Mr. Speaker, in the speech from the throne, the government committed itself to enhancing the credibility of Parliament. It also announced that changes would be proposed to the standing orders of the House of Commons to give members of Parliament a greater opportunity to contribute to the development of public policy and legislation.
Today, the government introduced its proposals for parliamentary reform. The Official Opposition does not object to the proposed changes to the Standing Orders of the House of Commons. However we do have some reservations.
Certain aspects of the proposed reform violate the fundamental principles of our parliamentary system. In other areas, we feel it does not go far enough, and we seriously doubt that the few changes being proposed will be able to restore Parliament's image and enhance the role of its members in the eyes of the public.
We realize that updating the rules in the Standing Orders is not a task to be taken lightly. Parliamentary procedure is extremely complex. It is based on principles that are meant to protect the inherent values of a democratic society like ours. Any attempt at reform must be done with great care, to avoid undermining the fundamental principles of our parliamentary democracy. As Charles Franks, founding president of the Canadian Study of Parliament Group pointed out, parliamentary reform is not a straightforward technique to make Parliament more effective and efficient, although it is often presented in those terms. This kind of reform is about the interests that legislators must serve in Canada and how various points of view may or may not affect choices and results.
However, we know that thorough reform is possible, witness the sweeping reforms of 1968 and 1985. It is enough to observe the following rule: any changes in the Standing Orders must conform to the fundamental principles of the Canadian parliamentary system.
Before taking a closer look at the government's proposals, perhaps I may briefly recall, for the benefit of this House, the underlying principles.
The Canadian parliamentary system is derived from the British system. In fact, according to the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867, the Canadian Constitution is based on the same principles as those applied in the United Kingdom.
Historically, the British parliamentary system has consisted in a set of techniques for co-operation between the government, called the King's Council, and the elected assembly or House of Commons. To encourage co-operation between the two powers, the British created various means of contact as well as certain controls and constraints.
Normally, these parliamentary techniques should have disappeared when the supremacy of Parliament, represented by the House of Commons, became the sole legitimate basis for the exercise of political power in Great Britain and Canada. However the need to reconcile parliamentary supremacy and effective government led to maintaining the parliamentary mechanisms that we know today.
Briefly, the British parliamentary system is based on maintaining a balance between the government's right to govern and the right of the House of Commons to control the government's activities, according to the principles of parliamentary supremacy.
To maintain this very necessary balance, the British parliamentary system requires a flexible sharing of legislative and executive powers by Parliament and the government, while stressing co-operation.
The government enjoys the confidence of members of Parliament who belong to the party that has the majority of the seats in the House of Commons. This allows the government to dictate the business of the House. Although the House of Commons conducts its business as it sees fit, it is more or less subject to the government's will. This mechanism allows the government to govern.
However, members of the House of Commons enjoy guarantees by which they are free to criticize the nature of government activity. These guarantees arise from the Standing Orders of the House and certain conventions. The preservation of the rights of the opposition is one of the basic unwritten rules.
The contemporary role of the House of Commons is therefore to monitor the government's actions. The main function of its members is to publicly and freely challenge and criticize the government and the measures it tables in the House. Any infringement of the member's role diminishes the usefulness of the House of Commons as a democratic institution.
As a result of the last election, the 54 members of the official Opposition were given the mandate to defend the interests of their constituents in the House of Commons pursuant to Parliamentary rules and traditions. They intend to assume the traditional role entrusted them under the Canadian parliamentary tradition to monitor the government's actions. However, Quebec voters did not give them the mandate to reform federal institutions such as the House of Commons.
Granted, the government has presented us with a proposed reform of the Standing Orders of the House, and it is its prerogative to do so. We have decided to co-operative to fully assume our parliamentary role and carry out our mandate. But our duties are not limited to approving the government's proposed amendments to the Standing Orders. We must also offer constructive criticism of the proposed reform. The Official Opposition intends to underline not only the positive aspects but also the shortcomings and oversights in the government proposals. The objective of this approach is to reassert the value of the members' work while respecting the underlying principles of the Canadian parliamentary system.
As representatives of Quebec voters, we cannot let the House lose some of the tools it has to monitor the government's actions. We would prefer to see an increase in the number of such tools. In fact, the Opposition watches over the transparency and openness of the House of Commons proceedings, in order to preserve the democratic values of our society.
In this regard, we are a little surprised by two amendments to the Standing Orders put forward by the government: the referral of a bill to a committee after the first reading and the delegation to a committee of the responsibility to draft a bill. Of course, the government asserts that noble goals are behind these proposals. Unfortunately, they will result in suppressing debate in the House on the principle of government bills.
The first amendment enables a minister to propose a motion to refer a bill to a committee right after the first reading subject to a short 180 minute debate during which no amendment would be allowed. Once the motion had been passed, the bill would then be referred to a committee controlled by the government majority for review.
The report stage would then be followed by second reading without amendment or debate. The report stage would become part of the second reading stage. The bill would then be reviewed at the third reading stage pursuant to the current Standing Orders.
Of course, Opposition members would have the opportunity to address in the House the principle of the bill during the initial debate on the referral motion. However, the debate would then be shorter than the usual second reading debate. Moreover, the members would lose the opportunity to propose the postponement of second reading or to put forward a reasoned amendment. The proposal to amend Standing Orders 73 and 76 and to add Standing Order 76(1) would limit debate in the House on the principle of the bill.
Comment 659 in the sixth edition of Beauchesne reads as follows:
The second reading is the most important stage through which the bill is required to pass; for its whole principle is then at issue and is affirmed or denied by a vote of the House.
The debate and vote on the principle of a bill is the Opposition members' main mechanism to control government bills. It enables them to criticize in the House the principle of a bill before the clause by clause review in committee.
It would be difficult to question the principle of a bill in committee at the report stage while trying to amend it clause by clause. As a result of this amendment, the debate on principle would be diluted by that on the amendments to each clause of the bill. We will debate technicalities without having discussed clearly and openly the opportunity of the bill. That is why the opposition has reservations about this amendment. In our opinion, it affects the fundamental right of members of Parliament to have an input in the legislative activities of government, a right which is at the very root of the Canadian parliamentary system.
We doubt that such an amendment will renew the credibility of this House in the eyes of Canadians. We could have had something more substantial to reassert the value of Parliament.
We feel uneasy about another amendment and for the same reason: the one allowing a minister to put a motion to instruct a committee to prepare and bring in a draft government bill. In its report, the committee would recommend the principles, scope and provisions of the draft bill.
Concurrence in this report by the House would constitute an order of the House for the government to bring in a bill based on the report, but not necessarily the one recommended by the committee. The government bill would then be introduced for first reading. The third sitting day after having been read a first time, the bill would be set down for consideration at the second reading stage, and immediately voted upon without debate or amendment.
In effect, this amendment to Standing Order 68 prevents members from debating in the House the principle of government bills. Certainly members are involved in the preparation of the draft, but their input is more theoretical than anything else, as far as we are concerned. In fact, the decision rests with the majority of the members of the committee who come from the government party.
The principle of the bill adopted in committee essentially reflects the wishes of the government. It cannot be argued therefore that opposition members participate fully to the preparation of the bill. They do participate in the debate on the committee report and can propose amendments. By then however, the bill tabled by the government has turned into an entirely new governmental bill that can be different from the draft bill tabled by the committee.
This can hardly be seen as the same bill. In fact, we are dealing with an entirely new bill, the principle of which has never been considered. This amendment denies the members the right to debate in this House the relevancy of the new government bill. Also, the involvement of opposition members in the preparation of the bill is used to claim later that they were in agreement. It is basically infringing upon the right of opposition members to examine the legislative activity of government by forcing them to conduct a fundamental part of their work as parliamentarians in committee, without debating the principle of the bill.
Again, the opposition doubts that this is the sort of amendment that will enhance the work performed by the opposition members. It undermines a major aspect of the Canadian parliamentary system, in that the members are to monitor the legislative activities of government through an open debate in the House of Commons on the principle of governmental bills. For that reason, it would be dangerous for the Official Opposition to say that this amendment will help remedy the negative perception the public may have of the House of Commons.
In spite of these reservations, the Official Opposition recognizes that some of the changes proposed by the government are indeed interesting. Two amendments are timid steps in the right direction. First, the amendment to Standing Order 81, empowers standing committees to consider government expenditures for future years.
Second, adding Standing Order 83(1) authorizes the Finance committee to make reports on budgetary policies before the tabling of the budget.
These proposals, however, are not enough. The government forgot to include some measures which would have enhanced, in a concrete manner, the status of the work done by MPs, thereby improving the credibility of Parliament as a whole. By proposing that the House of Commons examine order-in-council appointments before such appointments take effect, the government would have taken a giant step toward transparency.
It would have been in everyone's interests, including the Prime Minister, the opposition parties, the members of Parliament and the candidates to those positions, to submit to the House, as part of this parliamentary reform, a procedure allowing the members and the public to participate in the appointment process. In so doing, the government would have concretely enhanced the status of the work done by MPs and would have given back some credibility to Parliament.
Yet, during the election campaign, the Liberals promised to restore integrity within the federal government administration. On page 92 of their famous election program, the Liberals accused the Conservatives of choosing political friends when making key appointments within the government, adding that they would put an end to this reprehensible practice. The Liberals committed themselves to making appointments on the basis of competence.
Why then did they not propose, as part of this parliamentary reform, a review process which would take place prior to confirming order in council appointments? We wonder.
Giving MPs the power to approve order in council appointments before their coming into effect would have been an excellent way of solving the problem exposed by the Liberal Party in its election program. Indeed, to allow the House of Commons to review order in council appointments of parliamentary officials, judges, ambassadors, high commissioners, top civil servants, chairpersons and directors of Crown corporations, as well as of those appointed to various regulating agencies, organizations and tribunals, would certainly have
been an excellent way of removing the negative perception the general public has of some of our political institutions.
The idea is not a new one. Such a review process already exists in another great democracy, namely the United States of America. The reform proposed today does not take into account the urgency of implementing such a review process, by the House of Commons, regarding appointments made by the government. Yet, it is essential that the public view these appointments as not being merely a form of patronage.
The government is saying to Canadians: If you want more transparency, you will have to wait! Indeed, the government failed to propose an important measure which could have improved the public perception of our parliamentary democracy.
Unfortunately, the opposition also notes another important oversight, namely the absence of a mechanism to hold special debates on issues deemed important by the members of the opposition. Such a measure would have enabled the government to enhance even more the status of the work done by MPs. Past experience reveals that emergency debates in the House are a rather rare occurrence. These debates are held at the discretion of the government. The conditions regulating the holding of such debates are very strict and thus prevent debates on issues deemed important by the public. Many Canadians feel that the work done by the House lacks relevance to the main current issues. The holding of special debates would provide MPs with an opportunity to have in-depth discussions on current issues.
In its 81st report tabled in 1993, the Standing Committee on House Management recommended the adoption of a procedure to hold special debates on specific issues. The goal was to ensure that members of the opposition would be able to raise questions of particular interest to them. The government did not deem appropriate to include a procedure for special debates in its parliamentary reform, even though this would have had the effect of giving more credibility to the work of the House and to the parliamentary role of the MPs.
In the same vein, I would like to mention a final major oversight of the government. The government did not include a proposal to create a special question-and-answer period on particular topics or departments. This oversight is even more glaring in that the 81st report of the Standing Committee on House Management recommended establishing such a question period and having one every week. According to the committee, this special question-and-answer period could deal with regional or sectoral problems that do not receive due attention from the opposition, for lack of time. It would also provide an opportunity to question ministers more systematically than is possible now.
The government thus dropped a fundamental recommendation of the management committee to make the work of Parliament reflect the people's everyday concerns. This oversight will not bring the institution of the House of Commons closer to the people.
In conclusion, the reform proposed by the government is light-years away from a real, specific upgrading of the work of members of Parliament. On the contrary, the government is proposing changes to the Standing Orders which, although positive in some respects, seem in their application to contradict to some extent the foundation of the parliamentary system in which we now operate.
We deplore the fact that the government did not consider statements made by one of its own members when he criticized the Conservative government's reform plan in 1991. On April 9, 1991, the Liberal member for Kingston and the Islands said, as reported on page 19189 of Hansard :
We believe that this country functions best when it has a strong and effective opposition.
Later he added:
-the importance of an opposition in Parliament to inform the people and to express their grievances in Parliament is deep rooted in the British parliamentary tradition. Over the years, governments have sought to curtail the rights of oppositions to present grievances and to argue their case.
The official opposition agrees with the opinion expressed by the hon. member. Indeed, the present official opposition takes the same view of the parliamentary system because it summarizes the present situation. The government, by abolishing debate in the House on the principle of a bill, seems to be ignoring the right of opposition parties to express their grievances and to argue their case. Moreover, it is not proposing supplementary mechanisms that would allow free criticism of government action.
It is a pity that the Liberal Party in power has a different opinion than it held when it was in opposition. The government has not been concerned with the fine principles it defended when it was in opposition. Perhaps the Liberal Party in power and the Liberal Party in opposition say two different things. Events bear that statement out, at any rate.
With its incomplete reform, the government will not achieve its objective of restoring the credibility of Parliament and of the present system. The official opposition knew that we could not count on the federal government to solve an image problem with the House of Commons. Obviously, the government is showing real timidity in submitting specific measures to end what I
would dare say is the widespread disillusionment that people feel towards politicians.
Nevertheless, the official opposition is aware of the most important role which it must play in this House. It has always shown that it intends to defend the interests of its constituents, in accordance with parliamentary rules and traditions. For these reasons, it will not impede the proposed reform.
Yes, the opposition has reservations. It shares its disappointment with all citizens. But to show its good faith and its sense of fair play, it recognizes the proposed reform. It could have fiercely opposed some of the amendments presented today, but it prefers to give its consent so that the positive aspects of the reform can have unanimous support in this House.
In closing, I say to the government that forewarned is forearmed. The official opposition intends to continue to promote the openness demanded by voters. It will vigorously defend the values inherent in the Canadian parliamentary system so that it can defend the interests of Quebecers in this House, in accordance with its mandate.
This does not exclude the possibility that in future it might fight a subsequent reform which could interfere with its work in Parliament and its defense of its constituents' interests. Our society's democratic values depend on this.
