Lost his last election, in 2006, with 33% of the vote.
Aboriginal Affairs November 22nd, 1999
Mr. Speaker, what part of equality does this minister not understand?
In the face of the referendums that have taken place, private citizens' referendums in British Columbia, not only in Smithers, but in Ladner, Vancouver, and Prince George, all of the surveys that have been done, why is he prepared to ignore the expressed wishes of British Columbians and ram this Nisga'a treaty through the House of Commons without giving the people of British Columbia a chance to vote on it in a referendum?
Aboriginal Affairs November 22nd, 1999
Mr. Speaker, a couple of minutes ago the Indian affairs minister referred to an election in Terrace. I would like to give him some late breaking news.
On November 20, 1999 a private citizens' referendum on the Nisga'a treaty was held in Smithers, B.C. Residents from Hazelton, Moricetown, Telkwa, Houston, Burns Lake and Smithers all voted in that referendum.
The early indications would suggest that more people voted in the referendum than voted in the municipal elections. And, guess what? Ninety-three per cent of the people who voted said no to the Nisga'a treaty.
Why is the minister consistently ignoring the expressed wishes of British Columbians?
Supply November 22nd, 1999
Madam Speaker, it is interesting to see the member pirouetting around and changing positions in a heartbeat. On the one hand, he says the people of British Columbia should not be the only ones to have a referendum and then he says they should.
In answer to that question, it is the change to the social contract, the self-government provisions in this treaty, not the cost of it that people should be focused on. That is the real essence of the debate here today. It is the self-government provisions.
Supply November 22nd, 1999
Madam Speaker, the best answer I can give my colleague is to refer him to a book that was written by Thomas Sowell, an American author who wrote a book called The Vision of the Anointed . What we have here is a very similar proposition. We have a vision that is expressed through government policy that is adopted by all the other opposition parties in the House. It is a failed vision. It has been a demonstrated failure for over 130 years. My goodness, look at the results that it has represented for aboriginal people on reserves. Look at the dire circumstances that many of these people live in.
These people are so enraptured with this vision that they insulate themselves from the reality of the policy decisions that they make. They refuse to accept the fact that the failure and the abject poverty that many aboriginal people live in is as a direct result of these policies. They continue down the same path without being able to question or even engage in an honest, intellectual debate about what the government ought to do and ought not to do in terms of rectifying the situation and trying to improve things.
That in my view is the failure of the opposition and the government for that matter in this entire debate.
Supply November 22nd, 1999
Madam Speaker, I thank the hon. member for the question. I do not know who he means by the Nisga'a people because I talk to the Nisga'a people all the time. I meet the Nisga'a people face to face. The last time I had a face to face meeting with a Nisga'a individual was about a week ago. I met with Frank Barton and talked with him extensively about his concerns over the Nisga'a treaty. There have been many more like Mr. Barton with whom I have met face to face.
I remind the hon. member that not only do I have the responsibility and the privilege of representing the Nisga'a people, I also have the honour and privilege of representing the Gitksan and Gitanyow people, people who say they have never been consulted by the federal government, they have never been consulted by the provincial government, and they have never heard from this member over here or his party.
I would point out that there are many parties to this debate. I would ask the member not to focus on four or five Nisga'a leaders as being the only example that he can raise in the House.
Supply November 22nd, 1999
moved:
That, in the opinion of this House, the federal government should conduct a province-wide referendum in British Columbia on the Nisga'a Final Agreement prior to the consideration of any further stages of Bill C-9, an Act to give effect to the Nisga'a Final Agreement.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to advise the Chair that I will be splitting my time with the hon. member for Calgary Southwest.
I will confine my remarks today on the Nisga'a treaty to process. The reason we moved this motion for debate in the House regarding a referendum in British Columbia on the treaty has to do with the fact that the process that has brought us to this point with the treaty has been wrong. It has been wrong for many years. It has led to a treaty which, right now in British Columbia, enjoys at best questionable support. In our view it does not pass the judgment of the people of British Columbia. Indeed, we do not believe it would pass the judgment of the people of Canada.
I will give the House a bit of background as to what has happened up to this point in time. It has often been said that the Nisga'a leaders for more than 100 years have tried to get a treaty with Canada and with British Columbia. That is in fact the case. There is a lot of documentation which shows that the Nisga'a leaders have tried since before Confederation to have the Government of Canada, and prior to that the Government of Britain, enter into a treaty. They were steadfastly refused for more than 100 years.
It is also true that in 1973, with the Calder decision of the Supreme Court of Canada being a split decision, the Government of Canada became alarmed that the Nisga'a had come close to winning a land claim case in court. At that point the government decided that it would enter into negotiations.
British Columbia refused on the basis that in 1871 when it joined Confederation the terms of that union, which was called the act of union, expressly provided that the federal government would be responsible for all existing and future obligations to aboriginal people, except for the narrow requirement of the province of British Columbia to set aside lands known as reserve lands and to have those registered with the land title office and conveyed to the federal government, which B.C. did. British Columbia has about 1,600 such reserve lands that were registered between 1871 and 1926 when the federal government ultimately passed legislation which recognized that B.C. had lived up to its full obligations under the terms of the union.
British Columbia refused to join the discussions regarding treaties, taking the position that Canada was rightfully the body to be negotiating with the Nisga'a and if Canada required land or resources to complete those negotiations Canada would have to come back to British Columbia and make arrangements to compensate, to buy the land and the resources to be conveyed.
In 1991, however, there was a change taking place in British Columbia. The provincial government at that point said it would sit down as a party to the negotiations. It also indicated that it would be prepared to put land on the table as a provincial government on behalf of the people of British Columbia to resolve the outstanding claims. What it also did, the first major flaw in the process that has led us to the great problem we have today, was that it signed a secrecy agreement with the federal government and the Nisga'a negotiators wherein it said that it would be party to negotiations that would take place behind closed doors. The negotiators were all bound by the secrecy agreement not to discuss anything outside the negotiating room. The public of British Columbia for many years was not even aware that these negotiations were taking place and certainly had no idea of the ramifications of the negotiations.
In 1994-95 the Reform Party of Canada found out that these negotiations were taking place. It held a series of public meetings and tried to bring to the attention of the public that this was taking place. It also tried to create some kind of a mechanism for public input. The negotiators for the federal and provincial governments fought the Reform Party of Canada tooth and nail. They did not want to have anything to do with it.
In 1996 an agreement in principle was announced. It was released publicly. At that point the provincial government decided it would have its standing committee on aboriginal affairs travel the province of British Columbia to consult with the public. I attended several of those meetings and I have the minutes of proceedings of all of those meetings. People who showed up to voice concern or express any kind of opposition to any of the principles or any of the facets of the agreement in principle were routinely belittled and their character and motives were called into question. The provincial members, dominated by NDP MLAs, took the position that people who questioned the wisdom of the agreement in principle were not just wrong but were somehow lesser people; evil people, if I can use that term.
The final agreement was released publicly last year. We note that in the final agreement there was no substantive change from the agreement in principle, so all the committee work that was done by the B.C. standing committee was obviously just a big PR exercise so the government could say it had consulted with people when in fact it had not.
When the final agreement was released the provincial government spent $8 million of B.C. taxpayers' money in an effort to sell the agreement. In a highly emotional appeal it routinely belittled again anybody who questioned the agreement, and it routinely indicated that this was a good deal and it would not change one word of the agreement.
We then saw the ratification process take place in the legislature of British Columbia where debate was cut off after less than half of the agreement was debated. Even though the provincial government had promised British Columbians a full debate on the treaty, it guillotined the debate after less than half the treaty was actually debated.
Then we have the federal ratification process. We will recall that the minister of Indian affairs signed the treaty in June of this year, before the legislation or the agreement had even been introduced in parliament. Again we see a perverted process. We now have the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development travelling to British Columbia because, as one Liberal member who was in Terrace last week said: “We are only in B.C. because of a tactic by the Reform Party to hijack parliament. In fact we came here on the white knuckle route. I have not been on a train yet. I have been on every other mode of transportation. This little song and dance is costing the taxpayers $500,000 directly by the Reform Party”. He said that the only reason he was there was because of a tactic of the Reform Party.
In other words, the only reason the Liberal members came to British Columbia, and they made it very plain to the people who were testifying before the committee, which was a stacked committee, was because they were forced into it. They had no real intention of listening to British Columbians.
This is further evidence of the flawed and perverted process that has been used to date to try to ram through a treaty which we do not think enjoys the support of the public of British Columbia. Certainly all of the indications we have are that it does not. This is not a minor matter. This is, as broadcaster Rafe Mair said, a huge change in the social contract of British Columbia.
British Columbians deserve to have the right to vote on this treaty to decide whether the kinds of principles expressed in the deal are principles which they can support, because they will, for sure, be reflected in 50 or more treaties yet to be negotiated. Because of the flawed process that has been used to date, it is absolutely imperative that this parliament in the debate today come to the conclusion that British Columbians have a right to vote in a referendum, that they have a right to take part in the ratification process, and that they have a right to express their opinions.
Fisheries October 28th, 1999
Mr. Speaker, Newfoundlanders deserve clarity on this issue. They need to know where the government stands on the issue of the Marshall decision as it applies to Newfoundland.
I will ask the minister again, on behalf of the people in Newfoundland who depend on the fishery for their living, does he agree that the Marshall decision applies to Newfoundland, or does he agree with Premier Tobin that it does not apply? Which is it? Could he please give us that clarity?
Fisheries October 28th, 1999
Mr. Speaker, some Mi'kmaq leaders insist that the supreme court's Marshall decision applies to Newfoundland. A small group of Mi'kmaq have already gone to Newfoundland to fish crab and that has sparked confrontation and violence.
Yesterday, Premier Tobin said that unequivocally the Marshall decision does not apply to Newfoundland. Could the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans tell us if he agrees with Premier Tobin, or does he agree with the Mi'kmaq leaders?
Nisga'A Treaty October 27th, 1999
Mr. Speaker, I do not think the minister understands all he knows about the Nisga'a treaty.
The Bloc Quebecois has indicated it will support the treaty because it provides the kind of self-government powers it would like for Quebec.
I am going to ask the Prime Minister directly if he is prepared to give the same kind of self-government powers to the Parti Quebecois and Lucien Bouchard as he is to the Nisga'a under the treaty, yes or no?
Nisga'A Treaty October 27th, 1999
Mr. Speaker, the Bloc Quebecois has publicly stated it is supporting the Nisga'a treaty because it provides the kind of sovereignty association it would like to see for Quebec.
Reform does not support sovereignty association, but it is now becoming clear that the NDP, the Tories and the Liberals do.
Is the Prime Minister prepared to offer the same kind of self-government powers to Lucien Bouchard and the Parti Quebecois as he has to the Nisga'a, yes or no?