Réal Ménard

[Criminal Code, April 30th, 2007]

Mr. Speaker, I seem to recall that, a few years ago, our neo-Bolshevik colleagues failed to grace this House with their presence to vote when the hon. member for Richelieu introduced a bill to protect workers. Of course, I am referring to the anti-scab measures. I doubt it would occur to my neo-Bolshevik colleague to say that, because of their cowardly refusal to be present in this House to support workers at one time, this invalidates the principle that anti-scab provisions are needed. The issue here is that we voted in favour of mandatory minimum sentences in the matter—

[Criminal Code, April 30th, 2007]

Mr. Speaker, that is an excellent question. I congratulate my colleague who also worked on Bills C-9 and C-10, because there are links to be made between the two.

It is true that the government has not been able to provide convincing and conclusive data. I believe that is what my colleague is getting at with his question. It is the role of parliamentarians to make decisions based on convincing and conclusive data. Naturally, we must be wary when we are told that statistics, witnesses and rigour are not necessary. However, that does not mean that our desire to back up our claims with scientific studies cannot be reconciled with raw instinct and pure common sense.

It is true that our fellow citizens are worried about offences committed with firearms. It is true that at this time there are street gangs in the major urban centres of Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver. But there are ways of effectively dealing with street gangs, firearms, and the flow of firearms. We can never say it enough times. It is quite a contradiction for the government to want to abolish the gun registry that police forces wish to have, on the one hand, and to have mandatory minimum sentences, on the other hand. That is very contradictory, lacks logic, and shows a lack of respect for those who support this gun registry, which, naturally, must be managed effectively.

[Criminal Code, April 30th, 2007]

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I would ask the members to calm down, since things seem to be getting a little out of hand. We must be calm while doing our work.

I am pleased to speak to Bill C-10.

We must remember that, unlike what some government members have been insinuating, violent crime and the number of homicides are on the decline in Canada. Since 1992, crime rates have been decreasing in Canada, and there is every reason to be happy. Is crime going down because our economy is doing well, because, demographically, there are fewer young people? These are explanations that should be considered.

Let us talk about the solutions put forward by the government. It does not tend to take action in terms of prevention, to trust the judges, and to invest in social programs, but rather to resort to incarceration. It is inclined to go for mandatory minimum penalties, in its push for incarceration.

We in the Bloc Québécois are convinced that there are situations that call for incarceration. Moreover, it was the Bloc Québécois that took the initiative in the mid-1990s to propose measures to combat street gangs and criminal biker gangs. The Liberal government at the time said that the conspiracy provisions were enough to dismantle biker gangs. The Bloc Québécois, together with the police association and a number of other stakeholders, called for a new offence and new legislation. In response, the government introduced Bill C-95, which was amended by Bills C-24 and C-36.

Today, the government is addressing a real problem, compounded by the street gang phenomenon: the use of firearms in the commission of crimes. But the government is taking the wrong approach. It is focussing on certain specific offences, which are admittedly serious, disturbing and reprehensible. I am referring to attempted murder, discharging a firearm with intent, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, kidnapping, hostage-taking, robbery and extortion. For each of these offences, the government wants to increase three-year minimum sentences to five, five-year minimums to seven and seven-year minimums to as much as 10. The government is completely ignoring the fact that true deterrence means that a judge who is sentencing someone who has committed an offence involving a firearm, which is reprehensible, must assess the overall context in which the offence was committed. Does the individual have a criminal record? Was the offence premeditated? Did the individual act on behalf of a street gang or organized crime? In light of these factors and using judicial discretion, the judge must hand down the most appropriate sentence. In criminal law and especially in sentencing, the punishment must fit the crime. It is not a question of being soft on crime or saying that individuals should not be convicted.

Why are minimum sentences not the answer to the problem we are trying to solve?

First, let us start with the studies that were provided by the Department of Justice.

When former minister Allan Rock—I do not know if I am conjuring up good memories or bad in this House—had Bill C-68 passed to create the firearms registry—a registry the police want to have and which is consulted 11,000 times every day across Canada and that the Conservatives want to abolish—he created mandatory minimum sentences for a certain number of offences, particularly those involving firearms. Minimum sentences of four years were created. The logic behind minimum sentences is that they are deterrents and studies have been done to determine whether their intended purpose is being achieved. Allow me to read what an expert said at the University of Ottawa, which is a good university. Criminal lawyer Julian Roberts, from the University of Ottawa, conducted a study in 1977 for the Department of Justice of Canada, which the parliamentary secretary should have consulted. He found that, “Although mandatory sentences of imprisonment have been introduced in a number of western nations...the studies that have examined the impact of these laws reported variable effects on prison populations”—he was referring to the rate of recidivism—“and no discernible effect on crime rates”.

In other words, just because some countries, some legislatures, or some justice systems have mandatory minimum sentences that restrict judicial discretion, that does not mean they have lower crime rates. All the studies show that a true deterrent to crime is the real fear criminals have of being caught red-handed and ultimately being charged. Being caught has more to do with our ability to lay charges, with having police in the field, with the ability of crown prosecutors to review the evidence, and so forth.

Furthermore, several witnesses told us about the perverse effects of mandatory minimum sentences. I would like to quote some of the witnesses. André Normandeau, a criminologist at the Université de Montréal—which is also a good university—said:

Minimum sentencing encourages defence lawyers to negotiate plea bargains for their clients in exchange for charges that do not require minimum sentencing. Minimum sentencing can also force a judge to acquit an individual rather than be obliged to sentence that individual to a penalty the judge considers excessive under the circumstances, for cases in which an appropriate penalty would be a conditional sentence, community service or a few weeks in jail.

Obviously, minimum sentencing can have extremely perverse consequences. We are not saying that people who commit offences with firearms should be let go. What we are saying is that there are maximum sentences and that judges have the discretion to impose appropriate sentences somewhere between the maximum sentences and acquittal, sentences that take into consideration the circumstances surrounding the offence. That is why the Bloc Québécois, which has an extremely tough attitude toward criminals when severity is required, does not want to have anything to do with the artificial, ineffective logic underlying mandatory minimum sentencing. That is why we do not support either the bill or the amendments.

We have proposed a whole range of solutions to the government, solutions that include maintaining the gun registry, reviewing the parole issue, reviewing the double time issue, and doubling the budget for the national crime prevention strategy. We think that all of these options are far more appropriate than automatic sentencing, which does not stand up to scrutiny and which makes Bill C-10 a very bad bill.

[Criminal Code, April 30th, 2007]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to talk a bit with the hon. member, but I will put on my glasses so that I can really see her. The member for Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine is quick to plead her case when circumstances warrant.

In the end, any amendments we can introduce will not alter the fact that this is a bad bill. It is a bad bill because it is an ideological construct that is not backed by scientific evidence.

We heard many witnesses in committee, as my colleagues on the committee will attest. I believe that, at the time, the member for Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine had not yet been appointed as opposition critic and that her predecessor was the member for London West.

Criminologists from the Université de Montréal, Carleton University and the University of Ottawa appeared before the committee and said that there was no scientific evidence, based on existing research, including studies commissioned by Justice Canada, by Julian Roberts, a researcher who was given the task of assessing the impact of Bill C-68. Does my colleague agree that minimum penalties are not a proven deterrent and that no scientific evidence was brought before the committee? Should we not be concerned that public policy is being formulated without scientific evidence to back it up?

[Criminal Code, April 30th, 2007]

Mr. Speaker, would the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice be kind enough to tell us whether the Minister of Justice has studies that he could share with this House that show conclusive evidence that minimum sentencing serves as a deterrent? As you know, the committee saw no such studies.

[Government Appointments, April 26th, 2007]

Mr. Speaker, on April 23 the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada and the Minister of Public Safety announced the appointment of Steve Sullivan to the position of federal ombudsman for victims of crime.

There is no doubt that Mr. Sullivan is qualified and compassionate. However, the problem lies in the fact that he is a unilingual anglophone, which is unacceptable.

Does the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada agree that it is unacceptable for a person to hold a position as strategic as ombudsman for victims of crime when that person is not functional in French?

[Criminal Code, February 27th, 2007]

Mr. Speaker, I will resist the temptation to talk about foreign affairs, even though I could have a positive influence.

First I would like to congratulate the hon. member for his initiative. He is right to remind us that auto theft is a harsh reality that harms our society. He is certainly right to want us, as parliamentarians, to discuss this reality and propose the most appropriate measures. However, I do not believe that the bill before us this evening allows us to respond to our colleague's concern. In some respects, this bill is even contradictory and inconsistent with the current provisions of the Criminal Code.

Let us start at the beginning. The Bloc Québécois has never been in favour of increasing mandatory minimum sentences. The hon. member for Windsor—Tecumseh knows that the Bloc Québécois is not in favour of this, with only a few exceptions.

Mr. Speaker, allow me in passing to wish my former colleague from Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles the best of luck. He is a brilliant man. You know that Richard Marceau is a candidate for the Parti Québécois in the riding of Charlesbourg, in the Quebec City suburbs.

As the hon. member for Windsor—Tecumseh politely but incessantly reminds me, the Bloc Québécois has supported mandatory minimum sentences before, but in one very specific context, child pornography.

For the rest, it has been well documented, both by the Toronto centre of criminology and the Université de Montréal centre of criminology. When it was time for the parliamentary committee to review and examine Bill C-10, the committee clerk, Ms. Diotte—whom I thank for her fine work—sent us some 30 studies, both American and Canadian, showing that there is no correlation between having mandatory minimum sentences, their deterrent effect and the crime rate.

We know full well that the society with the highest rate of imprisonment in the world is still the U.S., our neighbour to the south. Nevertheless, the U.S. does not have the lowest crime rate.

From the perspective of criminology, law enforcement, and the design of legislation, we do not believe that having a mandatory minimum sentence for an offence will deter individuals. Not only do we believe that mandatory minimum sentences are not a deterrent but, furthermore, we are against such sentences because they do not allow for judicial discretion.

The sacred principle in law, and the sacrosanct principle in sentencing, is the individualized sentence. Appearing before the judge are the Crown and the accused, both represented by lawyers. The truth emerges from the clash between these points of view. The judge, who must be impartial, must weigh the evidence. In some cases, the jury will do so. The judge will hand down a sentence based on the circumstances, the specific offence and the evidence presented.

This is why, in principle, we do not agree with mandatory minimum sentences.

There is something disconcerting about our colleague's bill. Once again, auto theft is a worrisome reality and the Association of Canadian Insurers provided some very convincing testimony in this regard. Section 322 of the Criminal Code defines theft, although it does not make specific reference to auto theft. Section 322 defines theft and Section 344, a little further along in the Criminal Code, sets out the applicable sentence.

In the case of theft of a vehicle worth more than $5,000, the maximum sentence is 10 years' imprisonment. There are not many cars today worth less than $5,000, as we know.

Our colleague has presented a bill in which the maximum sentence for second or subsequent offences is five years. Why dispense with the provisions in the Criminal Code? Even if it is not a subsequent offence, a judge is able to look at the seriousness of the offence, the context and motivations, and the history of the offender. Thus, in cases of theft of a motor vehicle, the judge may impose sentences of up to ten years.

The second problem with this bill is that it relies on fines. For the first offence there is a fine of $1,000; for a second offence, $5,000; and for a third offence, $10,000. This brings up questions about the relevance of using fines in cases of vehicle theft. Obviously fines do not affect criminals in the same way. A $10,000 fine will not have the same impact on an organized crime leader as it would on a person living in poverty. With respect to my colleague's objectives, I am not convinced that imposing fines for vehicle theft is the way to go.

In a way, would it not have been preferable for our colleague to ask us to have a closer look at the charges brought against organized crime? It is clear that, here in Canada, there are certain sectors in which organized crime is very active. This is true in the car sector and the resale of car parts. In certain areas of Canada, especially where there are port facilities, cars are brought into Canada in containers, and this is a real problem. As parliamentarians, it is our responsibility to ensure that we have the best possible detection technology within the various infrastructures, such as our ports. It is also our responsibility to ensure that we have the best investigation mechanisms.

In the past, the Bloc Québécois has been extremely concerned about the whole question of police investigations and the tools available to the police to conduct their investigations. We agree entirely with the police that they should have electronic surveillance warrants, as well as with the notion that reverse onus is possible before a court of justice, in certain circumstances in which property is obtained by crime and when that property belongs to a criminal organization.

To conclude, I would like to emphasize that my hon. colleague's motivation is certainly commendable and that this is a real problem. Every year, I read the reports from Criminal Intelligence Service Canada and from the RCMP, and I know that, in Canada, auto theft is a real problem, especially thefts by organized crime rings. However, I do not think that the bill in its current form will find any support from the Bloc Québécois caucus, given that it contradicts sections 322 and 334 of the Criminal Code.

[Anti-terrorism Act, February 26th, 2007]

Mr. Speaker, I have no doubt that the Attorney General is quite a respectable person. Some say that he is charming, conciliatory and that he is very committed to being an honourable parliamentarian. However, we must look at the entire relationship that he may have with police forces and the complete respect that he must have for certain procedural guarantees that we are entitled to expect in a state which abides by the rule of law. My colleague is right: I am somewhat concerned.

The ruling has been handed down. It has put the government on notice to correct certain abuses. The Supreme Court identified potential solutions but it has given the government a fair amount of leeway. I hope this government will come to its senses.

To be true to history, I must also say that the government is not solely responsible because, at the time, the government of the day acted just as precipitously.

In reply to my colleague's question, I would say that I am somewhat concerned because I am familiar with the Attorney General's view of the police and judges. I hope that the Conservatives will nevertheless set aside a somewhat unfortunate dogmatism and will put forward solutions that respect the guarantees provided by section 7.

[Anti-terrorism Act, February 26th, 2007]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his question. I do not know whether I understood it, but I will try to answer as best I can.

First of all, I believe that the Supreme Court has clearly established that the charter provides the same guarantees, the same protection, whether or not someone is a Canadian citizen, and that that must be applied.

Does this mean that ex parte hearings are incompatible with the charter under any circumstances? No. For example, for fingerprint orders, in some cases of judicial release and in other situations, it is possible to hold a hearing where only one party is present.

However, that is not what we are talking about with regard to anti-terrorism provisions. What we are talking about is the fact that the person named in the certificate never has the opportunity to see all the evidence, especially so-called “sensitive” information.

The individual is not only denied the right to see this evidence, but is not represented. First, this places the judge in an unusual position, and second, the individual's rights are denied. The Supreme Court focussed its analysis on section 7 of the charter. Other provisions were mentioned, such as arbitrary detention and the right to equality under section 15, but the Supreme Court based 80% of its judgment on this point.

This is disturbing. I repeat, what concerns me is that for a legislator, for a democrat, the end never justifies the means. Canada also had and still does have Criminal Code provisions on conspiracy, preventive arrest—section 810—and arrest warrants. All that is possible.

I believe that there was a desire to act quickly and that the government and the official opposition at the time misjudged the situation. The best thing we could do for Canada's reputation with respect to human rights, which has already been marred by the Arar case, would be to correct these provisions.

The Supreme Court itself has proposed solutions. The Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security has also proposed solutions, but I am afraid that this government is so dogmatic and hard-nosed that it is likely to ignore such recommendations. I know what this government thinks of judges, and it is not very reassuring.

[Anti-terrorism Act, February 26th, 2007]

Mr. Speaker, it is a great privilege for me to rise and speak to this motion. I must say that I feel rather ashamed. I was here in the House in 2001 when we had the debate. I remember very well all the questions raised by the hon. member for Laurier—Sainte-Marie, who was the opposition leader at the time, as well as those of our justice critic, Michel Bellehumeur, the hon. member for Berthier—Montcalm.

We were worried about a number of things. The first was the very definition of terrorism and a terrorist act. I do not want to return to all that because the Supreme Court did not rule on it. The other extremely important questions that we raised had to do with procedural fairness, the right to a full and complete defence, and how best to achieve a laudable objective. We need to remember the situation in 2001 and how concerned we were, especially in view of what had happened in the United States. We know how close the historical bonds have been between Canada and the United States, bonds that led a former Canadian Prime Minister to say of our relationship that geography made us neighbours but history made us friends.

We could not remain unmoved by the collapse of the twin towers and all the information pouring forth about terrorist networks, real or potential. I would like to thank the hon. member for Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, by the way, for all the vigilance he has shown.

The speeches we heard this morning are pretty amazing in some respects. I should say, first, that for me the Liberals and the Conservatives are the same. We need to remember what the Liberals were saying. The Bloc was very clear. Not that we were great seers or prophets, but we did anticipate a few things. Some provisions of the bill that was being introduced, Bill C-36, were obviously incompatible with the basic principles on which our justice system is built.

I remember very well the questions and comments made by the justice minister at the time. They were even more unacceptable in that she was a former professor of constitutional law who had written articles on legal guarantees and procedural fairness, which I had had occasion to read.

The Liberals and Conservatives were animated by a common desire to move as quickly as possible and respond to the emergency because the situation was indeed very worrisome.

I read the Supreme Court ruling from beginning to end. What the Supreme Court told us is that in a democracy, and in a system where the rule of law means something, the end never justifies the means. As parliamentarians, we must respect that. The Conservatives and the Liberals were of one mind; we realize, with hindsight, that their position does not stand up to our most basic principles of justice.

It is demagogy, to some extent, to rise this morning in this House and to make it seem as though there are those who are concerned about the safety of citizens and those who are not. All parliamentarians in this House are concerned about the safety of citizens. However, it may be that, in our work as parliamentarians, we have to propose measures that push the boundaries when it comes to how we perceive the evidence or how we see the process unfolding.

I was in this House when Bill C-95, the first anti-gang bill, was adopted in 1997.

The definition of a criminal organization then was: five individuals who, in the past five years, committed offences punishable by more than five years' imprisonment.

At that time, there was also a sense of urgency. However, I would never have thought about rising in this House and voting for this bill, which was to be revised by Bill C-24, if the principal condition of the law had been to deny the accused access to all the evidence. That is the problem with this bill. I am surprised that no government members have noted this fact.

We will have an opportunity to mention this: the Criminal Code does contain mechanisms for preventive detention. First, common law recognizes this principle and the Supreme Court has recognized it several times. We need not go very far. Section 495 of the Criminal Code—if my memory serves me correctly—allows a police officer to arrest, on reasonable grounds, a person he believes has committed or is about to commit an offence.

Later, of course, the individual will have a trial and can be represented. All legal guarantees will be offered and justice will be served the way it should be in an adversarial system, in other words, the public prosecution lays charges and provides evidence and the accused can defend himself or herself. Getting to the truth is what this confrontation should be all about. That is not what is being proposed in the antiterrorist provisions.

We are not against the fact that measures are needed. I am sure that the hon. member for Marc-Aurèle-Fortin never said anything of the sort. We acknowledge that some individuals may pose a threat to national security. It is true there are terrorist movements.

I remember attending lectures given by researchers from the Raoul Dandurand Chair in strategic and diplomatic studies. We know that terrorist movements have been at work and that they will be in the years to come. We are even told that the largest terrorist movements, which constitute the worst threat to the security of modern states, are those with religious motivations.

We know all that. We are not questioning the fact that in legislation, whether in the Immigration Act or in other legislation, a minister may be asked to review situations where individuals will have to be deemed threats to national security. We recognize that and we agree that in all modern countries, particularly in vast countries and countries where borders are porous, it is acceptable for these provisions to exist.

Nonetheless, there is something quite unbelievable in these provisions. The Supreme Court said that the way in which the antiterrorist provisions are set up, in their wording and the way the courts are called to interpret them, some procedural guarantees are being breached. I will come back to that.

This leads to the following question. Can these terrorist movements be dismantled by using the provisions in sections 83.27, 83.28, 83.29, and 83.3? Why have these provisions not been invoked? Logically speaking, just because they have not been invoked yet does not mean they will not be in the future, but this is nonetheless a measure of their immediate relevance.

Under the existing Criminal Code—as we were reminded—an individual can be arrested without a warrant. It even sets out that in individual can be brought before a judge, compelled to enter into a recognizance to keep the peace and prohibited from contacting certain individuals. This is set out in section 810 of the Criminal Code.

Section 465 even includes a provision that allows for the arrest of individuals on the basis of conspiracy alone and because there is a risk they will commit acts at a later date. It is not as though we are completely without any other legislative recourse, or as though there is nothing in our existing legislation.

Something is very troubling. While we may not agree on how our political system operates, we cannot deny that there is a recognized tradition of respect for human rights. This includes Diefenbaker's Canadian Bill of Rights, the Canadian Human Rights Act adopted in 1977 and, more recently, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

In the National Assembly, in 1982, at the time the Canadian Charter was debated, we did not agree on the management of linguistic rights. Nor did we agree on section 27 pertaining to the enhancement of multicultural heritage. We nevertheless recognize the charter as a tool for the protection of human rights, particularly for judicial guarantees, which, moreover, already exist and were already set out in the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. We recognize that it serves as a tool for the promotion and enhancement of human rights.

As legislators, how could we have let ourselves become distracted? The Bloc Québécois cannot be blamed because, based on the recommendation of the leader of the Bloc and our justice critic, we voted unanimously against BIll C-36.

Why did we vote against Bill C-36? Because we did not believe that an individual could receive a fair trial without access to the evidence, especially the most important pieces of evidence, the ones supporting the charges or leading to a guilty verdict. The Supreme Court spoke of “sensitive information”. That was the main problem with the proposed law.

I would like to quote what the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court said on page 54. A unanimous ruling is significant, after all. In a decision written by Madam Justice McLachlin, the court said:

I therefore conclude that the IRPA's procedure for determining whether a certificate is reasonable does not conform to the principles of fundamental justice as embodied in s. 7 of the Charter.

This is serious. Legislators should be very concerned about this paragraph. I have difficulty understanding the government's obstinate refusal to recognize the proposed law. Of course, the Conservatives were not responsible for creating it; the Liberals were.

I hope that all Parliamentarians in this House will acknowledge that things have been taken too far, that due process is not happening and that even though we have a general duty to protect our fellow citizens, we must have safe communities. Specifically, we must protect our fellow citizens from possible terrorist attacks.

The court will explain what it means by the “principles of fundamental justice” embodied in section 7. This section is well known to us all. It concerns life, liberty and security of the person. The Supreme Court will say that those rights cannot be interfered with. First and foremost, we must ensure an impartial hearing.

The Supreme Court considered the question of the evidence being introduced ex parte, that is, the judge reviews the evidence, but not in the presence of both parties, specifically, defence lawyers for the person named in the certificate.

Is it not troubling to know that a person who does not appear before the judge—a judge who has reviewed the evidence, including the sensitive information—cannot refute that information, cannot correct the facts, cannot explain them, cannot respond to the quality of the information provided and the credibility of the informants?

Not only did the Supreme Court say that it was a miscarriage or denial of justice, as must exist for section 7 of the Charter to apply, but it also said that judges hearing the evidence ex parte are placed in a position where they cannot be impartial. Is this not tantamount to asking them to be investigators?

The court said that not allowing a person detained under a certificate to receive all of the evidence and be able to refute, explain and correct it, and to question the source of the evidence infringes section 7.

The court did not say that security certificates are unnecessary. Over the next year, the court invites the legislator to review the way in which certificates are issued. It is interesting to remember that the court gave the United Kingdom as an example. In committee, this was even brought to the attention of parliamentarians. The court even gives Canadian examples where the members of a House of Commons subcommittee, who were hearing from employees of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, were able to respect the security and confidentiality requirements and still carry out their parliamentary work.

The court also has the following observation, and again I will cite Justice McLachlin. Furthermore, no parliamentarian or minister has provided an explanation for this. I hope they will during our exchanges later. Justice McLachlin said, “—Why the drafters of the legislation did not provide for special counsel to objectively review the material with a view to protecting the named person's interest—as was formerly done for the review of security certificates by the Security Intelligence Review Committee, and is presently done in the United Kingdom...has not been explained”.

The United Kingdom has also passed antiterrorist provisions. The court wonders why we did not take the same route. The court proposes a compromise between complete denial of access to sensitive information about the person named in the security certificate and the possible confidential nature of certain information in thwarting terrorist attacks, in other words a procedural fairness requirement, a requirement for respecting basic justice. The court says that if we want to maintain these balances, these powers that have to be balanced between national security, confidentiality of certain information, but also the rights of those who may be charged—who are in fact charged in some cases—then we need access to information. I hope the government will take this into account during the review it has been given one year to do.

In closing, I cannot believe that people were detained for five or six years. I am running out of time. However, we have to remember that different rules apply depending on whether the person is a permanent resident or a foreign national when it comes to a review of detention. A permanent resident gets this review within 48 hours and every six months. A foreign national can be imprisoned for 120 days without ever having their detention reviewed. As the Supreme Court pointed out, this does not make any sense.

I will stop here, but, once again, I believe there is no reason to be proud today of Bill C-36. In my opinion, this House would have been better advised to listen to the Bloc Québécois when it gave these warnings. Fortunately, the Supreme Court was able to take an informed look at this legislation that offends human dignity and the best we can do is to review it.