Mr. Speaker, I am rising to respond to the question of privilege raised on April 29 by the member for Peace River—Westlock respecting the tabling of annual reports pursuant to an order in council.
I submit that this matter is a question of statutory law upon which the Speaker is not empowered to make determinations. In the ruling referenced by my colleague, I would like to draw the attention of members to parts of that ruling that were not addressed in the member's submission to the House.
On February 5, 1992, in the Speaker's ruling respecting the tabling of a document pursuant to an act of Parliament, he stated:
The first point that the Chair wishes to highlight is that Speakers do not interpret or enforce matters of statutory law. There are many precedents to this effect.
On June 19, 1978, a question of privilege was raised respecting the late tabling of the Postmaster General’s annual report. In rejecting claims that the failure to respect the law constituted a breach of privilege, Speaker Jerome warned the House that the authority of the Chair did not extend to the determination of questions of law.
On two occasions—March 27, 1981 and February 10, 1983—Speaker Sauvé confirmed this principle in denying claims for the Chair to intervene in cases similar to the one raised by the honourable Member for Scarborough—Rouge River. In each of these situations, the Government had failed to live up to its statutory responsibility to table documents within a specific period of time. In response, Madam Speaker ruled that the Chair had neither the responsibility to interpret the law nor the authority to compel the Government to obey it.
There are two important distinctions between the case of the ruling of February 1992 and the case currently before the House. In the situation facing the House in 1992, there was a statutory requirement found in the Customs Tariff, an act adopted by Parliament, to table an order made pursuant to that act respecting the elimination of tariffs on certain plywood and related products under a free trade agreement that required the Minister of Finance to table in the House no later than April 2l, 1989.
The case before the House is not analogous. The tabling of the report in question is not done pursuant to a statutory obligation but rather a legal instrument made by an order in council by the executive branch of government. The order in council referenced by the member, unlike the situation in 1992, does not provide a requirement to table the document by a certain date. Both of these points diverge distinctively from the situation facing the House in 1992.
More substantively, the case of a statutory obligation requiring that an order in council be tabled in the House respecting the alleviation of a tax or the elimination of a tax on certain products would be of legislative concern to members of the House. The question currently before the House is not a legislative requirement and has no direct impact on any legislative matter currently before the House.
Moreover, the All-Party Parliamentary Group to End Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking is not an official standing, legislative or special committee of the House. There is no mention in the Standing Orders of the powers, mandate and functions of such parliamentary working groups. These unofficial forums are not official creatures of the House and, therefore, are not subject to the provisions of Standing Order 108, which set out the powers and mandates of official committees of the House.
I submit that the matter raised by the member for Peace River—Westlock is a question of law, which is outside the purview of the Speaker. Secondly, the legal instrument referred to was not a requirement of an act of Parliament. Finally, the absence of a requirement for a time frame to be complied with brings into question whether the government has not exercised, or will not exercise, the obligation under that order in council.
I therefore submit that this is not a procedural question, nor can a determination be made that the government has not complied with its own exercise of authority under the order in council.