further transferring the viruses with others inside or outside China, except with Canada’s consent; (k) what due diligence did the NML perform to ensure that the WIF and other institutions referred to in (b) would not make use of the transferred viruses for military research or uses; (l) what inspections or audits did the NML perform of the WIV and other institutions referred to in (b) to ensure that they were able to handle the transferred viruses safely and without diversion to military research or uses; (m) what were the findings of the inspections or audits referred to in (l), in summary; (n) after the transfer, what follow-up has Canada conducted with the institutions referred to in (b) to ensure that the only research being performed with the transferred viruses is that which was disclosed at the time of the request for the transfer; (o) what intellectual property protections did Canada set in place before sending the transferred viruses to the persons and institutions referred to in (a) and (b); (p) of the Ebola virus strains sent to the WIV, what percentages of the NML’s total Ebola collection and Ebola collection authorized for sharing is represented by the material transferred; (q) other than the study entitled “Equine-Origin Immunoglobulin Fragments Protect Nonhuman Primates from Ebola Virus Disease”, which other published or unpublished studies did the NML scientists perform with scientists affiliated with the military of China; (r) which other studies are the NML scientists currently performing with scientists affiliated with the WIV, China’s Academy of Military Medical Sciences, or other parts of China’s military establishment; (s) what is the reason that Anders Leung of the NML attempted to send the transferred viruses in incorrect packaging (type PI650), and only changed its packaging to the correct standard (type PI620) after being questioned by the Chinese on February 20, 2019; (t) has the NML conducted an audit of the error of using unsafe packaging to transfer the viruses, and what in summary were its conclusions; (u) what is the reason that Allan Lau and Heidi Wood of the NML wrote on March 28, 2019, that they were “really hoping that this [the transferred viruses] goes through Vancouver” instead of Toronto on Air Canada, and “Fingers crossed!” for this specific routing; (v) what is the complete flight itinerary, including airlines and connecting airports, for the transfer; (w) were all airlines and airports on the flight itinerary informed by the NML that Ebola and Henipah viruses would be in their custody; (x) with reference to the email of Marie Gharib of the NML on March 27, 2019, other than Ebola and Henipah viruses, which other pathogens were requested by the WIV; (y) since the date of the request for transfer, other than Ebola and Henipah viruses, which other pathogens has the NML transferred or sought to transfer to the WIV; (z) did the NML inform Canada’s security establishment, including the RCMP, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Communications Security Establishment, or other such entity, of the transfer before it occurred, and, if not, why not; (aa) what is the reason that the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) redacted the name of the transfer recipient from documents disclosed to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) under the Access to Information Act, when the PHAC later willingly disclosed that information to the CBC; (bb) does Canada have any policy prohibiting the export of risk group 3 and 4 pathogens to countries, such as China, that conduct gain-of-function experiments, and in summary what is that policy; (cc) if Canada does not have any policy referred to in (bb), why not; (dd) what is the reason that did the NML or individual employees sought and obtained no permits or authorizations under the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act, the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, the Export Control Act, or related legislation prior to the transfer; (ee) what legal controls prevent the NML or other government laboratories sending group 3 or 4 pathogens to laboratories associated with foreign militaries or laboratories that conduct gain-of-function experiments; (ff) with respect to the September 14, 2018, email of Matthew Gilmour, in which he writes that “no certifications [were] provided [by the WIV], they simply cite they have them”, why did the NML proceed to transfer Ebola and Henipah viruses without proof of certification to handle them safely; and (gg) with respect to the September 14, 2018, email of Matthew Gilmour, in which he asked “Are there materials that [WIV] have that we would benefit from receiving? Other VHF? High path flu?”, did the NML request these or any other materials in exchange for the transfer, and did the NML receive them?

(Return tabled)

Question No.26

[Tamara Jansen, Conservative, Cloverdale—Langley City, BC]

With regard to both the administrative and RCMP investigations of the National Microbiology Lab (NML), Xiangguo Qiu, and Keding Cheng: (a) with respect to the decision of the NML and the RCMP to remove Dr. Qiu and Dr. Cheng from the NML facilities on July 5, 2019, what is the cause of delay that has prevented that the NML and the RCMP investigations concluding; (b) in light of a statement by the Public Health Agency of Canada to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation which was reported on June 14, 2020, and which stated, “the administrative investigation of [Dr. Qiu or Dr. Cheng] is not related to the shipment of virus samples to China”, what are these two scientists being investigated for; (c) did Canada receive information from foreign law enforcement or intelligence agencies which led to the investigations against Dr. Qiu or Dr. Cheng, and, in summary, what was alleged; (d) which other individuals apart from Dr. Qiu or Dr. Cheng are implicated in the investigations; (e) are Dr. Qiu or Dr. Cheng still in Canada; (f) are Dr. Qiu or Dr. Cheng cooperating with law enforcement in the investigations; (g) are Dr. Qiu or Dr. Cheng on paid leave, unpaid leave, or terminated from the NML; (h) what connection is there between the investigations of Dr. Qiu or Dr. Cheng and the investigation by the United States National Institutes of Health which has resulted in 54 scientists losing their jobs mainly due to receiving foreign funding from China, as reported by the journal Science on June 12, 2020; (i) does the government possess information that Dr. Qiu or Dr. Cheng solicited or received funding from a Chinese institution, and, in summary what is that information; and (j) when are the investigations expected to conclude, and will their findings be made public?

(Return tabled)