Madam Speaker, as we all know we have been asking the minister to introduce legislation that will allow Canada to fulfill its international commitments in the fight against terrorism for some time now.
It is therefore understandable that since the events of September 11 we have been looking forward to this bill on terrorism. Now that we have it, the question is whether or not it lives up to our expectations.
First, we can only applaud the fact that the minister has finally introduced legislation that truly outlaws activities that finance terrorism. Whether it be for organized crime or terrorists, money is the lifeblood of war.
By starving an organization of its sources of financing, we greatly reduce its striking power. Furthermore, by adding seizure and freezing of assets, we can begin to take seriously the government's claim that it wants to wage war against terrorists.
Unfortunately, from part 6 on, the bill contains, word for word, Bill C-16, the bill on funding charitable organizations. What we thought we could call the late lamented Bill C-16, has risen from the tomb. Apart from a few cosmetic changes, it is to be found in Bill C-36 almost in its entirety.
On April 30 I summarized Bill C-16 in the following terms: suspicion, discretionary power, enigmatic proof, and lack of control. Six months later, I have no choice but to reiterate these same comments about part 6 of this bill on terrorism.
We do not deny that it is appropriate to protect the integrity of the charities registration system by preventing their use as a cover for terrorist organizations. What we dispute is the way the government wants to go about achieving its ends.
This spring we criticized the fact that it went against too many principles of justice for it to pass royal assent. To let this happen would constitute a dangerous precedent in terms of the violation of procedural guarantees. However, yesterday the minister slipped the same bill, give or take a comma, under our nose. Worse yet, the inquisitional procedure established by Bill C-16 now applies to a body that wants its name removed from the list of organizations involved in terrorist activities.
Now under the bill before us the governor in council will be able to establish by regulation a list containing the name of any entity that might be associated with terrorist activities.
What does that mean, exactly? In both cases, the entity and the charity appear before a judge who can reach a decision from evidence submitted in camera and without the party or parties being present.
In even clearer terms, let us suppose that a charity loses its charitable status following the signing of a certificate by the solicitor general or the Minister of National Revenue. The organization will be allowed to ask the judge to quash the certificate. However, it is possible that the judge will base his decision on information that the organization will never have access to.
The same goes for a group that wants to see its name struck from the list of organizations associated with terrorist activities. That group will have to go before a judge, who will determine whether or not to remove the group's name from the list. However, this could take place without the applicant ever knowing why his name first appeared on such a list.
By violating such fundamental and elementary rules of evidence as the disclosure of evidence, the government is ignoring the contradictory nature of our judicial system. All the more worrisome is the fact that the evidence adduced will be based on information provided primarily by CSIS. Knowing the practices used by CSIS and its difficulties in striking a fair balance between national security and rights and freedoms, this might be cause for concern.
With such provisions, we can legitimately ask two questions. Either the information is not circulating between ministers or else the government has simply decided to turn a deaf ear to the representations made by countless witnesses who appeared before the Standing Committee on Finance when it reviewed Bill C-16, which at the time was sponsored by the solicitor general.
Since it is hard to imagine that the Minister of Justice was not informed of what went on during the proceedings of that committee, the only plausible assumption is the second one. Considering all that went on with the young offenders bill, could this be a habit with the minister?
In the same vein, during the first sitting of the Standing Committee on Finance, which took place on May 16, the solicitor general and the Minister of National Revenue tried to explain to us why Bill C-16 did not include the definition of the term terrorist. The solicitor general said, and I quote:
If you are aware, the courts have indicated that it is not necessary to define terrorism.
He went on to say:
When you evaluate around the world to find an exact definition for terrorism, it is about impossible.
As for the Minister of National Revenue, he specified the following:
Merely coming up with a definition or defining parameters would basically, at the end of the line, end up taking away tools or options that we would like to have in this bill.
Yet, to cite just two examples, the U.K. terrorism act and the French penal code have successfully done what these two ministers felt was impossible at the time they were defending Bill C-16 before the committee. The British legislation reads as follows:
In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where:
The use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public and,
The use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.
As for the French penal code, terrorism is defined as follows:
Certain criminal offences are considered terrorism when the acts are intentionally linked to an individual or group whose purpose is to cause a serious disruption of public order through intimidation or terror.
This is followed by a list of the criminal offences considered acts of terrorism. I will spare members that, however. We can see that there has been a sort of attempt in Bill C-36 to define the terms terrorist activity, terrorist group and terrorism offence.
Considering that the term was virtually undefinable, according to the two ministers, one might well think that the Minister of Justice has done nothing to simplify things. Bill C-36, instead of providing a definition along the French or British lines that states right off what is involved forces us to constantly jump from one reference to another, and we have almost forgotten what we were looking for by the time we get to the end of the chain of searches. Fortunately the basic content is there, but the form needs more work. In actual fact, there is no definition of terrorism, just definitions for act, action or omission.
In addition, as we have been seeing for some time now, law enforcement officials are demanding a considerable increase in their powers, but must the powers of the various government bodies responsible for security be increased in order to mount an effective campaign against terrorism? Well might one wonder. In the October 6 issue of La Presse , journalist Yves Boisvert wrote:
Nothing useful will be accomplished without effective information services and an intelligent police community.
What constitutes an effective information service? One thing is certain, that is, it is certainly not by keeping tabs on groups such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace, the Anglican Church, the United Church and the Raging Grannies that we are going to dismantle a major terrorist network. Yet considering that some fifty or so organizations and approximately 350 individuals are already being watched closely by CSIS as part of its anti-terrorist program, there is no lack of genuine terrorist threats. We may therefore conclude that if the resources and energies were concentrated in the right place, part of the problem would resolve itself.
Furthermore, in order to be intelligent, must the police be authorized to commit criminal offences as provided for in the organized crime legislation? By placing above the law those who are supposed to enforce it, such measures can only succeed in institutionalizing crime within law enforcement agencies.
Must we also bend the rules of evidence in order to compensate for deficiencies or errors in a case before the courts? Since a police investigation can have a tremendous impact on an accused, the work of law enforcement officers must be guided by rules imposing maximum rigour.
Let us not lose sight of the fact that the primary mission of police officials is to protect public safety. This is not some contest to make a maximum number of arrests leading to charges, particularly if these charges are the result of bungled investigations. Not only will the public not be better protected, but in fact it will be even more vulnerable to possible abuses of authority. This would be to replace one threat with another. If such guiding rules are limited, there is a good chance that corners will be cut.
Bill C-24 opened a door that will be very difficult to close and its long term impact could be catastrophic. By allowing a peace officer to detain a person following an arrest without a warrant, Bill C-36 just opens another door. If there are sceptics, just think of what happened during the October crisis with the War Measures Act: there were hundreds of arbitrary arrests and heavy handed searches without warrants, undoubtedly the worst case of abuse of power ever known in Quebec.
It is fine to introduce anti-terrorism legislation, but let us not forget that this is merely a legislative tool that cannot be effective in and of itself. The best legislation in the world is useless if there are not competent people with a good head to implement it and ensure compliance with it. This includes police authorities, intelligence services and customs officers.
In the case of customs officers, there is still a lot of work to do to change their approach, which remains much more focused on alcohol and cigarette purchases. I made a quick trip to the United States after the September 11 events and when I came back to the Canadian border, the only reflex of the customs officer was to ask me what I had bought that day.
This speaks volumes about the concerns of those who normally should be the first line of defence of our national security.
On the issue of possible abuse, the minister is also grabbing relatively extraordinary powers, since her bill gives the attorney general the authority to unilaterally suspend in a totally arbitrary fashion the application of the Access to Information Act, through powers usually reserved for the commissioner.
Once again, this type of political interference is a cause for concern, particularly since the government has been severely criticized recently, both here and elsewhere, for its policy of silence.
If we look at the amendments to the Firearms Act, we see that the governor in council can exempt any category of non-residents from the provisions of this bill.
According to information received yesterday morning from departmental staff, the amendments to the Firearms Act would apply solely to air marshals responsible for ensuring on board security on international flights.
If this is the objective the minister had in mind, it would be worth her while to say so clearly in her bill. Given the circumstances behind the creation of Bill C-36 and the government's policy of being reactive rather than proactive, we understand that this bill was drafted hastily. We hope, therefore, that we can count on the minister's co-operation when the time comes to propose the necessary amendments to fill in the gaps.
Given the urgency of the situation, the government must not be allowed to use the crisis situation as a pretext for sneaking its bill through. At any rate, the damage is already done, and the situation could hardly be worse, considering the state of psychosis that reigns just about everywhere
If we are to equip ourselves with such a significant tool, such a restrictive and invasive one as an anti-terrorist bill, then we might as well take the time required to make sure we have the best legislative framework possible. The committee stage must not be glossed over. We are certain that many people will want to be heard and we cannot afford to not take advantage of the valuable contribution of their expertise.
There is one more point we feel it is important to raise. At present, the bill specifies that a thorough examination of its provisions and application must be carried out within three years of its enactment. At this point, we feel it would be wise to reduce that three year deadline to one year.
Considering the fact that these are exceptional circumstances and that we are presently debating measures that are equally exceptional, we cannot afford to wait three years before reassessing this legislative framework that is taking us into uncharted territory. We must prevent any opportunities for mistakes and a shorter review period is the best way to make adjustments if the circumstances so require.
To close, as the Prime Minister so wisely stated, we must be vigilant and prudent in order to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past.
When it comes to mistakes of the past, we have no doubt that the Prime Minister knows what he is talking about, since he was a minister in the Trudeau cabinet during the October crisis of 1970.
There is no magic bullet when it comes to terrorism, as I have already said. At first glance Bill C-36 appears harsh and invasive. However, it would be inappropriate to remain passive in circumstances such as these.
Basically we will have to take the necessary time to ensure that this bill will allow us to fight terrorism effectively while minimizing the inconveniences to citizens.
In short, we must be sure that Bill C-36 will do more good than harm.
