Madam Speaker, I will. It is my right to speak in the House. I appreciate that.
Transforming Afghanistan was a great and noble goal, but doing worthwhile things is never easy. Supporting the democratic development of Afghanistan was always going to be a long process, and if it was going to work, then it would require a long-term commitment.
Tony Blair is right, in an ultimate sense. The people always ultimately choose freedom over tyranny, but the short-term optimism of the post-9/11 era did not pay enough attention to the need to gradually and painstakingly develop the institutions and political culture of a free pluralistic society over time. We were too quick to want to declare mission accomplished. We cannot expect to simply chase out the bad guys and then roll out the template of free democratic institutions because there is no single template for such institutions.
The core problem was that so-called neo-conservatism was not, in practice, sufficiently conservative. Conservatism, in its essential form, emphasizes the importance of local culture, tradition and familial attachments. To succeed, the institutions and culture of free democracy must be built on that pre-existing local foundation.
There is no single template for democracy because democracy succeeds when it builds on pre-existing cultural structures that have existing legitimacy, which then confer that legitimacy on the emergent democratic structures. This is how democracy was successfully built in the west, especially in the Anglo-American tradition over a long period. If those advancing democracy elsewhere do not build on the existing cultural foundation, then there will inevitably be rival centres of power that compete for legitimacy with the new democrat institutions.
In practice, neo-conservatism was not sufficiently conservative because it did not sufficiently take stock of how deeply embedded traditions and authority structures need to be collaborated with and harnessed in order to build free institutions that are authentic to the local setting over time. Any work of external nation building requires both great patience and even greater humility.
Free societies are not built like buildings. Rather, they grow like trees. Our own long history of halting democratic development in the west building on pre-democratic foundations should have made it clear to us that democratic development was always going to be a long-term project if it was going to be completed.
In one sense, the work of securing democracy is never complete. As the saying goes, the price of liberty is eternal vigilance. Save for the possibilities of divine intervention or nuclear annihilation, there is no such thing as the end of history. That is as true in Afghanistan as it is anywhere else. The work of building Canadian democracy is not complete, so why should we have expected it to ever be complete in Afghanistan? Of course, the hope of many, and rightly so, was that at some point along the way, external troops would be able to fully withdraw and Afghans themselves would be the ones vigilantly guarding and defending their own freedom, no longer needing outside help.
The critics of continuing western involvements in Afghanistan believed we needed to end so-called forever wars at a certain point and to leave the country to its own work in this regard. This framing of forever wars was highly misleading.
American troops have been stationed in Korea for much, much longer than they have been in Afghanistan. Nobody considers that American presence in Korea a forever war. America's presence in Korea is rather a matter of a contingent of troops helping to guarantee the peace. The withdrawal of Americans from South Korea would create a significant heightened risk of catastrophic conflict, so it is good for America to keep a contingent of troops there as long as is necessary.
The nature of America's presence in Afghanistan was different of course than the nature of its presence in Korea, but the western presence in Afghanistan was still consistent with the gradual drawing down of engagement, more limited air support backing the Afghan army, extremely low casualty figures in the later years compared to the height of the conflict and a trajectory whereby a smaller and less costly presence could, over time, still help sustain local democracy and security.
The fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban was not the inevitable result of facts on the ground. It was the result of a political choice that reflected a change in the western mood, the shift from too optimistic, impatient interventionism without sufficient cultural understand to too pessimistic isolationist abandonment.
As we have seen, the politics of isolationism and withdrawal, of putting domestic issues over external security imperatives, has led to global democratic decline, greater insecurity and ultimately a higher risk of costly war. This is why, in an age of further threats to free democracies, we must be vigilant and active, embracing realistic optimism and strategic patience and making the investments and the sacrifices that are required to keep the world a safe place for freedom and democracy.
The quote I read earlier continues with the poignant line, “The spread of freedom is the best security for the free.”
I hear from time to time from constituents who want us to ignore events far away and instead to simply focus on challenges at home, but history teaches us that impulse to retrench from the world always leads to the decline of democracy and liberty and to threats from abroad washing up on our own shores. When this spirit prevails, the long-term costs to our own well-being and happiness are inevitably much higher than if we had been engaged with international events from the beginning. I hope we learn the lessons of that history and we apply it.
As it relates to Afghanistan, we must now turn our attention to that other legacy of 9/11, which is the impact of anti-terrorism legislation. Anti-terrorism legislation was designed to confront the threat posed by violent non-state actors. Certain states do engage in acts that would fit any coherent legal definition of terrorism, but we have generally found it useful to maintain the possibility of some intercourse with hostile or rights-abusing governments, even those that use terrorism. The extreme isolation associated with a terrorist listing was therefore designed for violent non-state actors as opposed to violent state actors. This design, though, has been stretched and complicated in certain respects in recent years.
First, certain organizations, such as the IRGC or the Wagner Group, may simultaneously function as an international terrorist organization and as part of, or a close affiliate of, a state. In our view, these organizations should still be listed as terrorist entities, but we should acknowledge that such designations move us closer in the direction of capturing state-affiliated entities, instead of just non-state actors, with anti-terrorism legislation. Designating the particular organs of terrorism, rather than the state itself, still provides space for some interaction with other state organs, and is therefore, in my view, quite doable, even without amending the Criminal Code as it exists.
More complicated is the case in which a terrorist organization comes to occupy and function as the de facto authority in the state, and this is now the case in Afghanistan. Removing such an organization from the terrorist list would clearly send the wrong message and weaken legitimate and important sanctions against that group. Withdrawing the designation from a terrorist group once it takes over government would appear to suggest that one way for a terrorist group to get off the terrorist list is to simply take over territory. Again, that would clearly send the wrong message.
However, the Criminal Code, as it currently exists, was not designed for the situation in which a terrorist group also functions as the de facto authority in a state, so it is reasonable to look for ways to make these provisions nimbler, if that nimbleness allows us to preserve the listing of terrorist groups as terrorist groups. Rather than removing the terrorist designation from a terrorist organization that is still a terrorist organization, we should be prepared to thoughtfully amend the Criminal Code to still allow some presence in, and engagement with the people of, a country when that country has been overrun by a terrorist organization without in any way legitimizing that organization.
This brings us to the particular provisions of Bill C-41. Bill C-41 would allow the Government of Canada to grant very limited exemptions to the Anti-Terrorism Act to allow the delivery of humanitarian assistance in areas controlled by terrorist organizations. The legislation does not name Afghanistan or the Taliban directly, but it is clearly designed to allow the government to grant narrow exemptions that would allow the delivery of emergency humanitarian relief into Afghanistan.
Afghanistan faces an ongoing humanitarian crisis, in large part as a result of Taliban misrule. Terrorists are generally not very good at running an economy, yet Canadian charities have not been able to deliver essential humanitarian aid because in the process of delivering that aid to the Afghan people, they may run afoul of the Anti-Terrorism Act and thus risk criminal prosecution.
In this particular case, we are not talking about the expenditure of public funds. We are talking simply about increasing the precision of Criminal Code provisions to give private Canadian charities the freedom to deliver private funds to the suffering people of Afghanistan. Bill C-41 does not prescribe the precise form of the exemptions the government will grant. It would simply give the government the power to grant these exemptions. It is reasonable for a government to have this power to deal with contingency situations, although the government will necessarily be held accountable for its judicious and effective use of this power.
On the basic objective of Bill C-41, the biggest problem I have is that it comes too late, not too late to be useful, but too late for many who have already been suffering under Taliban misrule for over a year and a half. Peer countries have been way ahead of us in addressing this problem, and Parliament has been pushing the government to address this issue for almost all of that time. In fact, immediately after the 2021 election, Conservatives proposed a motion to create a special committee on Afghanistan. When it reported to the House last spring, that committee recommended that changes be made to allow humanitarian assistance to get into Afghanistan. Following that, this past fall, the foreign affairs committee unanimously agreed to my motion calling for changes that would allow humanitarian assistance to get into Afghanistan, reiterating what was in the Afghan committee's report, and the committee adopted a second motion on the matter, proposed by the NDP earlier in the winter session, yet it has still taken until the end of March to actually begin debate on this bill.
When I met with international development stakeholders on the bill, they emphasized a significant concern about timelines, and in a few different senses. They highlighted the issue of timelines for the passage of the legislation in the hope the government will choose to prioritize it within its legislative agenda so the legislation can, indeed, move forward. The bill does need to be studied and debated thoroughly, but we are prepared to move it forward as quickly as possible, provided that sufficient time is set aside for study and debate.
While the principles are important, the bill is technically and legally complicated and does require meaningful examination, but stakeholders are not only concerned about the timeline for the passage of this bill. They are concerned about the timelines the bill would create for them in being able to get to work on the ground. Until this legislation passes, international organizations are potentially prohibited criminally from running humanitarian or development programs in Afghanistan if there is some risk of any portion of those resources eventually ending up in the hands of the Taliban.
This legislation would allow the Minister of Public Safety to grant certain narrow exemptions. From the perspective of these organizations, the legislation marks an improvement. However, the process associated with accessing these exemptions would be time-intensive and potentially highly bureaucratic, with no timeline set out. Again, it is not only about how long it takes to pass the bill, but also how long it would take organizations to be authorized to get to work.
The proposed process is that an exemption would be granted after a thorough review by the public safety minister, but only after the issue has been referred to that minister by another minister, either the immigration or foreign affairs minister, who would presumably have to conduct their own analysis. Exemptions would also have to be granted for each individual organization. If one development organization applies for and receives an exemption to operate a particular program, then another organization, running essentially an equivalent program in the same or different geographic area, would also have to apply for their own separate exemption.
There is also a great deal of uncertainty about how widely an exemption would apply. Would an organization that got an exemption to run a program in one province in one year have to apply for another exemption to extend the program, run the same program in a different province or run the program in another year? From my reading, there is a certain lack of clarity around the breadth of the exemptions that would be introduced.
Multiple organizations doing essentially the same work would each have to apply separately instead of simply being able to proceed with their work based on an exemption granted to someone else. This process seems more bureaucratic and costly than it needs to be, and it raises questions about whether the actual exemptions would be in place in a reasonable amount of time.
It also raises concerns about equity. Would the government subject certain organizations to more scrutiny than others, and would small and diaspora-led organizations be able to access these exemptions alongside larger organizations that have a longer history of working directly with the federal government?
Conservatives have repeatedly highlighted the need to ensure the inclusion of small and diaspora-led organizations in our thinking about international development. It is perhaps natural and inevitable that certain trusted partners are more likely to receive direct government funding, but it would be a grave problem if small and less-known organizations continued to face criminal prohibitions on delivering aid while larger, better-known players were given exemptions in identical situations.
It would seem reasonable for the government to establish certain general categories or situations of exemption, which would apply to all organizations, rather than only grant exemptions on an individual case-by-case basis. We will be digging more into this specific part of the issue at committee. Although we feel there is an urgency around the timeline of passing this legislation, there is also an urgency to ensure that processes are streamlined so that we can get assistance to the people who need it as soon as possible.
When I have been consulting with Canadians about this legislation, some have asked if aid should be flowing into Taliban-controlled Afghanistan at all. We know that the real cause of the suffering of the Afghan people is their Taliban oppressors. Poverty is, in this and so many other cases, the result of unjust and broken political institutions preventing people from moving forward in freedom and security. Why treat the symptom when the cause of the problem remains in place?
To that, I would say that what is true in Afghanistan is true in many places, to a lesser extent, and that is that poverty often has its roots in injustice. When people cannot borrow against their assets because they lack clear title, when a primary breadwinner faces arbitrary arrests and does not have secure access to an objective justice system, when transportation routes of goods are not secure, when corruption limits opportunities, when teenagers cannot go to school for fear of violence there or on the way, these are all too common instances in many parts of the developing world where violence causes or perpetuates poverty.
People everywhere have the ingenuity and the potential to lift themselves out of poverty if they are not held back by unjust systems that deprive them of the security, title and credit that they need to get ahead. The fight for justice and for the recognition of universal human dignity is central to development and poverty alleviation. We need to recognize this reality, but we also still need to attack poverty directly, especially in emergency situations like this.
It is not always possible to go directly to the roots of a problem. In the case of Afghanistan, by choosing to abandon Afghanistan's security and the building of just institutions, we have cut ourselves off from the ability to get at the roots of the problem, but with those bad decisions already baked in, we should still do all that we can to save lives and elevate the conditions of the Afghan people.
We should support such measures, even while recognizing that the Taliban cannot be permitted to continue to inflict its reign of terror on the Afghan people. The political problem will require an eventual solution. Delivering humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan is a necessary form of harm reduction, but we should not lose sight of the underlying injustices, political problems and of the need to look for solutions to them.
Based on this, what can we say about the future of Afghanistan? Nobody can say what surprises will rest around the corner, but the Afghan people deserve our continuing support and goodwill. Continuing contacts between Canadian organizations and Afghans in Afghanistan help all concerned to be informed and create opportunities to respond to emerging issues and dynamics.
We need to start by removing legal barriers that prevent humanitarian aid from getting in. Continuing access to food, education and other essentials will provide Afghans some space to move forward. The involvement of Canadian organizations in this effort will mean contact and two-way awareness that could turn into something else down the road.
We should retain some of the old optimism, because the intervening decades between 2001 and 2021 were not all for nothing. A new generation of Afghans has seen a different set of possibilities, and we will work together to ensure the re-emergence of those possibilities. We must still look for a way to be there for them.
At the end of the day, we know the choice that Afghans will make when they are able, because even if not with the right timelines and the right tactics, the main point was correct: “Ours are not Western values, they are the universal values of the human spirit. And anywhere, any time ordinary people are given the chance to choose, the choice is [always] the same: freedom, not tyranny; democracy, not dictatorship; the rule of law, not the rule of the secret police. The spread of freedom is the best security for the free.”
