Madam Speaker, I am pleased to speak today at second reading of Bill C-321, an act to amend the criminal code to provide for the forfeiture of property relating to child pornography crimes. This bill, introduced by the member for Lethbridge, is votable, and the Bloc Quebecois is in favour of the amendment to the criminal code.
This bill consists of a single clause, which I will read:
- The Criminal Code is amended by adding the following after section 163.1:
163.2 Where a person is convicted of an offence under subsection 163.1(2), (3) or (4), the court that convicts the person may, in addition to any other punishment imposed on the person, order that anything by means of which or in relation to which the offence was committed be forfeited to Her Majesty in right of the province in which the person is convicted, for disposal as the Attorney General may direct.
Since this is a bit obscure for the average person, I will simplify.
The purpose of this amendment to the criminal code is to make it possible to confiscate, by court order, and following a conviction, any material that has been used to commit a child pornography offence.
In order to properly take in the ramifications of the bill introduced by the member for Lethbridge, it is important first of all to have a thorough understanding of the implications of the offences listed under section 163.1, which have to do with the making, distribution or sale, and possession of child pornography.
Prior to 1993, the criminal code contained no specific provisions relating to child pornography.
In 1993, as the result of the Butler decision, parliament passed Bill C-128, an act to amend the criminal code and the customs tariff (child pornography and corrupting morals). Its aim was to amend the criminal code to expressly prohibit child pornography.
In the Butler decision, which was given in 1992, the supreme court had to decide on the constitutionality of the definition of obscenity as set out in section 163(8) of the criminal code. The court stated that pornography describing sexual acts involving children constituted the undue exploitation of sex, and accordingly the production and distribution of this type of pornography were prohibited by the provisions of the criminal code.
Although freedom of expression guaranteed under section 2( b ) of the charter of rights and freedoms—fundamental freedoms such as the freedoms of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including the freedom of the press and other means of communication—was infringed upon as far as the supreme court is concerned, this infringement is justifiable under the first section of the charter.
However, the criminal code made no reference to the offence of simple possession of child pornography. Bill C-128 therefore filled this legal void by adding specific provisions to the criminal code with respect to child pornography, including a definition of it and providing that the distribution, sale, production and possession relating to this definition were criminal offences.
In adding the offence of simple possession, the aim of the legislator was to dissuade people from undertaking this sort of activity and thus further protect children against sexual exploitation.
Recently in British Columbia, John Sharpe's acquittal—the decision drew attention to the urgent and growing problem of child pornography—sparked a general outcry right across the country.
Not only was this decision questionable, relating as it did pornography with freedom of expression, it also pointed out the weakness of the instruments available to the law in seizures of pornographic material.
Sharpe was charged with the offences in subsections 163.1(3) and (4) of the Criminal Code for possessing pornographic material involving children.
In this decision, the judge declared the section invalid because it infringed section 2( b ) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and acquitted John Sharpe accordingly.
According to Justice Shaw, it was not clearly demonstrated that child pornography had direct harmful effects. He also pointed out that freedom of expression is an important value, that an individual's personal effects relate to that person's particular character and personality and that banning mere possession has an impact on a highly intimate and private aspect of a person's life.
Following on the Sharpe case, a motion relating to child pornography was brought before the House. That motion, by what was then, Reform Party, called for the government to immediately the move to use the notwithstanding clause in order to maintain the ban on the simple possession of child pornography as set out in subsection 163.1(4), which had been struck down by the Sharpe decision.
Reiterating its attachment to the social values condemning child pornography, the Bloc Quebecois expressed its conviction that, although this issue needed to be addressed, it was premature to immediately invoke the notwithstanding clause and that justice ought to follow its course to the Supreme Court of Canada. The Bloc Quebecois therefore opposed the motion.
Only this past January 18 did the supreme court hear this controversial case. The supreme court decision, which is about to be released, will attract the attention and interest of everyone. Let us recall that the supreme court stipulated in 1992, in Butler, that “The overriding objective of s. 163 is not moral disapprobation but the avoidance of harm to society, and this is a sufficiently pressing and substantial concern to warrant a restriction on freedom of expression”.
We are confident that the justices of the supreme court will rule along the same line in this case, justifying the attack on guaranteed charter rights and quashing the British Columbia Appeal Court judgment. The similarity with Butler leads us to believe that this will be justified under section one of the charter, given the potential of irreparable harm to the children.
Right now, section 164 of the code provides for the seizure, under certain conditions, of pornographic material, but this section has a very limited application. Only copies of a publication or copies of a representation or written material may be seized.
The purpose of Bill C-321 is to make it possible to seize everything that was used to commit an offence. Accordingly, under this new legislation, it would be possible to seize such things as the computer used to download the pornographic publications, the printer, the camera or anything else that made it possible to make, distribute, sell or possess the child pornography.
There are increasing numbers of organized networks for the distribution of pornographic material and their activities are made easier by the explosion of telecommunications technologies, which make access almost universal. Anyone, including children, has access, which is why it is important to put even more energy than ever into fighting these networks and giving the courts the tools they need.
Not only must the final product, whether copies of a publication or copies of a representation or written material, be seized, but so must everything used to produce and distribute this pornography. Only thus can we hope to help destabilize these networks and weaken their production capacity.
As the Bloc Quebecois pointed out during the debate held in the fall of 1999, it is imperative that section 163.1 stand, but what is also needed are tools that allow material to be seized, for the safety and dignity of our children. This is precisely what—