Mr. Speaker, this Thursday evening, parliamentarians will decide whether or not Canadian Forces will remain in Afghanistan beyond 2009 and, if they do, what will be their role. The premises for this decision are many and are included in the preamble to the motion.
Originally, Canada signed up for the UN mandated and NATO-led mission. In 2002, it joined the international coalition fighting the Taliban following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; in 2003, it provided 2,000 soldiers to manage ISAF; in 2005, it assumed responsibility for the provincial reconstruction team in Kandahar province; from February 2006 to 2007, it deployed a combat group of 1,200 soldiers in Kandahar and, subsequently, following the signing of the Afghanistan compact, there was the prospect of a more comprehensive strategy known as the three Ds.
There is a great deal of scepticism about whether we will leave the Afghans with a country that has better government, is no longer at war and is safer after helping them to rebuild. Parliamentarians must decide if Canada is to remain in Afghanistan beyond 2009 in order to help that country to determine its own future. We must decide if we believe that training Afghan troops, providing assistance for a true reconstruction effort and helping establish governance will give Afghans their own nation.
The House is preparing to authorize the extension of the mission in Afghanistan until 2011. This extension will have conditions that could significantly alter the mission after 2009. If these conditions are of paramount importance to the citizens who elected us, they are of even greater importance to the military personnel and civilians working in the Kandahar region, among others.
These conditions are crucial because they will refocus the mission by accelerating training of the Afghan army and ensuring that we address the major development difficulties faced by Afghanistan rather than focus on a counter-insurgency mission.
Let us be clear: after 2009, the mission can no longer be about hunting the Taliban. Obviously there may be some combat. How can that be avoided without leaving innocent people to die? The military mission will focus above all on training soldiers and protecting civilians who are risking their lives to rebuild the country.
The soldiers in Kandahar are carrying out a difficult but unfortunately essential task. When we talk about securing a region, we are talking about a combat mission. It is a matter of neutralizing the Taliban because they will continue to attack the regions the Canadian Forces are responsible for in Kandahar province through guerrilla and suicide attacks.
The Canadian Forces are there to protect Afghan civilians. However, the dynamic of the mission has to change because this strategy no longer works for the long term. We know that the Taliban are hiding and training in Pakistan. We also know that they are being financed through opium revenues and that NATO's strategy in this regard is counter-productive. We know that the Taliban have to lose these strategic advantages and be seen for what they are by the Afghan people, in other words the worst possible alternative.
For this change to be successful, the Afghan army has to be able to protect citizens, and the economic and security conditions truly need to be improved. Those are the objectives the mission must achieve. We have to give combat soldiers, and civilians involved in reconstruction the economic and diplomatic means to bring about this change. They need a little more time to carry out their mission with the necessary success we are hoping for.
I would like to provide some background to help people better understand Canada's presence in Afghanistan and the means used so far for rebuilding a viable Afghanistan. First, Afghanistan is not Iraq. This distinction is important. This means that we are in Afghanistan in accordance with international law.
Article 5 of the NATO treaty authorizes a country attacked on its own soil, as the United States was on September 11, 2001, to request help from other NATO members.
Operation Enduring Freedom, which removed the Taliban from power, was legitimate from an international law point of view, and few opposed it. However, overthrowing the Taliban did not bring instant lasting peace to the Afghan people.
Soldiers were sent to bring peace to the country. As we all know, traditionally, the blue berets, under the UN, were deployed to separate parties in conflict. This type of operation worked during the cold war.
Today, conflicts are resulting in more and more civilian deaths. These are transnational conflicts, civil wars, not conflicts fought by armies.
Afghanistan is a little different from other countries to which Canada has sent troops, because in this case, coalition forces overthrew a government that supported terrorism and trampled human rights.
However, recent peacekeeping operations have shown the limits and shortcomings of this kind of operation in civil war zones. Interposition forces failed in Bosnia, where the UN was unable to prevent Srebrenica and so many other massacres. The blue berets failed so badly in Somalia that soldiers themselves were traumatized. The blue berets also failed in Rwanda, where General Dallaire could not prevent the genocide because his hands were tied by his restricted mandate. These examples show that traditional peacekeeping does not work in these kinds of situations.
Does that mean we should turn a blind eye to people who are in difficult situations? Do wealthy countries have a responsibility to help oppressed peoples?
Regardless of skepticism about a mission that was initiated by an American administration that is, it must be said, unpopular with most Canadians and Quebeckers, the Afghan people need security.
Given the current state of the country, we have to admit that only an appropriate military presence supporting reconstruction efforts will result in real opportunities for success. The success of this mission is paramount. Failure would be extremely bad for NATO and for the credibility of other commitments we make to help people in difficult situations.
Nobody wants to see another Rwanda. To avoid potential tragedies, we need strong diplomatic action combined with the use of force to protect citizens. Moreover, it is the threat of force, the very possibility of it, that will prevent the kind of abuse that governments or military leaders might perpetrate against civilians.
Although this mission is important, the information we receive about this country, including the Manley report, indicates that the situation is very difficult and that the priorities are not well defined.
The motion we will be voting on sets conditions for the House to agree to extend the mission. Since we know that the solution is not strictly military, we need to redirect the mission towards rebuilding and solving correctional, legal and economic problems. We must play our diplomatic role to resolve regional problems. The Government of Canada must be completely transparent in order to keep the public and parliamentarians informed about the mission.
We must certainly not hand the Conservatives a blank cheque. On the contrary, we must ensure that they follow through on their commitments, as laid out in the motion, and for which they will be held accountable.
Although I am skeptical, as are many of my colleagues, I think we must consider the security needs of the Afghan people, our international obligations, our commitments and the hope to one day see the dictators of this world dethroned, because oppressed people will be able to trust in an international brotherhood that will not let its fellow brothers suffer with impunity.
Everyone will understand that I am in favour of this motion. Even if I am not able to be here on Thursday for reasons beyond my control, to be with my mother, who is gravely ill, I wanted my constituents to know that I am in favour of this motion. I am accountable to them; they have a right to know the reasoning behind my vote.
