John Maloney

[Pornography, May 10th, 2000]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to have the opportunity this evening to speak to Motion No. 69 introduced by the hon. member for Mississauga South.

The motion seeks to amend the current definition of obscenity as it appears in subsection 163(8) of the criminal code as follows:

“For the purposes of this Act, any matter or thing is obscene where a dominant characteristic of the matter or thing is the undue exploitation of any one or more of the following subjects, namely, sex, violence, crime, horror or cruelty, through degrading representation of a male or female person or in any other manner”.

I praise the member for his efforts to protect Canadians from any material containing violence. He is well known for his work in this area and I congratulate him. However, I am not sure the aim of the motion is clear enough.

First, let us examine the effect of the proposal before us. The proposed definition of obscenity would extend the notion of obscenity beyond the bounds of its common understanding. The current code definition requires the undue exploitation of sex or the combination of sex and at least one of violence, horror, crime or cruelty in order to be considered obscene.

Obscenity is understood to include some notion of sexual immorality or indecency. The proposed definition of obscenity in the motion would include materials that unduly exploit violence, crime, horror or cruelty alone. To include within the definition of obscenity strictly violence, horror, crime or cruelty would not fit in within the common and legal understanding of the concept. Other changes to the current definition of obscenity proposed by the motion would have little or no effect on the manner in which the term is currently applied.

The replacement of the word publication with matter or thing is not necessary. The courts have already held that the definition of obscenity in subsection 163(8) applies to all matter whether or not it is a publication. There is no need therefore to make this change.

Second, the addition of through degrading representation of a male or female person is also unnecessary because it is included within the judicial interpretation of the current definition of obscenity.

As has been referred to tonight, the Supreme Court of Canada said in R. v Butler that material which depicts explicit sex without violence will usually also have to depict degrading or dehumanizing treatment in order to be constitutionally prohibited.

As mentioned by the court, explicit sex that is not violent and not degrading or dehumanizing is generally tolerated by society and will not qualify as undue exploitation of sex. Where there is undue exploitation of sex alone, therefore, it is unnecessary to specify that it includes degrading representations because that is implicit in the context of undue exploitation based on the interpretation given by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The motion also proposes to add the phrase “in any other manner” as a qualifier of undue exploitation. The type of manner contemplated by this wording is unclear but it would appear unnecessary as well. For reasons similar to those I have already referred to, the provision as it currently appears in the code leaves the notion of undue exploitation unqualified so as to allow for more flexible interpretation.

The definition proposed in the motion would qualify the phrase undue exploitation with through degrading representation of a male or female person, with the result that the possible interpretations of the phrase would be narrowed. It then attempts to broaden the definition with the addition of the phrase “or in any other manner”. This addition is unnecessary and needlessly complicates the current wording with the possible result that judicial interpretations of the new definition may not turn out to be what the motion seeks to realize in proposing this definition.

Just like the hon. member, we want to protect children from the harmful effects of material containing violence. But there may be other, more efficient ways to go about it than to legislate.

First, we must trust the conscientiousness of Canadian parents to adequately supervise the activities of their children and regulate the types of materials to which their children are exposed.

In addition to parental supervision, the broadcasting industry has adopted a voluntary code regarding violence in television programming to respond to the public's concern over the issue of violence in the media and in society in general. The voluntary code states that:

It is the responsibility of the broadcaster, the regulator, the cable operator and cable delivered programming services, in conjunction with parents, teachers and individual viewers to work cooperatively to inform and educate society on how to best manage this technological revolution which has created an endless video buffet of programming choices.

While the government must certainly play a role in protecting children from the harm occasioned by violence in the media, all sectors of society must work co-operatively to achieve this goal. The criminal code is a blunt instrument. It is not the sole instrument or even the most effective instrument available to deal with social or moral behaviour. It may be used to deal with certain discrete types of behaviour but we must resist the tendency to rely too heavily on it as a panacea for all that we wish to repair in our society.

In conclusion, I would also like to join with other members in thanking this hon. member for his contribution to the debate on this subject.

[Criminal Code, May 2nd, 2000]

Mr. Speaker, this motion calls on the federal government to, first and foremost, defend the constitutionality of section 43 in the courts. I want to indicate at the outset that the federal government is doing exactly that. We are defending the constitutionality of section 43 in the courts. This matter is in fact still before the courts and, accordingly, it would be inappropriate for me to provide further comment on this specific case.

There has been a general misunderstanding of the purpose and the ambit of section 43. Section 43 provides that a parent, teacher or a person standing in the place of a parent may use force to correct a child, provided that the force used is reasonable in all circumstances. This is what sections 43 says.

Section 43 does not, however, condone or authorize the physical abuse of children. Equally important, it does not shield parents, teachers or caregivers from interference by the state or guarantee their freedom to discipline or correct children in any manner they see fit.

How does section 43 operate? A person who has been charged with the assault of a child under his or her care can raise section 43 as a defence. In other words, section 43 provides a defence to a criminal charge of assault for a limited category of persons in a limited set of circumstances.

Section 43 is a limited defence to a criminal charge because it is only available to an accused who is a parent, teacher or person acting in the place of a parent, and only with respect to a child or pupil under the person's care. It is a limited defence because the force in question must have been administered for the purpose of correction. Force exerted in a fit of rage or in a deliberate attempt to hurt a child will not be justified under section 43.

Finally, it is a limited defence because the force used must have been reasonable in all of the circumstances.

Canadian courts are very accustomed to applying a standard of reasonableness. Courts that are asked to consider a section 43 defence generally assess the reasonableness of the force by considering a number of factors. For example, they consider the nature and severity of the force in question, including any injuries suffered by the child, the child's behaviour or action calling for correction, the age of the child and the history of disciplinary action by the parent, vis-à-vis that child. Further, when determining whether the force used was reasonable, the standard that the courts apply is that of the Canadian community and not the standard or practice of the individual family or school.

To return to the specific issue raised by the motion, the federal government is defending the constitutionality of section 43 on the basis that it reflects a constitutional balance of the interests of children, parents and of Canadian society. However, section 43, interpreted and applied in conformity with the charter, does not condone or authorize child abuse.

It is also important to note that the protection of children from child abuse is not only a priority for the federal government in terms of criminal law reform. Provincial and territorial child protection legislation authorizes state intervention to protect children in need of protection, including to protect children from child abuse. As a result, even if the charges are not laid under the criminal code, child protection authorities can and do intervene under provincial or territorial legislation where parental discipline is inappropriate or excessive.

The motion also calls on the federal government to invoke section 33 of the charter or the notwithstanding clause in the event that section 43 of the criminal code is struck down. In my view, it is inappropriate to consider the invocation of the notwithstanding clause of the charter at this point in time. Invoking section 33 is a serious step that we must not take easily or casually.

If section 43 is ultimately struck down as unconstitutional, I would caution us to allow for a considered review of all of the options open to us to deal with both the criminal law system and the child protection laws before ever contemplating using section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Invoking section 33 of the charter is a serious matter which should only be considered in exceptional cases and only after all other legal avenues have been exhausted. This is the only responsible choice open to us as members of parliament.

[Peacekeeping, April 14th, 2000]

Mr. Speaker, Canada has been a leader in forging peace in the Middle East.

Canada's involvement in international affairs to secure peace in the Middle East dates back almost 50 years to when Lester B. Pearson won the Nobel Peace Price for his efforts during the Suez crisis in 1956. Canadian peacekeepers have participated in every UN peacekeeping effort in the region and Canadian troops are currently serving on the Golan Heights.

Canada is playing a pivotal role in the Middle East peace process as the chair of the Refugee Working Group. Contributing toward an effective multilateral track is helping to build confidence and trust among the parties. The efforts of the group have brought tangible improvements to the lives of Palestinian refugees and peace in the Middle East.

Furthermore, since the launch of the Ottawa process in October 1996, Canada has been engaged internationally in building momentum for a global ban on land mines. In the Middle East these activities have resulted in an effort by Canada, Norway, Israel and Jordan to rid the Jordan Valley of land mines.

Canada has a sincere interest and a deep commitment to securing a lasting peace in the Middle East and will continue to take a leadership role.

[Treaties Act, April 13th, 2000]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to participate in the second hour debate of Bill C-214. At the outset I would like to clear up two points raised by the hon. member for Beauharnois—Salaberry in the first hour of this debate last December 1.

The hon. member stated that “We are still waiting for the treaties signed in 1993, 1994, 1997 and 1998 to be tabled”.

The 1994 treaties were tabled June 9, 1999. The 1993 treaties were tabled June 10, 1999. The 1997 treaties were tabled April 13, 1999. Currently there are no treaties outstanding to be tabled under the current practice.

With regard to the 1998 treaties, departmental officials are now in the process of preparing 47 treaties for tabling. There is a normal lag of at least one year with respect to multilateral treaties. This period enables the depositories of these treaties, often the UN, to advise states of their entry into force and prepare the certified copies which are then tabled.

For example, the depository of Protocol II, annexed to the Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, intended to bring mines into the disarmament regime created by the main convention, advised Canada on July 7, 1999 that this convention had entered into force on December 3, 1998 and provided the certified copies.

Such time lags are normal practices among depositories such as the UN which manages hundreds of multilateral treaties and must calculate the exact date of entry into force of the convention based on the number of acceptances received and then prepare the certified copies.

The hon. member also suggested on December 1 that this bill would correct an obvious deficiency, allowing ordinary citizens as well as parliamentarians access to international treaties. This bill does no such thing.

The government already provides Canadians, including MPs, wide access to treaties. They are published in a Canadian treaty series and distributed to numerous libraries throughout Canada. In addition, they can be purchased from the government publishing centre on a cost recovery basis.

I remind all MPs in the House that they have access to treaties tabled since 1990 in CD-ROM format through the Library of Parliament.

This bill deals with the Canadian practice with regard to the conclusion of treaties, an important element of the Government of Canada's prerogative.

This bill seriously affects the division of powers in Canada and calls into question the ability of Canada to pursue major foreign policy objectives. It purports to democratize the treaty process by providing parliament with a greater role. Parliament already has a considerable role in our treaty process.

Canadian constitutional law clearly establishes that the negotiation and signature of a treaty are strictly in the purview of the federal executive. However, the legislative branch is still responsible for implementing the ensuing applications.

If a treaty results in changes to current laws, or enactment of new ones, the legislative branch alone can take such action. Depending on the jurisdiction, implementing legislation must be passed by parliament or provincial legislatures. As the hon. member knows, this role is essential because in the absence of any participation from the legislative branch, the international commitments made by Canada could not be met for lack of domestic enactments.

Because of this implementation power, parliament is regularly required to study and discuss treaties.

On December 1 the hon. member for Beauharnois—Salaberry stated that:

Neither the Free Trade agreement between the U.S. and Canada, nor NAFTA nor the recent treaties on Landmines and disarmament were approved by this House before the government expressed its consent to be bound by them.

This statement once again ignores parliament's crucial role in treaty matters. All of these treaties were subject to intensive study and scrutiny by the House when it considered the legislation to implement them. It was up to parliament to decide if it wished to enact this legislation and, if it were not passed, the government simply could not have ratified these treaties. Canada's most important treaties are already, and have always been, subject to this legislative process.

The role of parliament in treaty making continues to evolve. Not only is parliament involved in the implementation of treaties but consultation on our most important treaties now takes place before committees and prior to the government taking binding action.

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade and its subcommittee examined exhaustively and made recommendations to the government on the multilateral agreement on investment, on the WTO and the FTAA negotiations. They did so prior to the conclusion of these agreements by the federal executive. Let me be clear. Our current practice strikes a careful balance between the constitutional power of the executive to make treaties and the crucial role of parliament in implementing them, providing for the flexibility and efficiency which Canada needs to pursue its foreign policy objectives.

As another example, last spring parliament debated Bill S-22, the implementing legislation of an agreement with the U.S.A. on customs preclearance, prior to the conclusion of the agreement in order to give parliament greater latitude in determining what powers Canada would provide U.S. customs officers in Canadian airports.

In addition, Bill C-214, with its proposal to provide for the approval of treaties by the House of Commons prior to ratification, would adversely affect the development of Canadian foreign policy and would emulate the legislative approval system in the United States. Crises throughout the world must not be used for partisan purposes on the national political scene. The Government of Canada, which is accountable to parliament, is responsible for the country's foreign affairs. In order to be heard and to be perceived as a leader, it must have a single voice on the international scene.

The decision of the U.S. Senate not to sign the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty stunned Canada and the entire international community, dimmed the hopes for peace and international stability generated by the treaty, and dealt a serious blow to the United States' reputation, even though the administration supported ratification. This is a clear illustration of what happens when sterile party politics find their way into the conduct of a country's foreign affairs. Canada does not wish to undergo such a drastic change in the conduct of its foreign affairs.

The bill raises major constitutional concerns. Bill C-214 refers to the royal prerogative of the crown in right of a province with respect to the negotiation and signing of treaties. No such provincial prerogative exists. The prerogative with respect to the negotiation and signing of any international treaty lies exclusively with the Canadian federal executive. Therefore, Bill C-214 violates the constitutionally determined division of powers.

The bill would require the government to negotiate consultation agreements with provincial governments in areas of provincial or shared jurisdiction. Canadian constitutional law already requires that the Government of Canada secure the support of provinces before ratifying an international treaty requiring implementation through provincial legislation. It is done because it has to be done.

For example, the federal government is engaged in extensive consultations with provincial governments developing a national implementation strategy to allow Canada to ratify the Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Change Convention and there are extensive consultations to develop positions and policy to allow implementation of crucial agreements in the trade area. Provincial representatives are sometimes part of Canadian delegations when treaties concerning provincial matters are negotiated.

Bill C-214 creates nothing new in this area but it imposes a straitjacket on the Government of Canada for consulting its provincial partners.

Moreover, Bill C-214 with its requirement that treaties be tabled 21 sitting days prior to their ratification, would preclude Canada from playing a key role on global issues, as it has done in recent years. Our current treaty-making practices enabled Canada to be the first to ratify the Ottawa Convention on Landmines on December 3, 1997 when the international community came to Ottawa to sign the convention. Had Bill C-214 been law, Canada would never have managed this feat.

Bill C-214 could also seriously affect our ability to enter quickly into agreements on emergency food supply or peacekeeping forces deployment in times of humanitarian crises. It would fetter our ability to enter into ad hoc extradition agreements to extradite criminals seeking refuge in Canada and damage our commercial interests when time is of the essence to give an advantage to Canadian businesses.

Canada must have a treaty-making process that allows it to achieve its foreign policy objectives and to deal quickly and effectively with changing and urgent situations. Our current practice meets these imperatives.

There is already a major role for parliament with respect to the implementation of treaties and parliament has been consulted on our most important treaties prior to their conclusion. It is my strong view that Bill C-214 provides for an overly complex and inefficient procedure to replace a treaty-making process that so far has well served Canadians, parliamentarians and Canada.

[Modernization Of Benefits And Obligations Act, April 11th, 2000]

Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to be here today to speak to Bill C-23, the modernization of benefits and obligations act.

First let me thank my colleagues, the members of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, for their excellent work. I would also like to thank all the witnesses, the individuals and organizations that took the time to thoughtfully consider the bill and to either appear before the committee or to send in a brief on Bill C-23. Their work is very important in this process and I want to thank them for their time and helpful contributions.

Bill C-23 will amend 68 statutes to ensure that committed common law couples of the opposite sex and the same sex receive equal treatment under the law with regard to benefits and obligations. As the Minister of Justice has repeatedly said, the legislation is about tolerance and fairness.

Through the bill we are achieving respect for the fundamental values inherent in our Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The government and the majority of Canadians believe that all common law couples in committed relationships should be treated in the same way. Bill C-23 reflects this reality.

Let me take a minute to review some of the more complex issues and misinformation that have arisen surrounding Bill C-23. Some members of the House and some witnesses before the standing committee have suggested that Bill C-23 does not go far enough and that the benefits and obligations should be extended not to just same sex couples but to all people in relationships of dependency. I would stress, however, that Bill C-23 does not preclude discussion which has already started on whether or how to acknowledge the nature and reality of the many types of dependent relationships.

The government agrees that this is an important issue which deserves further attention. It is for this reason that the Minister of Justice has already announced that the issue will be referred to a parliamentary subcommittee.

The mandate of the parliamentary subcommittee will be to examine four broad categories of questions. First, should the Government of Canada reconsider the basis on which benefits and obligations are determined at present? Second, what overall policy objectives for Canadian society should benefits and obligations support? Third, if either economic dependency or economic emotional interdependency is the most appropriate basis on which to distribute benefits and impose obligations on Canadian society, how would it be defined and measured? Fourth, should all benefits and obligations be distributed on this basis or only some where appropriate?

These questions are highly conceptual and represent the first stage of this study which will set the framework and principles on which further study of the issue of dependency will be based.

As was mentioned in the committee hearings, the Law Commission of Canada has been studying the issue of dependency and interdependency for some time and expects to release a public issues paper on these questions in the early summer of this year. Work on these broader, important questions is real and is progressing.

The broader issue of dependency is complex and separate from the issue dealt with in Bill C-23. I realize that many are frustrated with what they see as further delay on this related but separate question. However the government firmly believes that it is premature and irresponsible to extend benefits and, more particularly, to impose obligations on these broader dependent relationships without careful consideration of all the implications for society.

Although some federal statutes already extend benefits and obligations to people in dependent relationships, we need to know more. We need to know about the financial cost, any possible downsides for elderly and disabled individuals and whether Canadians would even be prepared to take on legal obligations for their relatives and others before we could determine whether it would be appropriate to include such relationships in all laws.

A number of adult Canadians currently reside with elderly parents, siblings or other relatives. Extending benefits and obligations to people involved in all these forms of relationships would have far-reaching consequences for individuals and society as a whole. While benefits which reflect dependency would likely be welcomed, it is unclear whether the accompanying legal obligations should be imposed on individuals or those relatives with whom they reside.

For example, eligibility for the guaranteed income supplement under the Old Age Security Act is determined on the basis of combining the income of both persons, which might result in reducing benefits for some elderly persons who live with adult children or other relatives. As another example, if an adult lives with his or her elderly parent for many years and then leaves to marry, this extension might result in a situation where the Canada pension plan credit would be split between the parent and the child as it would now following a divorce.

Premature changes may have unexpected results. Government must be careful and responsible with any changes so that the system encourages rather than discourages people taking care of each other. We must be careful to ensure that any legal changes would not impose obligations which accidentally act as barriers to people supporting each other.

While the more complex issues surrounding the broader questions of dependent relationships need to be worked out, this work cannot be allowed to delay further the issues dealt with in Bill C-23. The Law Commission of Canada stated before the committee:

However much we believe the need for parliament ultimately to strive for its legislative “best”, we also believe that there are times, and this is one of them, when it should proceed to enact what is, constitutionally, a legislative “good”.

Members opposite have also claimed that Bill C-23 will destroy the institution of marriage or result in adoption by same sex couples. The Minister of Justice has repeatedly stated that the bill is not about marriage. It is about equal treatment under federal law for all common law couples, whether of the opposite sex or the same sex.

Nevertheless, the government has been responsive to the concerns of many Canadians, including some in my riding who needed reassurance that the fundamental institution of marriage would not be altered in any way by the bill. I proposed an amendment at committee stage to give this reassurance to Canadians. Subclause 1.1 of Bill C-23 now states:

For greater certainty, the amendments made by this act do not affect the meaning of the word marriage, that is, the lawful union of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others.

This answers the many questions which have been presented here today in the petitions. Although some have claimed this does not have any legal effect, I and others on this side disagree. The amendment to the bill is a clear statement of the intention of the government that the legal meaning of marriage remain the same as it always has been in the history of Canada.

With regard to the claims that the bill will result in adoption by same sex partners, I wish to point out again that adoption is decided under the laws of the provinces. It is provincial law. The references to adoption in Bill C-23 are there to ensure that children adopted in accordance with provincial law will be included in federal law.

This is one aspect of Bill C-23 which has not received much attention in the debates but which I believe is important. Bill C-23 amends several federal statutes to ensure that children are not discriminated against, both by including references to adopted children in those few statutes which do not already do so and by removing the last remaining reference to illegitimacy to ensure that all children are included in the federal law.

There has also been a series of conflicting remarks from the other side: first, that the government is only putting the bill forward because the courts have forced the government's hand over the objections of Canadians and, second, that the bill is unnecessary as it goes beyond what the Supreme Court of Canada has required. Let me respond by saying that the government brought forward the bill at this time because it is the right thing to do.

Governments have a duty to represent the interests of all its citizens whether they belong to the mainstream or, perhaps even more important, when they represent a minority group. I am pleased to represent a political party which believes as one of its central policies that governments have a duty to safeguard the interests of both the majority and the minorities which make up the face of Canada.

In May 1999 the Supreme Court of Canada in its ruling in M. v H. said that governments could not continue to discriminate against same sex common law couples by denying them the benefits and obligations granted to opposite sex common law couples. All unmarried common law couples, both opposite sex and same sex, must have access to the same benefits and obligations.

However, although the decision of the supreme court set out the road map by identifying that same sex common law couples must be included, which is its proper role under the constitution, it remains up to parliament to decide how the law must be changed to provide that equal treatment. That is why the approach in Bill C-23 is both a responsible and a balanced one which deliberately maintains a clear legal distinction between married and common law relationships.

What the courts have told us and what the bill addresses is that common law relationships should be given equal treatment in the law, whether they are opposite sex common law couples or same sex common law couples. The bill uses clear language to maintain the term spouse for married couples and to introduce the new term common law partner for both opposite sex and same sex unmarried relationships. By doing so it preserves the legal distinction between married relationships and unmarried conjugal relationships.

In the absence of a legislative action such as the bill the courts will continue to address cases in a piecemeal fashion, focusing on the very narrow issues brought before them. The status quo is not an option. It promises confusion, unfairness, and continuing and costly litigation. Equally important, it runs the unacceptable risk of making the courts the arbiters of social policy.

I have on final issue. The proposed amendments to the Judges Act contained in Bill C-23 were referred to the Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission for consideration and recommendation pursuant to the Judges Act. I am pleased to advise that this independent and constitutionally mandated commission has now informed the government that it supports the Judges Act amendments which are consistent with the amendments to the other statutes included in the bill.

In its reporting letter, which was tabled in the House on March 30, the commission observed that the proposed amendments to the Judges Act represent an appropriate response to the issues surrounding survivor annuity benefits. It is noted in particular that the apportionment rules provide a satisfactory basis for resolving any conflicts in those few instances where there may be more than one survivor, a legally married separated spouse and subsequent common law partner.

Perhaps most significant is the commission's observation that the proposed amendments are important and timely to ensure compliance with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and its recommendations that the amendments be passed without delay. We are grateful to the commission for its careful consideration of these issues and for the timely delivery of its report.

In conclusion, the bill is about equality and respect. Bill C-23 provides a responsible and balanced approach to correct longstanding discrimination against same sex couples and to ensure equal treatment for common law couples of the same sex and opposite sex while preserving the fundamental importance of marriage.

[Petitions, April 7th, 2000]

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to Standing Order 36, I am pleased to present a petition from Canadians who draw to the attention of the House that Canada has the second highest incidence of breast cancer in the world, that there is no legislation for mandatory mammography quality assurance standards in Canada, that one in nine Canadian women will develop breast cancer in their lifetime, and that early detection remains the only weapon in the battle against the disease.

Therefore, the petitioners call upon parliament to enact legislation to establish an independent governing body to develop, implement and enforce uniform mandatory mammography quality assurance and quality control standards in Canada.

[Division No. 1263, April 4th, 2000]

Mr. Speaker, the government takes the issue of hate crimes and hate propaganda very seriously and has been working actively to address this issue. There are a number of measures already in place at the federal and provincial levels to ensure that Canadians are protected from discrimination and crimes based on hate.

In 1995 the government enacted legislation in the form of Bill C-41 on sentencing reform which made it clear that hate motivation is an aggravating circumstance to be factored in at the time of sentencing. Paragraph 718.2(a)(i) of the criminal code provides that evidence that an offence was motivated by hate, bias or prejudice based on race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation or any other similar ground shall be considered an aggravating factor in the sentencing of an offender.

In other words, if there is evidence that an assault, damage to property, threatening, harassment or any other criminal offence was motivated by hate, bias or prejudice, it is an aggravating factor for the purposes of sentencing and it should result in a more severe sanction. In addition, in 1996 the government brought forward legislation, Bill S-5, which resulted in amendments to the Canadian Human Rights Act and added sexual orientation as a prohibited grounds of discrimination.

My hon. colleague will also be happy to know that as part of our ongoing discussions at the federal-provincial—territorial level, the minister and her colleagues have been discussing Canada's hate crime laws and recommendations to improve them. Given the nature of the criminal law in this country with federal responsibility for the enactment of the law and provincial responsibility for the administration of the criminal justice system, there is a collaborative process in the development and implementation of criminal law.

Federal-provincial-territorial ministers responsible for justice have approved for consideration, subject to an in-depth charter review, a number of recommendations which would further ensure that hate crimes are dealt with firmly. Many have suggested an expansion of the criminal code definition of identifiable group used for purposes of the hate propaganda offence provisions to include sexual orientation.

It is important to remember, however, that changes to the criminal code are only a part of a much broader strategy which must be taken to combat hate motivated activities in this country. This approach recognizes the importance of public awareness and education on the values of tolerance and respect which are fundamental to Canadian human rights and Canadian citizenship.

[Modernization Of Benefits And Obligations Act, April 3rd, 2000]

Madam Speaker, Bill C-23 extends to common law, same sex relationships, the same benefits and obligations already granted to common law, opposite sex relationships under federal law.

The bill also extends to common law partners some of the remaining obligations and a few remaining benefits of more limited applications currently limited to married couples.

The debate so far this afternoon has dealt with the issue of marriage. We keep saying that Bill C-23 is not about marriage. Notwithstanding, I will address some of the concerns expressed.

It is not necessary to add a definition of marriage to each individual statute in Bill C-23. The government has already amended the bill to add an interpretive clause that accomplishes the same result. The legal definition of marriage in Canada is already clear in law. It has been successfully defended and upheld by the courts.

On March 22 the Government of Canada tabled an amendment to Bill C-23. The amendment confirms the Government of Canada's commitment to the institution of marriage by reaffirming that marriage is the lawful union of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others. That was stated in the motion passed by the House of Commons last year. This clarification fully preserves the integrity of the bill while ensuring that it addresses the concerns of Canadians.

As we have stated before, nothing in this bill affects the definition of marriage. This bill is not about marriage. This amendment reflects this fact. This amendment will not change the law or the legal status of marriage. However, Canadians have made it clear that they want some assurance that there will be no change to the institution of marriage, and that is what we are doing through this amendment.

As we have said time and time again, Bill C-23 is about fairness. It will extend equal treatment for benefits and obligations to same sex couples on the same basis as common law, opposite sex couples.

The importance of marriage is not something derived from the law but from society itself, the men and women who make that commitment. It is clearly evident in that some 20 years after a majority of the benefits applied to marriages were extended to common law, opposite sex relationships, people are still getting married and do so in significant numbers.

It is also wrong to suggest that marriage will not continue to have a special status in law after this bill. For example, unlike common law couples, married people have a marriage certificate to prove their relationship and they are given extra protection by being considered to be in that relationship until the day it is dissolved by divorce.

To say that there is nothing left for marriage except for a divorce is clearly wrong. Several statutes and provisions retain distinctions and treatment that are directly connected to the legal difference between marriage, a de jure relationship, common law relationships and de facto relationships. These distinctions will be maintained in federal law.

The definition of marriage, as we will keep repeating, as contained in federal common law will not be modified. A married relationship has effect for benefits and obligations under federal law as of the first day that the marriage is registered. Common law relationships are established as a question of fact; that is that a reasonable period of cohabitation is required before the relationship has effect for the purposes of benefits and obligations. At the federal level this period of cohabitation is one year.

There is also a difference with regard to the legal treatment of separations. Because marriage is a legal relationship, where married spouses are separated their relationship still exists in law until the marriage is dissolved in divorce. This provided additional protection under the federal law for purposes of benefits and obligations.

Common law relationships, however, as a fact based relationship, end on separation. For example, several Treasury Board statutes related to survivors' benefits, such as the diplomatic service, the special Superannuation Act and the Lieutenant Governor's Superannuation Act, provide for the apportionment of the survivor benefits in those few cases where there may be two survivors: a legally married separated spouse and subsequent common law partner. These provisions do not apply to separated former common law partners.

The Divorce Act also contains a series of protections for married couples who separate and divorce. Similar protections for common law couples within the provincial jurisdictions are generally less favourable.

As one example, the federal Divorce Act provides for the division of marital property which is not available in any provincial legislation for common law couples who must instead apply to the courts for a judgment in equity of unjust enrichment. Similarly, provisions allowing for spousal and child support generally afford greater protection to married couples on relationship breakdown.

The government has a duty to guarantee the fundamental rights and freedoms of all Canadians. Courts have clearly found that same sex relationships of some permanency have many of the same issues of support, dependency and obligation as heterosexual couples and have indicated that it is necessary for the government to act under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Bill C-23 does this.

[Agriculture, March 24th, 2000]

Mr. Speaker, Canadian agricultural products are known the world over for their high quality.

Over the years supply managed farm commodities have ensured quality goods and stable prices. Canadian farmers, processors, retailers and consumers alike have benefited greatly from the steady and safe supply of regulated products.

Both our Canadian farmers and consumers recognize the obvious benefits of continuing such programs in the wake of a rapidly changing global agricultural landscape.

I urge the government to retain supply management for the benefit of all Canadians. Canadians have a right to enjoy a safe and healthy food supply and this should be first and foremost in our minds as we embark on WTO negotiations.

I further urge the government to continue to recognize and acknowledge that agricultural supply management programs are essential to ensure the protection and capability of Canada's agricultural production.

[Niagara Regional Police, March 3rd, 2000]

Mr. Speaker, the Niagara Regional Police service has recently received prestigious international recognition by its award of accredited status by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies Inc., following a vigorous three year test and satisfaction of 439 professional policing standards in areas of administration, operation and technical support. The police service also received the mark of excellence award from the Criminal Intelligence Services of Canada for exemplary investigation in Project Expiate.

I congratulate all members of the Niagara Regional Police Service for their continuing excellence in providing high quality law enforcement to the residents of the Niagara region. I commend our officers for their dedication, pride and professionalism. They epitomize their motto “Unity, Responsibility, Loyalty”.