I am getting there. Do not worry.
Mr. Speaker, the report goes on to say:
The overall target of Canada’s NHS is to remove 530,000 households from housing need by 2027‑28. After accounting for the impact of all relevant federal policies and economic trends, we estimate that 2.4 million households are currently in core housing need and we project that, by 2027, 2.6 million households will be in core housing need. We project that by 2027, there will be about 926,000 more households in core housing need compared to the start of [the national housing strategy] in 2017.
Let us go on to 2025. Then we are going to get to my speech. I have to do my research first.
In 2025, in “Build Canada Homes and the Outlook for Housing Programs under Budget 2025”, the Parliamentary Budget Officer highlights that:
Federal planned spending on housing programs is set to decline 56 per cent, from $9.8 billion in 2025‑26 to $4.3 billion in 2028‑29 due to the expiry of funding for existing programs and cuts set out in Budget 2025.
Within this spending plan, Budget 2025 prioritizes...the construction of new housing through a new federal agency called Build Canada Homes. Build Canada Homes plans to spend $7.3 billion over 2025‑26 to 2029‑30.
Here is the cliffhanger:
Build Canada Homes should be expected to make a modest contribution toward housing supply and affordability within the broader context of a large decline in support for housing affordability.
The report continues:
Build Canada Homes is presented as part of the Government’s efforts to double the pace of housing construction over the next decade. That said, the Government has not yet laid out an overall plan to achieve this goal.
Ouch.
We anticipate that the contribution of Build Canada Homes will likely be modest and estimate that the program will add about 26,000 units over five years, representing a 2.1 per cent increase in housing completions relative to our baseline projection.
Build Canada Homes has sufficient funding to create approximately 13,000...units of housing affordable for low‑income households. However, this occurs within a context of declining spending and a shift away from immediate affordability supports such as the Canada Housing Benefit and support for existing social housing.
Let us walk through this and break down all of this important information because that was a lot of data. It even got me sweating, it was so suspenseful.
I want to walk through not just what the government promised on housing but what the evidence shows. This is now a question not only of policy performance but of whether the government is delivering on its own law, the national housing strategy, and ambition in policy.
As I have reiterated numerous times throughout my remarks this morning, the government promised to remove 530,000 households from housing need, cut housing need in half, create 100,000 new housing units, repair or renew 300,000 existing units, protect 385,000 community housing units and reduce chronic homelessness by 50%, a suite of commitments that the government presented as comprehensive, time‑bound and transformational under the national housing strategy in 2017. It committed to cutting housing need in half. These were not small commitments. They, in the government's own words, were meant to be transformational.
However, the Parliamentary Budget Officer made very clear early on that outcomes were already falling far short. As early as the first major PBO assessments of the national housing strategy, the evidence showed that the scale of program impacts was insufficient relative to the need, as the member from Winnipeg will note in my disposition of the 2019 report. Even before recent population pressures and interest rate shocks, by 2021, only a few years into its implementation, the PBO was already warning that the net reduction in core housing need was modest and that federal interventions were not on track to meeting stated targets.
In other words, the warning signs were visible well before the current crisis we find ourselves in today. The strategy was underscaled from the outset, heavily relying on slow-moving capital programs and incapable of delivering the rapid affordability improvements the government promised. Rather than correcting course when this evidence emerged, the government largely stayed on the path, allowing a predictable gap between ambition and outcomes to widen year after year.
The net reduction in core housing need is limited relative to the scale of the problem. That is what the Parliamentary Budget Officer stated in the 2021 analysis report. This was the first clue that something fundamental was not working, because when a plan is described as transformative, but its outcomes are described as limited, there is already a gap between promise and performance.
My second point is on the National Housing Strategy Act and ambition in law. It is also important to situate this legal framework in the context of the scale of the federal investment that accompanied it.
When the national housing strategy was launched, it was presented as a $40-billion plan. Over time, that figure was repeatedly increased and reframed as over $70 billion in federal commitments across grants, loans, financing tools and program spending. I believe that as of last night, it is over $80 billion in commitments.
Parliament was told that this level of investment, combined with a rights-based legislative framework, as I outlined in my review of the act, would fundamentally change housing outcomes in Canada. The act was therefore never intended to operate in isolation from funding. It was meant to discipline and guide very large public expenditures toward measurable outcomes. Indeed, all of the speeches I read from concerning Bill C-97 in the 2019 debates reinforced that very point.
In other words, the bargain was clear: unprecedented federal investment in exchange for clear goals, timelines, accountability and a focus on those in greatest need. That is why the failure to meet outcomes is so consequential. After years and years of record spending, program expansion and administrative growth, the evidence shows worsening housing needs rather than the progressive improvement the government labelled in its original housing strategy, as I outlined.
This context matters when evaluating the current policy choices before us and this programming motion today. Bill C-26 and budget 2025 do not emerge in a vacuum. They follow a decade of escalating financial commitments that have not delivered the promised results.
When the government seeks additional funds through ad hoc legislation while simultaneously reducing support under the existing strategy, it is not because housing lacked funding in the past. It is because large-scale funding, absent structural reform and accountability, has not translated into affordability or adequate supply.
Seen this way, the issue before Parliament is not whether more money should be spent, but whether spending is being governed by a framework that actually works. The National Housing Strategy Act was supposed to be that framework. The fact that the government is now bypassing it after committing tens of billions of dollars without achieving its objectives underscores the depth of the policy failure we are confronting.
However, this is not just a policy story. As I outlined earlier today, in 2019, Parliament passed the National Housing Strategy Act, and that changed everything because it legally requires the government, in section 5, to set out national goals, timelines and desired outcomes, and “focus on improving housing outcomes for persons in greatest need”. At its core, the act establishes not only a statement of principle, but a framework for action and accountability that is directly relevant to the government's current legislative choices, including Bill C-26.
This is where the government's position becomes most revealing. The National Housing Strategy Act was designed to ensure that federal housing policy is guided by outcomes, not announcements: clear goals and timelines, a focus on those in greatest need and mechanisms to measure whether progress is actually being made. New spending under that framework is supposed to advance those objectives and be evaluated against them.
Bill C-26 departs from that logic. Rather than strengthening or reforming the national housing strategy to correct its glaring shortcomings and complete failure, the government is proposing a parallel track, authorizing significant new payments for housing supply without anchoring that spending to the strategy's target or the act's obligations. There is no requirement in Bill C-26 to demonstrate how funds would reduce core housing need, no binding affordability thresholds and no alignment with the act's statutory focus on households in greatest need.
In effect, the bill asks Parliament to approve new money while suspending the very accountability framework that the Liberal government put in place in 2019. That choice matters. If the strategy and the act were working, new resources would logically flow through them, reinforced by tighter targets and clearer accountability. Instead, Bill C-26 would bypass that framework altogether.
This is not an accident. It reflects a tacit recognition that the existing approach cannot deliver outcomes it promised. However, rather than acknowledging that failure and proposing a redesigned strategy, the government is seeking flexibility without accountability, with more money now and fewer questions later. This approach risks repeating the same mistakes at greater cost.
Untied spending may move dollars, but without discipline and without parliamentary accountability, it does not guarantee homes that are affordable, nor the intended objectives of the minister. Bill C-26 therefore represents not a course correction, but an institutional workaround, one that would allow the government to claim action on housing while avoiding a candid reckoning with why its flagship strategies have fallen apart.
The National Housing Strategy Act establishes the right to adequate housing as a “fundamental human right”. These are not suggestions. They are regulatory obligations, which means that we must evaluate this policy not just politically but legally. Is it improving outcomes? Is it prioritizing Canadians most in need who are going to their local food bank and working two jobs? Is it moving things forward, as the principle that the Liberals outlined of progressive realization requires? No.
Let us turn to the data we reviewed in the 2019, 2021, 2024 and 2025 Parliamentary Budget Officer reports that I outlined earlier.
The Parliamentary Budget Officer told us that housing need rose to 2.6 million households in 2024, yet only 78,000 households have been removed from need in that same 2024 report. This is not a small gap. This is a complete collapse in deliverology. The Liberals used to love talking about deliverology. That is a shortfall of more than 450,000 households. Barely one in seven who were promised relief will actually receive it.
Critically, the PBO concludes that housing need is expected to increase over the projected period despite program spending. It is very clear. Program spending is not working. What the government campaigned on in the last election is not working. This is perhaps the most damning finding in my entire analysis today, because it tells us that even after billions of dollars and years of programs, the system is not improving; it is deteriorating. Public, independent evidence makes clear that this deterioration is occurring despite the creation of a large federal housing bureaucracy and tens of billions of dollars in announced spending.
The Parliamentary Budget Officer is repeatedly showing us that while administrative structures, programs and reporting requirements have expanded, the measurable outcomes that matter, such as reductions in housing need, improved affordability and faster supply delivery, have not followed. In effect, the federal government has built a complex policy and administrative architecture, but that architecture has not translated into results on the ground. Rising housing need, declining affordability and missed targets demonstrate that process has outpaced performance and that the scale of bureaucracy and spending alone has not been sufficient to meet the Liberal government's stated objectives.
Let us look at some of the mortgage delinquency rates that are on the rise.
Mortgage delinquencies have increased significantly after nearly a decade of Liberal housing policy. CMHC reported in May 2026 that the national 90‑plus day mortgage delinquency rate rose to 0.2% in quarter four of 2025, up from 0.21% a year earlier. According to a 2026 Equifax report, the rate of delinquencies in Ontario sat at about 0.3% in the first quarter of this year, a jump of 52% year over year. In B.C., the number jumped 36% to 0.25%.
Rebecca Oakes, vice‑president of advanced analytics at Equifax Canada, said, “When we look kind of at the mortgage trend, it is just a really good indication of the severity of financial stress that’s happening in a region.” Ontario is experiencing record stress. The housing crisis is no longer even about affordability alone. It is becoming a mortgage payment crisis.
Equifax reported that mortgage delinquencies were up 52% year over year in Ontario during quarter one of 2026. In Toronto, mortgage delinquency rates increased by approximately 58% year over year. Data from CMHC showed that around 0.21% of homeowners in Hamilton had not made a full mortgage payment in at least three months as of late 2025, representing a 425% increase in that city's mortgage delinquency rate from mid-2022.
Homeowners are carrying larger and larger debts. When borrowers fall behind today, they are falling behind on much larger mortgages. The average delinquent mortgage balance reached approximately $355,000 in quarter one of 2026, a 13.2% increase from a year earlier. Total consumer debt reached $2.66 trillion nationally. Mortgage delinquencies are often the final stage of household financial distress. The Bank of Canada found that households heading towards mortgage delinquency typically increase credit card utilization roughly two years beforehand, begin missing consumer credit payments one or two years beforehand and experience rapidly worsening financial conditions in the six months leading up to mortgage delinquency.
Canada needs more homes, but the 2025 National Building Code risks making homes more expensive to build. The Canadian Home Builders' Association argues that housing affordability and supply are already in crisis and that the code changes should be evidence-based, cost-effective and implementable at scale. The CHBA has criticized the 2025 codes for insufficient consideration of their cumulative cost impacts.
The costs are so significant that in a February 2026 open letter to the Prime Minister, the Canadian Home Builders' Association calls for an immediate pause to that regulatory approach. The CHBA has cited federal impact analysis showing that high-energy performance tiers could increase construction costs by more than $40,000 per home. In total, the CHBA estimates that the 2025 National Building Code could add up to $100,000 in costs to a new unit.
Every policy should be tested against one question: Will it build more homes? Governments should be focused on removing barriers to construction and increasing supply. The association has warned that many regulatory responses to housing and climate objectives ultimately increase costs and reduce housing production.
Let me expand on my speech on budget 2025 regarding less support, not more. One might assume that worsening outcomes could be addressed simply by expanding funding, but the evidence shows that money alone is not the binding constraint. The problem is not a lack of announcements or headline dollars. It is that the underlying policy framework has failed to translate resources into results. Structural barriers, slow approvals and misaligned incentives such as those outlined by the Canadian Home Builders' Association outline that very fact.
Delayed project delivery, weak targeting and an overreliance on long-term capital programs have meant that additional funding has not produced proportional investments in affordability or a reduction in housing need. However, the PBO shows something more important: Outcomes have continued to worsen, not because funding was insufficient but because the government's approach failed to address structural constraints that determine whether homes actually get built and become affordable.
Spending's falling 56% is a signal that the government itself is implicitly acknowledging that simply layering additional funding onto the existing approach has not delivered results. Rather than openly reassessing the strategy and admitting that its core design has failed, the government appears to be quietly pulling back, reducing funding while maintaining the same policy framework. This halfway acknowledgement, though, stops short of the full consideration the evidence supports, which is that the approach itself, not just its funding level, has failed to meet its objectives.
I encourage everyone to look at the highlights on page 1 of the Parliamentary Budget Officer's outlook for housing programs under budget 2025. Federal plan spending on housing programs, as I just noted, is set to decline 56%, a decline that reflects more than a fiscal choice. It follows years in which the government failed to meet the core objectives it set for itself under both the national housing strategy and the strategy act. Rather than acknowledging that its approach has delivered neither the promised reduction in housing need nor improvements in affordability, the government is scaling back federal supports while leaving the underlying strategy largely intact, effectively retreating from its own commitments without admitting its failure.
Let us be clear. Housing need continues to rise in Canada. Targets are being missed, and spending is being cut. This is not an adjustment. It is a quiet retreat from objectives the government has failed to meet under both the national housing strategy and the National Housing Strategy Act, an implicit acknowledgement that the approach has not worked, without the candour to admit failure or undertake a genuine course correction.
If I had another couple of hours today, I would probably delve into some of the comments made by the Minister of Infrastructure and Housing on his new approach and the new bureaucracies the government is covering. I just do not have enough time to get through all that in the time I have today.
I will talk about the supply strategy and Build Canada Homes for a bit. The government's response is to emphasize supply, to build more homes and to accelerate construction, but the PBO even offers a reality check where Conservatives and Liberals might agree on improving supply: “[Build Canada Homes] should be expected to make a modest contribution towards housing supply and affordability.”
As I asked earlier when I read that report, what does “modest” mean in practice? It would be about 26,000 units over five years, a scale of delivery that underscores the failure of the government's current approach. Put plainly, this represents roughly 5,000 units per year nationwide, at a time when Canada is adding hundreds of thousands of new residents annually and facing a huge housing gap measured in hundreds of thousands of units. Even the Parliamentary Budget Officer characterized this contribution as “modest”, estimating it would increase housing completions by only about 2.1%, relative to baseline projections. That is not transformational. It is marginal change at best.
When a strategy promises to cut housing need in half but delivers a supply that addresses only a tiny fraction of that projected shortfall, this amounts to an admission that the policy levers being used are inadequate. The result is predictable: Housing needs continue to rise, affordability deteriorates, and the government declares success while the underlying problems worsen. In effect, the federal approach substitutes announcement and program branding for outcomes, producing numbers that are too small, too slow and too poorly targeted to reverse the crisis. According to the government's own independent budget officer's assessment, this level of supply cannot meet its stated objectives, confirming that the current strategy, as designed and funded, is failing to deliver the results Canada was promised.
Let us delve a bit more into a structural problem in policy design. The issue is not just scale. It is design. The strategy has shifted toward financing tools and long-term capital programs. That is not all bad, but the PBO warns that “this occurs within a context of declining spending and a shift away from immediate affordability supports”. I mention that in the context, because so many more Canadians are on the verge of being homeless. Homeless numbers are actually rising, while the government said they would do the opposite.
The government has failed to prioritize the people who are in greatest need. The National Housing Strategy Act requires a focus on those in greatest need, but the funding structure and approach tell a different story. Funding is being shifted from programs that provide current affordability supports toward capital contributions with benefits over many decades. I hope there are some improvements there.
Let us talk about generational impact. The consequences for the government's policy failures on housing are not evenly distributed. Young Canadians are bearing the brunt. They face higher rents, delayed home ownership, delayed family formation, rising debt burdens and other postponed life decisions. Even when new units are built, the PBO cautions, the addition of these units would only partially offset the decline in overall affordability support, so even new supply is not solving the overall affordability crisis so many Canadians face today. It barely offsets worsening conditions.
To add to these pressures, there is rapid population growth. Demand has surged. Supply has not kept pace, and policy failed to adjust fast enough. Over the last number of years, there have been historically low vacancy rates, rising rents and increased competition for entry-level housing. This is not an isolated policy failure. It is a system-level imbalance. It is therefore deeply ironic that the government is now taking credit for signs of easing in rental markets in some cities where rents have stabilized or grown more slowly. This change is far more plausibly explained by a reduction in housing demand, not by a sudden success of federal housing policy.
Over the past year, the federal government has tightened and reduced inflows of temporary residents, including international students and temporary foreign workers, as it celebrated in the 2019 budget implementation act. That shift has had an immediate and measurable effect on rental demand, particularly in urban markets that absorbed a large number of the new arrivals. Fewer new entrants competing for the same limited stock of rental housing naturally does ease upward pressure on rents. That is basic economics.
However, this is not a victory on housing policy, supply or affordability. It does not reflect new homes coming online at scale, faster approvals, lower construction costs or a more functional housing system. It reflects demand-side slowdown caused by changes in immigration and temporary resident policy, not the success of the national housing strategy.
Indeed, if the government's housing strategy were working as intended, rent moderation would be driven by increased supply, improved affordability outcomes and lower usage of the food bank, especially for low and moderate-income households, not by reduced population inflows. Claiming credit for lower rent growth under these circumstances risks confusing cause and effect. Slower rent increases caused by the arrival of fewer people does not mean housing has become more affordable. It means pressure has been temporarily relieved by constraining demand. This distinction matters.
A housing system that relies on dampening demand rather than expanded supply is not resilient. It does nothing to address the underlying shortage. It does not improve access for Canadians already locked out of the housing market, and it offers no assurances that affordability will be sustained if demand rises again. Without structural reform, faster approval, lower non-construction costs and a regulatory environment that enables builders to deliver housing at scale, any short-term easing driven by reduced demand will prove fragile and reversible.
In short, the recent moderation in rents is not evidence that the government's housing strategy is succeeding. It is evidence that the imbalance between supply and demand remains unresolved and that the system responds more quickly to changes in population flows than to years of federal spending and bureaucracy. That reality only reinforces the conclusion that the core problem lies not with the funding levels but with the policy framework that has failed to deliver sufficient housing supply.
At the same time, the government has not moved fast enough to improve the economic conditions required for private sector building. Developers have faced rising financing costs, regulatory delays, increased development charges and approval bottlenecks.
In fact, I think it is worth reading the February 18, 2026, letter to the Prime Minister. It states:
Dear Prime Minister...
The Canadian Home Builders’ Association (CHBA) continues to support building code development where it follows principles of clear and convincing policy analysis, where evidence-based decision-making happens in public meetings and where committees emphasize cost-effective (ideally cost-neutral) acceptable solutions that equally solve the climate and housing affordability crises in Canada. We estimate that the new 2025 code will add over $100,000 to the cost of a typical new home...this is completely untenable. To that end, we cannot support the 2025 model codes or their adoption and call for an immediate pause to redo them properly
CHBA has become seriously concerned over the last few years with how Canada’s new governance system for national codes and its updated code development process is neither transparent nor evidence-based anymore. These deficiencies are having a direct and negative impact on housing affordability, construction productivity, and the ability of industry stakeholders to contribute meaningfully to effective codes development and implementation while reaching your government’s priorities of additional housing supply and more climate change effective construction.
Further to that, by not addressing housing affordability in the national model codes, even though most provinces and territories call it a priority, there may in fact not be harmonization—the very reason model codes exist in the first place—because provinces may rightly reviewed and accepted by the time they are published, which negates harmonization by instead increasing the likelihood of provincial variations or non-adoption. Lack of harmonization at the provincial (and municipal) level is a key barrier to industry productivity.
A serious course correction is needed, and thus CHBA is urging the Government of Canada to immediately pause all changes to the National Model Construction Codes, as Australia has done with its code system. With that, and before seeking adoption of the 2025 National Construction Codes by the provinces, CHBA is calling on the government to improve the 2025 codes with the proper lenses of affordability, evidenced-based decision-making, and a view to regulations that will truly lead to the optimized outcomes that must be considered in today’s world. The 2025 codes should be paused, revisited, and re-issued once these issues are addressed, so that provinces can and should actually adopt them, and harmonization can be achieved.
Here are our key reasons for pausing all construction code changes and revisiting them with proper focus:
Reduced Productivity—The large amount of national priorities and the pace of developing the respective code changes leave insufficient time for proper review, simplification and resolution of outstanding constructability or affordability concerns by those who are most affected—the residential construction industry...and Canadians facing affordability challenges in trying to buy a home. The amount of new code requirements is overwhelming. Changes related to energy, greenhouse gas emissions, radon, and wind/seismic loads add significant costs and delays and will reduce the productivity of the sector, while in many cases not even delivering the right outcomes. Much better approaches to achieve these goals must be found through a revamping of the 2025 code, with timelines and solutions that support affordability.
Affordability Ignored—There is no formal requirement or code objective to protect housing affordability...
Again, the government's approach is not aligned with its national housing strategy or the National Housing Strategy Act.
The letter continues:
...not even a principle for committees developing the national codes. Economic concerns brought forward by the construction industry are being dismissed, and cumulative costs for all changes in the 2025 codes have not been calculated by those developing the code. Ultimately, it is Canadians bearing the brunt of the added cost of these changes. All changes should be properly revisited to look at their individual cost impacts, plus the cumulative cost impacts of the full suite of changes the 2025 code will require on each home. CHBA’s initial analysis of a typical 2500 sq. ft. home estimates increased costs from the 2025 code changes to be $56,364 (see Appendix A ) without any energy efficiency compliance cost. If provinces continue to mandate the progressive energy targets from the 2020 codes from Tier 1 to Tier 5 this would double those costs, bringing full implementation of the 2020 energy targets and 2025 codes to an estimated cost of $113,930 for each home built within the next few years. CHBA’s Housing Market Index shows material costs alone for that same house have gone up $100,000 from 2025. Canada’s housing crisis cannot handle these kinds of increases. A much more reasonable approach is needed.
Reduced Transparency—Recent changes to the governance and committee structure have reduced transparency and sidelined industry voices.
It would be interesting to see how many members of the Canadian Home Builders' Association are on any of the councils the government created in its National Housing Strategy Act.
The letter continues:
Decisions are increasingly made behind closed doors, with little rationale published or meaningful engagement with those most affected—Canada’s residential construction sector. The residential construction sector...can no longer be the target of poorly thought-out policies and regulations that take away from building more supply. If all levels of government hope to achieve building 500,000 new homes per year, they need to treat the sector as a partner, and excessive and ill‑conceived regulation is a key barrier to be addressed jointly.
The more I read this, the more the concerns outlined by the Canadian Home Builders' Association contradict the community-building partnership clauses of the National Housing Strategy Act. How dare they?
The letter continues:
Harmonization Failure—Without addressing affordability in national codes, which is a key priority for almost every province and territory, the national codes risk being not adopted, or being modified so much provincially that there isn’t in fact harmonization. To that end, the federal government should change the national code publication process such that provinces and territories have time to review a draft code for a year so they can collectively agree to a set of changes they can then adopt as fully harmonized national code at the time the code is published. Without this change, provinces will continue making their own amendments, which prevents harmonization and risks low adoption of costly changes in the 2025 codes. We are urging the federal government to take action now to avoid further fragmentation across Canada.
Fragmented Interpretation—Local interpretation of building codes varies significantly from municipality to municipality—even across the same city sometimes, causing delays and extra costs for the industry. This barrier to more housing faster has not been recognized by governments. As the government continues to reduce inter-provincial trade barriers, it also needs to resolve the fragmented interpretation of building codes that not only vary from province to province but also municipality to municipality. To that end, CHBA recommends a National Code Interpretation Centre be established at the National Research Council to publish code interpretations—provinces can in turn reference those interpretations, making them binding, and helping to end the endless variations on code interpretations that are a major barrier to industry productivity.
The roadblocks confronting the residential construction industry, such as rising costs, reduced transparency, and fragmented code interpretation will inevitably hinder the government’s pursuit of doubling housing starts, including affecting the government‑supported housing to be built under the Build Canada Homes initiative. Without urgent reform, these systemic issues will undermine all efforts to deliver housing Canadians can afford on the accelerated timelines needed.
Facing very similar challenges, the government of Australia recently paused changes to its National Construction Code until 2029, following a report from its own Productivity Commission. The report found that frequent code changes were slowing housing delivery and increasing costs. The pause is intended to provide stability, reduce red tape, and help the industry focus on building more homes. The parallels between Australia’s housing challenges and Canada’s are extensive, making a similar move for Canada justified and essential.
To that end, Canada should follow Australia’s lead and
immediately stop the adoption and implementation process of the 2025 National Construction Codes, and assess them, with a plan to only put forth for adopting cost-neutral changes for housing in Part 9 of the 2025 national codes...
pause all 2030 code development until critical reforms are made to the development approach, such as
restoring transparency, accountability, and meaningful stakeholder engagement within the codes system
adding an ex-officio seat for CHBA and other broad sector stakeholders at all CBHCC meetings (including in-camera meetings) to properly inform the development from an industry perspective
reinstating a coordination committee dedicated to NBC Part 9 (which deals directly with housing) rather than spreading it across 13 committees with nonresidential construction
reducing the priorities for the 2030 code cycles, focusing only on essential, cost-neutral requirements
making housing affordability a core principle in code development along with a robust structured process to assess and limit individual-change and cumulative costs for each future code edition
establish a National Building Code Interpretation Centre to achieve consistent local application of harmonized national construction codes, and work with the provinces to make published solutions binding.
Canada must act quickly to avoid the same problems identified in Australia and ensure our codes system supports safe, affordable, and climate-resilient housing.
CHBA remains committed to working with government towards a more effective and inclusive code development process. We would be happy to meet with you and your officials at your earliest convenience to continue this important conversation and inform immediate action.
That was written by Kevin Lee. That letter was cc'd to the Minister of Housing and Infrastructure, the minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development, the Minister of Internal Trade and minister responsible for One Canadian Economy, and the president of the National Research Council of Canada.
It also bears mentioning, reflecting on earlier words in the House of Commons today, that the minister responsible, when demanding $1.7 billion, unchecked, from the federal government, could not have referenced this very important letter outlined to him about what he needed to do to address housing affordability in Canada. It is from the very people the government depends on to build homes in the first place.
Getting back to my speech and the failure to enable private sector construction, it is not because builders refuse to build, but because conditions made projects unviable. This point has been repeatedly underscored by the Canadian home builders, and it aligns with the broader demand-side story now being mis-characterized as policy success. Builders have consistently warned that the primary barriers to increasing housing supply are not a lack of willingness or the capacity to build, but an accumulation of policy-driven costs, delays and uncertainty that makes projects financially impossible to proceed.
As Mr. Lee outlined in his remarks, just the regulatory additions from 2025 alone add over $100,000 to the cost of a 2,500-square-foot home in Canada. How is that a good thing? We have to also look at these building code requirements in the context of the rental market, which is now showing temporary easing during our reduced population inflows, but where we still need to see more rental construction.
In other words, recent moderation in rents does not signal that builders suddenly found projects viable. It signals that demand pressures ease when inflows of international students and temporary workers slow.
Builders have been clear that absent faster approvals, lower non‑construction costs and predictable timelines, supply will not respond at scale. Approval timelines stretching into years amplify financing risk. Development charges and levies imposed up front erode feasibility. Repeated redesigns across jurisdictions, as Mr. Lee outlined through the Canadian Home Builders' Association, add cost without adding homes. When these factors combine, projects stall or are cancelled, even as governments point to headline spending or short‑term rent data.
Canadian home builders have also cautioned that subsidies layered into this environment cannot compensate for structural barriers. Supply responds to certainty, speed and predictability, not to complex program criteria or untied transfers, as we see in Bill C‑26. Without reforms that fix approvals, fees and coordination across governments, additional spending risks flowing to a narrow set of projects or even, in some cases, sitting unused. The lesson from builders is consistent: Easing rents driven by lower demand is fragile and reversible; durable affordability requires making projects viable so homes actually get built.
Canadian home builders have pointed to approval timelines that stretch for years, during which carrying costs accumulate and financing risks rise. Zoning constraints, repeated designs and overlapping municipal, provincial and federal requirements add time and cost without adding homes. Development charges, parkland levies and infrastructure fees, often imposed up front, can represent a significant share of total project costs, particularly for multi-unit and purpose-built rental housing. Builders have been clear that when these charges rise faster than sale prices or rents, projects simply do not proceed.
If we look back on the 2019, 2021, 2024 and 2025 housing construction policies outlined by the Parliamentary Budget Officer, we can also draw a correlation between rental construction financing and some of these constraints faced by home builders. While intended to reduce costs and provide affordability for homeowners or renters, those costs, in fact, are so great that government financing is outweighed by the regulatory requirements that have increased the cost of home production in the first place, so financing conditions have compounded these problems.
Builders have also emphasized that higher interest rates and tighter lending conditions disproportionately affect construction projects with long approval timelines. When approvals take years, interest rate risks alone can erase already thin margins, especially for rental projects where revenues are capped for affordability expectations. In that environment, even projects that align with public policy goals are delayed or cancelled because they no longer pencil out.
Critically, builders have also warned that federal programs layered on top of the system do little to address these fundamentals. Subsidies and incentives cannot compensate for regulatory systems that delay projects or for cost structures that exceed what the market can bear. As builders have repeatedly argued, supply responds to certainty, speed and predictability, not program criteria or slow-moving capital contributions. Without reforms that reduce approval timelines, lower non‑construction costs and align incentives across government, additional funding risks sitting unused or flowing to a limited number of projects rather than unlocking broad‑based supply.
In short, the evidence from those who actually build homes reinforces the conclusion reached by the Parliamentary Budget Officer. The housing shortfall is not the result of building reluctance or market failure; it is the result of policy choices that have made building housing increasingly difficult. Until those structural barriers are addressed, no amount of new spending, whether under the national housing strategy or through ad hoc measures, such as Bill C‑26, will deliver the scale of housing supply Canadians urgently need. We now have a law requiring better outcomes, a strategy promising transformation and data showing deterioration.
The PBO's conclusion remains: The impact of federal housing programs is limited relative to the scale of need. That is our reality.
This is not just a policy failure. It is a failure to meet commitments, targets and statutory obligations. When the government promises to help 530,000 households in need and delivers only 78,000 units, when it plays around with its own budgets for housing and then, through Bill C‑26, asks Parliament to authorize new, untied spending for housing supply without reconnecting that spending to the outcomes, targets and timelines it established itself, it bears further scrutiny in Parliament.
Bill C‑26 and the programming motion I am debating right now reveal what Bill C‑26 does not do. It authorizes billions of dollars in additional payments to provinces and territories, but it does so outside the architecture of the national housing strategy. There are no statutory outcome requirements, no ties to reductions in housing need, no clear affordability thresholds and no measurable targets aligned with the act's obligations to focus on those in greatest need. In effect, the government is asking for more money now, while simultaneously retreating from the very framework that was supposed to ensure that money produced results.
This suggests a partial acknowledgement by the government that its existing approach is not working, but a willingness to go all the way in admitting failure is beyond any Liberal, in my opinion. Rather than reforming the strategy to fix its structural flaws or aligning new spending with the legal obligations Parliament enacted in 2019, the government appears to be sidestepping the problem. It is shifting away from the strategy through re-funding allocations while pursuing ad hoc spending through Bill C‑26 that is disconnected from its own commitments. This is not coherence; it is fragmentation.
If the national housing strategy were working, there would be no need to bypass it. If the act's frameworks were delivering results, new spending would logically flow through it, reinforced by clear targets, timelines and accountability. Instead, we see the opposite: declining support under the strategy, combined with new spending requests that avoid its constraints. That combination strongly suggests the government knows that its current approach has failed but does not want to formally acknowledge that failure or undertake the difficult work to redesign what is necessary to help build affordable homes in Canada.
The result that we have today, therefore, is the worst of both worlds. Canadians are told that housing remains a top priority, yet the strategy that was supposed to deliver results is being hollowed out. Parliament is asked to approve new funding, but without the guardrails that ensure effectiveness. The core problems, such as affordability, access to affordable homes for low-income households and the growing gap between need and supply, remain unaddressed. In short, Bill C‑26 does not represent a fix to a failing strategy. It represents a workaround. Workarounds are what governments turn to when they no longer believe their own plan can succeed. The conclusion is unavoidable: The strategy is not working, and Canadians are paying the price.
In conclusion, according to the Parliamentary Budget Officer, Canada now has approximately 2.4 million households in core housing need, and that figure is projected to rise to 2.6 million by 2027. That would mean nearly one million more households in core housing need than when the national housing strategy was launched in 2017. The very strategy that was supposed to make housing more affordable has coincided with a dramatic increase in the number of Canadians struggling to find suitable, affordable homes.
The Liberals have announced program after program, funding envelope after funding envelope, yet the results continue to move in the wrong direction. The PBO found that in 2023 Canada added approximately 460,000 new households while completing only 242,000 housing units. In other words, household growth vastly outpaced housing construction. The result is exactly what Canadians have experienced: rising prices, rising rents and fewer attainable housing options.
The same report estimates that Canada will require an additional 1.3 million housing units by 2030 above current projections simply to close the national housing gap. That means Canada would need, on average, roughly 436,000 completed housing units annually between 2024 and 2030, far beyond current construction levels. For renters, the situation is equally troubling. CMHC reported that affordability remains a major challenge. With turnover rents increasing by 23.5% in 2024, young Canadians, newcomers and working families are finding it increasingly difficult to secure housing they can afford.
What is most concerning is not simply the scale of the crisis, but the Liberal government's record. Canadians have heard the promises before. They were promised that the national housing strategy would improve affordability. They were promised that billions of dollars in spending would deliver results, yet the Parliamentary Budget Officer has concluded that housing needs continue to grow despite increased federal spending. Even the government's flagship housing accelerator fund deserves scrutiny. The PBO noted that very little funding was spent in its first year and that many of the housing increases observed in participating jurisdictions may have been driven by initiatives already under way before agreements were signed.
Trust is earned through results. After years of soaring home prices, rising rents, growing housing needs and repeated missed targets, Canadians have every reason to question whether the same government that helped this crisis can be trusted to solve it. Canadians do not need more announcements. Mission—Matsqui—Abbotsford does not need more announcements. That is why, in the first hour of my remarks today, I related Bill C-26 to the flexibility the government was showing and the lack of action we have had in the Fraser Valley region.
It bears repeating, before I conclude today, that my riding is the confluence of the Canadian Pacific Railway, the National Pacific Railway and the Southern Railway. We have a border crossing. The Government of Canada has chosen the Abbotsford International Airport and an amazing Canadian company, Conair, to build the national firefighting fleet for our entire country. Conair already hosts one of the largest fleets of any aircraft provider in the country. We are using De Havilland aircraft built in Canada to supply that fleet. We have the Trans Mountain pipeline and the Sumas transfer station, which transfers 37% of oil from the Trans Mountain pipeline to the United States. The Enbridge pipeline expansion and the Huntingdon transfer station that the government just approved are in my riding. We have the arterial road connecting British Columbia with the rest of Canada.
As I outlined for over an hour in this speech, we have received no federal supports, no flexibility and no accountability from the previous prime minister, who said that he would help us. Even today, High Commissioner Bill Blair said to me the other day, “Yes, we broke the promises we made to you.” It is my responsibility to continue fighting for that and to continue saying in this House that the status quo is not okay, if the Minister of Housing and Infrastructure can come forward with Bill C-26, a two-paragraph bill, to say that he needs $1.7 billion in additional housing funding, after a fund of $80 billion over 10 years has already failed every metric pointed out in the 2019, 2021, 2024 and 2025 Parliamentary Budget Officer reports.
Why can the federal government not support Abbotsford? I invite the minister to come to my community in good faith. I have never politicized this issue, because it is about Canada first, about the Government of Canada meeting its export objectives. Those export objectives run through the Fraser Valley. Canada cannot build if the Fraser Valley is not protected.
We are also the breadbasket of British Columbia. We are the heartland of dairy farmers, blueberry farmers and immigrants who have built their livelihoods supplying Canada with fresh produce, fresh vegetables and the best agricultural products we can find anywhere in this province, and we need help. I plead with the government to help us.
This June, we are launching the review process for the transboundary commission. The Minister of Emergency Management, in good faith, sent the parliamentary secretary to support it after I requested it. I will say that in good faith, and I invite the Minister of Housing and Infrastructure to come and hear what people have said and about the suffering we have gone through. Our only request is to help Canada build, help improve those exports and help Canada meet its objectives.
We are in British Columbia. I know many Laurentian elites in Ontario and Quebec see it as just this place where they go on vacation and ski, sail and golf in a single day, but it is more than that. It is the export opportunity to the Asia-Pacific region. It is the future of Canada's economic prosperity and it completely aligns with all of the trade objectives set by the Prime Minister, so again, I plead with the government—