Mr. Speaker, I will be sharing my time with the member for Eglinton—Lawrence.
I appreciate the opportunity to speak to Bill C-22. Since my time is limited, I will focus on part 2 of the bill, which deals with the technical capabilities of electronic service providers, while part 1 deals with the legal framework for obtaining information.
It is widely accepted that most crimes committed today leave a digital footprint. No matter what crime is committed, there is almost always a trace that enables investigators to track the perpetrator and understand how it was done. In the case of organized crime, the digital footprint helps shed light on its ramifications. These criminals and individuals who pose a threat to Canada's security exploit the digital environment to carry out a wide range of malicious activities. It is also an open secret that our laws on lawful access have not kept pace with advances in modern technology. Canada is the only G7 and Five Eyes country that does not have a modern lawful access regime requiring electronic service providers to establish ways to ensure authorized and timely access to information.
That is where the paradox lies. Currently, law enforcement agencies and CSIS already have the legal authority to obtain information from electronic service providers. However, there is no law requiring these providers to maintain a system that enables them to respond effectively to lawful access requests. This means that even if a provider has the requested information in its systems, it does not necessarily have the ability to retrieve that information and provide it to law enforcement agencies with a valid warrant, because it is not required to do so.
Without a modernized framework, law enforcement wastes valuable time and potential leads and misses out on crucial information. This can even lead to investigations being abandoned, particularly since the Jordan decision. Above all, these delays result in an increase in the number of crimes and victims. That is important, and it is worth reiterating. Take, for example, the wave of extortion cases observed in British Columbia and Ontario. The same individuals, likely affiliated with organized crime, are behind multiple attacks.
As things stand, even with the proper authority, if electronic service providers are unable to quickly extract the metadata needed, investigations can run into significant delays. Arrests that take several weeks result in a much larger number of victims than arrests made within days of the initial offence. The same applies to cybercrime, sextortion or Internet fraud cases. Being able to conduct investigations quickly can make a huge difference.
Apart from its impact on our ability to conduct investigations, this situation also prevents us from fully participating in security-related international co-operation activities and thereby benefiting from our partners' information and support at a time when transnational gangs and terrorists are especially active. Bill C‑22, especially part 2, entitled “Supporting Authorized Access to Information Act”, will correct these problems and establish a modern framework for lawful technical access while continuing to safeguard the privacy of Canadians.
It is important to note that part 2 of Bill C-22 does not create any new surveillance powers, either for law enforcement agencies or for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. There will be no surveillance of social media content, web browsing history or text message content. I would like to correct the record on something my colleague, the member for Rivière-du-Nord, said this morning. He claimed that this would be the case, but that is not accurate. This is only about the metadata transmitted by electronic service providers. The production of such transmission data has already been approved by the courts, with a valid search warrant.
Imagine that a missing teenage girl, 16 years old, makes an emergency call 10 days after her disappearance. Although the telecommunications service provider is able to confirm the call and the antenna used, it cannot precisely identify the last known location of the phone before it was disconnected, because it is not required to have that capability.
Bill C‑22 will correct this situation by requiring that these suppliers, considered essential suppliers, maintain consistent and reliable technical capabilities nationwide. Let me remind the House that these capabilities are already the norm in Europe and in Five Eyes countries. Under this bill, a supplier could be required to develop and maintain technical capabilities in two ways: based on specific requirements for major suppliers or, in other cases, pursuant to a ministerial order based on operational needs as new technologies emerge.
Instead of requiring entire industries, including small businesses, to develop the same capabilities, the proposed framework takes a more targeted approach by providing for the necessary capability development through ministerial orders based on strict criteria. Let me be clear. As an additional safeguard and external oversight mechanism, the bill requires the Minister of Public Safety to first consult with the relevant provider and then obtain approval from the intelligence commissioner before an order becomes valid. In addition, if the order is approved by the intelligence commissioner, the electronic service provider in question still has the option of challenging the order before a judge.
We have done our homework. We are talking about protecting the public and our country from bad actors in the digital world as we already do in the physical world, while protecting the privacy of Canadians and the rights enshrined in the charter. Criminals are constantly adapting to new technologies and finding new ways to commit crimes. We must ensure that our law enforcement and intelligence agencies can adapt as well. Our government is committed to doing everything it can to prevent criminals from threatening the security of Canadians.