Debates of May 12th, 2023

An Act for the Substantive Equality of Canada's Official Languages

[Niki Ashton, NDP, Churchill—Keewatinook Aski, MB]

Mr. Speaker, first of all, Bill C‑13 is a strong measure that gives us the tools to address the decline of the French language. It is a huge step in the right direction, but it is not enough, obviously. Of course, we must address the decline of French, be it in education or in other fields. We must make the necessary investments and recognize that we need clear and targeted plans to support our communities, especially outside Quebec, where we are seeing a fairly serious decline.

We certainly need to have the right information. Of course, we want Statistics Canada or any other government agency to be able to collect the necessary information to ensure that our children, our schools and our school districts have the data they need to support education in French.

As I said, we have a lot of work to do to end the decline of the French language, but I believe that Bill C‑13 represents a big step in the right direction.

[Mario Beaulieu, Bloc, La Pointe-de-l'Île, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for her co-operation and work on the Standing Committee on Official Languages.

I would like to know if she considers Quebec to be a nation with French as its official and common language, and if she recognizes Quebec's right to self-determination.

If so, does she think it is okay for the federal government to swoop in and spend hundreds of millions of dollars in areas of Quebec's jurisdiction to support English?

[Niki Ashton, NDP, Churchill—Keewatinook Aski, MB]

Mr. Speaker, yes, we recognize the Quebec nation. It was very important for us to work with the Government of Quebec in developing Bill C‑13.

We were very happy to learn that an agreement had been signed between the Government of Quebec and the federal government to advance shared priorities. It is obvious that such an agreement is crucial to ensure Quebec's self-determination in many key areas, and that the federal government must be a part of the solution to protect the French language and stand up for official language minority communities.

From the beginning of the debate on Bill C‑13, I have been very clear in saying that French is in decline. We see it here, in western Canada, and we know that it is obviously the case in Quebec. The federal government must keep this in mind not only in the context of this bill, but also, more specifically, when it invests and plans for the future.

[Joël Godin, Conservative, Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I have a quick question for my colleague. I was asking her about rights holders earlier. Now I have a question about the Treasury Board.

The FCFA, which represents several organizations across Canada, asked that the Treasury Board be extended to the entire legislation.

Why did my colleague vote with the Liberals again in the NDP-Liberal coalition?

[Niki Ashton, NDP, Churchill—Keewatinook Aski, MB]

Mr. Speaker, first I would say that this is not the time to give a course on Canadian politics. The NDP is not in a coalition with anyone. I know that is the message Conservatives like to use to raise funds, but it is not true.

I believe that the FCFA's statement is clear about the fact that they are very pleased with the final bill. The federation certainly fought hard, and we all collaborated to advance their priorities. I am proud that we were able to improve the bill by giving more powers to the Treasury Board. As I said, this bill is a big step forward.

Clearly, we will have to continue our work to meet the objectives of the bill and invest in what our communities need to protect French and official language minority communities.

Finally, I would add that I appreciate that my colleague is raising this priority with respect to the bill, but I have many concerns about the Conservative leader, who talks a lot about cutting funding to Radio-Canada, an organization that is vital to the protection of French, especially in western Canada.

I have concerns about the Conservative leadership, and I question why they do not want to protect French in minority situations in various ways.

[The Deputy Speaker, Conservative, Chris d'Entremont]

Is the House ready for the question?

[Some hon. members]

Question.

[The Deputy Speaker, Conservative, Chris d'Entremont]

The question is on the motion.

If a member of a recognized party present in the House wishes the motion be carried or carried on division, or wishes to request a recorded division, I would invite them to rise and indicate it to the Chair.

The hon. deputy whip for the government.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I would request a recorded division.

[The Deputy Speaker, Conservative, Chris d'Entremont]

Pursuant to order made on Thursday, June 23, 2022, the division stands deferred until Monday, May 15, at the expiry of the time provided for Oral Questions.

The hon. deputy whip for the government.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I believe if you seek it, you will find that there is unanimous agreement to see the clock at 1:30 for Private Members' Business.

[The Deputy Speaker, Conservative, Chris d'Entremont]

Is that agreed?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

Amendments to the Standing Orders

[Daniel Blaikie, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

moved:

That:

(a) the House recognize that,

(i) it is a prerogative of the Crown to prorogue or dissolve Parliament at its pleasure,

(ii) the circumstances surrounding a prorogation of the House may bear on whether the government enjoys the confidence of the House,

(iii) the confidence convention is an important cornerstone of the Canadian political system,

(iv) the confidence convention has never been clearly codified and this has sometimes led to confusion among members and the general public as to the nature and significance of certain votes,

(v) governments have sometimes abused the confidence convention to reinforce party discipline or influence the outcome of a vote that is not explicitly a matter of confidence or that would not be considered a matter of confidence by convention;

(b) in the opinion of the House,

(i) the House itself, not the Prime Minister, should be the final authority as to whether the government of the day enjoys the confidence of the House,

(ii) when the House assembles following a general election, the government shall be called upon to demonstrate it enjoys the confidence of the House,

(iii) before a prorogation occurs, the House ought to have an opportunity to express its confidence in the government,

(iv) the means by which the House may pronounce itself on a question of confidence should be explicit, clear and predictable so that all members know well in advance when and how the confidence of the House will be tested,

(v) once the House has determined such means in its Standing Orders or in legislation, the government should not seek to circumvent the process established by the House by declaring a vote to be a matter of confidence if the rules of the House would not otherwise designate that vote as a matter of confidence, and any attempt to do so constitutes a contempt of Parliament,

(vi) a question of confidence is a serious matter and should not be used as a pretext for dilatory tactics by either side of the House;

(c) effective from the 20th sitting day after the adoption of this motion or at the beginning of the next Parliament, whichever comes first, the Standing Orders be amended as follows:

(i) by adding, after Standing Order 53.1, the following new standing order:

“53.2(1) The government must enjoy the confidence of the House of Commons. The House may express its confidence, or lack thereof, in the government by adopting a confidence motion in one of the following forms:

(a) “That the House has lost confidence in the government”;

(b) “That the House has confidence in the government”.

(2)(a) Notice of a confidence motion pursuant to section (1) of this standing order shall meet the requirements of Standing Order 54, provided that four sitting days shall be given prior to the motion being placed on the Order Paper. Such notice shall be signed by the sponsor and 20 other members representing more than one of the recognized parties.

(b) Notwithstanding Standing Order 18, the House may pronounce itself on the motions listed in section (1) of this standing order more than once.

(c) Only one confidence motion pursuant to section (1) of this standing order:

(i) may be placed on notice in each supply period;

(ii) shall be sponsored or signed by the same member of the House in a session of a Parliament.

(3) At the expiry of the notice period pursuant to section (2) of this standing order, an order of the day for the consideration of a confidence motion shall be placed on the Order Paper, be considered at the next sitting of the House and take precedence over all other business of the House, with the exception of a debate on a motion arising from a question of privilege.

(4) When the order of the day on a confidence motion is called, it must stand as the first order of the day. The confidence motion is deemed to have been moved and seconded and shall not be subject to any amendment.

(5) Private Members’ Business shall be suspended on a day any such motion is debated.

(6) No dilatory motion shall be received during debate on a confidence motion pursuant to section (1) of this standing order and the provisions of Standing Orders 62 and 63 shall be suspended.

(7) The proceedings on the order of the day on a confidence motion proposed thereto shall not exceed one sitting day.

(8) No member shall speak for more than 20 minutes at a time in the debate on a confidence motion. Following the speech of each member, a period not exceeding 10 minutes shall be made available, if required, to allow members to ask questions and comment briefly on matters relevant to the speech and to allow responses thereto. Any period of debate of 20 minutes may be divided in two pursuant to the provisions of Standing Order 43(2).

(9) When no further member rises to speak, or at the ordinary hour of daily adjournment, whichever is earlier, the Speaker shall interrupt the proceedings and the question shall be put and forthwith disposed of, notwithstanding Standing Order 45.

(10) Any matter of confidence so designated beyond those provided for in Standing Orders 50(8), 53.2(1), 81(18)(e), and 84(6)(b) may be called to the attention of the Chair and the member may ask that the matter be referred to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs. As the case may be, the matter shall automatically be referred to the said committee.”,

(ii) by adding, after Standing Order 53.2, the following new standing order:

“53.3(1) Following an expression of intent by the Prime Minister to recommend prorogation to the Crown, a minister of the Crown may place a confidence motion on notice that does not count for the purposes of Standing Order 53.2(2)(c).

(2) This motion shall proceed pursuant to Standing Order 53.2, except that the notice period required by Standing Order 53.2(2)(a) shall be one sitting day, instead of four, and the notice need only be signed by a minister of the Crown.

(3) During an adjournment period, when a confidence motion is put on notice pursuant to paragraph 3(1) of this standing order, the Speaker shall recall the House to meet at an earlier time, and thereupon the House shall meet to transact its business as if it had been duly adjourned to that time, provided that at least 48 hours’ notice shall be given for any sitting held pursuant to this paragraph.

(4) In the event of a prorogation occurring prior to the question being put on a confidence motion, the House shall, as its first item of business of a new session, consider a confidence motion pursuant to Standing Order 53.2, which shall be deemed placed on the Order Paper for that purpose.

53.4 At the opening of every Parliament, immediately after the Speaker has reported on the attendance of the Commons to the Senate, a motion pursuant to Standing Order 53.2(1)(b) shall be deemed moved and seconded, and be otherwise governed pursuant to Standing Orders 53.2(6), (7), (8) and (9).

(iii) in Standing Order 45(6)(a), by adding, after the words “An exception to this rule is”, the following: “the division on a confidence motion pursuant to Standing Order 53.2(9) and”,

(iv) by adding, after Standing Order 50(7), the following:

“(8) If the main motion is defeated, the government has lost the confidence of the House.”,

(v) by adding, after Standing Order 67(1)(p), the following:

“(q) for the consideration of a confidence motion”,

(vi) in Standing Order 81(13), by adding the following:

“They cannot contain explicitly worded expressions of confidence in the government.”,

(vii) by adding, after Standing Order 81(18)(d), the following:

“(e) After having disposed of any opposed item, if the motion to concur in the main estimates is defeated, the government has lost the confidence of the House.”,

(viii) by renumbering Standing Order 84(6) as Standing Order 84(6)(a),

(ix) by adding, after Standing Order 84(6)(a), the following:

“(b) If the main motion is defeated, the government has lost the confidence of the House.”,

(x) in Standing Order 99(1), by adding, after “52(14),”, the following: “53.2(5),”; and

(d) the Clerk of the House be authorized to make any required editorial and consequential alterations to the Standing Orders, including to the marginal notes, as well as such changes to the Order Paper and Notice Paper, as may be required.

Mr. Speaker, the Prime Minister is one of the most powerful people in the country, and that is a function of the Prime Minister's Office, which includes a number of serious powers.

Foremost among those is the power to decide, at any time, that Parliament is done, that the work of Parliament is finished and that we are going to have an election. It is the power to decide that Parliament's work can be put on pause, and the important work that is happening at committee could be, not just put on pause, but stopped. It would have to start up again in another session of Parliament.

We have seen this power used appropriately over the course of Canadian history, and we have also seen it be abused. One of the most recent examples of the abuse of this power was in the summer of 2020, when the government was embroiled in the WE charity scandal, with many committees studying what had happened. They were calling for witnesses for, and papers and evidence about, what was going on in the government and how the scandal arose. The Prime Minister decided to say that Parliament was prorogued. All that work stopped. Members of Parliament were not able to come to this place or to work together to do the work that we are elected to do, which is to hold the government to account.

We saw that happen in the summer of 2020. It was a controversial decision to prorogue. I think many Canadians were rightly upset about that. I was part of an effort at the procedure and House affairs committee to get to the bottom of why it was the Prime Minister chose to prorogue. One of the real frustrations in that sitting was that the Prime Minister himself refused to come to that study. In fact, we watched Liberal members on that committee filibuster for months on end to avoid a simple invitation to the Prime Minister to come to explain his own actions.

That was certainly an example where we saw the power of prorogation abused. I would say, arguably, just the next year, in 2021, we saw the same Prime Minister abuse a similar power, which was to dissolve Parliament and declare our work finished, and then we went to the polls. We have fixed election date laws in Canada. Unfortunately, there is no way to punish prime ministers for ignoring those laws, as the Prime Minister did in the fall of 2021 when he called an election while we were still in the midst of a pandemic. In fact, the procedure and House affairs committee was in the process of looking at a government bill designed to make accommodations for the pandemic at election time.

Instead of respecting the work of that committee and the many voices across the country who were saying that Canada was not ready to have an election during a pandemic, the Prime Minister pulled the plug and held the election anyway. It was an election that no one but him wanted, and that was very clear. It was made very clear to all of us on the doorsteps over the course of that election. Nevertheless, it was the Prime Minister, through the power of his office, who was able to do that, without any meaningful accountability.

I want to go back to an example from much earlier, but folks would be relieved to hear it is in this century. I am not going all the way back to the 19th century. In 2008, former prime minister Harper effected the most egregious abuse of the power of prorogation when he knew that opposition parties were going to bring a non-confidence motion forward to say that the members of this place did not believe that he should govern. Instead of facing the House and facing that vote, which would have been the honourable thing to do, he chose to abuse the powers of the Prime Minister's Office and prorogued parliament, so opposition members could not bring a motion of non-confidence to the House.

[Some hon. members]

Shame.

[Daniel Blaikie, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

It was indeed a shameful thing.

Mr. Speaker, up until now, there has been a lot of discussion about this, but I do not think there have been real proposals to try to do something about it. It is difficult to do something about it because, in our Constitution, dissolving or proroguing Parliament is said to be a power of the monarch, of the Queen, or now the King. Really, it is a power of the Prime Minister because it is only on the Prime Minister's advice that this is done. Because this is a power that is granted to the monarchy, we need a constitutional amendment to do anything about it, or so we have been told.

Let us consider all the important institutions that make up the very foundation of Canadian government. We could think about the monarch, the executive or the government, and we could think about the House of Commons, the judiciary and the Senate.

Actually, only one of those is directly elected by Canadians, and that is the House of Commons. The monarch certainly is not elected; we have all been bearing witness to that process recently. The Senate is not elected. Judges are not elected, and I do not think that is a bad thing; we need accountability in the process of their appointment, so they are not elected. The executive is not directly elected; it is actually the House of Commons that ultimately decides who sits in the Prime Minister's chair, or not, based on what happens at election time.

I think that the House of Commons, both as the democratically elected component of the Canadian government and as the institution with the job of holding the government to account, should be the one to decide whether the work here is paused in a prorogation. The House of Commons, as the democratically elected chamber, should be the one to decide if we are done before fixed election date laws say we would be done and to have an early election. No simple motion in the House of Commons can change the Constitution, which is as it should be. Therefore, within the constitutional context that we are in, this motion would allow us, the members of this place, to assert our rightful role in having a much bigger say on when our work begins, when it ends and whether it is stopped or paused by a prime minister. That is a decision that should be in the hands of Canadians.

If we want to talk about gatekeeping in Canada, one of the biggest gatekeeping powers that exists is the power of the Prime Minister to get out of accountability to Parliament. Anyone who is concerned about fighting inappropriate gatekeeping in Canada should be concerned to constrain that power by the Prime Minister.

That is what this motion is really about. It is about making it more difficult for prime ministers to prorogue Parliament to get out of facing accountability on a confidence vote. It is about making it more difficult for prime ministers to get out of accountability for scandals like the WE Charity scandal or the question of Afghan detainees by telling members of this Parliament to go back to their ridings and not come back until the Prime Minister decides he is okay with having them back. It is about ensuring that the Prime Minister does not get to inappropriately influence votes in this place by suddenly declaring something that has nothing to do with confidence and everything to do with covering his own behind or a special pet project in order to try to force members to vote for something that they would not otherwise vote for. That is what this motion is about, and that is why it is so important that this motion pass.

It is about time that the House of Commons started pushing back on those other unelected parts of the Canadian governance structure and assert its own authority and its own decision-making power, especially in regard to our ability to sit in this place and to hold governments to account.

How would it constrain the power of the Prime Minister? As I said, there is no perfect solution without a constitutional amendment. However, it would mean that a prime minister who wanted to prorogue would have the option of first having a confidence vote in the House of Commons before a prorogation. If the Prime Minister did not do that, it would guarantee that the first order of business when parliamentarians came back would not be the Prime Minister's Speech from the Throne, where they get to frame the issues however they like; it would be a debate and a vote of confidence in the government after it made a decision to prorogue.

I say that would have been especially important in the case of the Harper prorogation, because he prorogued in order to avoid a confidence vote. We know that the next way for opposition parties at that time to have a confidence vote would have been on an opposition day motion. Who decides when to have opposition day motions? The government decides when to have an opposition day motion. Therefore, that does not really work as an accountability mechanism. If the Prime Minister can prorogue for as long as they want and then delay an opposition day motion for just about as long as they like after we come back, then opposition parties do not have the ability to hold the government to account in the appropriate way.

What this motion would guarantee is that there would be a moment of accountability at the beginning of every Parliament, with a confidence vote. There would be a possibility of a prime minister doing the right thing and testing the confidence of the chamber before prorogation; if they do not, it would guarantee that the first order of business when we came back would be a confidence vote to have that accountability for the House of Commons. It makes it clear for members how they can go about initiating a confidence vote. It lays out a process for that. I will spare folks the details; they are in the motion.

Another thing it does, which is also quite important, is that it specifically says what votes would be votes of confidence. Traditionally, by convention, the Speech from the Throne is a vote of confidence. This motion would simply add that into the Standing Orders so that it would no longer be a question for which we have to call in a whole bunch of constitutional experts who have studied the history of Canada since 1867 to weigh in on it. We would know because it would be written in the Standing Orders that it is a vote of confidence. We would know that the budget vote is a vote of confidence because it would be written down in the Standing Orders.

We would know that the main vote on estimates is a confidence motion. That matters because there have been many times where we have voted all night on the estimates, on every line item, and it is always a debate. We see the media questioning if the government could fall on any vote. Some people say it could. Others say that it cannot; it is complicated; maybe it would; maybe it would not; maybe it would lose that vote and the next day it would have to come to the House for a more explicitly worded motion of confidence; or maybe the Prime Minister would decide.

We are a 21st-century democracy. How is it so unclear whether the only elected chamber, the only elected part of our Constitution, would sit or not sit, have confidence or not have confidence, have an election or not have an election? These are things we should be able to put our heads together on to sort out so it is crystal clear to Canadians, who should not have to get a Ph.D. in Canadian constitutional history to understand what the heck is going on in this place. It is something we should be able to teach in a grade 12 civics class and be proud of. The idea behind this motion is to make it a heck of a lot more clear so that we can do exactly that. To have a lack of clarity around these issues that are so central to the proper functioning of our democracy is to invite the kind of toxic debates and intractable disputes that we see too often now in western democracies about whether this was a power grab or if the government acted appropriately or not. The way to defend this is to seek the maximum amount of clarity before we are in a crisis.

Already this year, there has been speculation in the media about whether a motion in the House would be a confidence or non-confidence vote. The government House leader refused to comment, so it hung in the air. It should not be that way. We should know clearly whether something is or is not a vote of confidence.

There have been rumours around prorogation already in this Parliament. We should know that, if a prime minister is going to prorogue and we think it is a bad decision, the House of Commons itself will have the opportunity to pronounce on whether the government is making an acceptable decision or not. That is something the House ought to be able to do because we are the only ones who are elected with a mandate to make those kinds of decisions.

It is not the Prime Minister or anybody else. It is certainly not a King or Queen who has the ability to make that decision. It is not a decision for the Senate, where senators who have all been appointed by previous prime ministers to make that decision. This is the place that decision ought to be made. That is how we put democracy before gatekeeping. That is what this motion is about. That is why I encourage all members of the House to give their support to this motion.

[Terry Beech, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank my colleague for his speech and for putting this together. He has obviously thought it through. I appreciate him going over how in some ways the current rules could be abused.

He is a thoughtful guy, and I am sure he has thought about the other side. Has he considered any ways this change in procedure could potentially be abused, and if so, has he thought about ways to mitigate that, or are there no ways in which this could be abused?

[Daniel Blaikie, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I think Canadians would agree that politicians are often disappointing and find ways to abuse things that ought not to be abused, so I certainly would not make the claim that anything that comes out of this place is beyond abuse. One hopes that it has enough clarity and instruction behind it that folks would find it hard to abuse.

One of the ways I was concerned this new way of presenting a confidence motion might be abused is as a dilatory tactic, so one of the provisions in this motion is that, to move a motion of non-confidence or confidence, as the case may be, there are two ways to present those motions. One would need a mover and 20 other members from at least two recognized political parties to sign onto it. That is one way I have sought to ensure this new type of motion would not be used continuously as a dilatory tactic.

I can say more about that. If members read the motion in its entirety, they will find that there are some other guardrails in there as well because of that. In fact, what the Speaker read in the guiding principles is exactly that, that this should not be seen as a dilatory tactic or some other way to conduct funny business. What we want is for members of Parliament to have lots of notice when votes of confidence are coming, a full day of debate and a vote at the end of that day so that it is a clear process that is hopefully not open to abuse.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I know the hon. member for Elmwood—Transcona certainly brings a lot of knowledge on questions of procedure.

My issue with the motion is largely one of the process that the member has chosen. Many aspects of his motion are seemingly novel, in terms of what he is proposing. I am curious as to why he chose this route of two hours of debate rather than inserting a clause into the motion to refer this to the procedure and House affairs committee for a more thorough study.

[Daniel Blaikie, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

Mr. Speaker, the issue of confidence has been studied a number of times. It has been studied in the House and outside the House. The reasons why I chose not to refer it to the procedure and House affairs committee are twofold.

The first is out of respect for the work that it is doing currently on foreign interference and a number of important issues, and an issue of privilege, actually, after the last day, with respect to the member for Wellington—Halton Hills.

The other reason is that I think it is high time we just got this done. I do think there is enough time to examine the content of the motion. I think that this would be a significant improvement on the current state of affairs.

I want to make change and one cannot make change without doing something novel. I do not hide from the fact that there are novel ideas in here. I think they are good ideas and I welcome the debate that is to come.

I hope that members here will fall on the side of asserting the power of the House of Commons over these decisions and making a change to something that has been open to abuse now since Confederation and that it is high time we did something about.

[Gabriel Ste-Marie, Bloc, Joliette, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to begin by congratulating the hon. member for Elmwood—Transcona on his important motion and on the very compelling speech he just delivered.

Accountability is important. We need to limit the concentration of power, and I think this motion contributes to that. We know that concentrating power almost systematically leads to abuse.

My question for my colleague is about the government's present attitude toward votes taking place in the House. When the House votes on motions or bills, we see that the Prime Minister does not always respect the will of the House when what has been proposed does not come from him.

For example, my colleague moved a motion on tax havens. Even though it had support in the House, the government did not introduce the measures that the motion called on the government to introduce. Another colleague had a bill passed to provide 50 weeks of EI sickness benefits to people with cancer. The government never followed through, even though it was the will of the House. A bill by one of our Conservative colleagues was passed about the family transfer of businesses. The government would not implement it.

What does my esteemed colleague think of that?

[Daniel Blaikie, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

I do believe that all too often, the government does not take the work that we do in the House of Commons and its committees seriously. That is why I think that we as members of Parliament must take measures to ask for that respect. This is about targeting the Prime Minister's important powers and saying the elected chamber should have more say in these decisions. We can get the federal government to take us much more seriously.

[Chandra Arya, Liberal, Nepean, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I am rising to speak to Motion No. 79, sponsored by the member for Elmwood—Transcona, which proposes a permanent change to the Standing Orders respecting confidence motions.

Before I speak to the content of the proposal contained in Motion No. 79, I would like to discuss some important principles that should guide our work when contemplating changes to the Standing Orders, especially when the changes would be permanent changes to the rules of the House. There is a long-standing tradition of the House in considering changes to our Standing Orders. This tradition includes two important principles. The first is that any change or suite of changes should benefit from a thorough study by the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs. The second is that any change to the rules that govern our deliberations should be done on a consensual basis.

The importance of having changes to the Standing Orders considered by the procedure and House affairs committee seems to be self-evident to most members of the House. These are our rules; they guide all the work we conduct in this place, and any change must be well understood by all members of the House. As a result, the procedure and House affairs committee plays an important role in studying the Standing Orders as they are, as well as proposed changes before they can be considered by the whole House.

In fact, Standing Order 51, chapter VII, which deals with the special debates that the House make take up and is the subject of the proposed amendment contained in Motion No. 79, provides a mechanism that requires the House to study the Standing Orders at the beginning of each Parliament. Standing Order 51 provides that the government, through a minister, must designate an order of the day for the consideration of a motion to take note of the Standing Orders and procedures of the House, which has precedence over all other business. The debate on the designated day is then permanently referred to the procedure and House affairs committee for study. Having these debates permanently referred to the procedure and House affairs committee allows the committee to take up studies over the course of the Parliament to review and consider changes to the Standing Orders.

The purpose of Standing Order 51 is to allow members to bring forward ideas on changes to the Standing Orders, which can then be studied by the procedure and House affairs committee. During the committee's study of the Standing Orders, the committee can hear from expert witnesses, including the Clerk of the House and other senior procedural clerks, to bring to the attention of the members possible adverse consequences that may result from certain changes. This expert testimony ensures the members of the committee consider changes to our rules by using an evidence-based process. Witnesses may also suggest changes to the proposed standing order changes to ensure consistency and alignment with the Standing Orders and practices of the House.

I believe that the procedure and House affairs committee plays an essential role in reviewing the Standing Orders, and I know the members on that committee take this work very seriously and with a great deal of pride. We must always keep in mind that changes to our Standing Orders affect every member of the House, and we not only need to get it right, but we also need to know and appreciate the long-term consequences of such changes. When we make changes in a majority context, we need to appreciate and understand how these changes will operate in the minority context, and the inverse is just as important.

I would now like to turn my attention, and that of the members, to Motion No. 79. The member for Elmwood—Transcona has selected, as his item of Private Members' Business, Motion No. 79, on confidence motions. The motion would create a new scheme in the “Special Debates” chapter in the Standing Orders dealing with confidence motions.

The preamble of Motion No. 79 states, in part (a), that “(i) it is a prerogative of the Crown to prorogue or dissolve Parliament at its pleasure“, and that “(iv) the confidence convention has never been clearly codified and this has sometimes led to confusion among members and the general public as to the nature and significance of certain votes”.

I would like to spend part of my remarks on the Crown's prerogatives. Page 43 of House of Commons Procedure and Practice states:

An essential feature of parliamentary government is that the Prime Minister and the Cabinet are responsible to, or must answer to, the House of Commons for their actions and must enjoy the support and the confidence of a majority of the Members of that Chamber to remain in office. This is commonly referred to as the confidence convention. This complex constitutional subject, a matter of tradition that is not written into any statute or Standing Order of the House....

Members can see that royal prerogatives are not found in any statute or in the Standing Orders. There is, however, one reference to confidence in the Standing Orders, that is, in Standing Order 6, in relation to the election of the Speaker. Precedents are clear that this provision is unnecessary and outdated, since the House itself elects the Speaker of the House, and the executive no longer plays any formal role in the election of the Speaker.

House of Commons Procedure and Practice, at page 43, goes on to articulate the point that confidence is not a matter of parliamentary procedure. It says, “What constitutes a question of confidence in the government varies with the circumstances. Confidence is not a matter of parliamentary procedure, nor is it something on which the Speaker can be asked to rule.”

There was a time when there were references in the Standing Orders to motions of non-confidence in relation to the consideration of supply. Page 44 of House of Commons Procedure and Practice sets out how the Standing Orders were modified in this regard and when these changes were removed:

When the Standing Orders respecting supply were amended in 1968, it was specified that, in each of the three supply periods, the opposition could designate not more than two of the motions proposed on allotted days as motions of non-confidence in the government. This was the first time the notion of confidence found expression in the Standing Orders. This rule was modified provisionally in March 1975 to remove the non-confidence qualification; the motions would still be brought to a vote but the vote would not automatically be considered an expression of confidence in the government. The provisional Standing Orders lapsed at the beginning of the following session and the term found its way back into the 1977 version of the Standing Orders. No further changes were made until June 1985, when the Standing Orders were again modified to remove the non-confidence provision with regard to supply.

For 43 years, there have been no operative Standing Orders that deal with confidence. There is a good reason for this. Since many Crown prerogatives have been superseded by statutes, there are still royal prerogatives that are not found in statutes, including but not limited to foreign affairs and treaty making, and the powers to prorogue or dissolve Parliament.

Now that I have addressed the notion of the Crown's prerogatives in relation to the prerogatives to prorogue or dissolve Parliament, I would like to speak of the mechanics of how Motion No. 79, if adopted, would operate.

I have not made up my mind about whether I will support this motion or oppose it. I will say, however, that I think this motion would benefit from study at the procedure and House affairs committee. The committee could really dig into the interplay between the role of the Standing Orders and the Crown prerogatives, and whether the scheme that is proposed in Motion No. 79 is acceptable in the context of our rules, given the informal nature of non-confidence motions in the Standing Orders.

Finally, I do not think that two one-hour debates are sufficient to fully understand the implications this motion would have on the procedures and practices of this House. That said, I will continue to have an open mind about the proposal because I have great respect for my colleague from Elmwood—Transcona and the views of other members who will speak in debate on this motion.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak on Motion No. 79, introduced by the hon. member for Elmwood—Transcona. The motion would make substantial changes to the Standing Orders pertaining to confidence votes and the prorogation of Parliament.

With respect to confidence votes, it would make significant changes in a number of different ways. Perhaps less of a change is that it would seek to amend the Standing Orders to expressly provide that votes on the main estimates, the budget and the address in reply to the Speech from the Throne be treated as questions of confidence. By convention, for all intents and purposes, these votes are treated as questions of confidence. It would, indeed, be difficult to imagine a scenario in which a government could survive losing any such vote.

Even more, however, this motion would significantly regulate and limit the ability of members to bring forward and put on notice motions of non-confidence in the government. It would do so in three ways. First, in order to put such a motion on notice, the signatures of at least 20 members of Parliament from more than one of the recognized parties would be required. Second, only one such motion of non-confidence could be put on notice per supply period. Third, members would be limited to either sponsoring or signing such a motion once per session.

With respect to prorogation, this motion would require that the government put on notice a confidence motion upon the Prime Minister expressing the intention to advise and consult the Governor General with respect to prorogation.

The hon. member for Elmwood—Transcona is a learned member. He brings a great deal of institutional knowledge and a good understanding of matters of procedure, and I have a lot of respect for him. I appreciate, in that regard, the spirit in which the member is seeking to make changes to the Standing Orders. However, I will be unable to support this motion, primarily because of the process that the member has proposed in making changes to the Standing Orders.

Two hours of debate, nothing more, nothing less, is the process that the member has chosen. There would be no study or consultation. Why is this? It is because that is the process for private members' motions, and it is the way in which the hon. member has embarked upon amending the Standing Orders. I would submit that, with regard to the substantial changes that are being proposed, two hours of debate would be completely inadequate under the circumstances.

I would submit further that it is all the more inadequate given the fact that many aspects of this motion are seemingly novel, as the hon. member conceded when I put a question to him earlier. Although much ink has been spilled on, for example, the subject of prorogation, and although the procedure and House affairs committee has undertaken multiple studies in recent years on prorogation, what the hon. member is specifically proposing has not been studied. This is that the government should put forward a confidence motion upon the Prime Minister expressing the intention to prorogue Parliament. Similarly, the significant way in which the hon. member is proposing to limit the ability to put on notice other motions of non-confidence in the government has not been considered either.

The hon. member is quite right to say that he is not ashamed that some of these ideas are novel ones. It is good to come up with new ideas. All hon. members should make an effort to bring fresh ideas, but new ideas need to be tested.

What would have been better is if this motion had contained a clause referring the items and the changes proposed to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs. That would have provided an opportunity to hear from witnesses, including experts, to better understand the implications of the many changes that the member is proposing. Had the hon. member included such a clause in the motion, I would have been very open to supporting the motion. It is unfortunate that the motion does not contain such a clause. On that basis alone, I am unable to support the motion.

The need for study is further underscored by the fact that the motion could have constitutional implications as it pertains to prorogation. The Governor General derives the authority to prorogue Parliament pursuant to section 38 of the Constitution Act of 1867. More specifically, section 38 provides the Governor General with the authority to summon Parliament and therefore, by extension, to prorogue it. The authority of the Governor General is exercisable according to unwritten constitutional convention upon the Prime Minister providing advice and consulting with the Governor General. It is the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister alone who consults the Governor General on the question of prorogation.

By prescribing that a motion of confidence be put before the Prime Minister goes to the Governor General limits the discretion of the Prime Minister to seek prorogation. Moreover, the motion proposes to insert a wedge between the Prime Minister and the Governor General and that, in turn, could impact upon the manner in which the Governor General responds to the advice of the Prime Minister. I would note that, on the question of constitutional implications, section 41(a) of the Constitution Act of 1982 provides that any change respecting the Office of the Governor General requires a constitutional amendment.

All of this is to say that there are a number of considerations that need to be studied and considered, and on that basis, it would be premature to adopt the motion at this time.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak to Motion No. 79, moved by my colleague from Elmwood—Transcona, whom I thank, by the way, for his excellent speech.

Despite the fact that I still consider myself a young politician, perhaps less so in age than in years of experience, I feel that I have learned a lot about procedural matters during my three and a half years in office. I had the pleasure of participating in the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, particularly when it came time to set up a hybrid Parliament during the pandemic. Although I stopped sitting regularly on the committee after that, I followed its work from a distance. Among that work was the study on proroguing Parliament during the summer of 2020. This was the first time that the government was required to justify its use of prorogation after the fact. As I will explain, this did not solve the problem of partisan use of prorogation.

Today's motion just happens to touch on the framework of prorogation, along with the definition of a vote of confidence. I want to quickly review these two aspects of the motion, which are in some ways intertwined.

With respect to prorogation, the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs had the opportunity to read and analyze the “Report on the Government's Report to Parliament: August 2020 Prorogation—COVID-19 Pandemic” and produce its own report on that report. That report noted the various times in history when the government has used prorogation for what could be described as partisan purposes. I would like to take a moment to read part of that report. It is rather enlightening.

[In 1873,] Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald requested and received a prorogation from Governor General Lord Dufferin when facing a loss of support in the House of Commons during a political scandal that would be dubbed the Pacific scandal. The Committee heard that the 1873 prorogation ended a committee inquiry into the matter but that the controversy over the scandal resumed during the subsequent parliamentary session. Sir John resigned a few weeks after Parliament resumed.

[More recently, in 2002,] Prime Minister Jean Chrétien requested and received a prorogation from Governor General Adrienne Clarkson at a time when details were emerging of a political scandal that would be dubbed the sponsorship scandal. The prorogation prevented a report from the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts on the sponsorship scandal from being presented in the House.

[One year later, in 2003,] Mr. Chrétien prorogued Parliament until February 2004. This delayed the tabling of the Auditor General’s report on the sponsorship scandal, which was due to be tabled that November, until after Mr. Chrétien left office.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper requested and received a prorogation from Governor General Michaëlle Jean in December 2008. The prorogation occurred at a time when a global financial crisis had recently begun. However, the prorogation also enabled the government to postpone a non-confidence vote in the House that was being sought by the Liberal Party, the New Democratic Party, who had proposed a coalition, and the Bloc Québécois, who had agreed to support the coalition under a supply and confidence agreement. It was noted that the Governor General granted the request for prorogation but only after several hours of reflection. By the time the House resumed sitting in January 2009, the opposition coalition had collapsed. One witness referred to these circumstances as being driven by a breakdown in good governance within the Liberal caucus.

[En 2010,] Prime Minister Harper requested and received a prorogation from Governor General Michaëlle Jean, from January 2010 to March 2010. The reason for the three-month duration of the prorogation was to allow Parliament to recess for the Winter Olympics in Vancouver. However, the prorogation also postponed the examination by the House of Commons Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan into alleged mistreatment of Afghan detainees while in custody.

The 2020 prorogation was no exception to the list of prorogations that were requested for partisan purposes. Although the government invoked the pandemic as a reason, in the eyes of several witnesses who appeared before the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, there was some doubt about that justification. The fact that the government was mired in the WE scandal, that the prorogation lasted for a long time, five weeks, and that the government's report was biased, led the committee to conclude that reforms around the prorogation of the House and votes of confidence needed to be clarified.

Essentially, while the legislative change in 2017 was intended to make the use of prorogation more transparent after the fact, the goal was not met. In a way, the purpose of Motion No. 79 is to make the use of prorogation transparent upstream instead of downstream, after the fact, when it is too late. Essentially, Motion No. 79 would allow, prior to a prorogation of the House and after the Prime Minister expresses an intention to recommend such a prorogation, a motion of confidence to be moved, in which case the motion should meet a range of criteria.

It will have to be tabled with four days' notice and to be signed by 20 members of the House representing more than one recognized party, which removes some of the partisanship from the initiative.

To avoid abuse, there are safeguards in place. Only one such motion can be placed on notice per supply period and only one can be sponsored or signed by the same member of the House in a session of a Parliament. The text of the motion can either be, “That the House has lost confidence in the government” or “That the House has confidence in the government”. Both are quite clear and unambiguous. It cannot be amended. The time of the debate is limited to a maximum of one ordinary sitting day and a maximum of 20 minutes per member and 10 minutes for questions and answers. Consequently, no stalling tactics are possible. Once the four days have passed after notice was given, the motion takes precedence over all other business of the House. It is debated and then voted on.

Linking prorogation to a confidence vote will hopefully make a government that wants to use it not only think twice about the risk of being defeated and triggering a general election, but also consider whether it has the grounds to seek prorogation with the assent of other parties in the House.

We must remember that the prorogation of a session puts an end to all the business of Parliament, with some exceptions. Every committee, with the exception of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, stops its work when prorogation occurs.

Every time there is a partisan prorogation, it is the taxpayers, the citizens, who pay the price, since many bills that affect their daily life die on the Order Paper.

In a political context where we can expect more and more governments to be elected with a minority, making prorogation increasingly likely, Motion No. 79 provides a framework that is entirely justified and welcome.

As for the confidence vote aspect, how does a confidence vote work? How do we define what constitutes a confidence vote?

Actually, it is not always particularly clear. I would refer members to what the parliamentary website tells us. Currently, matters of confidence are regulated by constitutional convention. The website states:

As the confidence convention is an unwritten parliamentary practice, it is not always clear what constitutes a question of confidence. Motions that clearly state that the House of Commons has lost confidence in the government, motions concerning the government’s budgetary policy, motions for the granting of supply, motions in relation to the Address in Reply to the Speech from the Throne, and motions the government clearly identifies as questions of confidence are usually recognized as such.

This convention is subject to interpretation, so some uncertainty needs to be cleared up in terms of the definition of “vote of confidence”. That is what Motion No. 79 seeks to do.

Professor Hugo Cyr had this to say to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs:

It is essential to understand that it is up to the House of Commons itself to determine whether it gives and maintains its confidence in the government. There is sometimes confusion in this respect, as prime ministers sometimes state that a vote on a particular bill or issue will be a confidence vote.

This undue pressure on parliamentarians could be considered a form of blackmail, and that has no place in a democracy. The government should never be able to hold an opposition responsible for defeating a government, for example, on an issue that should never have been a matter of confidence.

For all these reasons, both with respect to prorogation and the framework for votes of confidence, I commend the work of the member for Elmwood—Transcona on Motion No. 79. It lines up with the recommendations the Bloc Québécois made during the drafting of the report on the prorogation of the summer of 2020.

I hope, despite what I just heard in the last two speeches in the House, that Motion No. 79 will receive the support of the House.