Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to have this opportunity to respond to the Solicitor General's statement on national security.
The minister is quite right when he states that we are facing a very different world than we did 11 years ago when CSIS was created. Although Canada was generally considered to be a peripheral player in the world of espionage, our proximity to the United States made this country a base of operations for hostile intelligence services operating against the Americans.
The traditional targets of the Warsaw pact nations have disappeared and some of our old adversaries are now our friends. At the same time, we see a different relationship with some of our old allies.
Recently the French and Americans quietly expelled some of each other's diplomats for activities that were inconsistent with their duties. I understand this is the diplomatic way of saying these people were kicked out of each other's country for spying.
Imagine if the French and Americans, two countries which have had cordial relationships going back to the American revolution, start spying on each other. Is anyone safe in today's environment? We used to be able to rely on our NATO allies to put up a common front against the communist bloc. How times have changed.
Today, the country that is viewed as the greatest threat to Canadian sovereignty is none other than our NATO ally, Spain. As Canadian and Spanish vessels play out a game of high seas brinkmanship off the Grand Banks, Canada is seeking diplomatic support among other countries, including Russia. I only hope during this confrontation that all Canada's intelligence agencies are providing our government with the best possible information and analysis that is available.
I agree with the minister that there is a need for Canada to have a security intelligence capability. The Reform Party supports the use of such agencies, as long as they are accountable to citizens of Canada.
Canada's intelligence services are faced with a rapidly changing political environment. How well they are able to adapt to it may become evident in the weeks ahead. Let us hope they pass the test.
Turning our attention to the world of counter-terrorism, the minister points to the recent nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway lines as an example. It is interesting that he used this example to justify our continued vigilance against terrorist attacks. Last year it was the bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York. Both these incidents were high profile attacks on innocent civilians and both appeared to have involved intricate conspiracies. Yet these two attacks had two very different groups behind them.
The attack on the World Trade Centre appears to have been the work of a fundamentalist Islamic group carrying on with its traditional battle against what it perceives as American imperialism. This incident can probably be viewed as a traditional terrorist attack.
The nerve gas attack in Tokyo is very different. Here the group that is suspected of being behind the terrorist action is a religious cult. It is not a group previously thought to be a terrorist organization, but rather an eccentric religious cult.
We have several religious cults in Canada. Are they capable of terrorist activities? Who knows? Does CSIS? Would CSIS be monitoring this doomsday cult if it was in Canada? When does an eccentric cult go from being a relatively harmless religious sect to being a threat to the security of the nation?
If an intelligence agency is to be useful, its interest in the group has to occur before the attack, not after. The question remains: Could CSIS have monitored a similar religious cult in Canada and prevented a nerve gas attack in Canada? It likely could have done it if the group was an extreme right wing group like the Heritage Front.
The best known example of Canada's domestic counter-terrorism has received a great deal of attention this past year. Canadians have had a rare glimpse inside a CSIS operation. However a glimpse is all that CSIS, SIRC and the Solicitor General seem prepared to give Canadians. The minister ad-
dressed the Heritage Front affair to some extent in his speech and unfortunately seems convinced that CSIS has acted in an exemplary manner. I will provide the House with a different interpretation.
I have no argument with CSIS monitoring the activities of the Heritage Front or similar groups. The manner in which CSIS used its human source, Grant Bristow, in relation to Heritage Front activities that targeted the Reform Party caused my colleagues and me a great deal of concern.
CSIS appears to have no problem with one of its sources playing an active role in the Heritage Front plan to discredit the Reform Party. SIRC appeared to have no problem with this. From what the minister has stated, he appears to have no problem with this either.
I wonder if the Solicitor General would be so understanding if the CSIS source had been operating within the Liberal Party instead.
As the Solicitor General is aware, the subcommittee has been meeting with SIRC over the past couple of months in camera reviewing its report on the Heritage Front affair. I am confident that when our committee goes public once again a very different picture of CSIS investigations will appear.
One thing the Solicitor General will have to address or perhaps readdress is the issue of CSIS sources involving themselves in legitimate political parties.
The ministerial directives issued in October 1989 by the then Solicitor General, the Hon. Pierre Blais, appeared to have been ignored. Then we have the issue of CSIS providing reports to the government of the day about rival political parties. Is it right that CSIS should be providing information to the party in power about another political party when it refuses to inform that second party? I do not think so.
We must not forget the alleged investigation or, as the government would prefer, the non-investigation of the leader of the Reform Party by CSIS. The SIRC report mentions that in late 1989 and early 1990, CSIS conducted an investigation into completely unsubstantiated accusations about campaign funding. The report says the subject of this investigation was Lnu Fnu, unknown contributors to the leader of the Reform Party's electoral campaign.
After a little prodding SIRC later reported that a mistake had been made, that during the three-month period the investigation actually was on the leader of the Reform Party, but that this was just a clerical error.
The Solicitor General has continued to try to portray this as a clerical error. The cold, hard reality is that on October 17, 1989 CSIS began a TARC level one investigation on the leader of the Reform Party and it ran for three months. Two months after the conclusion of this investigation which CSIS knew it could not possibly justify, it changed the name on the file to this mythical contributor and CSIS, SIRC and the Solicitor General want us to believe there is nothing wrong with this.
If a domestic security intelligence service is to exist in a democracy it must have the support of the people. The Solicitor General asks for the support of the opposition parties in acknowledging the need for a domestic security intelligence service. I ask the minister in return does he expect our party to give him any support when there are so many unanswered questions about the service's conduct in the Heritage Front affair?
The Reform Party is not prepared to give either the minister or CSIS a blank cheque. The Solicitor General will have to provide us with answers to a lot of questions. He should look carefully at the reports issued by the previous inspector general about the completeness of information that directors of CSIS have been providing to the minister.
While I can accept the notion that Canada's security intelligence apparatus must operate behind a veil of secrecy, this does not mean it can hide its mistakes behind this veil as well. All government agencies must be held accountable to the Canadian people. This is especially true for organizations like CSIS and CSE.
If the minister wants our support, it is available. Do not expect us to buy into something sight unseen.