Michel Bellehumeur

[Criminal Code, May 11th, 1999]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to rise today to speak to Motion M-265 introduced by the NDP member for Yukon.

I will read the motion because it is important to know what it is all about when listening to a speech. It says this:

That a legislative committee be established to prepare and bring in a bill, in accordance with Standing Order 68(4)(b), to abolish the legal defence of provocation contained in Section 232 of the Criminal Code of Canada.

Although the motion calls for the establishment of a legislative committee, one must ask a fundamental question right from the start: should we maintain or abolish the defence of provocation contained in section 232 of the Criminal Code?

The member for Yukon already had the opportunity to give her point of view on this question. The wording of her motion leaves no doubt as to her goal, namely to strike down section 232.

During the first hour of the debate she clearly explained why she is seeking to have it struck down. No matter how legitimate her reasons are, the question remains: should we or should we not abolish section 232?

To answer this question properly, one must understand what the defence of provocation is all about, carefully choose one's arguments, and not get carried away. It is really well defined in Quebec and Canada's jurisprudence.

I will quote Mr. Justice Irénée Lagarde, the author of several criminal law papers, who gave the following definition of the defence of provocation. I will read it because it contains all the significant elements:

Provocation consists of one or several unfair acts by the victim against the accused, or one or several insults hurled by the victim at the accused, these acts or insults being of such a nature as to deprive an ordinary person of his or her self-control and push the accused to act in anger, in the heat of the moment, and before being able to calm down.

It is a lengthy definition, but it is extremely clear and it contains all the elements the accused must prove to be able to use the defence of provocation.

The criteria are very strict. In fact, it must be said that in the majority of cases that went to trial, the criteria set out in section 232 were not met and, therefore, the judge did not allow the accused to use the defence of provocation.

Before going any further, it must be said also that, contrary to self-defence, the defence of provocation cannot lead to an acquittal. It can only reduce the charge. It is only after the crown has proven all the elements of the offence that the accused can present such a defence.

The courts have widely interpreted the terms of section 232 to establish a series of objective tests that are easy to apply. These tests determine if indeed, under the circumstances, an individual acted under the impulse of provocation.

The accused must prove, among other things, that his or her behaviour was caused by sudden provocation that would deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control. The supreme court has stated that the reasonable criteria required under section 232 calls for a test that takes into account not only the characteristics of the provocation, but also the characteristics of the person who was the object of such provocation.

The supreme court has determined that jealousy and admission of adultery are not sudden provocation under section 232.

Furthermore, drunkenness was not considered a relevant element to determine if the criterion of “reasonable person” is met under the objective test of section 232. Indeed, someone who easily loses his temper or is intoxicated with alcohol could not invoke provocation as a defence. Those who are said to have a short fuse when provoked cannot use the defence of provocation.

Moreover, it appears clearly from section 232 that the accused must not have taken time to think before committing the fatal act. Case law confirms that if the accused has had the time to cool off, he will not be allowed to use defence of provocation.

Indeed, for the accused to be allowed to benefit from section 232, the victim must not only have tried to provoke the accused but the latter must also actually have been provoked. In other words, the accused must have totally lost self-control. This is even one of the arguments that judges use in similar cases. If the accused has taken time to think, he will not be accused of manslaughter but of murder and the defence of provocation will not be allowed by the court.

The legislator also deemed it appropriate to indicate that there is no provocation if the victim is only exercising a legal right in reaction to the behaviour of the accused. For instance, a person accused of sexual abuse cannot invoke the defence of provocation because the victim hit him to defend herself. The victim has a legitimate right to defend herself. She can plead self-defence. The victim has defended herself and the accused cannot plead that the death of the victim, if there is a death, is the direct result of provocation on her part.

As members can see, the defence of provocation is not easily used. It cannot be used easily and one has a very objective test to meet before a judge accepts or refuses it. However, the hon. member has every right to condemn what appears prima facie to be unjust, that is allowing a guilty person to benefit from a reduced sentence.

Indeed, we can easily understand why section 232 of the Criminal Code raises concerns among people. It is absolutely normal for people to ask why favours should be granted to individuals who have been found guilty of murder, because this is where the defence would apply.

Section 232 of the Criminal Code must not be seen as a sop to criminals. Criminal law condemns antisocial behaviour. The Criminal Code identify actions that do not meet with the community's approval. It must not be forgotten that these actions are committed by men and women, human beings with changing moods who are subject to intense emotions and who sometimes act instinctively and in the heat of the moment.

But it would be far too easy to argue that people who commit crimes of passion should be completely exonerated because it is sometimes normal to react without thinking. That is why section 232 of the Criminal Code provides for a reduced sentence rather than acquittal.

In short, while it is important to consider the relevance of section 232, I do not think we should abolish it as Motion M-265 proposes.

The defence of provocation is an extremely complex process, which may be justified in the context of a free and democratic society. This does not exclude, however, the fact that we must be sensitive to its overuse. At the moment, however, as I have said, the judges are making very limited use of it. An objective test is applied rigorously by all the courts. I think our judges are sufficiently on the watch.

There is enough jurisprudence and doctrine in this regard to make good use of this defence.

[Public Sector Pension Investment Board Act, May 11th, 1999]

Madam Speaker, I am very pleased to speak on Bill C-78, an act to establish the Public Sector Pension Investment Board.

I will try to share with my colleagues the views my constituents of Berthier—Montcalm have expressed about this bill. They had some very serious comments to make.

They said that this bill is another indication that the Liberal government is having trouble understanding that the working men and women are sick and tired of paying for the policies of this government, which prefers to take the easy way out.

As some of them told me “You do not need to be a rocket scientist to come up with such bills or to balance the budget the way the Liberals did it”.

When they needed money, what did they do? They helped themselves to the workers' contributions. When they needed more money, they cut transfer payments to the provinces, which means that the provinces are also paying part of it. Then they needed even more money and increased indirect taxes. They hid these increases in the budget. Now, they still need more money, so they are getting ready to take it from their workers' pension plans. This is totally unacceptable.

Workers are tired of seeing the government brag, especially with all its usual arrogance.

Bill C-78 is just one more bill in the long line of government measures that could be called “systematic pillage”. For several years now, the government has misappropriated funds belonging not only to Canadian workers, but also to Quebec workers.

The government has a simple strategy: spend in provincial jurisdictions by using surpluses from large funds established by workers. If the government at least abided by the Canadian Constitution—which Quebeckers have not even signed—there would less spending than there is now. The government would not be forced to take $30 billion from the pockets of workers.

After misappropriating the surplus in the employment insurance fund, the Liberal government is now going even further and grabbing the accumulated surpluses in the public service employees' pension funds.

The debate on Bill C-78, like the debate on the employment insurance fund, should be an opportunity to condemn the government's arrogance. It is a matter of respect for the thousands of workers who have worked all their life to secure the financial future to which they and their family are entitled. More than 487,000 retired contributors or their surviving spouses will be affected by the bill, without their opinion having really been taken into account.

These people will be subjected to measures which, according to the President of the Treasury Board himself, should have been negotiated and on which workers should have been consulted. I remind members that not so long ago, in February 1998, the President of the Treasury Board had proposed consultations on the pension plan.

He said, and I quote:

Consultations could lead to a partnership which would introduce in the public service the concept of a management board acting at arm's length from the government.

I stress the expression at arm's length, because it is extremely important.

The bill before us makes no provision for partnership. I do not see how the government can claim that the bill establishes some sort of partnership with the members of the public service. Bill C-78 is a unilateral act that permits the government to dictate the rules of the game.

The members of the Public Service Alliance and the Professional Institute of the Public Service are right to protest the way in which the government is preparing to appropriate their assets. I agree with the remarks of the alliance, which said, and I quote:

We can certainly not sit back and watch this government unilaterally take money out of the pockets of the contributors.

Not only is the Liberal government appropriating accumulated surpluses, but Bill C-78 prepares the way for future surpluses. In fact, in addition to taking the some $30 billion accumulated in the various public service pension plans, clause 96 of Bill C-78 will allow the government to take the surpluses of future plans.

Let us not forget that the advisory committee on the Public Service Superannuation Act noted, and I quote:

The Committee's view is that the allocation of surplus should be in accordance with recommendations of the pension management board.

The same committee stipulated that all special negotiations on the subject had to recognize pensioners' interests.

Not only is the government blithely helping itself to something that does not belong to it, but Bill C-78 also proves that it is completely ignoring the recommendations made by the advisory committee in 1996.

This is typical of the Liberal government. It examines issues, keeps its backbenchers busy, produces wonderful reports, pens lovely letters, and comes up with great discussion topics, but it takes none of this into account when it comes time to deliver the goods.

This government's arrogance can also been seen in the provisions concerning the establishment of the public sector pension investment board. The provisions of Bill C-78 must be completely overhauled.

Once again, the government shows that it is incapable of taking workers' interests into consideration. Its bill does not guarantee sufficient worker representation on the board's board of directors. Let it be noted that the advisory board clearly recommended that six of the board's directors represent employers and six represent workers.

Bill C-78 has a number of other shortcomings. As my time is running out, I will only mention some of them.

For instance, the bill does not allow the board to establish independently the percentage of funds that must be held available for investment in Government of Canada bonds. Clause 50 provides that the governor in council may make regulations respecting the limitations to which the board is subject when it makes investments.

By setting too high a percentage of funds to buy government bonds, the government could significantly reduce the board's ability to achieve rates comparable to those of other pension funds.

In conclusion, I hope the government will support the very legitimate amendments proposed by the Bloc Quebecois, which reflect what we heard from our constituents, in our ridings across Quebec.

The government would be well advised to take a serious look at these amendments. It should leave aside its tendency to indulge in petty politics and see the serious nature of our proposed amendments.

Again, these amendments did not come out of the blue, but from workers in Quebec—because, as Bloc Quebecois members, we work hard to protect the interests of Quebeckers—who came to meet us, and who want to see these amendments included in the bill. We cannot sit idly and let the government misappropriate $30 billion without saying anything. No way.

As one of my constituents said, “Tell the minister, if you see him”—and I do now—“that he should keep his hands in his own pockets. That way, we will be sure he is not going to take money out of our pockets”. This says it all. People in Quebec and the rest of Canada are fed up with this government, which takes money out of their pockets whenever it feels like it, for its own purposes.

By supporting our proposed amendments, the government would make honourable amends for its lack of respect toward public service employees. In fact, the least this government could do is to take into consideration the advice and opinion of those who are entitled to the content of the funds that it is about to steal from.

[Bill C-68, May 10th, 1999]

Mr. Speaker, the bill on young offenders is not short on contradictions. For example, the French version of the statement of principles in Bill C-68 alludes to the positive perspectives and social reintegration of adolescents, while the English version refers to the meaningful consequences of the crimes committed by young offenders.

Considering the fundamental contradiction that exists between these two principles, could the minister tell us which version will guide the courts: the French one or the English one?

[Bill C-68, May 5th, 1999]

Mr. Speaker, the minister cannot even answer an extremely simple question with a yes or a no.

By sticking to this position, the minister is contradicting Quebec's lawyers, judges, police officers, educators and decision makers.

Does the minister really think she alone is right when all these stakeholders are saying that her bill threatens Quebec's approach, which is working well in Quebec?

[Bill C-68, May 5th, 1999]

Mr. Speaker, the Minister of Justice received a letter from her Quebec counterpart requesting that Bill C-68 be amended so as to exempt Quebec from the application of this legislation. This request represents a very broad consensus of lawyers, judges, police officers, educators, social workers and decision makers in Quebec.

Does the minister intend to respond favourably to this broadly based request from Quebec and introduce an amendment? Yes or no? That is all I ask. I would like a yes or a no. Is the minister going to amend her legislation?

[Justice, May 4th, 1999]

Mr. Speaker, the minister is confusing the Criminal Code and the Young Offenders Act. That is not reassuring.

For her bill to make any sense, does the minister realize that the principle of harmonized sentences, or if you prefer, the new concept of consistency in sentencing, implies that either Quebec must change its approach, or the Canadian west must? Quite obviously, the two approaches cannot coexist.

[Justice, May 4th, 1999]

Mr. Speaker, in response to Quebec experts who fear the negative effects of the principle of harmonization of sentencing, the Minister of Justice claimed, in a letter made public on Saturday, that her bill on young offenders merely encourages what she calls “consistency in sentencing” in Canada.

According to the minister, is there consistency in sentencing under Canadian law and the measures taken by Quebec with its approach?

[Criminal Code, May 3rd, 1999]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise to debate this bill, which I know fairly well.

Together with my Bloc colleague, the member for Témiscamingue, I met with Mrs. Martine Ayotte at the very beginning, when she started her petition and her giant puzzle. She wanted to raise the awareness of politicians, but mostly she wanted to find out what they thought of this kind of toys. She was interested in the Bloc's position, and more specifically its justice critic's.

Right from the start she got the unwavering support of her federal MP in this matter, but she wanted to know what a member of the Standing Committee on Justice thought of her petition and giant puzzle.

I will not repeat what has been said so far on the issue. It can easily be summed up as follows: a woman realized that in Canada in the 1990s you can purchase a toy with instructions inciting young people to violence. These instructions were aimed at young children. Teenagers do not play with trolls, young children do.

We know how vulnerable young children are. The instructions said “To make your troll happy you must beat it up, throw it around, lock it up in the dark without food, and so forth”. This will make a troll happy. Is this the kind of instructions we want to give children in Canada? Of course not. I can see that all the representatives of the opposition parties are against this kind of violence.

Since this is allowed and legal, one must wonder if is it normal that in a country as advanced as ours in every respect, toy manufacturers, merchants, and stores are allowed to market toys inciting children to violence.

What a five or six-year old does will stay with him all his life. We know that at that age, at five or six, children are very vulnerable and impressionable. If they are told that to make a toy happy they must mistreat it, they might eventually come to believe this is the way to behave when they grow up. This is unconscionable.

The private member's bill introduced by the member for Témiscamingue deals with dolls. It could have included video games, board games, violent movies and so forth. But to respond to the request of one person in particular, Mrs. Martine Ayotte, the member specifically restricted its scope to dolls, more particularly trolls.

What member for Témiscamingue and I are asking its that the House unanimously agree to make this item votable.

[Young Offenders, April 29th, 1999]

Mr. Speaker, how can the minister talk about flexibility, her refrain from the beginning, and uniformity of sentencing, as provided for in clause 37.2(b) of her bill, in the same breath? It is one or the other.

She cannot talk about flexibility and coast to coast uniformity at the same time.

[Young Offenders, April 29th, 1999]

Mr. Speaker, rather than try to understand where Quebec is coming from on the young offenders legislation, the Minister of Justice has stuck to the same old script from the beginning.

Today, I urge the minister to listen carefully to my question, to give it some thought, and to come up with an answer.

How can she say that Quebec's model is not threatened, when Quebec's judges will be bound by her bill's principle of uniformity in sentencing? I would like an answer, this time.