Jeremy Harrison

[Tlicho Land Claims and Self-Government Act, December 6th, 2004]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the member for Blackstrap for her intervention on this subject. I know this is an area in which she has a great deal of interest and on which she spoke very eloquently.

My question for the hon. member has to do with the international component of this agreement, which she touched on in her speech and which has been an issue we have spoken about today in the House.

A cabinet document about 70 pages long has come into our possession, a document that was approved by cabinet. We read in the document the direction in which the federal government would be going in the negotiation of treaties. This document made it very clear that there was to be no provisions in any agreement that would be negotiated by the federal government. There would be nothing to do with Canada's international sovereignty or commitments. However this was not followed. It was included in the agreement in violation of the cabinet's own approved policy on the issue.

I must say that this particular provision is very worrisome. I pointed out a couple of reasons in my speech as to why I think it is worrisome. I have asked members of the government whether there had been any jurisprudence on the issue in the past or whether it was an unprecedented provision in that treaty. It is an unprecedented provision. The provision, I believe, could lead to some serious consequences for this country, particularly considering the jurisprudential direction that we have seen the courts move in on these issues. I would like to have the hon. member for Blackstrap add her comments to those I just made.

[Tlicho Land Claims and Self-Government Act, December 6th, 2004]

Mr. Speaker, we have a problem with the government putting a provision in the agreement that could literally sign away our ability to enter into international agreements and its refusal to answer why it was put there in the first place. I asked the minister this question this morning. I asked this question numerous times in committee. We have not received an answer. Why is this provision in the agreement? What is the answer? Why would this have been included at the request of DFAIT

This provision could hamper the ability of this country to enter into international agreements. We have not received an answer as to why that provision is in there. The government insisted upon it. Government members have been asking why we take issue with the government's negotiating position, that is an example of it.

[Tlicho Land Claims and Self-Government Act, December 6th, 2004]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the Tlicho people and the Tlicho negotiators on the work they have done. They obviously did a good job.

The issues our party have are not with the Tlicho people. Our issues are with the agreement that the government negotiated and the concessions that were made. The Tlicho negotiators did a good job.

With regard to the member's question, we do run the risk of creating a situation where we would have a patchwork of legal regimes across the country, particularly a patchwork of legal regimes in the Northwest Territories. It was made clear by my colleague from Calgary Centre-North this morning, and we have seen it just recently in the government report on smart regulations, that the situation in the Northwest Territories is confusing right now for all involved. Before we can move forward on the construction of the Mackenzie Valley pipeline, 2,000 approvals are needed.

We do run the risk of having overlapping and confusing jurisdictional areas, and that is a very legitimate concern.

[Tlicho Land Claims and Self-Government Act, December 6th, 2004]

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak at third reading of Bill C-14, the Tlicho treaty. Bill C-14 ratifies the Tlicho agreement signed on August 25, 2003, between the Tlicho people and the Governments of the Northwest Territories, Canada and the Tlicho.

The bill would give the Tlicho First Nation ownership of 39,000 square kilometres between Great Slave Lake and Great Bear Lake, located in the Northwest Territories.

The bill is unique in that it gives effect to both a comprehensive land claims settlement and a self-government agreement.

The agreement is precedent setting in both respects and will guide future claims settlements and self-government provisions across the north. This agreement is a culmination of two separate negotiations.

First, the negotiation of the comprehensive claim has been carried out pursuant to the 1986 comprehensive claims policy, and in this respect the agreement is similar to the Nisga'a agreement.

Second, the negotiation of the self-government arrangements are based upon the 1995 inherent rights policy, and in this respect the agreement follows the path of the Westbank treaty.

It should also be noted that the bill gives force of law to the tripartite agreement of August 25, 2003, and accords the agreement paramountcy over the act itself. In other words, the approval of the act will bring into law the very complex provisions set out in the 208 page settlement agreement and the shorter tax agreement and will in essence incorporate the 208 page agreement into the Constitution of Canada through section 35.

In general terms, the agreement gives the 3,500 Tlicho people claims to subsurface resources, law-making authority, and the power to tax, levy royalties and manage resources on the 39,000 square kilometres of land laid out in the agreement. The Tlicho lands are bounded in the north by the Sahtu agreement, on the east by Nunavut, and on the south and to the west by the future Akaitcho and Deh Cho territories.

The Indian Act no longer applies to Tlicho citizens and Tlicho lands are no longer to be considered reserve lands. In terms of governance, the agreement creates four local governments consisting of a chief and council. The agreement provides that the chief must be Tlicho and further that 50% of the community council must be Tlicho citizens.

The Tlicho government consists of a grand chief elected at large by Tlicho citizens, the chief from each of the community governments and one councillor from each of the community governments. The Tlicho government has the power to enact laws in relation to things such as the use of Tlicho language and culture, traditional medicine, resources, and businesses and occupations on Tlicho land as well as taxation and enforcement powers.

When I first spoke on Bill C-14 during second reading, I pointed out a number of areas that I had concerns with. These concerns centred around a few specific issues, namely, the absence of finality in the agreement, problems with sections relating to the interrelationship of Canadian and international sovereignty and provisions of the agreement, and jurisdictional confusion within the agreement.

As you know, Mr. Speaker, I serve on the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development. Indeed, I serve as the vice-chair. I sincerely had hoped that once we had Bill C-14 at the committee perhaps some of the concerns enunciated during second reading debate could be alleviated. Unfortunately, they were not.

Regarding concerns about the absence of finality in the agreement, I pointed to article 27.6.1 of the agreement. The article reads, under the heading “Agreements for Equivalent Benefits”, as follows:

Where government provides, in legislation or in or under a land claims agreement or a self-government agreement, tax powers or exemptions to another aboriginal group in the Northwest Territories that are of greater benefit to that group than those provided to the Tlicho First Nation or the Tlicho Government...at the request of the Tlicho Government, will negotiate and make best efforts to reach an agreement with the Tlicho Government to provide equivalent benefits for the Tlicho First Nation....

In other words, this agreement can be reopened if greater benefits are conferred upon another group in later negotiations or if the Supreme Court or other court of competent jurisdiction discovers new tax benefit rights for particular groups of first nations in the Northwest Territories.

The second area that my party and I expressed our concerns about during second reading debate and in committee is with regard to the issues of jurisdictional confusion within the agreement and between the agreement and powers granted the federal government by the Constitution Act in 1982.

Without getting into great detail on the subject, I will refer hon. members to the second reading debate in which members of my party very eloquently and clearly laid out their concerns on this issue.

Broadly speaking, the agreement addresses inter-jurisdictional issues in three different areas and lays out potentially problematic hierarchies of authority. The general intent of the legislative scheme is that the powers of the Tlicho government are to be concurrent with those of the Government of Canada and the Government of the Northwest Territories.

The problem is that there are multiple definitions of how to determine paramountcy in the event of conflict. The one area that I believe should be highlighted in this area is the hierarchy of authority as laid out in articles 7.7.2 through to 7.7.4.

These sections provide for the following hierarchy of authority: one, federal legislation of general application; two, territorial legislation implementing Canadian international agreements; three, Tlicho laws; four, territorial legislation of general application; and five, specific federal legislation relating to the Tlicho.

In other words, Tlicho laws prevail over territorial laws and over federal laws relating to the Tlicho, specific federal laws. Hence, after the passage of Bill C-14, the House will no longer have the constitutional jurisdiction to pass laws of specific application relating to the 39,000 square kilometre area described in the agreement.

A third area that I have very specific concerns with, and about which I worked hard in committee to extract answers from the government and the INAC bureaucracy, is with regard to article 7.13.2 of the agreement. This provision reads as follows:

Prior to consenting to be bound by an international treaty that may affect a right of the Tlicho Government, the Tlicho First Nation or a Tlicho Citizen, flowing from the Agreement, the Government of Canada shall provide an opportunity for the Tlicho Government to make its views known with respect to the international treaty either separately or through a forum.

At this point, I would like to make clear that I intend to split my time with the hon. member for Blackstrap.

As the Hansard record of the Bill C-14 committee hearing will bear witness to, I pressed very hard to get some answers as to what this provision would mean in practice and what the rationale was for including it in the agreement in the first place. I have further pressed on this today in the chamber during debate. I have asked the minister. Again we have had no answer to this question.

As to what the provision would mean in practice, I have some very serious concerns. The government itself does not seem to know what the provision means. My fear is that when it comes time for this section to be judicially interpreted, and that time will come, given the jurisprudential direction of the Canadian courts on these issues we will find ourselves in a situation whereby our nation's ability to enter into international treaties and agreements will be compromised; that we will in fact have given a de facto veto over our international sovereignty on certain issues to the Tlicho government.

To be blunt, this is a ridiculous state of affairs. The impression I have is that the government and bureaucracy have not fully thought through the implications of this section.

Even more strange, we discovered during questioning in committee that this section was included not at the insistence of the Tlicho negotiators but at the direction of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Why was it included? We did not get a straight answer.

Today we came into possession of the cabinet framework document governing this negotiation, from back in 1995, a document that was accepted by cabinet in 1995 and which made it very clear that there was not to be any abdication of Canadian international sovereignty in the process of negotiating these agreements. That does not seem to have been followed with this treaty.

For these reasons I have enumerated, I will not be supporting this agreement. My party has also made clear the reasons that our party will not be supporting this agreement. I thank hon. members for their time and their attention.

[Tlicho Land Claims and Self-Government Act, December 6th, 2004]

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member is a diligent member of the aboriginal affairs committee.

The question I would like to ask is a question that I had asked the minister this morning but one to which I did not receive an answer. Perhaps the hon. member could enlighten me with regard to articles 7.1 through 8.2 of the agreement which deal with international agreements.

We learned in committee from the counsel for the Tlicho people that this particular provision was included at the request of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. We also found out that it was in conflict with the actual cabinet document that guided the negotiations for this agreement. I was wondering if the hon. member could perhaps tell me why DFAIT insisted upon the inclusion of this particular article in the agreement.

[Tlicho Land Claims and Self-Government Act, December 6th, 2004]

Madam Speaker, first I would like to thank the hon. member for Calgary Centre-North for his presentation. In my short while in this House I must say that is one of the finest presentations I have heard. The hon. member brought forward many important issues.

The particular question I have for the hon. member concerns, what I find to be, the shocking disregard for the cabinet's own guidelines and directives on this negotiation. We have now heard what the original 1995 cabinet guidelines for the negotiation of the Tlicho agreement included. We have seen what the final product is, which is before this House right now. I must say that the discrepancy between the two is shocking.

The explanation for the 180 degree change in the course of the government has not been explained. I just asked the hon. minister to explain why DFAIT insisted on this particular provision regarding international sovereignty be included but I did not get a straight answer again for probably the 10th time.

Would the hon. member for Calgary Centre-North have some ideas as to why the government deviated so much from the original cabinet guidelines on this negotiation?

[Tlicho Land Claims and Self-Government Act, December 6th, 2004]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the minister for her speech on this subject. The Tlicho people are here today, but I realize we cannot acknowledge their presence.

I was at the committee meetings. I am the vice-chair of the aboriginal affairs committee. One of the concerns that my party had with this piece of legislation had to do with article 7.13.2 of the agreement. The provision reads as follows:

Prior to consenting to be bound by an international treaty that may affect a right of the Tlicho Government, the Tlicho First Nation or a Tlicho Citizen, flowing from the Agreement, the Government of Canada shall provide an opportunity for the Tlicho Government to make its views known with respect to the international treaty either separately or through a forum.

My reading of that is it essentially creates a duty to consult with regard to Canada entering into international obligations that may have some effect, however oblique that effect may be, on the Tlicho government. Obviously it is of great concern that we may be hamstringing our ability to enter into international agreements and infringing on the sovereignty of this country.

Under questioning I never did get a straight answer from government bureaucrats, the parliamentary secretary or any official of the government on this question. The attorney for the Tlicho did mention in committee that this particular provision was included at the insistence of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. I must say I find this very strange. It is something to which I never did receive an answer as to why this provision was included at the insistence of DFAIT.

Perhaps the minister could comment on this. Could she offer an explanation as to why DFAIT wanted this provision in the agreement?

[First Nations Fiscal and Statistical Management Act, November 19th, 2004]

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak in support of Bill C-20, the first nations fiscal and statistical institutions initiative. The act would provide for real property taxation powers of first nations, create a first nations tax commission, first nations financial management board, first nations finance authority and a first nations statistical institute, as well as making consequential amendments to other acts.

The bill was tabled in the previous Parliament as Bill C-23 but was not passed before dissolution. The purpose of the act is to create the above-mentioned institutions with the intention that those institutions provide first nations with the tools needed for economic development primarily by facilitating access to capital markets for much needed infrastructure development.

We should make no mistake that infrastructure development is sorely needed on first nations right across the country. I know this first hand. In my riding of Desnethé—Missinippi—Churchill River there are over 30 first nations and 108 separate reserves. Many are in desperate circumstances with incredible and severe problems. Any access to additional tools for economic development and improvements to infrastructure are a positive thing.

The four institutions that would be created by this act are designed to provide participating first nations with the tools they need to build stronger local tax bases, infrastructure and economies. Economic independence is intended to be pursued by improved access to private capital.

Participation will be restricted to ensure that only those first nations that have demonstrated the requisite managerial and financial capacity will have access to the borrowing capacity of these new institutions. The first nations financial authority will allow participating first nations, like local governments, to raise long term private capital at preferred rates for infrastructure development. They will do so by securitizing a portion of their potential real property tax revenues generated under the bill. It is estimated that $120 million in debt financing will be raised over the first five bond issues. These funds will allow first nations to develop infrastructure that supports business and investments.

At this point I would like to stress that the legislation does not provide federal government credit backing or guarantees and that borrowing participation is voluntary, as are the advisory services. First nations choosing to participate in the first nations finance authority will pool together their capital. The FNFA will act as a central borrowing authority by selling bonds on the strength of the first nations collective credit. They will attempt to achieve an A credit rating.

The qualifying and participating first nations will be required to guarantee one another's debt. The finance authority will establish eligibility requirements, issue first nations debentures and re-lend the proceeds to those first nations participating in the borrowing. In concert with such borrowing, the on reserve property tax system will be gradually expanded to provide debt service cash flow. The result will be to provide qualifying first nations with the comparable credit for infrastructure expansion to that available to municipal authorities elsewhere in Canada.

The second new institution that would created under the act, the first nations tax commission, is essentially the natural evolution of the current Indian Tax Advisory Board. The ITAB has worked to build awareness of the real property tax system and provide the tools for its implementation. The FNTC will have the authority to approve first nations tax bylaws, a power that is currently exercised by the minister alone. The FNTC will also provide sample bylaws, training, education and an alternative dispute resolution process to prevent and resolve disputes.

At present, 100 first nations levy property tax, collecting $44 million annually from 28,000 taxpayers. The FNTC will be responsible for the development and regulation of first nation property tax systems. It will assume responsibility for the approval of bylaws, ensure compliance and provide dispute resolution mechanisms for on reserve taxation, providing an alternative to the Indian Act property tax system.

Another new institution mandated in the bill is the creation of the first nations financial management board. The initial task of this new institution will be to provide the independent and professional financial management assessment services required by participating first nations. It will provide professional advice to those first nations that have entered the FNFA borrowing pool and provide training and services related to policy development for all first nations.

The final new institution that would be created under Bill C-20 is the first nations statistical institute. This organization is intended to provide statistical data and analysis of the social, economic and environmental conditions of first nations. It will supplant Statistics Canada in the development of statistical information, support borrowing, credit rating, property taxation and provide information for marketplace investors. It is intended to address the current lack of capacity of first nations to maintain statistical systems needed to match their growing local decision making responsibilities.

I must admit that I have some problems with the creation of this institution. This institute will clearly duplicate the services that are supposed to be supplied by Statistics Canada, a federal agency that receives $600 million per year in funding.

Why does this institute have to be created? The answer is not entirely clear, but to me it would seem to indicate a failure on the part of StatsCan to keep adequate information on first nations across the country.

Although I have stated that I support this bill, I also am somewhat worried about the costs associated with the creation of the new institutions I have talked about. It is estimated that the cost over the first five years will be $67.3 million. This is based on a start-up of $9 million and operational costs over the five year period of $58.3 million. The objective of the financing authority is to be self-financing. I sincerely hope that this is the case. There are also opportunities for some cost recovery with the other institutions, although break-even, by even the best estimates, will occur in 2010.

Another concern I have is that this bill may also underscore a trend we are starting to see develop, namely, a schism between have and have not first nations. Only time will tell in this regard.

It cannot be stressed enough that this bill is an initiative of first nations leaders from across the country. These leaders are seeking the gradual removal of their communities from the Indian Act. They blame much of the on-reserve poverty, joblessness, and the minimal wealth creation on the poor quality infrastructure and institutional limitations of the Indian Act.

Mr. Manny Jules, spokesperson for the first nations fiscal institutions initiative, has said:

This legislation is the bedrock on which you can break the dependency cycle. The creation of the First Nations Tax Commission, First Nations Finance Authority, First Nations Financial Management Board and First Nations Statistical Institute will provide the information, certainty, a regulatory framework, confidence and infrastructure required to attract investment to First Nation lands.

The hallmark of this bill is its optional nature, which recognizes the diversity among first nations. This legislation will apply only to those first nations that have chosen to access the full range of services offered by the institutions in the areas of property taxation and financial management. Solid capacities in these areas are essential for the future of first nations from coast to coast.

[Citizenship and Immigration, November 19th, 2004]

Mr. Speaker, this is a very serious issue and we are not getting the answers to our questions.

Yesterday the Prime Minister booted the member for Mississauga—Erindale out of caucus for criticizing his leadership.

While the Prime Minister is peeling back his caucus one member at a time, why will he not bounce his immigration minister to the head of the line for demotion?

[Citizenship and Immigration, November 19th, 2004]

Mr. Speaker, the Liberal immigration minister recently allowed an exotic dancer who worked on her election campaign to jump the queue for temporary residence in Canada.

The immigration minister has claimed that she has the ethics commissioner looking into this matter but we have learned today that she has not given him the necessary information to investigate.

Why has the immigration minister been allowed to remain in cabinet while misleading the House and bending the rules for Liberal friends?