Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise to speak to Bill C-14, which is quite a substantial bill with a relatively broad scope. It is clear that this is something that the House has been very interested in. Several private members' bills have been introduced that deal directly or indirectly with the same subject as Bill C‑14. I expect that this will open the door to some very interesting debate, if not in the House, then at least in committee.
According to the minister, Bill C‑14 seeks to tighten bail rules. It also affects other aspects of the Criminal Code and even the Youth Criminal Justice Act, or YCJA. I will not get into all of the details because there is a lot of material in there, but I do want to go over a few aspects of the bill. Before I do that, however, I just want to give a little background on the situation.
Contrary to popular belief, we know that the number of inmates awaiting trial has never been higher. Considering how many bail reform bills that have been tabled, a lot of people seem to believe that accused persons are normally released pending trial. However, inmates awaiting trial accounted for 64% of the prison population in 2019-20. By 2022-23, the percentage had gone up to 72%, which is extremely high. This is not a great look for Canada. I believe the only country with a higher percentage is the United States, which is not exactly a good role model, generally speaking. The idea that accused persons are systematically being released is therefore a misperception.
The other factor to consider is that there is no such thing as zero risk of recidivism. We may want to eliminate the possibility of a crime being committed by a person awaiting trial, but the only way to achieve that would be to systematically imprison everyone who is accused of any offence, however minor. This would very likely create other problems, not least of which would be prison overcrowding. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that prisons are often referred to as schools for crime, so increasing the prison population could potentially create more problems than it would solve. All of this must be kept in mind.
It is also important not to give in to the temptation to think that the judges analyzing an accused person's risk of recidivism do not take a whole host of criteria, particularly the person's criminal history, into account when they determine whether the person should be released. The judge analyzes the accused person's record and also looks at the nature of the offences. A great deal of data is taken into consideration by the judges. They have some discretion, and it is not a given that a person will be released so easily. People must not think that judges have no tools for keeping accused persons in custody while awaiting trial. An in-depth analysis of the bill is in order.
I would like to go over some general clauses and provide a few examples of what is in the bill. As a reminder, judicial discretion is generally a central consideration when analyzing the justice system. Members may be tempted to systematically tell judges what they should do and to tie their hands, but that could lead to situations that would simply not make sense, situations where judges would be forced to do things they do not want to do, just because parliamentarians tried to be more cautious than those on the ground were suggesting.
There is a possibility that some things might conflict with certain provisions in the bill. For example, section 718 of the Criminal Code already sets out how a sentence is determined. It would conflict with one element in the bill, namely consecutive sentencing. For repeat offenders, the bill would require consecutive sentences for offences arising out of the same initial event. That would conflict with the principle set out in section 718 of the Criminal Code, which provides that sentencing should have certain objectives, including “to denounce unlawful conduct” but also “to deter the offender” and “to separate offenders from society, where necessary”. Sentencing also seeks “to assist in rehabilitating offenders” and “to provide reparations for harm done”. Lastly, sentencing should “promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims or the community”. There are already provisions for analyzing how a sentence should be imposed. Would this bill not override these provisions by systematically imposing consecutive sentences?
There are also clauses dealing with freedom of expression that should be studied in committee, including the one that would make interfering with access to essential infrastructure an aggravating circumstance for sentencing purposes. In a way, would this not curtail freedom of expression, for example in the event of protests that may be deemed illegal? Certain protests that took place not too far from here come to mind. That could potentially be considered an aggravating circumstance. Do we want to go down that path? That raises some questions.
That being said, we should not throw the baby out with the proverbial bathwater. Some of the amendments proposed in the bill are interesting, particularly with regard to the YCJA, the Youth Criminal Justice Act. For example, one of the clauses seeks to fill a sort of legal vacuum in the YCJA regarding the length of time a record is kept when a young offender is the subject of an investigation and the investigation is dropped. The courts have attempted to fix this legal vacuum by suggesting record retention periods. A retention period is codified in the bill, but the proposed period may need to be reviewed, because the bill suggests that records should be retained for two years for a young person who is the subject of an investigation that is discontinued, whereas when a young person is convicted of an offence but given an absolute discharge, their record is kept for one year. The bill says that the active record for someone who has been the subject of an investigation that was subsequently dropped should be retained longer than for a young person who has been convicted. There are some minor contradictions like this that will need to be addressed.
One interesting amendment to the YCJA is the codification of the definition of “violent offence”. The bill codifies what was determined by the Supreme Court in 2005. It expands the application of the definition of “violent offence” found in paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Act. The emphasis is on the repercussions of the offence on the victim, rather than the legal characterization of the offence. The amendment establishes that the definition of a violent offence is based on whether it caused harm, including psychological harm, rather than on whether the offence involved the use of force, in line with the Supreme Court's rulings in this area. This could be a good amendment. Still, it remains to be seen whether it is actually useful, given that the court has already codified this.
However, the bill has a blind spot with regard to offences involving a firearm. There is a definition of what constitutes a violent offence, which was not defined in the YCJA, but offences involving a firearm are left out altogether. As we know, firearm use is a serious problem among young offenders nowadays. It is extremely difficult for Crown attorneys to get someone committed to custody for an offence involving a firearm. It might be worthwhile to look into this aspect at committee, as it seems to be one of the bill's blind spots.
In light of the section on the YCJA, which adds some valuable elements to the bill, we suggest that the bill be passed at second reading and referred to the committee so that it can be studied in greater depth with a view to making good recommendations while still preserving certain essential criteria, such as judicial discretion. That work will be particularly meaningful.
I would like to take the few seconds that I have left to thank two of my colleagues—they know who they are—for the groundwork they did on Bill C-14. They have already given us some good ideas about what we should be looking at in committee. I want to acknowledge them here, and I will certainly be calling upon them again for additional matters.