Madam Speaker, I was unaware of the code of conduct issues that had arisen with regard to the member. I will just observe that it is an excellent introduction to what I am about to deal with here, which is our own code of conduct.
The Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons is an appendix to the Standing Orders, and today's debate is therefore the appropriate forum in which to discuss the code and also to discuss the problematic way in which it has been administered.
In my remarks today, I will demonstrate that, in at least one case, the administration of the code by the former ethics commissioner, Mr. Mario Dion, was itself a very consequential violation of the code. I hope that the current commissioner will take heed.
I have already been vocal in my criticism of Mr. Dion. In February 2021, I wrote an essay, which I published on my website, criticizing Commissioner Dion's report finding the member for Etobicoke—Lakeshore guilty of an entirely invented breach of the code. Last October, I had the opportunity to speak out against the former commissioner's outrageous 2019 finding that the member for Ottawa West—Nepean had violated the code by transgressing a preposterously stringent interpretation of the term “using her position as a member of Parliament”.
On September 29, 2020, it was my turn; the commissioner went after me. I received a letter on that day in which the commissioner informed me, “Pursuant to subsection 27(4) of the...Code, I am writing to notify you of my concerns that you may have contravened the Code by attempting to use your position as a Member of Parliament to influence a decision so as to further the private interests of a member of your family”. Commissioner Dion further stated, “Upon receipt of your response...I will determine whether an inquiry into your conduct is warranted”.
I will fast-forward to another piece of correspondence from Commissioner Dion, dated November 25 of the same year, in which he wrote:
I am writing further to the letter from your [legal] counsel...responding to my concerns...that you may have contravened section 11 of the...Code....
...I have determined that I do not have reason to believe you have contravened section 11 of the Code and I will not initiate an inquiry into the matter.
That ended things. I had a clean bill of ethical health. However, members will note that Commissioner Dion makes reference to a letter from my legal counsel. Here is that letter, and as members can see, it is over 100 pages long. I apologize for showing it in the House, but I want to make the point that it is over 100 pages. It includes tax returns, audited statements and other documents. Importantly, my legal bill to respond to Mr. Dion's preliminary review was $43,423.53, every penny of which was paid out of after-tax income. At the 50% tax bracket in which all MPs sit, the cost to me was over $80,000.
I have the good fortune to have a significant amount of inherited wealth. However, for the majority of members in this place, the sudden imposition of a legal bill of this magnitude could be ruinous. Had Commissioner Dion decided, as he could well have done, that he would go further and launch an actual inquiry, my legal bills might well have been several multiples higher.
When the costs of responding to an accusation become ruinous, prosecutions, including preliminary reviews and inquiries, can be weaponized. That is to say, the process of prosecution itself can be used as a weapon. Mere accusations, including groundless accusations, become death blows to all but the wealthiest. Our court system has therefore adopted a number of rules to prevent weaponization. One such rule is that the losing party in a court action must pay a share of the court costs of the winning party. Another rule is that the person who is accused has the right to face his or her accuser.
By contrast with the courts, our conflict of interest code contains no version of the first of the two rules I just mentioned, but it does contain an interesting proxy for the right to face one's accuser. Pursuant to subsection 27(1) of the code, the commissioner may pursue a preliminary review only if authorized to do so by a signed, written request from a member of Parliament, who effectively takes on the role of publicly identified accuser, and if at the conclusion of an inquiry, the commissioner is of the opinion that the request for an inquiry was frivolous or vexatious, subsection 27(6) of the code provides that “the commissioner shall so state in dismissing the request in a report...and may recommend that further action be considered against the member who made the request.”
However, in my case, the commissioner ignored the limit imposed on him by subsection 27(1). In his letter of September 29, the commissioner informed me that he had been notified by an anonymous tip. He said, “On June 26...I received a letter from a member of the public alleging that you communicated numerous times with councillors and municipal employees of Tay Valley Township in respect of your spouse's operation of a forest school and community garden at [Blueberry Creek Forest School and Nature Centre] on Highway 7.”
It was on the basis of this letter, from a party whose identity the commissioner subsequently kept secret, that he informed me that he would launch an inquiry unless, within the next 30 days, I satisfied him as to my innocence. It was the act of satisfying him as to my innocence, by exhaustively demonstrating the fact that Blueberry Creek is a bona fide not-for-profit and that my wife derives no financial benefit from the operation of the forest school, that cost me 43,000 after-tax dollars in legal bills. That is a bit like proving someone's innocence of witchcraft by drowning them during a witch dunking: They are innocent but also dead.
The accusation was costless for my anonymous accuser to make. Refuting the anonymous accusation was devastatingly expensive. Even though the request for the inquiry was indeed vexatious, I have no ability to seek the redress promised by subsection 27(6) because the commissioner has made sure that I cannot find out who made the anonymous denunciation.
However, I was able to draw the commissioner's attention to the fact that, whomever it may have been who contacted him, the ultimate source of this information had to be an interested party on the other side of an ongoing legal dispute between Blueberry Creek Forest School and Tay Valley Township. I sent a letter to the commissioner pointing out that one piece of evidence that had been given to him by the anonymous informant “has never been made public”. I am quoting from my letter, which continues, “Only the eight members of the Council to whom this was emailed, plus the township's clerk, Amanda Mabo, and the township's Chief Administrative Officer, Larry Donaldson, would ever have seen the...email.”
An Ethics Commissioner who allows anonymous denunciations to which the cost of responding are ruinous has set the grounds for the serial use of vexatious assertions of ethical breaches in order to settle scores or to force elected officials to resign as the only means of escaping expensive inquiries.
Now, lest the assertion that I have just made be taken as hysterical, let me point out that this is exactly what has happened to Ontario's system of municipal integrity commissioners. Ironically, this was attested to just a moment ago in the last remark by the previous speaker, the member for Hamilton West—Ancaster—Dundas, who said he faced numerous such accusations for reasons that were entirely personal.
The Ontario system permits anonymous denunciations, arbitrary penalties and provides only the weakest safeguards against the integrity commissioners, as ethics commissioners are called provincially, who are usually external counsel retained on contract by the township or municipality, having their own conflicts of interest. For example, they might be simultaneously a town solicitor and its integrity commissioner, a clear conflict of interest.
In 2024, Ontario's integrity commissioner system was variously described as the “wild west” and as being a “cash cow” for the commissioners themselves, most egregiously for Tony Fleming, a lawyer at the Kingston law firm of Cunningham Swan, who served simultaneously as town councillor and integrity commissioner for 35 municipalities, despite repeated accusations that this represents a conflict of interest on his part.
In 2022, it was reported that the legal bills paid to the integrity commissioner in the town of Elliott Lake over the four-year term of the town council amounted to $858,000, or about $80 per town resident. To give another example, at one point in the summer of 2025, the integrity commissioner for the Township of Rideau Lakes, just south of my riding, was involved in 11 simultaneous investigations. The town council in Rideau Lakes has only nine members. A year earlier, the Ontario ombudsman reported that most of the complaints it had received regarding municipal accountability officers were specifically about integrity commissioners.
A similar form of weaponization of our own ethics code is a very real danger should the safeguards that have been built into the code continue to be ignored by the official who is charged with their enforcement.
Commissioner Dion facilitated weaponization. It is my hope that the current commissioner will hear what I am saying today and will firmly reject the dangerous precedent set by his predecessor, and in the event that he takes the position that his predecessor's actions in accepting anonymous denunciations were not a breach of the code, that the House will modify the code to impose this limit in clearer terms in the future.