Pierrette Venne

[Allotted Day--Anti-Terrorism Legislation, September 18th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to inform you that I will share my time with the member for Laval Centre, our party's citizenship and immigration critic.

It is therefore with sadness that I rise to speak today in this debate on terrorism, following the attacks against the American nation and against the entire system of western values.

I will not go back over the adjectives that might be used to describe such acts. They have almost all been used and, in any case, there are no words powerful enough to express my utter repugnance at actions that are beyond my comprehension in a land of democracy and freedom.

When we realize just how shaken the U.S. was last Tuesday as a world power in defence and national security, it makes us stop and think about Canada's ability to fight terrorism effectively with the means currently at its disposal.

First off, our borders have holes in them. Doubtless, the length of the country does not help border control. However, Canada's policy of openness to refugees and its very minimal control over the movements of individuals make them even less secure.

With questions such as “Where have you come from? How long have you been gone? and What are you bringing back?”, customs officials are clearly far more concerned with the movement of alcohol and cigarettes than with identifying criminals and terrorists.

At the moment, the main concern of the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency is to keep tabs on the extra mickey that slips across the border, costing the government a few dollars in lost taxes.

The Canada Customs and Revenue Agency must change its strategy and focus first and foremost on increasing surveillance on nationals from countries known to be particularly tolerant of terrorism.

In addition, this does not mean doing ill-timed searches. Discretion is the watchword. In other terms, controls must be tightened, but we must avoid becoming xenophobic and paranoid.

Moreover, as the president of CP said on Friday in Calgary:

For the United States to keep an open border with us, it must have confidence in our ability to maintain the security of our borders.

I would draw your attention, as well, to certain passages in the annual report of CSIS for the year 2000, which caught my attention particularly. The report provides at page 7 that, and I quote:

Canada belongs to international institutions and bodies, participates in peacekeeping missions and hosts major international events, all of which are potential targets for terrorists.

Further on, the report states:

—Canadians, now more than ever, are potential victims and Canada a potential venue for terrorist attacks.

Both of these excerpts are of particular interest, for different reasons, if only when one considers the fact that the next G-8 summit will take place from June 26 to 28, 2002, in Kananaskis, Alberta. Clearly it is imperative that we act and provide for means to ensure the protection of both participants and residents during this summit.

This threat is real and cannot be taken lightly. We know that there are terrorist groups planning certain terrorist acts from Canada, and the fact that they are already here makes it that much easier for them to take action.

Pages 7 and 8 of the report read:

Individuals with links to international terrorist groups use Canada primarily as a base from which to orchestrate terrorist activities abroad.

It is not hard to guess why terrorist groups choose to live in Canada to plan their acts. The reason is quite simple. There is no anti-terrorist legislation in Canada. They know that as long as they are on Canadian soil they can act with impunity.

A good example of this is the case of Ahmed Ressam, who organized an attack on the Los Angeles airport while living in Canada without ever being inconvenienced by Canadian authorities. As a matter of fact, Ressam only started having problems when he reached American soil.

Not only has the Government of Canada demonstrated that it is unable to protect its citizens and its territory, but Canada was also severely criticized by U.S. authorities, who stated that we constituted a threat to their national security.

This is not surprising, when one considers that the only coercive measure relating to terrorism currently in effect in Canada is the deportation of foreign nationals connected to terrorist activities under the Immigration Act.

Moreover, this measure raises another problem. In the Suresh case, which the Supreme Court of Canada heard this past May 22, but on which it has not yet brought down its decision, the court is confronted with the following dilemma. Suresh being suspected of fundraising for a Sri Lankan terrorist group, the preservation of national security would require him to be deported to his country of origin.

However, since he has made a refugee claim involving fear of torture, returning a refugee in danger of mistreatment to his country would be contrary to all of the principles of human rights defended by the United Nations.

When the supreme court reaches its decision, it will have to decide whether to move us down to the lowest United Nations ranking as far as the protection of human rights is concerned, or to send the message that Canada constitutes a refuge for all the undesirables of the world.

With anti-terrorist legislation such as that passed in the United Kingdom—this is just an example—or with a criminal code that deals with terrorist activities, such as the one adopted in France, Suresh could have been punished in Canada. This would have been done in the respect of human rights, while also indicating to terrorists that we are not a haven for them.

With such examples, the Bloc Quebecois feels perfectly right in asking the federal government to introduce anti-terrorist legislation that would, of course, respect our fundamental values. Moreover, contrary to what some believe, a more aggressive fight against terrorism does not mean that rights and freedoms would necessarily be affected. For example, the fact that we have a criminal code and that we fight crime does not make Canada a police state.

Of course, when we talk about acts that have teeth and mete out appropriate punishment, we are not talking about something as meaningless, from both a practical and legal point of view, as Bill C-16. It might be useful to remind hon. members that this bill, the object of which is to prevent the funding from Canada of terrorist groups, simply seeks to strip charities taking part in the funding of terrorist activities of their status as registered charities.

When we are confronted with people who, in order to promote an ideology, take pride in sacrificing their own lives by taking thousands of innocent lives, can we seriously believe that the mere fact of preventing an organization from issuing tax receipts can be effective in the fight against terrorism? Once again, the government is much more concerned about tax issues than about safety issues.

Since I have very little time left, I will simply say that the Bloc Quebecois cannot agree with the Alliance motion, because in its current wording that motion does not respect the fundamental values advocated by the Bloc Quebecois, which is opposed to the death penalty.

[Allotted Day--Anti-Terrorism Legislation, September 18th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, I must tell you that, from where I sit, I did not hear. Did I obtain unanimous consent?

[Allotted Day--Anti-Terrorism Legislation, September 18th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, first of all, I seek the unanimous consent of the House to have the following words deleted from the motion:

—the prompt extradition of foreign nationals charged with acts of terrorism, even if the charges are capital offences;

[Terrorism, September 17th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, the situation in which we have found ourselves over the past few days calls for improved communication between the various intelligence bodies, such as the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the RCMP, the Sûreté du Québec, and the various municipal police forces.

My question is for the solicitor general. Will the government tell us how it plans to ensure greater co-ordination among these various police and security services in the country?

[Proceeds Of Crime (Money Laundering) Act, June 11th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to have this opportunity to speak today on the third reading of Bill S-16, an act to amend the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act.

On June 29, 2000, Bill C-22, or the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act received royal assent. The purpose of this statute is to make it easier to prevent money laundering of the proceeds of crime by creating a financial transactions and reports analysis centre responsible for gathering, managing, analyzing and distributing reports of suspicious operations and any other pertinent information.

In fact, the inauguration of a mechanism for the reporting of suspicious transactions and major transborder capital transfers, as provided for in Bill C-22, was in response to the problems raised by the financial action group against money-laundering.

This would be a good opportunity to point out that the Bloc Quebecois had supported this government initiative, out of a concern to protect the Quebec population from the calamity represented by organized crime. Moreover, in order to make money laundering more inconvenient, the Bloc Quebecois were the ones behind the withdrawal of $1,000 bills and the requirement for banks and other financial institutions to report any suspicious financial transaction involving $10,000 or more in cash.

Before I go further, money laundering may be defined as follows. It is the process by which the proceeds of crime are converted into assets whose origins are difficult to trace. Despite all, we know that 70% of the money laundered in Canada is drug money. The remaining 30% comes from activities as varied as under the table gaming, tobacco and alcohol smuggling, fraud, counterfeiting and petty computer and telecommunications crime.

As we know, money is the sinews of war, and the one waged by the authorities against organized crime is no exception. Internationally, proceeds from crime entering the financial market represents hundreds of billions of dollars. So, considering that the prime motivator behind organized crime is lucre, and here I am speaking of huge sums quickly pocketed, the confiscation of such laundered proceeds hurts a lot more than the usual sanctions of fines and prison terms.

Legitimate or not, every business aims at making a net profit. By way of example, let us look at a business whose activities are on the up and up. Suppose that for some reason or other the business is taken to court and for purposes of discussion, let us imagine that at the end of the trial it is sentenced to pay a fine or to pay damages. Of course, the business will feel it but this comes with the territory.

The same holds true for organized crime. A jail sentence or a fine is among the inherent risks associated with criminal activities. However, by depriving an organization of its most profound motivation, we destroy the directly proportional relation that exists between the risks and the benefits. So, getting our hands on that organization's assets will weaken it from an economical and moral point of view. In other words, we must show that, indeed, crime does not pay.

Even though it does not at all change the substance of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act, Bill S-16 does address some issues raised during the hearings held on Bill C-22 by the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce. The four changes included in the bill should address the following issues.

How long will the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada keep the information that it collects? When and how will it dispose of the information that it will have gathered? What information can the centre transmit to law enforcement bodies? Will the federal court have the power to order the centre to transmit the file of an individual under the Privacy Act and the Access to Information Act? Finally, who is authorized to make a claim of solicitor-client privilege?

We must ask ourselves if Bill S-16 adequately addresses these concerns, and this is what we are going to do.

First, we can say that clause 1 responds satisfactorily to the first two questions raised before the standing Senate committee. This amendment sets out the circumstances justifying the maximum retention period of eight years for reports and all information.

This retention period shall be enforced when the centre forwards information either to law enforcement authorities or to the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, an agency in a foreign state or an international organization with a mandate similar to the centre's.

Moreover, the addition of paragraph ( e ) to section 54 of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act provides that each report received and all information received or collected shall be destroyed on the expiry of the applicable period. This paragraph therefore adds certain necessary clarifications regarding the duration of retention and the destruction of information.

Similarly, with the addition of the term identifying information in paragraph 55(7)( e ), the purpose of which is to clarify to what the information is similar, the second clause of Bill S-16 thus responds to the third question. The purpose of this amendment is to clarify that the identifying information in question is that found in paragraphs ( a ) to ( d ).

In our view, this clarification was not needed since paragraph 2(e) is interrelated to the previous ones. But since this is a catch-all paragraph, I guess someone felt the need to make this clarification which does not change anything to the original provision. If this amendment can clarify things for some people, great.

With respect to the fourth question, clause 3 of Bill S-16 was drafted because initially the federal court was not allowed to make an order for disclosure. In fact, such an order could only be made pursuant to subsection 60(4) of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act.

The amendment ensures that no provision in this legislation can prevent the federal court from ordering the director of the centre to disclose information under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act. It seems that it was always intended for the federal court to enjoy this authority, which will now be clearly stipulated in clause 3 of Bill S-16.

With this amendment, the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act will now give the federal court some judicial control over the disclosure of information.

As for the fourth clause, as we mentioned at second reading, it certainly would have been possible to word it to make it easier to understand. Unfortunately, it was not, and we have to live with it.

In addition, following the explanations we were provided with at the Standing Committee on Finance, we believe that, even if this amendment answers our fifth question about who could invoke the solicitor-client privilege, it seems that it does not deal with the concerns that led to its drafting.

Before the Senate committee, accountants maintained that they have very high standards of confidentiality to meet, just like any lawyer. Consequently, they say that they should also be allowed to claim solicitor-client privilege. However, clause 4 of the bill responds only partially to this demand. An accountant or any other person, other than a lawyer, cannot personally claim solicitor-client privilege.

Indeed, the protection of documents in the possession of a person who is not a lawyer depends on the involvement of such a legal counsel in the matter under investigation. Therefore, the possibility of claiming solicitor-client privilege remains restricted to the lawyer.

How does this work in practical terms? First, the client gives a legal mandate to a lawyer. I must insist on the fact that the nature of the mandate is crucial because a lawyer who would act as business adviser could not claim solicitor-client privilege.

In fulfilling his or her mandate, the lawyer may work jointly with other professionals, such as an accountant for example. Having doubts regarding the legality of the activities conducted by the client, the authorities decide to investigate. The person authorized to conduct the search will not be able to examine the documents handed over to the accountant by the lawyer. Therefore, it is through the lawyer, the only person who can claim solicitor-client privilege, that the documents in the possession of the accountant will remain confidential.

In this context, it would be fair to think that, in order to enjoy absolute protection, money launderers will systematically go to a lawyer first, who will hand the documents over to the appropriate professionals.

Yet the situation is not as simple as it may appear. Even if the solicitor-client confidentiality required of the lawyer at this time provides considerable guarantees of confidentiality, this is not an absolute concept but one subject to a number of conditions and restrictions, which I will not list in the context of today's debate.

When an individual or organization involved in money laundering requires the services of any professional with a view to facilitating the perpetration of a crime, regardless of whether or not a lawyer was involved, the seized documents cannot be protected by solicitor-client privilege.

In short, this amendment adds nothing new to the present situation, in that it merely codifies existing principles which have long been in place under common law. The concept of solicitor-client privilege therefore remains exclusive to the performance of the duties of a lawyer.

This notion can, moreover, be extended to other persons when their services have been retained by a lawyer, in order to enable him or her to meet the obligations of his or her mandate as a lawyer.

Under these circumstances, one might say that the solicitor-client privilege is not a right transmittable to a third party. It is instead a real right involving transmitted documents which, as the bottom line, are the purview of the lawyer.

We believe that the law will meet the objective of this provision, that is to ensure that specialized professionals such as lawyers and accountants cannot act as accomplices to the money laundering mechanism.

As we have already stated, Bill S-16 ought to respond to five very specific questions raised before the Senate committee. Despite the fact that accountants do not really enjoy the same privileges of client confidentiality as lawyers, we still consider that Bill S-16 effectively addresses all these issues.

Obviously, as we supported the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act and as the four clauses the present debate addresses are intended simply to clarify the intent of the provisions they amend, we will also vote in favour of Bill S-16.

However, we wish to point out to this House that we are supporting the government today for the same reasons we became involved in the introduction of new coercive measures.

We are satisfied these measures will enable the authorities to more effectively fight organized crime and therefore to ensure the safety of Quebecers.

In addition, it is unfortunate that the people of Quebec must once again put their faith in the goodwill of a federal government, which, more often than not, does what it likes when it comes to resolving problems that, despite their application to Quebec society specifically, fall under the jurisdiction of the federal government because of the distribution of jurisdictions, which gives it exclusive jurisdiction in matters of criminal law.

It is therefore appropriate to mention that this dependency will be eliminated with a sovereign Quebec.

[Pyrite, May 15th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, we have twice asked the Minister of Public Works and Government Services whether the government intends to help victims of pyrite damage. He told us yes, soon, and very soon. At least we know that the federal government intends to do something.

Will the minister tell the House whether he intends to join forces with Quebec's program to provide financial assistance to the owners of residential buildings damaged by pyrite, and how much he will be contributing?

[Victims Of Pyrite Damage, May 1st, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, on February 7, I asked the Minister of Public Works if he planned to meet the commitment made by his party during the election campaign to financially participate in the program to help the victims of pyrite damage. The minister replied “yes, and soon”. The months have come and gone but, unfortunately, owners are still waiting.

Can the minister tell us what he meant by “soon”?

[Charities Registration (Security Information) Act, April 30th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, the bill respecting the registration of charities and security information and to amend the Income Tax Act seeks to counter activities in support of terrorism as provided under the convention on the financing of terrorism which was approved by the United Nations.

Through its bill, the government wants to counter terrorism by preventing supporters of terrorism from engaging in fundraising or the transfer of money and materiel abroad.

The bill seeks to deny support to terrorist activities and to protect the integrity of the charity registration process through the fair and transparent use, to the extent that it is possible, of confidential information that could jeopardize national and human security.

Concretely, this bill seeks to prevent organizations that are related to terrorist groups from obtaining the status of charities. This should help reduce the funding of terrorist activities. The legislation would, among other things, facilitate the use of confidential information to determine the eligibility for registration as a charity or to revoke the registration of a registered charity.

It is interesting to note that the minister does not define what he means by "terrorism" even though the purpose of the bill is precisely to counter the funding of organizations that engage in such activities. Such an omission can of course lead to a broad or liberal interpretation of the term. This means that in a highly politicized context there is always a potential risk of abuse.

In that perspective, we have no guarantee that the criteria used for interpretation purposes will allow us to distinguish between the funding of legitimate activities, such as political protest, and that of violent activities. The word "terrorism" must be thoroughly defined.

As for the judicial review of the certificate, while the procedure is relatively simple, it does raise some concerns. First, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service will inform the solicitor general and the Minister of National Revenue that it has come to the conclusion that an organization is fundraising to finance terrorist activities.

On the basis of that notice the ministers can then start procedures to prevent that organization from getting the status of charity or to revoke its registration.

Given that this process is set in motion by an administrative notice to the political arm, which then issues a certificate, we feel that this approach is flawed by the absence of any possibility of judicial control.

As a result, the impossibility of filing an appeal places any organization faced with such a procedure at the mercy of errors or political and judicial administrative abuses which might arise from excessive alarmism. Knowing that CSIS practices are not above reproach, we are concerned.

In addition, there is the absence of control mentioned earlier. What reasons could the organization give for purposes of control or appeal, when it is not entitled to know the information giving rise to the certificate?

But there is no objection to giving it information which does not pose a threat to national security. In other words, it will be given information which is not really relevant because the denial or revocation of charitable status will be based on information which could pose a threat to national security.

Finally, the only procedural guarantee the organization is allowed is the audi alteram partem rule. But one might wonder just how useful that is since the organization will not have access to the facts and the reasons for the certificate being issued.

The section on evidence raises equally important concerns. First, under a procedure provided for in the bill a judge will be able to allow evidence regardless of its admissibility.

By disregarding specific rules of evidence the government is ignoring the contradictory nature of our judicial system. The bill would institute an inquisitional procedure which is unacceptable in a free and democratic society.

As we have only ten or so minutes each, I will skip over a few of my remarks and go to the heart of the issue.

We wonder how anyone could possibly think an accused would have the impression that justice had been done. For that to be the case, there would at least have to be the appearance of justice. The whole thing is hard to verify, when the evidence is revealed in camera, in the absence of the principal parties. It can be said therefore that in the case before us the procedure stands out because of its almost total lack of transparency.

The organization mentioned in a certificate will be able to apply for a review by showing that a material change has occurred in circumstances since the determination. This is an interesting possibility since the organization is permitted to mend its ways.

However, if we consider the problems raised previously it seems to me uncertain that an organization can prove this. In order to prove reform, a party must know the allegations against it.

Once the ministers have given their decision, the organization will have all the time in the world to apply to the federal court to review the decision. Once again this possibility appears to accord certain procedural guarantees.

Unfortunately, this is not entirely the case. In fact, the ministers do not seem to have to give reasons for the decision that is to be reviewed. In addition, the federal court will review the decision only if it was given under subclause 10(5)( b ) of the bill, that is, if the circumstances have changed but the certificate continues to have effect.

This implies therefore that when the ministers conclude that the situation has not changed materially, the federal court does not have real review power. In such a case it can only quash the decision on the grounds that the circumstances have materially changed and return the file to the ministers for another determination. In this way, there is no real control because the file goes back to those who made the original determination.

The aim of this bill is most worthy, but the means to achieving it are dubious. At the moment, as it is written it snags on too many principles of justice to be passed in its present form. The committee will have to improve it significantly, otherwise, it would set a dangerous precedent in terms of the violation of procedural guarantees.

Some will say that charities may be a disguise for terrorist organizations. Even if they are right, I do not believe the right thing is being targeted. It is somewhat absurd to think that the supporters of terrorist organizations want to take advantage of tax credits.

One may even wonder to what extent this bill is not a roundabout way of enabling the minister to control taxation. It must be kept in mind that terrorism is not financed exclusively through charitable organizations. Although the government is attempting to show that it is taking concrete actions against terrorism, with this bill it is opting for facility rather than really attacking the source of the problem.

In actual fact, all it is doing is making sure that tax receipts cannot be issued for financing terrorist activities.

I agree is a very real phenomenon and we must help fight it. On the other hand, do we need to recreate psychoses such as there were in the era of fear of the communist threat, or worse still, go back to the era of the Inquisition and its search for heretics? I think not.

I believe it would be far more effective for the criminal code to properly address the financing of criminal activities for this would focus directly on those involved in such acts.

In short, to conclude, Bill C-16 could be summarized as follows: suspicion, discretionary power, enigmatic proof, and lack of control.

[Cigarette Smuggling, April 30th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, during the summit of the Americas co-operation between the RCMP, the SQ, and municipal and aboriginal police forces resulted in full monitoring of reserve territory and prevented the entry into the country of undesirable elements.

Will the solicitor general guarantee us the same co-operation between the RCMP and police forces in Quebec as well as the same effectiveness in the fight against cigarette smuggling?

[Cigarette Smuggling, April 30th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, we have learned that smuggling has apparently resumed on aboriginal reserves following the recent hikes in tobacco taxes. This is a repeat of the 1994 situation.

My question is for the solicitor general. Will the government guarantee us that it will show leadership this time so that we do not have to go through the hell we went through in 1994 with cigarette smuggling?