Mr. Speaker, in proposing a series of changes that come within the existing structure of the DNA data bank legislation, the government is building upon legislation that has been upheld by the courts every time it has been challenged.
I am not an expert but I understand that a particular pattern of DNA will only appear in one out of billions of samples taken. There are few things harder to explain than the presence of an accused's DNA in or on the body of a victim of a sexual assault. The courts are well aware that DNA evidence provides a virtual guarantee against convicting the innocent, and the miscarriages of justice that have been brought to light by the testing of old exhibits for DNA. Convictions that preceded the development of DNA evidence have been overturned and the real perpetrators identified.
The national DNA data bank contributes to the administration of justice and the safety of Canadians by ensuring that those who commit serious crimes are identified more quickly across all police jurisdictions in Canada, while innocent people are eliminated from suspicion. It assists law enforcement agencies in solving crimes by linking crimes together where there are no suspects, helping to identify suspects, eliminating suspects where there is no match between crime scene DNA and a DNA profile on the national DNA data bank, and determining whether a serial offender is involved.
The Criminal Code establishes the process that can lead to a judicial order authorizing the taking of samples of bodily substances from certain convicted offenders for analysis and inclusion in the DNA data bank. Where a person has been convicted or discharged of a primary designated offence committed after the DNA Identification Act came into force, the judge is required to make a data bank order except in the most exceptional circumstances. The judge must be satisfied that the impact on the offender's privacy and security of the person would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest in the protection of society and the proper administration of justice. The court is also required to give reasons for its decision to make or to deny making a DNA data bank order.
Where a person has been convicted or discharged of a secondary designated offence, the order may be granted if the judge, on application by the Crown, is satisfied that it is in the best interests of justice to do so. In granting or refusing an order with respect to a secondary designated offence, a judge must consider the criminal record of the individual, the nature of the offence, and the circumstances surrounding its commission and the impact such an order would have on the person's privacy and security of the person. Again the court is required to give reasons for its decision to make or to deny making a DNA data bank order.
The legislation contains important protection against the misuse of DNA profiles. It is an offence to use them for any other purpose than the investigation of crimes.
I understand that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, which operates the national DNA data bank, has developed a system of separating the DNA profile from the identifying information. The bodily sample that is to be analyzed and the identifying information on the offender, which is based on finger prints, are identified by the identical bar code. The DNA data bank keeps the sample and sends the identifying information to the criminal identification branch. The analysis is tracked by the bar code, and the DNA data bank does not know who the offender is.
When there is a match, it advises the criminal identification branch of the bar code, and the criminal identification branch identifies the convicted offender. Moreover, the DNA data bank only analyzes so-called junk DNA, that is, strands of DNA that do not provide any information regarding the personal characteristics of the offender, such as hair or eye colour. The committee, I am sure, will want to hear from the management of the DNA data bank regarding these privacy protections.
With such strong protections for the offender's privacy and the great value of DNA evidence, the courts have welcomed the legislation. I am advised that there has not been a single trial or appellate court judge who has found a violation of the charter in the existing legislation. In this charter sensitive era, when many claim that judges are activists and are eager to strike down legislation, this unanimous support for the legislation is little short of amazing.
In Briggs, a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal handed down in August 2001, the DNA legislation was unanimously endorsed. Its reasoning has since been endorsed by several other provincial courts of appeal. The court dealt with many of the issues that may arise in considering the legislation and held that:
One, whether or not there is evidence at the scene of the crime of which the offender was convicted that would likely yield a DNA profile of the perpetrator is not necessarily a relevant consideration.
Two, the phrase “best interests of the administration of justice” does not import as a prerequisite to making the order that there be reasonable and probable grounds to believe a further offence will be committed.
Three, the state interest in obtaining a DNA profile from an offender is not simply law enforcement by making it possible to detect further crimes committed by the offender. Rather, the provisions have much broader purposes including: deterring potential repeat offenders; promoting the safety of the community; detection when a serial offender is at work; assisting in the solving of cold crimes; streamlining investigations; and most important, assisting the innocent by early exclusion for investigative suspicion or in exonerating those who have been wrongfully convicted.
Four, provisions in the Criminal Code and the DNA Identification Act restricting the use that could be made of the DNA profile and protecting against improper use of the information offer significant protection of the offender's privacy.
Five, the procedures for obtaining bodily substances authorized by the provisions are of short duration and involve none or minimal discomfort. There is a minimal intrusion with no unacceptable affront to human dignity.
Six, a person convicted of a crime has a lesser expectation of privacy.
Seven, the trial judge is entitled to look at the offender's entire record, not just the crimes that may be designated offences.
In Hendry, another decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that has been widely quoted in decisions in other provinces upholding the legislation, the court held that:
In balancing the offender's right to privacy and security of the person against the state interests in obtaining the offender's DNA profile, the court must consider the following. The legislation offers significant protections against misuse of the DNA profile information, thus minimizing an improper intrusion into the offender's privacy. Having been convicted of a designated offence, the offender already has a reduced expectation of privacy. In the ordinary case of an adult offender, the procedures for taking the sample have no, or at worst, a minimal impact on the security of the person. Thus, in the case of an ordinary adult offender, there are important state interests served by the DNA data bank and few reasons based on privacy and security of the person for refusing to make the order.
With no judge dissenting, it seems that this legislation may never make it to the Supreme Court. However, members should be aware that in R. v. S.A.B. decided on October 31, 2003, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously upheld the constitutional validity of the DNA warrant scheme. It found that:
Generally, the DNA provisions appropriately balance the public interest in law enforcement and the rights of individuals to dignity, physical integrity, and to control the release of personal information about themselves.
As the DNA data bank scheme is based on the same designated offences as the DNA warrant scheme and has many of the same safeguards, R. v. S.A.B. provides strong support for the constitutionality of the data bank legislation.
I believe we need have no concern about the constitutionality of Bill C-35, although the committee will undoubtedly want to hear from experts on that particular point.
Across Canada judges are deciding every day whether to make an order against an individual offender. Bill C-35, by expanding the number of offences and by clarifying procedures, will make the law even more effective. It will continue to be based on the same protections that have already led to its endorsement by the courts.
I urge all members of the House to support the motion to refer the bill to committee.