moved:
That:
(a) the House recognize that,
(i) it is a prerogative of the Crown to prorogue or dissolve Parliament at its pleasure,
(ii) the circumstances surrounding a prorogation of the House may bear on whether the government enjoys the confidence of the House,
(iii) the confidence convention is an important cornerstone of the Canadian political system,
(iv) the confidence convention has never been clearly codified and this has sometimes led to confusion among members and the general public as to the nature and significance of certain votes,
(v) governments have sometimes abused the confidence convention to reinforce party discipline or influence the outcome of a vote that is not explicitly a matter of confidence or that would not be considered a matter of confidence by convention;
(b) in the opinion of the House,
(i) the House itself, not the Prime Minister, should be the final authority as to whether the government of the day enjoys the confidence of the House,
(ii) when the House assembles following a general election, the government shall be called upon to demonstrate it enjoys the confidence of the House,
(iii) before a prorogation occurs, the House ought to have an opportunity to express its confidence in the government,
(iv) the means by which the House may pronounce itself on a question of confidence should be explicit, clear and predictable so that all members know well in advance when and how the confidence of the House will be tested,
(v) once the House has determined such means in its Standing Orders or in legislation, the government should not seek to circumvent the process established by the House by declaring a vote to be a matter of confidence if the rules of the House would not otherwise designate that vote as a matter of confidence, and any attempt to do so constitutes a contempt of Parliament,
(vi) a question of confidence is a serious matter and should not be used as a pretext for dilatory tactics by either side of the House;
(c) effective from the 20th sitting day after the adoption of this motion or at the beginning of the next Parliament, whichever comes first, the Standing Orders be amended as follows:
(i) by adding, after Standing Order 53.1, the following new standing order:
“53.2(1) The government must enjoy the confidence of the House of Commons. The House may express its confidence, or lack thereof, in the government by adopting a confidence motion in one of the following forms:
(a) “That the House has lost confidence in the government”;
(b) “That the House has confidence in the government”.
(2)(a) Notice of a confidence motion pursuant to section (1) of this standing order shall meet the requirements of Standing Order 54, provided that four sitting days shall be given prior to the motion being placed on the Order Paper. Such notice shall be signed by the sponsor and 20 other members representing more than one of the recognized parties.
(b) Notwithstanding Standing Order 18, the House may pronounce itself on the motions listed in section (1) of this standing order more than once.
(c) Only one confidence motion pursuant to section (1) of this standing order:
(i) may be placed on notice in each supply period;
(ii) shall be sponsored or signed by the same member of the House in a session of a Parliament.
(3) At the expiry of the notice period pursuant to section (2) of this standing order, an order of the day for the consideration of a confidence motion shall be placed on the Order Paper, be considered at the next sitting of the House and take precedence over all other business of the House, with the exception of a debate on a motion arising from a question of privilege.
(4) When the order of the day on a confidence motion is called, it must stand as the first order of the day. The confidence motion is deemed to have been moved and seconded and shall not be subject to any amendment.
(5) Private Members’ Business shall be suspended on a day any such motion is debated.
(6) No dilatory motion shall be received during debate on a confidence motion pursuant to section (1) of this standing order and the provisions of Standing Orders 62 and 63 shall be suspended.
(7) The proceedings on the order of the day on a confidence motion proposed thereto shall not exceed one sitting day.
(8) No member shall speak for more than 20 minutes at a time in the debate on a confidence motion. Following the speech of each member, a period not exceeding 10 minutes shall be made available, if required, to allow members to ask questions and comment briefly on matters relevant to the speech and to allow responses thereto. Any period of debate of 20 minutes may be divided in two pursuant to the provisions of Standing Order 43(2).
(9) When no further member rises to speak, or at the ordinary hour of daily adjournment, whichever is earlier, the Speaker shall interrupt the proceedings and the question shall be put and forthwith disposed of, notwithstanding Standing Order 45.
(10) Any matter of confidence so designated beyond those provided for in Standing Orders 50(8), 53.2(1), 81(18)(e), and 84(6)(b) may be called to the attention of the Chair and the member may ask that the matter be referred to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs. As the case may be, the matter shall automatically be referred to the said committee.”,
(ii) by adding, after Standing Order 53.2, the following new standing order:
“53.3(1) Following an expression of intent by the Prime Minister to recommend prorogation to the Crown, a minister of the Crown may place a confidence motion on notice that does not count for the purposes of Standing Order 53.2(2)(c).
(2) This motion shall proceed pursuant to Standing Order 53.2, except that the notice period required by Standing Order 53.2(2)(a) shall be one sitting day, instead of four, and the notice need only be signed by a minister of the Crown.
(3) During an adjournment period, when a confidence motion is put on notice pursuant to paragraph 3(1) of this standing order, the Speaker shall recall the House to meet at an earlier time, and thereupon the House shall meet to transact its business as if it had been duly adjourned to that time, provided that at least 48 hours’ notice shall be given for any sitting held pursuant to this paragraph.
(4) In the event of a prorogation occurring prior to the question being put on a confidence motion, the House shall, as its first item of business of a new session, consider a confidence motion pursuant to Standing Order 53.2, which shall be deemed placed on the Order Paper for that purpose.
53.4 At the opening of every Parliament, immediately after the Speaker has reported on the attendance of the Commons to the Senate, a motion pursuant to Standing Order 53.2(1)(b) shall be deemed moved and seconded, and be otherwise governed pursuant to Standing Orders 53.2(6), (7), (8) and (9).
(iii) in Standing Order 45(6)(a), by adding, after the words “An exception to this rule is”, the following: “the division on a confidence motion pursuant to Standing Order 53.2(9) and”,
(iv) by adding, after Standing Order 50(7), the following:
“(8) If the main motion is defeated, the government has lost the confidence of the House.”,
(v) by adding, after Standing Order 67(1)(p), the following:
“(q) for the consideration of a confidence motion”,
(vi) in Standing Order 81(13), by adding the following:
“They cannot contain explicitly worded expressions of confidence in the government.”,
(vii) by adding, after Standing Order 81(18)(d), the following:
“(e) After having disposed of any opposed item, if the motion to concur in the main estimates is defeated, the government has lost the confidence of the House.”,
(viii) by renumbering Standing Order 84(6) as Standing Order 84(6)(a),
(ix) by adding, after Standing Order 84(6)(a), the following:
“(b) If the main motion is defeated, the government has lost the confidence of the House.”,
(x) in Standing Order 99(1), by adding, after “52(14),”, the following: “53.2(5),”; and
(d) the Clerk of the House be authorized to make any required editorial and consequential alterations to the Standing Orders, including to the marginal notes, as well as such changes to the Order Paper and Notice Paper, as may be required.
Mr. Speaker, the Prime Minister is one of the most powerful people in the country, and that is a function of the Prime Minister's Office, which includes a number of serious powers.
Foremost among those is the power to decide, at any time, that Parliament is done, that the work of Parliament is finished and that we are going to have an election. It is the power to decide that Parliament's work can be put on pause, and the important work that is happening at committee could be, not just put on pause, but stopped. It would have to start up again in another session of Parliament.
We have seen this power used appropriately over the course of Canadian history, and we have also seen it be abused. One of the most recent examples of the abuse of this power was in the summer of 2020, when the government was embroiled in the WE charity scandal, with many committees studying what had happened. They were calling for witnesses for, and papers and evidence about, what was going on in the government and how the scandal arose. The Prime Minister decided to say that Parliament was prorogued. All that work stopped. Members of Parliament were not able to come to this place or to work together to do the work that we are elected to do, which is to hold the government to account.
We saw that happen in the summer of 2020. It was a controversial decision to prorogue. I think many Canadians were rightly upset about that. I was part of an effort at the procedure and House affairs committee to get to the bottom of why it was the Prime Minister chose to prorogue. One of the real frustrations in that sitting was that the Prime Minister himself refused to come to that study. In fact, we watched Liberal members on that committee filibuster for months on end to avoid a simple invitation to the Prime Minister to come to explain his own actions.
That was certainly an example where we saw the power of prorogation abused. I would say, arguably, just the next year, in 2021, we saw the same Prime Minister abuse a similar power, which was to dissolve Parliament and declare our work finished, and then we went to the polls. We have fixed election date laws in Canada. Unfortunately, there is no way to punish prime ministers for ignoring those laws, as the Prime Minister did in the fall of 2021 when he called an election while we were still in the midst of a pandemic. In fact, the procedure and House affairs committee was in the process of looking at a government bill designed to make accommodations for the pandemic at election time.
Instead of respecting the work of that committee and the many voices across the country who were saying that Canada was not ready to have an election during a pandemic, the Prime Minister pulled the plug and held the election anyway. It was an election that no one but him wanted, and that was very clear. It was made very clear to all of us on the doorsteps over the course of that election. Nevertheless, it was the Prime Minister, through the power of his office, who was able to do that, without any meaningful accountability.
I want to go back to an example from much earlier, but folks would be relieved to hear it is in this century. I am not going all the way back to the 19th century. In 2008, former prime minister Harper effected the most egregious abuse of the power of prorogation when he knew that opposition parties were going to bring a non-confidence motion forward to say that the members of this place did not believe that he should govern. Instead of facing the House and facing that vote, which would have been the honourable thing to do, he chose to abuse the powers of the Prime Minister's Office and prorogued parliament, so opposition members could not bring a motion of non-confidence to the House.