Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my Conservative colleague. I cannot recall the name of his riding, but thanks to him, I have an attentive audience. I think this is the first time I have been in the middle of a speech and seen everyone rush into the House to listen to it. I thank my colleague.
I was talking about the offence of intimidation in order to obstruct or interfere with access to a place of worship. That kind of behaviour is unacceptable. It is disrespectful and creates frustration, which often leads to acts of violence. We need to address this problem. Of course, protests must still be allowed. The Bloc Québécois cares deeply about that. We care deeply about these values regarding rights and freedoms.
I see that some of my colleagues are starting to leave. I must be a little bit more boring now. I apologize.
We are committed to freedom of movement, freedom of speech and freedom of thought. We have no objection to people demonstrating outside public places. We believe that it can be a wonderful expression of democracy when done respectfully. However, blocking access—for example, demonstrating outside a church to prevent people who attend that church from entering, or intimidating them to discourage them from returning—is disrespectful and unacceptable. Bill C-9 addresses this problem.
There is also the issue of offences under the Criminal Code that are committed and additionally motivated by hatred. We must do something about this. Bill C-9 addresses this. Sentences may be increased by up to 10 years. Committing theft or another offence under the Criminal Code is one thing. There are penalties in place. A certain amount of evidence must be provided for each of these offences. However, if it can be established that the offence in question was also committed on grounds of hate, then the sentence may be increased significantly.
Unfortunately, I think this is a good thing. I say “unfortunately” because, like most of us probably, I wish we never had to do this or worry about this issue. We should live in a society where, first of all, no one commits crimes, and second, when someone does, it certainly should not be for hateful motives that are unacceptable in our society. These are all important things that we welcome with great pleasure, though that is not quite the right word. We certainly agree with that.
The Bloc Québécois felt that Bill C-9 was incomplete and had certain shortcomings, which is why we proposed a number of amendments. We are pleased that, following discussions, the minister came to the conclusion that this made sense. Some of the proposed amendments were adopted.
The first was to restore the prior consent of the Attorney General before starting proceedings under these hate crime provisions. When we talk about hate, we are talking about a number of things that often stem from frustration, which is often due to a lack of respect. One thing leads to another and we see situations where the parties are at odds with each other and things get heated, if we can put it that way. Without this requirement to obtain the Attorney General's consent, we run the risk of ending up with cases that might have little chance of success or that could, at the very least, turn into frivolous prosecutions. We do not want that.
I think that we need to be prudent, remain calm and use some wisdom when dealing with these hate crime offences. Personally, I like to think that there are people in the Attorney General's office who will keep a close eye on things. It was a Bloc Québécois amendment that sought to undo the elimination of the prior consent of the Attorney General from Bill C‑9. That provision will remain and will ensure prudent and reasonable management of this whole issue.
Then there is the definition of hate. There was a definition in Bill C-9 that struck us as somewhat flawed. In fact, it was a sort of exercise in rephrasing the Supreme Court's decision in the Keegstra case, changing a few words to try to come up with wording that was a bit more catchy or flashy.
I think that was a bad idea. We wanted to stick to the definition established by the Supreme Court in the Keegstra decision, and the Minister of Justice agreed to do so. We therefore amended Bill C-9 to adopt the exact wording proposed by the Supreme Court. This will spare us legal setbacks, rulings that would delay the implementation of the law, or even hinder or overturn certain trials.
Finally, there is the issue we have been discussing for some time now. It feels like when we talk about Bill C-9, that is all anyone talks about. Members will notice that I waited to bring it up, because I have spoken about it so often that everyone knows where I stand on the matter. I am referring to the religious exemption.
Hatred, hate crimes, hate propaganda and anti-Semitism are already covered by section 319 of the Criminal Code. However, one of the subsections created an anachronism. I do not have the text in front of me, but I believe it states that no person shall be convicted of these offences if it can be proven that they spread hatred in good faith based on a belief in a religious text.
That makes no sense. How can someone spread hatred in good faith? That seems contradictory to me. Canada, like Quebec, has also enshrined freedom of religion in law. In a state that claims to be secular, how can one claim that a person can twist and distort religious texts to make them say things that serve to spread hatred and that this constitutes a valid defence? I am sorry, but that seems unacceptable to me.
We reached a compromise with the Minister of Justice because some people had been spreading a lot of propaganda about repealing the religious exemption, claiming that people would no longer be allowed to read the Bible, the Quran or the Torah. I find that troubling because members of the public accepted that idea, whether out of naivety or because they trusted elected officials in whom they believed, and now they are concerned about Bill C-9.
We added subsection 319(2), which states that nothing in the Criminal Code “shall be construed as prohibiting a person from communicating a statement on a matter of public interest, including an educational, religious, political or scientific statement made in the course of a discussion, publication or debate, if they do not wilfully promote hatred against an identifiable group by communicating the statement...[or] if they do not wilfully promote antisemitism by condoning, denying or downplaying the Holocaust.”
This clearly indicates that a person may make a statement of a religious nature as long as it is not done for the purpose of spreading hate. That seems like an acceptable compromise to me.
I will stop there. I sense that my time is up. I was pleased to address the House on this issue.