Debates of Sept. 16th, 2024

Question No.2799—

[Yasir Naqvi, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health]

Mr. Speaker, in response to parts (a) to (c) of the question, the health and safety of Canadians are the utmost priority for Health Canada and the Public Health Agency of Canada, or PHAC. Health Canada has a rigorous scientific review system in place to ensure vaccines are safe and effective in preventing the diseases they target. Before a vaccine can be approved for sale in Canada, it undergoes an in-depth review of evidence for safety, efficacy, and quality by Health Canada. Evidence provided to Health Canada includes data from pre-clinical studies, including toxicology studies, clinical trials as well as data demonstrating that manufacturing processes ensure the consistency and quality of the vaccine. Once vaccines are authorized, Health Canada releases information about the vaccine, including summaries of the data considered by Health Canada. This includes non-clinical, clinical and other studies, as well as how the decision was made. For coronavirus disease 2019 vaccines, this information can be found on Health Canada’s website at https://covid-vaccine.canada.ca/.

COVID-19 vaccines are indicated for active immunization to prevent COVID-19 caused by SARS-CoV-2. The approval of the vaccines was based on safety and efficacy data collected in non-clinical studies and clinical trials. Clinical data for these vaccines is available on the clinical information on drugs and medical devices website at https://clinical-information.canada.ca/search/ci-rc?f%5B0%5D=drug_brand_name%3A%22COMIRNATY%20OMICRON%20XBB1.5%22#tabs-0-laurier_content-1.

Clinical trials were not designed to demonstrate that vaccines were effective in preventing the transmission of SARS-CoV-2. Once available on the market, the safety and effectiveness of the COVID-19 vaccines are continuously monitored and evaluated by Health Canada and PHAC. Vaccine manufacturers are obliged to continue to collect information about the long-term safety and effectiveness of their products. Evidence from peer-reviewed studies from domestic and international sources published in the medical literature established the effectiveness of vaccination in reducing disease transmission.

With respect to parts (d) to (f) of the question, the National Advisory Committee on Immunization, or NACI, provides PHAC with ongoing and timely medical, scientific, and public health advice relating to immunization. The health and safety of Canadians has always been a priority. Leading up to and during the height of the pandemic, officials were briefed regularly on developments in relation to COVID-19.

In 2021, early NACI guidance to PHAC and stakeholders initially emphasized uncertainty surrounding the ability of COVID-19 vaccines to prevent infection and transmission and duration of protection following vaccination, and communicated the need for ongoing monitoring. As the pandemic progressed, emerging evidence suggested some degree of prevention of infection and transmission was achievable with COVID-19 vaccination and this was reflected in NACI’s advice.

The emergence of each new variant required re-assessment of how the vaccines were performing, including against infection and transmission. The emergence of the highly transmissible Omicron variant at the end of 2021 introduced new complexities, making the prevention of infection and transmission from COVID-19 vaccination, including from booster doses, less certain. All NACI advice regarding COVID-19 vaccines is published online at https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/immunization/national-advisory-committee-on-immunization-naci.html and is representative of the evidence available at the time each statement was written. In addition, starting in March 2021, summaries of NACI advice were also provided by PHAC to succinctly communicate the key points and implications of the NACI guidance to the public.

Informed consent occurs through discussion between health care providers and patients on the risks and benefits of a vaccine. In order to support these informed consent discussions, PHAC communicated the evolving evidence on vaccine effectiveness to healthcare providers throughout the COVID-19 vaccine rollout. This began in December 2020 when PHAC launched a series of webinars that communicated what was known and not yet known about the newly authorized vaccines from clinical trial data, as well as recommendations for their use. PHAC continued to deliver webinars to update health care providers as evidence emerged throughout 2021 and 2022. Additionally, as noted, NACI statements and the Canadian Immunization Guide were updated to reflect the most recent evidence on vaccine effectiveness as it emerged. PHAC's webinars for healthcare providers on COVID-19 vaccines can be found at https://canvax.ca/public-health-agency-canada-phac-vaccine-confidence-webinar-series.

With respect to part (g), the NACI secretariat was the source of messaging for all officials, supported by PHAC, as well as Health Canada in its role regulating drugs and health products to support public safety.

With respect to part (h), these messages were approved by the president of PHAC and Health Canada’s deputy minister.

Question No.2800—

[Larry Maguire, Conservative, Brandon—Souris, MB]

With regard to Transport Canada and meetings concerning Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP): (a) when Patrick Juneau was the Director of Aviation Safety Policy and Intelligence at Transport Canada, did he meet with any United States officials on the subject of UAP, and, if so, what are the details of all such meetings, including, for each, (i) the date, (ii) the location, (iii) the names and titles of those in attendance, (iv) what was discussed or agreed upon; (b) have any Transport Canada officials other than Patrick Juneau met with any United States officials on the subject of UAP, and, if so, who and what are the details of all such meetings attended by any Transport Canada official, including, for each, (i) the date, (ii) the location, (iii) the names and titles of those in attendance, (iv) what was discussed or agreed upon; and (c) what are the details, including the website where the agreement can be read, of any UAP information sharing agreements that Transport Canada is aware of, between Canadian entities and American entities?

[Pablo Rodriguez, Liberal, Minister of Transport]

Mr. Speaker, in response to part (a) of the question, Transport Canada can confirm that Mr. Juneau did not have any meetings specific to Unidentified Aerial Phenomena with United States officials.

With respect to part (b), Transport Canada did not locate any meeting notes or records of decisions of meetings occurring about Unidentified Aerial Phenomena with United States officials.

As for part (c), Transport Canada did not locate any records pertaining to information sharing agreements about Unidentified Aerial Phenomena.

Reports filed in Civil Aviation Daily Occurrence Reporting System on Transport Canada’s website are publicly available at CADORS: Query, at https://wwwapps.tc.gc.ca/saf-sec-sur/2/cadors-screaq/q.aspx?lang=eng.

Question No.2803—

[Laila Goodridge, Conservative, Fort McMurray—Cold Lake, AB]

With regard to requests received by Health Canada related to decriminalization from provinces, municipalities or Indigenous communities, since January 1, 2016: what are the details of all such requests, including, for each, the (i) date, (ii) name and title of the person who made the request, (iii) entity represented by the person making the request, (iv) summary of the request, (v) response by Health Canada?

[Élisabeth Brière, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Families]

Mr. Speaker, as to the request by the City of Vancouver, the final submission was made on May 28, 2021, by the city manager. The proposed model would decriminalize personal possession of small amounts of controlled substances for adults over 18 within city limits. Specific thresholds were proposed for common drugs. Personal possession of other drugs was proposed as a three-day supply, as determined by police. Individuals in possession of drugs below thresholds for personal use would not be arrested or have their drugs seized. Instead, they would be given a voluntary referral to a health care resource. The proposed exemption would not apply where there is evidence to indicate intent to traffic. The request has been suspended at the request of the City of Vancouver since June 2022.

As to the request by the Province of British Columbia, please refer to the website of the Province of British Columbia for publicly available information on this request. Health Canada granted B.C.’s original request for an exemption on May 31, 2022. This exemption was amended in September 2023 to add additional targeted exceptions to where they would apply. The exemption was amended again in May 2024 to prohibit possession in public spaces. The exemption expires on January 31, 2026.

As to the request by Toronto Public Health, please refer to the website of the City of Toronto for publicly available information on this request. Toronto Public Health’s request was refused on May 17, 2024.

Question No.2805—

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

With regard to the Department of National Defence's decision to move employees working out of offices at 400 Cumberland Street to the Major-General George R. Pearkes Building due to safety concerns: (a) how much is the move expected to cost, in total and broken down by type of expense; (b) how many employees are being moved; (c) did the department make any representations to the Minister of Justice that the government's catch and release justice policies were creating safety concerns for their employees, and, if so, what are the details; and (d) if the department did not make any such representations to the Minister of Justice, why were they not made?

[Marie-France Lalonde, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence]

Mr. Speaker, as to part (a), the overall cost of moving National Defence employees from the 400 Cumberland location to the Major-General George R. Pearkes Building is estimated at approximately $1 million. This amount includes approximately $20,000 for space cleaning and building preparation, and $980,000 for moving personnel and equipment.

As to part (b), up to 995 National Defence personnel will be moved from 400 Cumberland to the Pearkes Building.

As to parts (c) and (d), National Defence did not make any representations to the Minister of Justice on this topic.

National Defence takes seriously the safety and security of its personnel. Canadian Forces Military Police respond to incidents within their jurisdiction at Department of National Defence establishments. Incidents taking place in locations where there is concurrent jurisdiction with the civilian police are deferred to the police of primary jurisdiction, which in this case was the Ottawa Police Service.

Question No.2808—

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

With regard to Health Canada’s (HC) approval of the modRNA COVID-19 vaccines manufactured by Pfizer and Moderna and distributed throughout Canada, its mechanism of action and the elements of which they are comprised: (a) how many copies of the modRNA molecule are in a single dose, for both the Pfizer and Moderna products, (i) for adults, (ii) for children; (b) how many copies of the antigen are in a single adult dose of Novavax; (c) if there is a significant numerical difference between the answers for (a) and (b), does this affect the immunological response; (d) how many copies of dsDNA are found in a single 30 microliter adult dose of (i) Pfizer’s product, (ii) Moderna’s product; (e) was a request made to Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna regarding the DNA size distribution in the vaccine and, if so, (i) what proportion of the total DNA quantity were under 200bp, (ii) what was the average, range and standard deviation; (f) what is the function of the modRNA; (g) what is the function of the lipid nanoparticles (LNPs); (h) what is the specific role(s) of N1-methyl-pseudouridine as used in the modRNA of the vaccines; (i) what safety data was available to HC at the time of approval and is currently available, regarding any and repeat exposure to the following in human cells (i.e., safety, efficacy, toxicity): (i) large amounts of N1-methyl-pseudouridine, (ii) dsRNA, (iii) cytosolic DNA, (iv) lipid nanoparticles; (j) with regard to the research underpinning (g), has a risk assessment been performed of the LNPs separately from that of the drug product for safety, toxicity; (k) does HC have any degradation data for the modRNA in the vaccines and, if so, what does the data show; (l) what is the duration of action of modRNA from the COVID-19 mRNA in the body and how was that measured; (m) in what cells and organs is spike protein most likely to be produced in the body; (n) in which cell types and tissues does the modRNA remain for the longest period of time and second longest period of time, and what are the time periods; (o) for what period of time does a person injected with modRNA produce spike protein; (p) is the production of spike protein dependent on cell type; (q) is there a known correlation between the amount of modRNA in the vaccine and the amount of spike protein produced by the cells; (r) has HC performed a risk assessment on the immunological, toxicological and carcinogenicity of the spike protein and, if so, what was the analysis, and, if not, why weren't these risk assessments considered necessary; (s) if production of spike protein antigen is prolonged for greater than three to five days, does prolonged exposure lead to ongoing production of antibodies; (t) if the answer to (s) is negative, will a study or investigation be undertaken to determine this; (u) if the answer to (s) is affirmative, and if antibodies are the indicator of immunity, why does efficacy wane with time when the antigen production is prolonged; (v) has the purity of the modRNA contained in the COVID-19 vaccines been determined; (w) if the answer to (v) is affirmative, what is the present accepted limit of fragmented and truncated modRNA; (x) if the answer to (v) is negative, why hasn’t the purity of the modRNA been established; (y) if production of spike protein expression is prolonged for more than three to five days, are there harmful sequelae to prolonged exposure; and (z) if the answer to (y) is affirmative, what are those harmful sequelae?

[Yasir Naqvi, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health]

Mr. Speaker, with regard to parts (a) to (z), the health and safety of Canadians are the utmost priority for Health Canada. Health Canada has a rigorous scientific review system in place to ensure vaccines are safe and effective in preventing the diseases they target. More information on these standards and how Health Canada regulates vaccines for human use in Canada can be found at https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/biologics-radiopharmaceuticals-genetic-therapies/activities/fact-sheets/regulation-vaccines-human-canada.html. Once vaccines are authorized, Health Canada releases information about the vaccines, including summaries of the data considered by Health Canada. This includes non-clinical, clinical and other studies, as well as how the decision was made. This information can be found on Health Canada’s website at https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/drug-products/drug-product-database.html.

Information requested regarding the strength of each of the COVID-19 vaccines, dosing information and information on the mechanism of action can be found in the product monographs: Nuvaxovid XBB.1.5, at https://covid-vaccine.canada.ca/info/pdf/nuvaxovid-xbb-1-5-pm-en.pdf; Comirnaty Omicron XBB.1.5, at https://covid-vaccine.canada.ca/info/pdf/comirnaty-omicron-xbb-1-5-pm-en.pdf; and Spikevax XBB.1.5, at https://covid-vaccine.canada.ca/info/pdf/spikevax-xbb-1-5-pm-en.pdf.

The manufacturing data provided to Health Canada demonstrated the ability to produce a vaccine with consistent quality. Levels of impurities, including dsDNA, are strictly controlled during the manufacturing process and before the product is released on the market, to ensure product quality and safety. The sponsor provided sufficient information to support the consistency of production and quality of the product. These requirements are informed by science and are aligned with international standards, including the International Council for Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use.

The mRNA in the COVID-19 vaccines uses modified nucleosides to avoid activation of the cellular immune response and destruction of the mRNA, to enhance translation and to improve stability. Various modifications to the mRNA sequence have been introduced for maintaining antigen conformation, that is, ensuring the ‘shape’ of the antigen is capable of generating the desired immune responses. Detailed characterization studies were performed to provide assurance that the drug substance consistently exhibits the desired characteristic structure and biological activity. Additional information can be found in the summary basis of decision, or SBD, documents published by Health Canada, which provide an overview of the data examined. These can be found by accessing the COVID-19 Vaccines and Treatments Portal, at https://covid-vaccine.canada.ca/.

Studies on the biodistribution and pharmacokinetics of the lipid nanoparticle-formulated modified mRNA were conducted and were submitted as part of the preclinical and early clinical trial phase data packages that companies are required to submit to regulatory agencies, including Health Canada. The preclinical data provided demonstrated that vaccine-produced spike protein is rapidly broken down and does not persist in the body. This data was analyzed by Health Canada prior to authorizations being granted for the COVID-19 vaccines. The outcomes of some of these studies can be found in the summary basis of decision for each product, available on the Drug and Health Product Portal, at https://dhpp.hpfb-dgpsa.ca/review-documents.

The benefits of vaccines authorized in Canada continue to outweigh the risks. Health Canada, PHAC, the provinces and territories, and manufacturers continue to closely monitor the safety of COVID-19 vaccines. Health Canada and PHAC receive reports of adverse events following immunization with COVID-19 vaccines in Canada through the Canada vigilance program, or CVP, and the Canadian adverse events following immunization surveillance system, or CAEFISS. Adverse events following immunization are routinely monitored. Information on adverse events following immunization with COVID-19 vaccines, including breakdowns of reports by vaccine name, age and sex, are published on the Government of Canada website at https://health-infobase.canada.ca/covid-19/vaccine-safety/. All signals are monitored and investigated.

Question No.2811—

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

With regard to Global Affairs Canada’s obligations detailed in the Voices at Risk guidelines, since January 1, 2023: (a) what are the details of any efforts Canadian officials have made to advocate for the release of detained human rights defenders in each country where Canada has a diplomatic presence, including the number of requests for prison visits made by Canadian missions, and the response of detaining authorities; and (b) what are the details of any efforts made to attend trials of human rights defenders in each country where Canada has a diplomatic presence, including the number of requests to attend these hearings made by Canadian missions, and the response of detaining authorities?

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs]

Mr. Speaker, the promotion and protection of human rights is a long-standing foundation of Canadian foreign policy. Human rights are essential to Canada’s identity, prosperity and security, and a key component to addressing global challenges. Canada is strongly committed to taking action to respect, protect and fulfill the human rights of all, both at home and abroad. This action includes constructive engagement on human rights within the United Nations system. Canada advocates through bilateral diplomacy and technical assistance, public advocacy, support for local and international human rights defenders and civil society entities, including women’s rights organizations and women human rights defenders, the imposition of sanctions and export bans, and actions in regional and global multilateral forums.

Voices at Risk: Canada’s Guidelines on Supporting Human Rights Defenders”, found at https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/human_rights-droits_homme/rights_defenders_guide_defenseurs_droits.aspx?lang=eng, provides practical advice, tools and resources to Canadian officials supporting human rights defenders, or HRDs, around the world. As section 4.1 of the guidelines indicates, when the HRD at risk is a Canadian citizen, it is considered a consular case. In these instances, Canada can seek to leverage specific mechanisms for engagement due to the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, found at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=III-6&chapter=3. However, these efforts can be complicated when the Canadian citizen HRD has dual or multiple citizenships, given that the degree to which dual citizenship is accepted or recognized varies from country to country. In all cases, regardless of the citizenship of HRDs, Canada’s approach is tailored to local contexts and circumstances, and respond to the specific needs of the HRDs.

Section 3.9 of the guidelines provides information on attending trials and hearings, and visiting detained HRDs, recognizing that these efforts can demonstrate a clear and visible expression of Canada’s concern, enable officials to monitor legal proceedings and observe whether due process is respected, and allow networking opportunities with human rights organizations, other diplomats and local authorities working on cases of concern. It is recognized that local authorities do not always allow foreign diplomats to attend trials and may implement restrictions on visiting HRDs in detention, even in the cases of Canadian citizens.

Section 3.1 further outlines that missions are encouraged to monitor relevant situations and report regularly on developments in their countries of accreditation, with information being shared with the relevant geographic bureau at headquarters, the human rights and indigenous affairs policy division and other units as appropriate. The management of this documentation requires serious considerations with respect to the protection and safety of the HRDs. Operational safeguards must be applied to ensure respect for confidentiality, the protection of sources and the security of information, to avoid heightening the risks faced by the HRDs and diminishing Canada’s ability to provide support.

GAC does not systematically track all HRD cases on which Canada is engaged in a centralized database. Producing and validating a comprehensive response to this question would require manual collection and review of information held by the human rights and indigenous affairs policy division, the consular affairs bureau and the geographic bureaus at headquarters, as well as by GAC’s network of 182 missions across 112 countries. It would also require significant due diligence measures to ensure any information released does not put HRDs more at risk and is compliant with the principles of the Privacy Act and other related legislation, which includes consulting with, and obtaining consent from, HRDs or their representatives. This is not possible in the time allotted for a response without risking the disclosure of information that is incomplete, inaccurate or misleading, which could cause extremely grave injury to the HRD or other individuals or entities, or could be injurious to the conduct of Canada’s international affairs.

Finally, the government is aware of Bill C-281, an act to amend the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act, the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (Sergei Magnitsky Law), the Broadcasting Act and the Prohibiting Cluster Munitions Act, which is currently being studied by the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. This proposed legislation would, among items, impose new reporting requirements on the government with respect to Canada’s efforts to advance human rights internationally as part of Canada’s foreign policy and Canada’s advocacy on behalf of prisoners of conscience. As outlined by GAC officials during the study of the bill by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, while the department welcomes efforts to increase transparency with respect to Canada’s work on human rights globally, such a proposal could risk impeding diplomatic actions and could endanger the safety of the individuals concerned. The government supported a version of the bill at third reading stage in the House of Commons that contained amendments to address the most significant of these concerns, and it will continue to monitor the progress of the bill as it proceeds through the legislative process.

Question No.2812—

[Larry Maguire, Conservative, Brandon—Souris, MB]

With regard to the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD): (a) how do the CAF and NORAD determine what is a threat or worthy of a response when an Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) report is made; (b) is there a specific criterion or checklist that is used related to (a), and, if so, what are the details; (c) how many reports of UAP have been made in the last two years; (d) when there is a report of a UAP, which entities are the reports shared with; and (e) have there been any interceptions since the high-altitude balloon incident, and, if so, what are the details of each, including the date and summary of the incident?

[Marie-France Lalonde, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence]

Mr. Speaker, with regard to part (a), the North American Aerospace Defense Command, NORAD, and the Canadian Armed Forces, CAF, have standard procedures to detect, identify and assess airborne objects. Specifically, NORAD responds to unknown radar tracks by correlating radar data with various data sources and means, including NORAD aircraft, to inspect the source. If NORAD assesses that an object does not present a threat, it will continue to monitor and be prepared to respond as appropriate, in coordination with other government departments and agencies.

With regard to part (b), both the CAF and NORAD utilize checklists to determine what may constitute a threat. National Defence applies the principles of the Access to Information Act, and protects information on the grounds that disclosing certain information could be injurious to national security and defence. Therefore, the contents of the checklists cannot be disclosed.

With regard to part (c) and (d), reporting on unidentified aerial phenomena, UAP, can be undertaken at multiple levels, including at local and national levels, through organizations internal and external to the Government of Canada. Thus, details for parts (c) and (d) are not held exclusively by National Defence and cannot be provided within the allotted time.

With regard to part (e), NORAD has used aircraft to inspect several airborne objects since March 2023, all of which were correlated to hobby balloons. The most recent of these events occurred in February 2024 over the state of Utah. NORAD has conducted no intercepts of airborne objects since February 2023.

Question No.2814—

[Adam Chambers, Conservative, Simcoe North, ON]

With regard to vessel registrations, broken down by year since January 1, 2016: (a) how many pleasure crafts, broken down by new and used, were registered in Canada that had a total sales price (i) below $250,000, (ii) between $250,000 and $500,000, (iii) above $500,000 up to $1 million, (iv) above $1 million?

[Pablo Rodriguez, Liberal, Minister of Transport]

Mr. Speaker, Transport Canada does not collect information on purchase price or value of a registered vessel.

The total number of pleasure crafts registered from 2016 to 2024 was 5,949 vessels.

For year 2016, 534 total pleasure crafts were registered, with 48 total new pleasure crafts registered and 486 total used pleasure crafts registered.

For year 2017, 648 total pleasure crafts were registered, with 63 total new pleasure crafts registered and 585 total used pleasure crafts registered.

For year 2018, 673 total pleasure crafts were registered, with 69 total new pleasure crafts registered and 604 total used pleasure crafts registered.

For year 2019, 712 total pleasure crafts were registered, with 83 total new pleasure crafts registered and 629 total used pleasure crafts registered.

For year 2020, 574 total pleasure crafts were registered, with 37 total new pleasure crafts registered and 537 total used pleasure crafts registered.

For year 2021, 812 total pleasure crafts were registered, with 77 total new pleasure crafts registered and 735 total used pleasure crafts registered.

For year 2022, 874 total pleasure crafts were registered, with 92 total new pleasure crafts registered and 782 total used pleasure crafts registered.

For year 2023, 807 total pleasure crafts were registered, with 69 total new pleasure crafts registered and 738 total used pleasure crafts registered.

For year 2024, 315 total pleasure crafts were registered, with 11 total new pleasure crafts registered and 304 total used pleasure crafts registered.

Question No.2815—

[Laila Goodridge, Conservative, Fort McMurray—Cold Lake, AB]

With regard to the government's approach to oil sands mining effluent and the Crown-Indigenous Working Group (CIWG) for the Potential Oil Sands Mining Effluent Regulations: (a) what is the government's current plan for dealing with effluent, including the (i) scope of the plan, (ii) key deliverables, (iii) stakeholder engagement process, (iv) key dates in the plan, (v) current status of work items; (b) what is the current status of the work undertaken by the CIWG; (c) on what dates has the CIWG met to date, and on what dates are future meetings planned; and (d) what is the CIWG's workplan, including any goals it is trying to accomplish, and by what date is each goal projected to be met?

[Steven Guilbeault, Liberal, Minister of Environment and Climate Change]

Mr. Speaker, in 2021, Environment and Climate Change Canada, ECCC, and nine indigenous communities established the Crown-indigenous working group for potential oil sands mining effluent regulations, CIWG. The CIWG is exploring options to manage the buildup of oil sands mine water in tailings ponds located in the Athabasca oil sands region. One of the options under consideration is regulations that, if developed, would place strict protective conditions on the release of treated effluent to the Athabasca River. Any such regulations would be developed with protective standards reflecting available scientific information and indigenous knowledge. The key deliverables of the CIWG will include recommendations on the path forward for managing the buildup of oil sands mine water.

Last fall, the public and stakeholders were invited to provide input on an introductory paper, found at https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/managing-pollution/sources-industry/mining-effluent/oil-sands.html, which included an update on the work completed by the CIWG to date, an overview of the collaborative process established through the CIWG and an opportunity for early feedback. The release of the introductory paper was accompanied by targeted engagement sessions with stakeholders and interested parties, including provincial and territorial governments, oil sands mine operators, environmental non-governmental organizations, academia and indigenous communities not included on the CIWG. In May 2024, ECCC published a “what we heard” report, found at https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/managing-pollution/sources-industry/mining-effluent/oil-sands/summary-report-introduction-crown-indigenous-working-group.html, summarizing input received on the introductory paper. ECCC plans to publish a discussion paper, accompanied by further stakeholder engagement, by the end of 2024.

ECCC has been meeting regularly with the CIWG since the group was established in 2021 and leverages subgroups that have been established. The current focus of the CIWG is publishing a discussion paper by the end of 2024, completing an assessment of available treatment technologies, developing aquatic toxicity and monitoring requirements and developing an approach for incorporating indigenous knowledge.

Question No.2817—

[Blaine Calkins, Conservative, Red Deer—Lacombe, AB]

With regard to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans' (DFO) recreational fishing survey in Canada, released every five years from 1990 to 2015: (a) why has the 2020 survey not yet been released on the DFO's website; (b) was the 2020 survey conducted, and, if not, why not; and (c) when will the next recreational fishing survey be conducted and when will those results be released to the public?

[Diane Lebouthillier, Liberal, Minister of Fisheries]

Mr. Speaker, with regard to the recreational fishing survey in Canada by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, DFO, released every five years from 1990 to 2015, DFO, in collaboration with provinces and territories, has conducted a survey of recreational fishing in Canada every five years from 1990 to 2015. The survey for the 2020 reference year was not conducted for several reasons, including the COVID pandemic. DFO is currently working to assess options for this survey work and will be engaging with relevant partners, including provinces and territories, to discuss resources and timelines.

Question No.2819—

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

With regard to the Auditor General of Canada’s 2024 Report 7 entitled “Combatting Cybercrime”, paragraph 7.6 of which states that the RCMP “has a mandate to investigate the greatest criminal threats to Canada, including cybercrime, transnational and serious organized crime, and threats to national security”: (a) since January 1, 2016, how many cybercrime case reports has the RCMP received; (b) in how many of the cases reported in (a) did the RCMP or other police forces lay charges; (c) how many of the cases in (b) resulted in convictions; (d) how many of the cases in (c) resulted in funds being returned to victims if the crime involved financial loss; (e) how many cases has the RCMP pursued alongside other jurisdictions; (f) in how many of the cases in (e) did the RCMP or other police forces lay charges; (g) how many of the cases in (f) resulted in convictions; and (h) how many of the cases in (g) resulted in funds being returned to victims if the crime involved financial loss?

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety]

Mr. Speaker, the RCMP does not have the ability to report solely on “pure cybercrime” offences, which are crimes that target technology itself and can only be committed using computers, networks and digital devices. Common offences include ransomware, malware and distributed denial of service attacks.

Some information on cybercrime statistics is available on the Statistics Canada website at https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3510000201. The information reported on the Statistics Canada website contains the information by every police force in Canada, including the RCMP.

Recognizing the importance of strengthening Canada’s capacity to counter cybercrime, in 2020, the Government of Canada provided the RCMP with approximately $137.5 million to establish the national cybercrime coordination centre, NC3, to work with domestic and international law enforcement and other partners to investigate and combat cybercrime.

The RCMP has also invested an additional $78.9 million to increase its federal policing capacity, including by establishing specialist cybercrime teams across the country.

With regard to (a) (b) and (e), the RCMP undertook an extensive preliminary search to determine the amount of information that would fall within the scope of the question and the amount of time that would be required to prepare a comprehensive response. The level of detail of the information requested is not systematically tracked in a centralized database. The RCMP is a decentralized organization comprising over 700 detachments in 150 communities across the country. The RCMP concluded that producing and validating a comprehensive response to this question would require a manual collection of information that is not possible in the time allotted, and this could lead to the disclosure of incomplete and misleading information.

With regard to (c), (d), (f), (g) and (h), the RCMP does not have this information.

Question No.2820—

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

With regard to the Auditor General of Canada’s 2024 Report 7 entitled “Combatting Cybercrime”, paragraph 7.23 of which states that “We found that the centre did not forward 7 of 26 (27%) of the requests we reviewed from international partners to domestic police agencies to see whether that had evidence relevant to the investigation,”: (a) what proportion of the requests which the RCMP did not forward to domestic police agencies were held back for (i) lack of sufficient evidence, (ii) lack of credible evidence, (iii) inadmissible or unlawfully collected evidence, (iv) other reasons; and (b) what were the other reasons in (a)?

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety]

Mr. Speaker, cybercrime investigations are complex and multi-jurisdictional, especially given that cybercriminals can perpetrate their actions from anywhere in the world. Therefore, it is essential that all relevant parties work together in a coordinated fashion to better protect Canadians.

Recognizing the importance of strengthening Canada’s capacity to counter cybercrime, in 2020, the Government of Canada provided the RCMP with approximately $137.5 million to establish the national cybercrime coordination centre, NC3, to work with domestic and international law enforcement and other partners to investigate and combat cybercrime. The RCMP has also invested an additional $78.9 million to increase its federal policing capacity, including by establishing specialist cybercrime teams across the country.

The NC3’s ability to collect, analyze, share and coordinate international requests with domestic police agencies for assistance will improve as the program continues to work toward its full operating capability in 2024-25, including with the ongoing implementation of a new case management system, referred to as the national cybercrime solution, to collect, analyze and exchange operational cybercrime data with law enforcement partners domestically and internationally.

The RCMP undertook an extensive preliminary search to determine the amount of information that would fall within the scope of the question and the amount of time that would be required to prepare a comprehensive response. The level of detail of the information requested is not systematically tracked in a centralized database. The RCMP is a decentralized organization comprising over 700 detachments in 150 communities across the country. The RCMP concluded that producing and validating a comprehensive response to this question would require a manual collection of information that is not possible in the time allotted, and this could lead to the disclosure of incomplete and misleading information.

Question No.2821—

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

With regard to the Canadian Armed Forces’ reconstitution and readiness: (a) how many pilots at 3 Wing Bagotville are qualified to fly CF-18s; and (b) how many pilots at 4 Wing Cold Lake are qualified to fly CF-18s?

[Marie-France Lalonde, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence]

Mr. Speaker, the Royal Canadian Air Force, RCAF, currently has a fill rate of 64% for frontline fighter pilot squadrons. Detailed information regarding pilot numbers is considered sensitive, as it can provide adversaries with information about CF-18 and broader NORAD capabilities, which could then be injurious to the defence of Canada and North America.

As the RCAF transitions to a fifth generation fighter, work is ongoing to ensure appropriate fighter pilot levels. National Defence is undertaking a multipronged approach to increase personnel numbers and pilots in particular. For example, the RCAF established an attractions team that participated in over 125 events in 2023, including air shows, exhibitions, career fairs and sporting events. The team complements wider CAF recruitment efforts that showcase existing recruiting allowances, pay incentives and subsidized education programs. In addition, the RCAF is streamlining its pilot training courses, which has reduced wait times by over 40% for the initial phases of pilot training.