Jim Gouk

[Supply, April 18th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, the member does not like my use of the word divisive but found many uses for it himself.

Yes I said that no one wants it and the member challenged that. I suppose he is right. There is absolutely nothing I can think of where there is absolute unanimity all across the line.

I would point out to the member that the last survey I saw suggested that 63 per cent of all those surveyed in Quebec did not agree with the national bilingual program and there was a higher percentage than that in the rest of Canada.

The hon. member suggest that because many people take French language training that they are in favour of this. I have taken Spanish and I have taken Portuguese and I am not in favour of Canada implementing bilingualism in Spanish and Portuguese either. Therefore, his argument does not hold much water.

With regard to the fact that no one is forced to take bilingual training because of the provisions of the bilingual service, tell that to the controllers at the Ottawa terminal.

[Supply, April 18th, 1994]

After that counter speech I am not quite sure where to begin.

First, does the hon. member who posed that convoluted question think that 55 per cent of the French speaking people who live in the national capital region go up to the cockpit while they are on some flight, use the radio and handle the aircraft control procedures for the pilot?

The two per cent is documented. It is the optimum figure in terms of the French language used in the national capital region.

I would love to compare passports with the hon. member. I suggest that I travel at least as much as he does and probably quite a bit more. English is the international language of aviation.

I have no problem with the idea of using French in Quebec because that is the language there. I would even go along with providing the service here. However, we are going so far beyond the amount necessary to provide the service to those who require it that it is absolutely ridiculous.

When the member talks of implementing this right across Canada it is no wonder the budget is so totally out of control.

[Supply, April 18th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, our motion today deals with facts.

The fact is that the Official Languages Act is a total failure. It is divisive. It is so overwhelmingly expensive it would even be impractical in a booming economy with an overflowing treasury, neither of which we currently enjoy.

One of the most curious aspects of the act is that no one asked for it. Quebec did not ask for it. Most certainly neither did the rest of Canada.

Quebec wanted the French language in its own province and we agree with that. It wanted access in French to key federal institutions such as Parliament and the Supreme Court and we agree with that. It expects federal services in French. We agree with that where there is sufficient demand to warrant cost effective provision of that service.

Given that the majority of the people in Quebec are not concerned about it and even a larger majority of Canadians in the rest of Canada are not in favour of continuing with it, why are we spending so much money to maintain a program that does not work, that we cannot afford and that no one wants?

One theory generally follows the concept of Newton's first law of physics that an object in motion will remain in motion unless acted upon by an external force. In other words, the status quo reigns supreme.

In actual fact, given that the program is in fact flourishing it appears many are operating under their own special agendas without concern for the fact that the time for this program to end has long since past.

I would like to focus today on one particular aspect of the bilingual implementation program. The area I am personally concerned about is the introduction of bilingual services to the air traffic control system. These implementation programs are horrendously expensive and at times compromise the safety of the Canadian traveller.

Air traffic control primarily uses two types of services: tower control, which controls the movement of traffic on and in the immediate proximity to the airport; and radar control, which controls aircraft flying by use of aircraft instruments within a defined area of airspace.

The Official Languages Act imposes a duty on all federal institutions to ensure that the public can obtain all services

available from federal offices or facilities within the national capital region in either official language.

In keeping with that, Ottawa tower became fully bilingual 16 hours a day as of June 1990 and 24 hours a day as of March 1991. The cost of this was and still is outrageous. The staffing of Ottawa tower calls for 17 controllers but at present there are only 9 controllers available for duty. Part of the problem is that all positions are designated as bilingual imperative. This means a controller must be fully bilingual to even apply for the position.

I for one have no problem with the concept of providing bilingual service where demand is sufficient to warrant cost effective language services. I already mentioned this at the beginning of my talk. Just how much demand constitutes sufficient is a questionable point and well worth examining here.

Before I begin to discuss the need in the tower I would like to add that the full bilingual service is in place at Ottawa tower. It is now in the process of being implemented in Ottawa terminal.

Let us look at how one might determine what demands are and how much service is needed to satisfy those demands, if in fact they are in need of being satisfied.

Simulations were run on equipment then located at the research and development department in Hull. Operating from a single bilingual position, traffic that included 30 per cent French speaking pilots was handled acceptably. This establishes a rate at which we can then look at staffing plans if it can be determined that the demand exists. What of the demand? Controllers at Ottawa tower record each contact requesting service in French. The optimum amount of requests they receive is 2 per cent, one-fifteenth of the amount that has been demonstrated can be handled safely from a single position.

A little side note on that 2 per cent figure, these figures include Air Canada pilots who can obviously speak and operate in English. It includes an airline whose next stop after Ottawa is Boston. It includes pilots from Transport Canada who fly all over this country.

I suggest there is no justification at all for bilingual air traffic control services in the Ottawa area. If there is, it should only be in that single position originally envisioned which could demonstrably control not only that amount of traffic but a tremendous and unexpected amount of growth in the future.

The cost of this bilingual service is just one of the concerns of this program, but it certainly is a significant one. At present the combined cost of the overstaffing needed to implement the bilingual program in Ottawa terminal plus a shortage of three bilingual controllers from the tower who are now on training for the terminal to staff the new bilingual positions is almost $1 million per year. There are English speaking tower controllers in Ottawa who can relieve this cost but they are not allowed to control in the tower because they do not speak French. These costs are only the tip of the iceberg.

At the beginning I also mentioned the concern about safety. The source of this concern is the way the English speaking controllers are being dealt with during this highly questionable implementation of bilingual services. Incumbent rights are being ignored. Original implementation plans are being scrapped. Controllers' futures are up in the air, no pun intended.

I fly a lot, as do most of the members in this House. I would not want to have open heart surgery from a doctor whose face I had just slapped the night before. Why then are we doing the same thing to the people whose hands we place our lives in every time we take to the skies?

This is but one small example of the problem caused by the Official Languages Act. However it is a very important example of the extent to which this is getting out of hand.

The time to end the problem is now. It is time that we became the external force that will put an end to the motion of a program that has never worked in the interests of anyone.

[Canadian National Railways, April 15th, 1994]

Madam Speaker, I would like to raise a few points and some issues with regard to the motion by the hon. member for Roberval.

I am going to be as frank and straightforward as I can possibly be with him. Hopefully by doing so I will be able to get closer to the heart of what he is proposing.

I would welcome the opportunity to have the various doubts I have about the member's motion cleared up. First I should spell out some of the issues as I see them. To begin with let us take a good look at the Franquet-Chapais line that the member is in favour of privatizing. Let us examine the history of this trunk line so that we can better understand what it is that is being requested.

The line in question, which is 97 miles long, is located in northern Quebec. This is a rather short line but it would make no difference to Canadian National which controls the line if this route were considered a profitable one. However, it is not. Let me make myself very clear about that because CN officials have stated unequivocally to me that the Franquet-Chapais line is not profitable and has not been for quite some time.

CN Rail first applied to the National Transportation Agency for abandonment of the line in 1989. At that point, to quote the railroad, there was no traffic at all on the line in question.

The NTA ruled that the line was not economical to maintain and operate and stated that there was no near term possibility for that line to become profitable. At that time the NTA also pointed out there was a reasonable possibility the line could be economically valuable at some point down the road.

As a result of this CN Rail was told to continue operating the line for a period of three more years to determine beyond a doubt whether the line had any economic potential. As it turned out, it did not.

The Franquet-Chapais line has been a drain on CN's resources ever since and traffic on that line has continued to be next to non-existent.

In 1992 the NTA reviewed the case again and ruled that all but six miles of the entire 97-mile route were uneconomical with "no possibility that it could become feasible to operate".

Since that time the line has existed in a sort of railway hinterland. It has not been abandoned outright but this is due to occur on May 31, 1994, unless a private buyer can be found for the line.

What should we make of this? I presume the hon. member for Roberval raised this motion in order to head off the unhappy destiny this trunk line is about to meet. I think that is both an honourable and just thing for him to do. After all CN has stated quite flatly it has no use for that line and no desire to keep it in service any longer.

The member has nothing to lose by putting forward his privatization motion and everything to gain.

I would like to point out a few minor things, however, which may run against what the member is trying to accomplish with his motion. Number one, allow me to say to this House that although the Franquet-Chapais line has been on the CN auction block for a good number of years not a single private or public

body has ever expressed a concrete interest to CN officials in purchasing the line, not one, Madam Speaker.

Where then would the hon. member suggest a a real buyer be found for this trunk line? It may be accurate for him to say that such a line would allow mining and forestry development in the northern region of Quebec but such potential did not transpire overnight.

Even when the Canadian economy was booming and prices were high for mineral and wood products, there was not one proposal put forward to CN which called for the 97-mile route to be taken off the railroad's hands.

With this in mind at a time when the natural resource industry remained depressed I sincerely do not know how the member hopes to find a saviour, a white knight who will rescue the Franquet-Chapais line from its ultimate fate.

Let us not be mistaken. CN Rail has not been jealously guarding its many trunk and feeder lines in the hope of preventing potential buyers from taking them away and making better use of them. Quite the contrary, in fact.

For a number of years Canadian National has been making a strong concerted effort to sell off its smaller lines to private interests in hopes of concentrating more fully on the primary areas of operation and reducing its staff and maintenance costs. The sell-off has been even more actively promoted in eastern Canada. In fact, CN even went so far as to produce a line of all trunk lines that it felt had a real potential for interested buyers. Unfortunately the Franquet-Chapais line did not make that list. I believe the reason for this was simple. It has been a consistent money loser for years while many of CN's other trunk lines were managing to turn a profit.

What is one to make of this predicament? CN Rail went even further to do away with lines like the one in question. It actively pursued sales offers not only from the private industry but also from other public entities such as municipalities and even the Quebec government. Not one of these bodies expressed an interest in taking on the Franquet-Chapais line.

Simply put, CN Rail would love someone to take the line off its hands but no one has approached the railroad about it and time is running out for anyone to do so. Therefore, what am I to make of the hon. member's motion? It is certainly well intentioned and I commend him for that but I honestly do not know if it is feasible. This is where my concern lies.

That is not the end of the confusion surrounding this motion. Officials I have spoken with at CN expressed some concern about the vague terminology of the member's motion, especially the phrase that calls for the line to be offered to a bidder for a nominal sum. What is exactly meant by this unclear choice of words? He has cleared that up a bit today.

In terms of what CN Rail would actually be willing to see the Franquet-Chapais line sold for, federal transportation policy is very explicit and, I might add, quite reasonable. If a company wishes to take over unwanted rail line from its owner at any point during the abandonment process and is willing to pay the basic salvage value of the rail line as determined by the National Transportation Agency then the railroad must sell the line in question.

In the case of the Franquet-Chapais line this abandonment process has been dragging on for a period of five years but no potential buyers have forced CN to divest itself of this asset. I may point out that the concept of salvage value is important here because it shows that CN could not possibly be holding on to a money losing line because it is not getting top dollar offers from outside sources.

In actual truth the railway simply has not received any purchase offers for the Franquet-Chapais line, period. It could be that in this case the total salvage value of the 97-mile route would turn out to be nothing more than a nominal sum. Is this what the hon. member is actually driving at?

My impression is that he would be satisfied to turn the trunk line over to private interests for the sum of $1. Certainly this would accomplish his goal but it would not be a benefit to CN. It would open every line in its system to takeover for $1. In fact, CN Rail would never agree to such a proposal and this is the hard fact of the situation. The Franquet-Chapais line is worth more to CN sitting idle than it would be as a gift to private investors.

Let me express my sincere sympathy for the member for Roberval because I understand very well what he is trying to accomplish with his motion. My riding is also facing rail problems similar to those that have plagued the Franquet-Chapais trunk line.

In British Columbia's Slocan Valley, a rail line is being threatened with closure because of a variety of negative economic factors. I understand what the member is driving at. I am now trying to get abandonment proceedings delayed in my own riding just as has been done in the past in the hon. member's own area.

If a delay in Slocan Valley is successful as it was in his own area with the Franquet-Chapais line, then it should be up to that specific area to promote rail business through local economic development if the people of that area want to keep the rail line in the long term.

In the case of the Franquet-Chapais line the citizens of the region had the chance of stretching it over a five-year period to bring about the renewal and redevelopment of the line. Unfortunately, it appears that nothing was done with this opportunity. This suggests that there simply was no business to promote on the line to begin with.

Hopefully the Slocan valley rail line that is now on the chopping block will be given the same chance for renewal the Franquet-Chapais line has already had. Hopefully we will be

able to accomplish more with our opportunity and save our line by making it more economically viable for private industry.

However, I do not know how much more can be done in the case of the rail line advocated by motion 194. Private and public investors have had since 1989 to revamp and reinvest in the line and return it to profitability. This has not been done.

I do sympathize with the hon. member's motion but unfortunately I simply do not believe there are any simple solutions to be gained from motion 194.

[Pearson Airport, April 15th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, with regard to the Pearson airport development deal I am happy to see the Liberals are honestly attempting to sweep away this tainted plan signed hastily in the dying days of the last Tory government.

The Pearson fiasco was clearly an example of unfair lobbying tactics and shady backroom dealings so typical of the Mulroney era.

I have only one real concern with the government's handling of the aborted airport deal. I believe in no uncertain terms that no compensation whatsoever should be provided to the consortium responsible for whipping up the Pearson privatization plan and then pushing it through the Tory cabinet like a knife through butter.

These people know full well any controversial contract signed during an election campaign would never hold water if the Tories were not re-elected. I ask, compensation for what? For abusing the public trust?

I say tough luck if they lost money putting their shady plan together. I call on the government not to extend a single dime in so-called compensation payments.

[Budget Implementation Act, 1994, April 14th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to raise a few points on Bill C-17. There are many problems with it depending on which area one would want to approach it from.

Often we hear the other side of the House say they are concerned that the Reform Party does not support this or the Reform Party does not support that. This certainly is a prime example of what happens. They jam a lot of different areas all together. If we turn one down because there is something in there we do not like, they say we are against everything.

I mentioned in the past how they did that with the Charlottetown accord. It was not just the other side but in fact all parties at that time. They had this huge, all-encompassing accord. Then after the people of Canada in their wisdom decided to turn it down they forever more are saying each and every part of that accord was rejected.

Some people voted against it because they did not like the fact it was almost impossible to amend it. Some people did not like the way the Senate was set up. Some people did not like the arrangements for the province of Quebec. Some people did not like it because of the concept of aboriginal self-government with no definition as to what it really was. The aboriginal people themselves did not like it. Yet every time now that we come back to one of the issues in there the government says: "You had your chance and you turned it down".

So it is with Bill C-17. The government likes to say we are against the individual parts of this, but of course we cannot be against the individual parts. We are not allowed. We either accept it in whole or reject it in whole. There are many areas in there.

I talked in the past about the transportation subsidies. Unemployment insurance is another example where the government is saying we are turning something down that we should be embracing. The government in fact is twisting our very words.

Under unemployment insurance they are dropping the rates from $3.30 to $3 and then we are chastised for making any comment against its action. The reality is they were the ones who put it up to $3.30 in the first place. Then they say a company with 10 people or 50-I cannot remember the magic number used-is going to save all these thousands of dollars with which it can hire new employees. The reality is that nothing has been saved because it was a charge imposed by the government in the first place.

If it were true, and I pointed this out to the Minister of Human Resources Development before, it should have put the rate up by $3 instead of 30 cents and then dropped it back down. That way the companies would save 10 times as much and all our economic problems would be over.

The reality is whether we should be debating the implementation of this budget at all. It is already out of date. The budget will not work. It has not taken into account the impact and the effect it has had on our economy already, how it has shaken the confidence of international lenders around the world. Our foreign bond credit rating has dropped. The stock market has dropped. Interest rates have climbed and our dollar has dropped. We are in big trouble and it started with this budget.

It is time the government realized this is not a budget that is going to work for Canadians. Instead of debating this we should be setting it aside and working together to develop a new budget, one that will really work and one that will address the real needs of the Canadian public.

We have to oppose the bill because it is the implementation of a variety of acts, some of which might be good but many of which will not work. It works toward passing an overall budget which itself is flawed and already out of date.

[High Speed Train, April 13th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, I rise in the House today to speak on Motion No. 112 proposed by the hon. member for Joliette.

The motion calls for the federal government to authorize the construction of a high speed train link between Windsor and Quebec City. That is something which has been talked about in government circles, not to mention within the transport industry itself for many years but to little avail.

Before such a rail line could even possibly be seriously considered by the federal government, a wide array of important details and snags would have to be studied and worked out after

a long period of planning and public consultation. This is a project that could have far reaching ramifications to Canada well into the 21st century.

Although the good side of the coin is pretty evident for all to see, we should first take a good hard look at what some of the potential downsides of such a plan might be. I do not believe the hon. member's motion really addresses any of the essential specifics needed by the House before it could possibly see itself as being well enough informed to consider such a complicated issue.

Transport Canada is presently studying the high speed rail issue at length. Until it releases its report on the matter tentatively for some time in June, I certainly would not consider it wise for this House to blindly approve the sweeping motion put forward by the member for Joliette.

I understand as this is a private member's motion I am speaking on at the moment, it has little chance of successfully passing the skeptical eye of government benches. I nevertheless feel I have not seen enough by way of concrete information that would allow me to support the motion in good faith.

At present the motion before us in the House is simply a standard motion. It basically says there is something we should do and that is about it. There are no details, no dollar figures and of course nothing concrete or of an analytical nature.

Let us not be mistaken here. Properly constructed, a high speed rail line would cost somewhere in the neighbourhood of $5 billion to $7 billion. That is a little more than pocket change even for free spending members on the other side of the House.

The first question I would have to ask the hon. member for Joliette is where he would suggest the funding for such a project might appear. Is it expected to miraculously materialize out of thin air? Or, does the member actually have some ideas in mind as to where he would raise the necessary funding for this bold and innovative proposal? There is no mention at this point in his motion. Quite frankly that concerns me.

There have been all sorts of rumours flying of late as to who would or should shoulder the burden for such a major expenditure. On one hand let me say right now I would be much more apt to throw my support behind a high speed rail proposal if I had some concrete assurances that the entire multibillion dollar cost of such a major undertaking would be handled entirely by private industry. Unfortunately I have been hearing a number of disconcerting things that would have me believe otherwise.

The concept of a 50:50 funding split between the private sector and various levels of government, including our own here in Ottawa has been discussed and certainly has not been ruled out. From what I understand this possibly means the federal government could be asked to shell out as much as $2.8 billion toward the construction of something that sure sounds nice but carries the potential of turning into a bottomless money pit.

If this $2.8 billion figure is anywhere near accurate and truthful as the truth now stands in the mind of the hon. member for Joliette then I would strongly suggest it may be time to set the alarm bells ringing over this one.

The arguments that have been floating around in favour of publicly funded high speed rail lines are always the same ones we end up hearing when requests for government handouts come up, something to the effect of "do not worry, Mr. Prime Minister, sure you are putting up a big chunk of money but do not be concerned. This is a profitable enterprise and we are going to cut you a chunk of the profits".

As charitable and generous to the government as this offer may seem at first glance, let us be realistic. In the past so-called profitable endeavours the government has been foolish enough to get itself into have turned out to be total financial busts more often than not. The record of government involvement in the sphere of industrial development has been a dismal one as far back as most of us can remember.

This rotten record speaks for itself and it speaks volumes. Ottawa is unable to effectively manage its financial investments in the private sector and this will probably never change, nor should it.

If the high speed train link is supposed to be such a financial benefit for the federal government in the long haul with all the profit sharing that will take place why let us in on a share of the profits in the first place? Certainly it cannot be because private business has suddenly become enamoured with the likes of the Ottawa political crowd.

Considering that the political elites of Ottawa have not had the competence to turn an annual budgetary surplus since the early 1970s, I would certainly be surprised if any viable industry would want to enter into a working partnership with the federal government.

What could possibly be the justification for government participation in this high speed proposal? In short, the crux of the issue is very simple. If the rail line is a financially viable project then the federal government should give its full legislative backing to such a plan, provided there is no fiscal component involved. If that is not proven to be fiscally viable, why then would the government want to sink any of its non-existent money into such a plan? It certainly would be nice for us to be the North American pioneers of high speed rail transportation. If the logic is not there, neither should the taxpayers' money be.

The whole issue of taxpayers' dollars becomes even more acute when one considers the potentially far reaching ramifications of the upcoming Quebec referendum. If Jacques Parizeau and his Parti Quebecois are successful in their next run at the voters, as many polls seem to indicate, then we would certainly expect to see the whole separatism issue shoot to the forefront, a public debate yet again.

As unappealing as I personally find this considering my preference for a strong and united Canada, we certainly must take this situation into account when we examine the possibility of assisting any major infrastructure project between Quebec City and southern Ontario. As distasteful as this may sound to some ostrich-like Liberals with their heads buried in the political sand, it stands to reason that the federal government should have the common sense to refrain from throwing any further multi-billion dollar funding allotments to Quebec until such times as the future of that province is settled democratically and decisively, hopefully once and for all.

Even if the government had wads of money spilling out of its coffers at this point, which it certainly does not, there would be no sense in undertaking a major high speed rail link, a third of which would be located in Quebec, as long as the separatist threat continues to loom over the economic and political well-being of this great country.

As with the citizens across the rest of Canada, voters in Quebec are no longer willing to allow their support to be bought off with their own taxpayers' dollars. That time has long passed. People from the Atlantic to the Pacific are aware that the national and provincial treasuries are as bare as the trite promises contained in the Liberal's red book. They are no longer willing to let their elected representatives throw oodles of their own hard earned money at dubious megaprojects, especially ones that would be completely lost to Canada in the event of a successful Quebec separatist effort.

These are the hard facts of the late twentieth century, and though they may seem confrontational or narrow minded they are not meant to be so. They are simply meant to set out the honest truth, alarming and brutal though it may be.

I have not arrived at my conclusions lightly, nor have I arrived at them without significant consultation with other various official sources within the transportation sector. This includes extensive and recent meetings with representatives from Bombardier, the Quebec based company hopefully planning to receive a significant chunk of any contractual work which would arrive out of this high speed link.

Despite the admittedly optimistic outlook of Bombardier officials I am afraid past experience has shown Canadian people that their politicians should look a little more before they leap. That is precisely what I am attempting to do now by avoiding making hasty commitments to this very shaky concept. As such I find I am unable to support the motion made by the hon. member for Joliette.

The homework has not yet been done. I believe the proposal for a high speed train line, though intriguing, is simply too much too soon at this point in time.

[Budget Implementation Act, 1994, April 11th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the hon. member for his comments and questions.

With regard to prairie grain subsidies I would point out that if they go to the farmers they still have to transport their grain. It is not a question that they are going to pocket that money, use it for other things, and not bother to ship their grain because there is no way to get paid until they ship it.

The point I was trying to make during my presentation was that these subsidies to western grain farmers could be reduced or, for that matter, virtually eliminated if we also eliminated the other unnecessary expenditures they are burdened with right now because of the problems with shipping grain other than the cost factors.

With regard to the port of Montreal the hon. member seemed to indicate that it should be kept open because it was a decision made by the Canadian government. It was also a decision made by the Canadian government that put us over $500 billion in debt. I do not think the hon. member likes that decision. Many decisions made in the past have to be questioned.

I am not questioning whether we should be keeping the port of Montreal open. To suggest that we shut down the port would be ridiculous. In my speech I said that I had no objection to the icebreaking service being made available to ships, but let them pay the cost of having this service provided to them. It otherwise forms an extremely expensive offset subsidy in direct disproportion to all other subsidies for the service.

We have to look at ways of cutting all costs right across the country in virtually every area the government does business. This is just another way of addressing the problem.

[Budget Implementation Act, 1994, April 11th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, the omnibus nature of this bill makes it very awkward to deal with the component parts contained in it. Some of the items are realistic and reasonable. Some are not.

In normal circumstances one studies a bill and then makes an informed decision whether or not that bill should be supported. In the case of Bill C-17 that decision is not so easy to make.

One of the great political red herrings of the past Parliament was the Charlottetown accord. It too was omnibus in nature. There was something in it which almost everybody could accept collectively and there were areas which almost no one could accept as well. On the whole the majority of the Canadian population rejected the accord because in an all or nothing arrangement there were too many areas that were not acceptable. Therein lies the problem.

Since the rejection of the Charlottetown accord the past and present government have used the rejection to throw back in the faces of people advocating such timely reforms as an elected Senate the fact that such a reform was offered and rejected.

At the same time the government seems able to proceed with such constitutional items as official bilingualism for another province, changes in wording of an agreement which allow a bridge to replace a ferry system and negotiations on aboriginal self-government.

Thus is the problem associated with omnibus type bills which have in the past created a lose-lose situation for many of those involved in the process. It is with this obstacle in mind that I have prepared my position on transportation subsidies.

The prairie grain farmer has many problems in attempting to operate a successful and very necessary business in Canada. For years grain farmers have been receiving freight subsidies to offset the cost of grain transportation. There is in this subsidy a bit of a misconception. The farmers do not receive the subsidy directly. It is paid to the railway and there many unresolved

problems with the rail system which I believe are further complicated by the manner in which the subsidy is paid.

By paying the railroad directly one would assume that they ship all the grain and the overall cost of the freight is reduced by the subsidy amount. This is not the case. Many grain elevators are full to capacity and have been for quite some time. Some of these elevators have not seen a rail car in over two months.

A further complication to this is the spring road weight restrictions which are now in place which make it even harder for farmers to move their grain when elevators space does become available. Grain farmers are not paid for their harvest until it is sold and shipped to the purchaser. In the interim period grain farmers are not only not paid for their work and expenses, they also incur further costs which are often the difference between making a decent return on their labour and investment or going broke.

Some of these include the cost of storage of grain, interest charges on debts which should have been reduced or paid off from the proceeds of the grain sale, lost sales as a result of failure to deliver the product on time and demurrage charges levied by ships sitting in Vancouver harbour empty, waiting on grain to be delivered by the railway. These demurrage charges run up to $20,000 a day and some ships have left the harbour empty after collecting as much as $350,000 in demurrage charges.

The total crop transportation subsidy last year was about $36 million. Western grain farmers have lost approximately $200 million in grain sales and demurrage charges alone since the beginning of the Vancouver port labour dispute which the government was so reluctant to end.

Since the 1970s provincial and federal governments and the Canadian Wheat Board have supplied thousands of hopper cars to the railway. The Western Grain Transportation Act pays a transportation subsidy directly to the railway. In doing so there seems to be a loss of accountability which can be addressed very easily.

Paying the subsidy directly to the grain farmer on a pro rata basis will allow the farmers to have more control over the method of shipment and provide more incentive to the rail lines to move the grain more effectively and efficiently. The concept of a reduction in the amount of the subsidy paid is not where my concern lies. I know costs have to be cut and this is an area that has potential for reduction. These cuts however must not be solely on the backs of the grain farmers who are already in a very insecure financial position.

In normal business practices one looks at a rate of return on an investment. A return of 10 per cent is not considered particularly high, especially if there is an element of risk involved.

In addition, one normally and reasonably expects to be paid something for one's labours. Many grain farmers are currently paid less than one-quarter of the normal return on their investment that they hold. If we look at their total income in light of that small investment return they are paid nothing at all for their labours.

These farmers are not growing coloured TVs or fancy furniture. They are growing the food we need to produce in this country to maintain our independence for this vital commodity and an extremely important export product which helps maintain the economic viability of our country in an international global market.

We cannot simply turn our backs on the needs of the farmer. We must find a way to reduce expenses like the grain transportation subsidy without creating further economic hardships on people who are a vital part of our food chain and economic well-being.

The changing of the payment of the subsidy directly to the grain farmer is the first step. This step however must be accompanied by further changes to reduce unnecessary loss of income caused by the current transportation problems.

Subsidy reductions contained in the 1994 Liberal budget would result in a saving of approximately $5 million.

If the government were prepared to take some initiative in ending the unnecessary loss of income through the current transportation problems, not only would the subsidy reduction not create a further hardship, it would open up the potential for further reductions without hardships at all.

In short, there is a potential in this small portion of a great all-encompassing bill for savings in the area of grain transportation subsidies, but the government must do its homework first. In this draft that homework has not been done.

I trust the government will accept these remarks as items to consider and modify this entire section before it is brought before the House again.

I now turn my attention to the Atlantic region transportation subsidies. The Atlantic region consists of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Labrador and the eastern portion of Quebec. The purpose of these subsidies is to promote and encourage the transport of goods within the Atlantic region.

There are three different components to these subsidies under the Maritime Freight Rates Act. The first is a basic westbound subsidy on virtually all commodities travelling from inside the region to territories outside the region.

In 1992 this totalled $38.4 million, $9.6 million for rail transport and $28.8 million for truck transportation; a separate

westbound selective subsidy of 20 per cent on selected goods which were actually manufactured inside the region as opposed to simply passing through.

In 1992 this totalled $13.7 million, $3.7 million for rail transport and $10 million for truck transportation.

In addition, there was an internal regional 10 per cent subsidy which was reduced to 9 per cent in the budget of April 1993 on a selected list of commodities. In 1992 this totalled $57.7 million, $9.5 million for rail transport, $47.5 million for truck transportation and $.7 million for marine transportation.

The combined total of all Atlantic subsidies for 1992 was $109.8 million.

In the budget of April 1993 this $109.8 million subsidy was reduced by 10 per cent. To achieve this cut the overall westbound rail shipment subsidy was cut from 30 per cent to 28.5 per cent.

Other reductions in costs were made through general administration and internal cutbacks across the board.

This year's budget calls for another 5 per cent cut in the total Atlantic shipping subsidy, which now sits between $100 million and $105 million, commencing April 1994.

Once again I find myself in a mix of support and opposition. On the one hand we have the continuing problem of the needs of government to reduce expenditures. On the other hand I find the government has once again not done its homework.

The general economy of the maritimes is fragile at best and the government while recognizing the need to reduce its spending must also be mindful of the need to examine all areas of savings before taking any arbitrary action.

The reduction of the Atlantic shipping subsidies as proposed is not unreasonable. The reality is these subsidies could probably be reduced considerably more but not without coupling these reductions with other changes.

One of these changes is the removal of interprovincial trade barriers in the region. These barriers already cost the Atlantic region more than the total value of the regional development grants. As in the case of western grain farmers, subsidy reduction would be a lot more palatable if it were coupled with reductions of other costs of doing business.

Another area that should also have been considered is the cost of keeping the port of Montreal open in the winter months. Currently icebreaking services are provided by the coast guard at no cost to the shippers or ships that the goods travel on. This creates two problems. First, this service costs the federal government about $33 million a year. To be sure some of this, about a third, is spent on flood control work. The rest amounts to yet another transportation subsidy costing the Canadian taxpayer four times the amount of saving in the Atlantic regional freight subsidy reductions proposed.

Second, this free service actually works against the Atlantic region by subsidizing the movement of goods through the maritimes in the winter instead of utilizing the ice free ports in Halifax and St. John's. It is well and good to have this service available for ships wishing to utilize this service, but it should be user pay. This would result in savings far in excess of the current amount targeted by the government and at the same time likely produce some economic benefit for the Atlantic ports.

To put it mildly, the St. Lawrence icebreaker issue certainly seems ironic considering the large degree of difficulty the Atlantic shipping industry is presently going through. The disorganized, self-defeating government policy in subsidy fields does not end there.

To add further fuel to the fire I must also express some sincere concerns regarding the proportion of truck subsidies received in the Atlantic region when compared with the alternate subsidies received by rail and marine transportation sectors. I am a bit perplexed as to why the government would provide such a proportionately huge subsidy for the very industry that is supposedly bringing about the untimely demise of our nation's rail system.

This is particularly true in the case of Atlantic Canada which has been suffering a great deal in recent years and has suffered deep cuts by both Canadian National Rail and Canadian Pacific Rail as a result.

Although there is certainly an argument that is to be made that Canada's railroads are not competitive enough to go head to head with trucking firms in the ongoing quest for this market share, I am not sure that I am prepared to accept this argument at full face value. The fact that major trucking companies are being so well subsidized by the government is bound to have a negative effect on our important rail system, something that will only hasten the demise of the rail lines in the Atlantic region.

Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland in particular have already felt the sting of line closures, a predicament that strikes at the very heart of interprovincial arrangements which were made with the east at the time of Confederation. This relatively heavy subsidization of truck transportation in Atlantic provinces is a double pronged blow to our nation's railroads.

The reason for this is simple. The disproportionate amount of direct subsidy money received by trucking firms amounts to a second major subsidy for this industry which already receives a major indirect subsidy in the form of government paid highway construction and repair. Whereas railway companies like CN and CP are obliged to basically pay their own way for the upkeep and maintenance of their expensive rail lines, trucking companies are under no such obligation when it comes to Canada's roads. Yes, there are fuel taxes paid by trucks that travel down

our highways but trains are also obligated to pay these same taxes.

The result of this scenario is that trucking firms are being assisted in their transportation responsibilities to double and triple the tune of what our railways are receiving on a per capita basis.

While all this is happening our essential highways, particularly the Trans-Canada, are crumbling beneath the weight of heavy 18 wheel vehicles that are not required to pay their full share of much needed repairs. At this point it seems unlikely the federal government would be willing to put any more money into expensive highway renovations. This has not been done for years and the present deficit mess certainly does not lend itself to alleviating the often dangerous conditions drivers must deal with.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that the present subsidy system in the Atlantic region as it now operates is obviously geared to work against railways that might not be so indebted at present if it were not for unfair government policies.

I am not arguing that the subsidy systems provided to Atlantic Canada are too high, although it is good to see small cuts have been made by the government in this sector. What I am arguing is that subsidies are being unevenly, unfairly, unwisely spread throughout the transportation sector.

This is what I mean by the government not having done its homework or having the courage to alter and improve what is clearly an very inequitable subsidy system. I would hope and expect that the Minister of Transport will give some serious consideration to the revamping of its funding allocations in the weeks and months to come. There are clearly much greater potential savings than those proposed by the government and without serious effect on either group or region involved.

Beyond the fact of subsidy issues we are now talking transportation matters and none of this has come before the transportation committee.

I generally support both subsidy reductions proposed by the government although I cannot support the overall bill because of clauses that have nothing to do with the subsidies. I suggest the government now commence to complete its overdue assignments: government cost reductions coupled with economic benefits to these regions.

[Budget Implementation Act, 1994, April 11th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, with all due respect, if I may make my full speech immediately after I would much prefer that.