Debates of April 15th, 2026

Lawful Access Act, 2026

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Secretary of State (Combatting Crime)]

Mr. Speaker, in an increasingly and rapidly evolving digital world, law enforcement services are having to mitigate new challenges in the face of a rising tide of criminal activity using technology. Let me give some examples that we have been hearing. Cases of extortion are on the rise, including with arson and with shootings. Pedophiles are exploiting children online, which often leads to sextortion or human trafficking. Just in 2024, we lost over $600 million to fraud and cybercrime, and often the victims of these crimes are our most vulnerable seniors.

This bill, in fact, would help law enforcement to be able to tackle these challenges. These new challenges have created a gap in ensuring the safety and security of Canadians. This gap is between what our investigators know and what our legal framework allows them to do about it. I am pleased to say that Bill C-22 would close the gap that currently exists.

When an investigator receives a tip, a phone number linked to an extortion ring or a child exploitation case, or information about a human trafficking network, they have the grounds to investigate. They are ready to move, but before they can seek a production order from a judge, they need the answer to one foundational question: Which telecom company services the number? Under our current law, there is no clear legal tool to get that answer. Police must rely on voluntary co-operation, which may come in days or weeks, or not at all. Investigators may have to spend considerable time and resources pursuing a provider, only to learn that the phone number was never that of the suspect, and then they have to start all over again. In some cases, this completely stalls the investigation, not because the officers failed, but because the law did.

Peel Regional Police has described cases where quick confirmation from a telecom company, a simple yes-or-no answer about whether a phone number is theirs, was the centre point of an entire investigation. That confirmation allowed them to seek a production order, identify a suspect and locate the victim quickly, but that outcome depended entirely on the provider choosing to co-operate voluntarily, as there was no legal framework requiring it. The victim was found because of goodwill, not because of the law, and goodwill does not always come. Goodwill is not what the justice system should rely on.

What does Bill C-22 actually do? Let me describe the following tools that would aid law enforcement officials.

The first tool is the confirmation of service demand. Police can ask a telecom or an Internet service provider one question: “Do you service this number or IP address?” It is a yes or no only. That is all: no content, no personal information, no communications. This question alone does not require a warrant, because the Supreme Court has recognized that a yes-or-no confirmation does not carry the same privacy weight as subscriber details or content.

The second tool is a new, faster, narrower production order specifically for subscriber information, which means name, address and account details. This would require a judge and require reasonable grounds. This process would be court-supervised at every step. It would provide a more direct path to that basic identifying information so that investigators can act quickly at the start of a case without waiting on a process designed for other, far more sensitive data.

The third tool requires core electronic service providers to actually have the technical capability to respond to lawful orders. Right now, and this is the part that is almost impossible to believe, a provider may receive a court order and be genuinely unable to comply, not unwilling but unable, because they have never built the infrastructure to respond. Investigations have stalled and in some cases gone cold for this reason alone.

Canada is currently the only Five Eyes G7 country without a lawful access regime. The United Kingdom has one. The United States has one. Australia and New Zealand also have them. We are not proposing something radical. We are proposing something long overdue.

The OPP commissioner and president of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, Thomas Carrique, told reporters that he and many of Canada's police leaders have been sounding the alarm about the need for lawful access for the last 30 years, before smart phones and before the modern Internet.

I want to now speak directly to those who have raised concerns about this legislation, those who believe, as I do, that protecting the privacy of Canadians is a fundamental function of government. They are not wrong to ask the hard questions. They are not wrong to be skeptical. That is what democracy is all about. This is why I want to tell them how we are balancing bringing investigative capacity into the modern era while at the same time protecting the privacy rights of Canadians.

Every ministerial order requiring a provider to build lawful access capabilities must be reviewed and approved by the independent federal intelligence commissioner before it takes effect. Annual public reports would be required under this bill. The new subscriber production order would cover basic subscriber information and nothing more: no browsing history, no content and no communications without a separate and higher judicial threshold.

This bill was shaped directly by feedback from numerous consultations with law enforcement, civil liberties groups, telecoms and Internet service providers. It is also shaped by Supreme Court rulings that tell us precisely where the constitutional lines are. We drew those lines, built in oversight and narrowed the scope from what was proposed before, because we understand that we cannot afford to get this wrong. Technology continues to evolve, and this is the moment. We must act now. Victims and investigators cannot wait any longer for action.

This is what I need everyone in the House to understand: The alternative to this bill is not privacy. The alternative is impunity. A legal framework where investigators cannot confirm which telecom or Internet service provider to approach, and where the first step of an investigation depends on voluntary goodwill, is not a framework that protects rights. It is a framework that currently protects criminals.

Canada was built on a promise. We are not a country that chooses between safety and freedom. We built the charter because we believe we can have both. We built our courts because we believe oversight is strength and not weakness. That is exactly what this bill reflects: not surveillance, but accountability; not a back door, but a courthouse door, one that finally works in the digital world.

Every day we delay is another day an investigator hits a wall at the very first step of a case. Every day we delay, another victim waits, while police chase down voluntary confirmations that may never come. Every day the police have to wait, victims multiply. Every day we delay, there are families somewhere in the country waiting for answers that exist but that we choose not to allow investigators to reach.

I have heard it said that we cannot let security compromise freedom. I agree completely, and that is precisely why I am standing here today. Freedom without justice is not freedom. It is a promise we made and did not keep. The law, not the gaps in it, not the limitations of outdated legislation and not the absence of a framework that our allies have had for years, is the supreme authority of this country. It is time we made that mean something in the digital age.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC]

Mr. Speaker, it is always a pleasure to rise on behalf of the people from Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola.

One question I really hope the Secretary of State for Combatting Crime can answer right here and right now is a very clear question that relates to encrypted communications: Would this bill be going after encrypted communications, yes or no?

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North—Caledon, ON]

Mr. Speaker, the bill as it is right now does not provide for encrypted communications. I know that after the bill passes, there is a regulatory framework that is going to take place, but that, too, does not envision receiving the content of encrypted, detailed messages. What it does is connect who is sending those messages, and that is what is really important to law enforcement, so that they can catch those who are involved in criminal activity.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

Mr. Speaker, we have been told that all police services across Canada want this. They are demanding it. We understand them. This is a tool they need, but questions have been raised. For instance, lawyers who specialize in privacy protection want to know why the government set such a low threshold for collecting information.

Perhaps the secretary of state can explain to me why the government feels that reasonable grounds to suspect a crime will be committed—rather than reasonable grounds to believe that a crime will be committed—is sufficient to make a demand for information.

In law, there is a big difference between those two thresholds for demanding information.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North—Caledon, ON]

Mr. Speaker, reasonable grounds to suspect have been used in other places in the Criminal Code. I think that is completely appropriate in this case, since these are the initial steps in an investigation.

Confirmation and subscriber information provide the police the ability to eliminate or narrow down suspects, so these are the first, initial steps of an investigation. At that point, having reasonable grounds to believe would be too high of a burden and would hinder investigations and us getting to the bottom of catching criminals.

[John-Paul Danko, Liberal, Hamilton West—Ancaster—Dundas, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I have been fortunate to have a good working relationship with Hamilton police and the Hamilton Police Association. One of the things they bring up on a regular basis is the need for the tools that are in this bill to properly investigate crimes.

The secretary of state mentioned in her speech the discussions that she has had with OPP and law enforcement. I was wondering if she could expand on that and the response that she has had from law enforcement across Canada.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North—Caledon, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I have been really pleased with the response. Law enforcement, from the beginning of Bill C-2 to now, has been actively involved in providing recommendations and assistance on making sure that this bill is tabled so that they can see it passing.

As I have said before, it has been decades in the works. Many governments and different Parliaments have brought a version of this bill forward. It is time that we get it passed, because we are falling far behind.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I have a couple of questions.

I know that law enforcement has been asking for this for quite some time, and I know they are generally pleased with the start of this. I am wondering whether my colleague has heard any feedback from law enforcement that is encouraging Parliament to go further with this legislation, some specific things they are asking for that are not yet in this bill.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North—Caledon, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the member for his years of service, as well as his contributions. I know that the member cares greatly about getting this legislation right and making sure that, hopefully, it passes through the House.

I think law enforcement would be in agreement for maybe even a broader scope, but that is something we can work on, with this as a first step. We need to get this passed in order to take those other steps in the future. I would be open to going further in the future as well.

[Dane Lloyd, Conservative, Parkland, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise today to speak to Bill C-22, an act respecting lawful access. I will be splitting my time with my hon. colleague from Kitchener Centre.

I want to give a shout-out to my excellent staff here in Ottawa, Harry McGuire, Aidan Plesa and Andrew Gelok, for their great work in helping me research, both in committee and in the House, this important legislation.

Conservatives recognize that we need to ensure that law enforcement and national security agencies have the tools required to investigate serious crime in this increasingly digital age, but as members of His Majesty's loyal opposition, our job is to hold the government accountable to ensure that we can get the best legislation for Canadians. That means holding government accountable when we are talking about important issues such as expanding state powers in relation to increased surveillance. It is our responsibility as an official opposition to scrutinize, to challenge, and to ensure that any new authority is absolutely necessary, proportionate and consistent with the rights and freedoms of Canadians.

This legislation has evolved from the original Bill C-2 legislation that was brought forward in the fall. It is important to give a bit of background on that legislation and why we are here today. The first substantive piece of legislation introduced in the sitting of the current Parliament was Bill C-2, which proposed a number of significant legal changes regarding Canada's national security, to disrupt organized crime and secure the border.

Conservatives were and remain supportive of any efforts to provide law enforcement with the tools necessary to keep Canadians safe, but we could not support Bill C-2 in its original form. We know that civil liberties organizations and all opposition parties in the House felt that Bill C-2, in particular the lawful access regime in parts 14 and 15, fell short of what was needed. Bill C-22 represents the government's second attempt at enacting lawful access legislation. While I would say that there are improvements, particularly in narrowing certain provisions, some of the structural issues remain and have to be looked into further.

Law enforcement and CSIS need modern tools to deal with modern threats. The issue that the bill is attempting to address is real. Law enforcement and national security experts have long argued that they do not have the tools to effectively go after terrorists, organized criminals and child predators, who are coordinating a lot of their activity online.

Part 1 of the bill focuses on investigative authorities, and in many respects it is an improvement over what was previously proposed in Bill C-2. That said, while the direction in this legislation is more measured than Bill C-2, concerns remain, particularly with respect to the legal thresholds, scope and the adequacy of any safeguards.

I want to talk about the new powers and authorities proposed in the legislation. Part 1 proposes a number of changes that are clearly aimed at improving the efficiency of investigations in a digital environment. It would amend existing search warrant provisions to permit the examination of computer data during the execution of a warrant, and it would also introduce new information demands and production orders that could be used both by police forces and by CSIS. In addition, it would create mechanisms to facilitate access to data held by foreign-based service providers, which reflects the reality that much of the information that law enforcement and security agencies need in this country is not even being stored within our own borders.

These would be very practical changes, and they would respond to real challenges faced by investigators. However, the details of how these powers would be structured, and the limits that would be placed on them, remain critically important.

I want to talk about the confirmation of service demands. One of the proposed powers outlined in part 1 is the confirmation of service demands. This would allow authorities to ask a telecommunications provider a very narrow question, which is whether or not it provides service to a particular person or subscriber. The response would be limited to a simple yes or no. Compared to what was proposed in Bill C-2, this is a much more restrained approach. In Bill C-2, information demands could be issued to any person who provides services to the public. This would now be limited to telecom providers.

One of the more concerning elements of Bill C-2 was other subscriber data. For example, there was concern that people's medical records could be accessed. Thankfully, I believe that this has been clarified and the scope has been narrowed with the new legislation.

I want to talk about foreign data requests. Another significant element of part 1 of the bill is the introduction of a mechanism that would allow Canadian judges to authorize requests for data held by foreign entities. This reflects a very real challenge to modern investigation, as data is frequently being stored outside of Canada, often by companies that operate in multiple jurisdictions. Providing a judicially authorized pathway for these requests may improve co-operation and provide greater legal certainty for foreign service providers. However, it is important to recognize that this would not fully resolve the challenges associated with cross-border data access and whether there would be any way to compel foreign service providers to comply with the requests.

There is also a section on publicly available and voluntary information. The bill clarifies that law enforcement would be able to receive and act upon information that is either voluntarily provided or publicly available, without the need for a warrant or a production order. This appears to be a reasonable clarification, but I do wonder if it raises questions about scope, because what exactly qualifies as publicly available information? Does it include information that has been exposed through data breaches or leaks? Without clear definitions, there is a risk that this provision could be interpreted much more broadly than seems to have been intended. This is something that needs to be addressed.

I want to talk about one of the reasons the legislation was brought forward. It was partially in response to the Bykovets decision of the Supreme Court. In 2024, the Supreme Court ruled that IP addresses have a reasonable expectation of privacy. In that case, police had received an IP address voluntarily from a financial company that had flagged suspected fraudulent transactions to the police. However, since the IP address was not acquired using a production order, this evidence could not be used. Privacy experts have raised concerns that the provisions in the bill may not actually address the issues created by the Supreme Court of Canada's decision. That is concerning.

Part 2 of the bill would enact the supporting authorized access to information act. It is in this section of the legislation that privacy experts seem to have raised the most concerns. It would require electronic service providers to build and maintain systems capable of supporting the lawful access regime, including real-time interception when authorized. In practical terms, this means that companies would be required to design their systems in such a way that law enforcement could access communications once the appropriate legal authorization has been obtained.

With respect to the scope of the application, one of the key concerns with part 2 is the breadth and the definition of what an electronic service provider is. As the bill is currently drafted, this is not limited to traditional telecommunications companies and could extend to a very wide range of entities, including digital platforms, messaging and cloud services, and potentially businesses where communications are only an incidental part of the business.

This could create both practical and legal challenges, as well as uncertainty about who is captured by the legislation, because almost all businesses these days have some sort of electronic recording or storage. There is a possibility that smaller or non-traditional actors would be subject to complex obligations that they are, frankly, not equipped or cannot afford to meet. If the objective is targeted modernization, then the definition needs to be more clear. Unfortunately, as was recently the case with Bill C-8, many of these specific details were left blank and have been left to regulations.

Another area of significant concern in part 2 is the retention of metadata. Under the act, ESPs could be required to retain metadata for a reasonable period of time of up to one year. This is particularly concerning since that data may reveal a person's location. While there are provisions on the retention of information that could reveal private communications and web browsing history, experts have raised concerns that Canadians who are not accused of any wrongdoing may still have their data retained that could reveal their location. It is important to note that similar provisions that were put in place in the EU were actually found disproportionate and unlawful.

In his analysis of the legislation, privacy lawyer David Fraser explained that requiring companies to create capabilities that do not currently exist within their systems to assist law enforcement could lead to creating vulnerabilities within the systems themselves. This can include the development of interception tools that resemble traditional wiretap capabilities adapted for modern environments.

In 2023 and 2024, multiple U.S. telecom companies were compromised, and hackers were able to access data from millions of customers and obtain audio recordings of calls made by senior government and elected officials. I raise this example because U.S. officials subsequently reported that the hackers exploited vulnerabilities that the companies had installed in order to comply with lawful access requests from law enforcement. We need to be very aware that we could be creating a risk if this is not done properly.

The legislation would also have practical cost considerations that cannot be ignored. We know that the compliance costs could be significant, and we do not want those costs to be borne by taxpayers.

In conclusion, I believe that Bill C-22 addresses some real and pressing challenges. It contains provisions that can include the effectiveness of investigations, but at the same time we need to ensure that these new powers would be effective and necessary, and that they would not unnecessarily infringe on the freedoms of Canadians.

[John-Paul Danko, Liberal, Hamilton West—Ancaster—Dundas, ON]

Mr. Speaker, the comments from the member for Parkland were a very thoughtful review of the legislation that is before us. He brought up some really important points on the rights of privacy and freedoms, as well as the issue of cross-border data, which is something that could require additional investigation.

Of course, the purpose of the legislation is to identify, investigate and prosecute threats, including drug trafficking, terrorism and violent crimes, etc. I think we all see a priority to hold criminals responsible and to give police the tools that they need to investigate crimes and to stop crimes before they happen.

Would the member opposite agree that the discussion could continue at committee and that additional changes could be made to make the legislation before us even stronger and more effective?

[Dane Lloyd, Conservative, Parkland, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I think committee is a great place to hash out legislation and to hear from experts on civil liberties, privacy and law enforcement. When we have all those voices, as we saw with Bill C-8 at the public safety committee, we are able to put forward proposals to fix things.

When I was talking, in the wake of the Bykovets decision in 2024, to local integrated child exploitation teams, they were so disappointed, because a lot of the tips we receive in Canada actually come from the FBI. A lot of the child sexual abuse material being circulated is coming from Canada, but they are finding it only on computers in the United States. Under the Bykovets decision, that information could not be used, because it was not being obtained by a production order and a warrant. We need to ensure that our system is stronger so we can ensure that Canada is not a safe haven for people who produce child sexual abuse material.

[Andréanne Larouche, Bloc, Shefford, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I want to follow up on the comment and question raised earlier by my colleague from Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon.

Although Bill C-22 corrects certain aspects of last year's Bill C-2, according to the Canadian Bar Association, it falls far short of addressing all the gaps and issues raised during the study of Bill C-2. Several issues still need to be examined and addressed during the study of Bill C-22.

I would like to hear my colleague's thoughts on that.

[Dane Lloyd, Conservative, Parkland, AB]

Mr. Speaker, this is second reading of the legislation that has been put forward. If the legislation does move forward to committee, I think that will be an excellent opportunity to hear from witnesses, possibly the Canadian Bar Association, to hear their concerns. I know that we are meeting with many different stakeholder groups to talk about various concerns with the legislation that is before us today. I think the ultimate goal is to ensure that we have the best piece of legislation, one that balances the freedoms of Canadians with the digital tools that law enforcement needs to keep Canadians safe and to keep our country a place that criminals cannot treat like their own backyard.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I am wondering whether my colleague would share the concerns that some Canadians have already expressed with respect to ministerial orders, requiring only the approval of the intelligence commissioner, rather than maybe adding the Privacy Commissioner or even judicial oversight onto those ministerial orders. I wonder if he shares the concerns of people who have raised that issue.

[Dane Lloyd, Conservative, Parkland, AB]

Mr. Speaker, ministerial orders are very powerful tools. I think we need to ensure that they are the appropriate tools and that they are the necessary tools. I do note that an improvement to the legislation is that it is very clear that judicial authorizations would be needed in the vast majority of the cases that are dealing with the legislation. I think it should give Canadians some relief to know that this would be added, but we need to ensure that these measures would be proportionate and that they would actually be effective in getting the job done in the way that we want it to get done.

[Kelly DeRidder, Conservative, Kitchener Centre, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is always an honour to rise in the House to speak on behalf of Kitchener Centre residents. Today, I will be speaking to Bill C-22, an act respecting lawful access.

Let me start with the principle that has guided Conservatives for generations, which is that Canadians deserve to feel safe in their homes, their communities and their daily lives. They deserve a justice system that reflects the same values they hold, one that protects their freedoms and keeps the focus where it belongs, which is on keeping criminals accountable and victims protected. Conservatives believe in law and order. We have always stood for practical measures that keep our streets safe, protect our victims and respect the rights of Canadians. That is not new.

For the past decade, we have been warning the government that its approach to public safety and justice has been failing Canadians by putting dangerous criminals on bail and allowing them to walk on our streets, often to just reoffend again. We have been repeatedly asking the Liberals to reverse the policies that weaken the consequences for crime and leave communities feeling less safe. Instead, the current government has doubled down and allowed the situation to worsen.

This is not just theatrics. In my community of Kitchener Centre, officers are dealing with repeat calls. The Waterloo Regional Police Service has reported that a small number of repeat offenders are responsible for a large share of the calls that they get. The same names come up again and again while officers are pulled from other emergencies. Members can think about what that means. The same person can be arrested and released on bail, sometimes even on the same day, only for the police to rearrest them all over again.

Instead of strengthening enforcement and ensuring our frontline police officers and first responders have the resources they need, the government has gone to bat for policies that do not always reflect the realities on the ground, and Canadians can see the results in their communities. They see them in rising crime rates and in their local police forces that are stretched thin. As His Majesty's loyal opposition, it is our role to see if legislation has gone too far. It is not only our role to say so, but also our responsibility.

That is the context in which we find Bill C-22.

Nobody understands more than Canadians that our police services need the necessary tools to do their jobs and be able to keep up with the modern world. They deal with real threats and emergencies. They deserve a system that supports their work. That is not the issue. What Canadians expect and what they deserve is a respect for their privacy and freedom at the same time. However, these tools must be carefully balanced with the rights of Canadians. Public safety and civil liberties do not actually oppose one another; they work hand in hand. That is why Conservatives are approaching this with such caution.

These tools must be able to withstand scrutiny over time. Everyone benefits from clarity. For those in public safety and the general public, clarity reduces uncertainty, because once the government gains access to more of Canadians' personal information, it is not just a question of what it will do with it today, but what it will do with it tomorrow and then the day after that as well. That is why Canadians are paying attention, and the questions they are asking are about trust. They should not be difficult ones for the government to answer. Who has access to this information? Under what conditions can it be accessed? How is that access controlled? What safeguards exist to ensure it is not misused? Where is the line drawn? I think Canadians deserve to know.

When Canadians hear about lawful access, most of them are not thinking about legal definitions and technical terms. What it really boils down to is who can see their information, and why and how that data would be used. If those answers are not clear in the law itself, then it leaves too much room for interpretation and confusion later on what the law is being applied to in real situations.

So much of our lives take place online. We communicate online and bank online, some of us work online, and we store information online. We shop online, and we watch our favourite shows online. More and more of what we do in our daily lives leaves a digital trace. That does not automatically create a problem, but it does mean that the laws around access to digital information now reach further into ordinary activities than they once did.

For example, simple data, such as if someone sends a message, where they are or what device they are on, can reveal a lot about their daily life, even if the actual content of the message is never read aloud. Even something as simple as linking a name to an IP address can reveal where a person goes online, what they look at, their habits or who they talk to.

Good legislation is not just about intent. It is about whether the rules are clear enough that they cannot be misinterpreted. It is about whether the safeguards in place are strong enough that Canadians' rights are protected. Once information is shared in a digital system, it can move quickly between organizations.

That is what Canadians want and, frankly, deserve to know. It is not just who can access their information, but how it is tracked and how it will be protected once accessed. If Canadians cannot see that process clearly, it becomes harder for them to trust how the system is going to work. Once they start to believe that their personal information is not fully protected, it changes things as they know it. It changes how they interact with technology, how they communicate and how confident they feel in their institutions.

We can also not ignore a particularly vulnerable group in this conversation: children and young Canadians. They are now growing up in a world where sharing information is automatic, not deliberate. Many of them do not fully understand what happens to their data once it is shared, who can access it or how long it is stored. That is precisely why the law must be written with them in mind.

Research from the Canadian Centre for Child Protection highlights that young people are more likely to make privacy decisions online without fully understanding the long-term implications of how their personal information may be collected, stored or used. Similarly, Pew Research Centre research shows that teenagers often underestimate how visible and permanent their online activity is. This falls not only under privacy legislation in general but also under what the definition of lawful access means.

The risks do not fall to everyone equally. They cling to those who are the least equipped to understand how their information is being used. We must also recognize that consent in a digital environment is not always meaningful when users do not fully understand what they are agreeing to. Conservatives want to protect kids, which is why clear rules, strict limits on access and strong accountability matters.

Canadians outside this chamber are not reading every clause of the bill, but they know that government decisions impact their daily lives. They understand what it means when privacy is weakened. They have seen before what happens when government powers grow without transparency and accountability. Really, it all comes down to trust, and right now, that trust is fragile.

A poll from Ipsos, as reported by Global News, shows that Canadians are increasingly worried about how their personal data is being collected and used, especially in private industry and by government. Canadians need to be able to trust that, when government is given access to sensitive personal information, it will use that authority carefully and only within clear limits set out by the law. They need to trust that those limits are not flexible or open to interpretation, but firm enough to protect Canadians in practice, not just in principle. They need to trust that, over time, these powers will not quietly expand beyond what was originally approved. Once that trust is lost, it is very difficult to rebuild. That is why clarity, restraint and accountability matter just as much as the intent behind the text itself.

Conservatives are not interested in rushing this process. We are not interested in opposing the bill just to oppose it. We are interested in getting this right for Canadians. They should not have to choose between being safe and being free. They deserve both. Conservatives will stand for both as we review Bill C-22.

[Guillaume Deschênes-Thériault, Liberal, Madawaska—Restigouche, NB]

Mr. Speaker, my colleague expressed some concerns about public safety, and I want to reassure her. On this side of the House, we take these commitments to make our communities safer seriously. The purpose of Bill C-14 is to ensure tougher sentences for repeat violent offenders, while Bill C-16 seeks to better protect victims. Finally, the purpose of Bill C-22 is to provide law enforcement with the tools they need to properly investigate various crimes being committed using more modern technology.

Her colleague, the member for Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, even said that the bill would better assist law enforcement in their investigations and that he welcomed this legislation. He urged us to send Bill C-22 to committee. I would like to know whether the member agrees with her Conservative colleague that the bill is a step in the right direction for law enforcement in this country. Does she also agree that it should be sent to committee?

[Kelly DeRidder, Conservative, Kitchener Centre, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I respectfully disagree that the Liberals are taking it seriously to act on public safety.

In Ontario, violent firearms offences increased by 98% last year, and instead of addressing illegal firearms or border control, the government tried to do a failed gun buy-back program, which is not taking those illegal firearms off the street and is not actually protecting Canadians. There have been other measures showing that whatever the Liberals tried to do, they failed over and over again.

While Bill C-22 is moving in the right direction, there is work to do here. We will be scrutinizing the bill, as the Conservative Party, to make sure that we get it right for Canadians.

[Gabriel Ste-Marie, Bloc, Joliette—Manawan, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my colleague for her detailed speech, which provided a thorough analysis of the situation. It was very interesting. I understand that there has been some criticism.

Since the minister just said that he was open to making improvements in committee, I have the same question as the member who spoke before me. I would like to know whether my colleague thinks that this bill is worth debating and examining in committee.

[Kelly DeRidder, Conservative, Kitchener Centre, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I do think that it is worth reviewing in committee.

[Kelly McCauley, Conservative, Edmonton West, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I used to live in my colleague from Kitchener Centre's riding. It is a wonderful area. I am very glad that she is representing it.

The member brought up the point of a lack of trust in the government and a fear of a lack of transparency and accountability. The government will argue not to worry because inside the bill is a mandated comprehensive review of the legislation in three years. However, we have the same thing for the Access to Information Act, which the government has blown off; the Environmental Protection Act, which the government has blown off; the Lobbying Act, which the government has not done a review on; the Conflict of Interest Act; the Proceeds of Crime and Terrorist Financing Act; the CSIS Act; the Anti-terrorism Act; and the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act. For all of these acts, the government has blown off the legislative review.

Does my colleague trust that the government is going to do the review as mandated, or will it be just another broken promise from the Liberal government?

[Kelly DeRidder, Conservative, Kitchener Centre, ON]

Mr. Speaker, truthfully, I do not trust the Liberal government right now to handle crime and what is happening in our communities. I will share a very personal reason why that is.

Homicide is up almost 51% in Ontario, and that is not just a statistic for me. A very close and dear friend of mine was murdered and was part of these numbers last year. She was murdered by someone who had committed repeat violent offences, including stabbing, and that is how my friend died. She was stabbed to death.

The revolving door that is our justice system is a piece that has been ignored. We have put opposition motions forward to try to reverse what is happening in this country. No, I do not have faith in this coming forward with the Liberal government, and I do not trust that it will keep its promise on this. We will continue to hold the government accountable, and we will do this right.

[Taleeb Noormohamed, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Innovation]

Mr. Speaker, I will be sharing my time with the member for Hull—Aylmer.

I am pleased to rise today to speak to Bill C-22, an act respecting lawful access.

I want to start by asking two questions that I think Canadians are rightly asking.

The first is this: Are we meeting the moment when it comes to investigating crimes in a digital world? The tools that criminals use today, including encrypted communications, cryptocurrency and transnational digital networks, did not exist five years ago the way that they do now and certainly not at the scale at which they exist now. The crimes have not changed. Child exploitation is real and still exists in our world. Organized crime has not changed, and fentanyl trafficking is still there. What has changed, however, is how these crimes are carried out and the degree to which our existing investigative tools simply cannot keep pace.

The second question is just as important: Are we doing this in a way that protects the privacy of Canadians? If the answer to the first question comes at the expense of the second, then we have not done our job.

Bill C-22 seeks to answer both questions.

I think it is important to walk through what the legislation would do because there has been a lot of confusion and misinformation about what is being proposed. Bill C-22 has two parts that would work together. Part 1 would modernize legal authorities that law enforcement and CSIS need to investigate crimes in a digital environment. Part 2, the supporting authorized access to information act, would establish the technical requirements for electronic service providers, companies like our major telcos, to be able to comply with existing court-authorized processes. I want to emphasize the word “existing”. The bill would not create new surveillance powers, new intercept authorities or back doors into any one system. It would make the court-authorized processes that we already have, warrants and production orders, which are tools that have always required judicial oversight, functional in a world that has moved online.

Right now, if a judge were to issue a production order for evidence held by a service provider, there is no regulatory framework in Canada that requires the provider to have the technical capability to comply. I would ask us all to think about that for a moment. A judge can authorize access to evidence, but the system to carry that out may not exist. That is the gap this bill seeks to close.

Folks may ask, “Why now?” The answer is simple: The gap between criminal capability and law enforcement capability is widening, not narrowing. Two Supreme Court decisions, R. v. Spencer and R. v. Bykovets, have brought important clarity to the legal landscape around digital investigations. In Spencer, the court confirmed that police need a warrant to obtain basic subscriber information. In Bykovets, the court extended that principle to IP addresses. These rulings affirmed something important: Canadians have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their digital lives. This bill would respect that.

Those decisions also made clear how outdated our existing legislative framework really is. The law as it stands was not built to function in a world where, rightly, judicial authorization is required at these stages. Without the proper tools to operate within that reality efficiently, investigations are slowing at precisely the moments when timeliness matters the most.

Here is a practical reality. When police are investigating a serious crime, such as a child exploitation case, an extortion ring or an active threat, and have a court-authorized production order in hand, they still need to know which service provider holds the relevant data. Under the current framework, they cannot even ask that question. They cannot confirm whether a provider services a particular IP address, not the subscriber's identity, just whether the provider has any connection to that address at all. If they serve the order on the wrong provider, they have to start all over again. Meanwhile, evidence degrades, trails go cold and, in some cases, kids remain at risk.

That is the gap I am talking about. It is not hypothetical; it is playing out in investigations across the country, and it is costing us time that we simply do not have.

We are the only Five Eyes country and the only G7 member without a modernized lawful access framework. What that means practically is that Canadian law enforcement has had to rely on international partners to do what we should have been able to do ourselves. That is simply not a sustainable position for a country that takes both public safety and sovereignty seriously.

We also need to have the conversation about whatever concerns exist about privacy.

I would ask members to look carefully at how this bill is structured, because I think that when we do, we see something that should give Canadians confidence. The principle at the heart of this bill is proportionality. The level of oversight is calibrated to the level of intrusion. The more information one is seeking and the more it touches the privacy of an individual, the higher the bar that has to be cleared. Most Canadians, I believe, would agree with that instinct.

Let us walk through what that might look like in practice. At the most basic level, there is confirmation of service demand, which is a threshold question. It asks, does this particular provider service this IP address or phone number, yes or no? There are no subscriber details, no content, no further information. This simply tells investigators whether they are knocking on the door of the right service provider. Because it reveals so little, it does not require a warrant. We are not learning anything about a person. We are learning whether a company has a connection to an identifier.

The next step is the subscriber information production order. Now we are asking for something that starts to identify a person, such as a name, an address, a phone number or an email address. This is more intrusive, so, appropriately, it requires the consent or the authorization of a justice or a judge. However, it is still narrower than a general production order, because we are not seeking content or communications, just the basic identifiers that allow an investigation to proceed. Then, when an investigator needs access to the content of communication or more detailed data, the full weight of the existing production order and warrant process applies, such as judicial authorization and full oversight. These are the same protections that have always existed under Canadian law.

Each step up in what the police ask for comes with a corresponding step up in the scrutiny that is applied. The oversight is proportionate to the invasiveness. I would suggest that this is not just good policy. It is in line with what the courts have told us about privacy and privacy interests in a digital context. The courts have said that these things engage privacy. This bill seeks to address the instructions of the court. It builds a system where the protections match the intrusions.

I want to speak briefly to the safeguards, because they reflect something important about how this bill came together. Earlier proposals around lawful access raised legitimate questions. The government's members heard those concerns. We went back and refined our approach. The definition of subscriber information was narrowed to basic identifiers. Ministerial orders under part 2 are now subject to approval by the intelligence commissioner. Data retention requirements are limited to metadata only and for a maximum of one year, and the bill explicitly excludes content, web browsing history and social media activity.

These are not small refinements. They are the product of careful work to get the balance right. The bill also includes mandatory public reporting in a parliamentary review three years after royal assent. I think we have an obligation to build that kind of transparency into any legislation that touches on investigative power, and this bill does exactly that.

I would like to end with what matters to me as a dad, what should matter to all of us, because what matters is at stake. The crimes that depend most heavily on digital infrastructure, such as child exploitation, extortion, human trafficking and money laundering, are precisely the crimes where law enforcement currently lack the tools to investigate effectively.

The Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police has called for the modernization of our lawful access regime. The Canadian Centre for Child Protection has supported the advancement of this bill. The National Police Federation has recognized that this legislation is a long-overdue modernization that protects the rights of Canadians while keeping them safe. When law enforcement and child protection organizations are telling us the same thing, we have a responsibility to act, not recklessly, but deliberately, and with the kind of care that this bill reflects. Responsible governance means modernizing our tools while respecting the rights of Canadians, not one at the expense of the other, but both together.

Bill C-22 gives law enforcement the investigative tools that they need to combat serious crimes, while ensuring that the privacy of Canadians is protected through judicial oversight, proportioned authorities and robust accountability. It is built within the charter. It responds to the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, and it closes a gap that has left Canada behind every one of its Five Eyes allies and G7 partners. This is how we keep Canadians safe, not by standing still while the world moves forward, but by keeping pace with the threats and the values that define us.

I urge all members to support this bill.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC]

Mr. Speaker, it is always a pleasure to rise on behalf of the people from Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola. When it comes to getting it right, there is no doubt that we need to address loopholes when it comes to access and when it comes to ensuring that information is available. The question is, how do we get it right? I am approaching this debate with that lens. We have ministerial orders that will not necessarily be transparent under this legislation. They will be in secret.

Does my hon. colleague have a position on that, namely whether they should all be in secret, or whether some should be in secret in order to protect vulnerabilities?