Mr. Speaker, I want to pick up on one thing my colleague said. She talked about how, when someone has dementia, they become, in certain respects, a very different person than they were before, which is, in a way, precisely the argument against advance requests, which is that a previous version of a person should not be able to definitively bind a future version of a person, as they may have different preferences and different desires, or they may have a quality of life or an experience of life that is different than what they would have expected. If asked what I would like to happen to me if I had dementia or some other disability, I would find it very hard to predict what my experience would be or what I would feel one way or the other. This is why, generally speaking, we expect contemporaneous consent. That is, we rely on the consent of the person themselves in the moment.
It would seem strange to me to go from saying that a person becomes a completely different person to concluding that person one should be able to make life-or-death decisions for person two.
