Pierrette Venne

[Supply, March 16th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, the answer is a simple no. Unfortunately, since the Liberal government came into office in 1993, it has not demonstrated the will to appoint more women to the bench. We just have to look at the appointments that have been made.

On this subject, I would like to add that it is often said that if women are under-represented in the system, it is because they do not want to be elected to the House of Commons, they do not want to attend the conventions, they do not want to take part in the nomination process.

I would immediately say to that that the problem is not that women do not want to participate, but rather that they often do not want to be part of a system that was established by men for men. Women are not used to fighting with each other for a position. They are used to getting a position because of their skills.

When they go to a convention or a nomination meeting and see everybody bickering on the floor, they are very uncomfortable. That is why there are not too many women in politics.

I just wanted to add this observation to explain that it is often for that reason that, unfortunately, there are not more women in this House.

[Supply, March 16th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, we know full well that, each time the issue of status of women is raised, we lose a large part of our audience. It is not that too much time is devoted to this subject in this House. It is just that many people do not want to hear what we have to say and, more than anything else, they refuse to take action.

I will speak on the status of women anyway, and the status of women in the legal profession in particular. In Quebec, you can be a lawyer or a notary.

I will focus on women lawyers because, unfortunately, a committee has yet to be appointed to look specifically into the experience of women notaries in their everyday practice. All our statistics on women lawyers were provided to us by the Quebec bar association.

In the legal profession, women experience basically the same thing women experience in any area in which they work; by "work", I mean work outside of the home, of course.

If there has been such an influx of women on the labour market, outside of the home, we know this is due to a large extent to socioeconomic factors. It became necessary for women to help maintain the family income. This has been a determining factor.

In 1951, women accounted for less than 25 per cent of the Canadian labour force, as compared to 58 per cent of adult women in 1991. By far the biggest increase in the labour force participation rate occurred among women with young children, the majority of whom have full time jobs.

Women who, by necessity or by choice, head for a career in law face many difficulties inherent in this line of work. The dysfunctional relationships with male colleagues, the under-representation on the bench and the limited number of female teachers in our law faculties are but a few of the symptoms of a serious problem which persists in a world which claims to be eliminating injustice and unfairness.

Women are now part of the labour force, but female jurists form a distinct group. In the public's eye, we are perceived as being privileged. Yet, to become a disciple of Themis, a woman must overcome many obstacles which are not related to her status as a jurist, but to her status as a woman.

The Quebec Bar Association's committee on women lawyers, to which I alluded earlier, took a close look at the issues confronting female lawyers. Unfortunately, the chamber of notaries does not have a similar committee. A poll was conducted among women lawyers and the findings were released in

1. Those findings are very instructive. They clearly show the obstacles which we must face not just as jurists, but also as women.

In the five years previous to the poll, 71 per cent of female lawyers experienced problems in their vocational practice. It is important to point out that the situation of the majority of these women did not change over that period, whether we are talking about hiring policies, relations with male colleagues, judges and clients, parental obligations, working conditions in general, or career advancement. In short, there is no progress.

Women lawyers practice a profession which was defined by men. Our laws and our precedents are set in a masculine mould. Lynn Smith, the dean of the law faculty at UBC, clearly exposed the problem in an article entitled "A system that's changing". Let me quote and eloquent excerpt: "The roots of the current legal system were planted by men. Developed at a time when women could not vote, be elected, become lawyers or be members of a jury, the law sought to protect the interests deemed important by men, given the realities of their lives as men. When the law did take women into consideration, it was solely from a male standpoint".

The most glaring example of inequity comes from the judiciary. An overwhelming number of judges appointed by the federal government, that is, the provincial superior court judges and the Federal Court judges, are men. Overall, only 134 of the 950 federal judges are women.

By interpreting the law and exerting some moral influence, judges help to shape and develop the fundamental values upon which our society is based. Women have been chronically under-represented among judges. In other words, although they have had the right to practise law for 53 years now, the proportion of women on the bench still remains under 10 per cent of all Quebec judges in the Quebec Court of Appeal, the Superior Court, the Court of Quebec or the municipal courts.

At the Quebec Superior Court, where judges are appointed by the federal justice minister, women represented 11.3 per cent of all judges, accounting for 20 of the 176 judges, as of March 1, 1995.

The situation elsewhere in the country is not much better. Madam Justice McLachlin and Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dubé are the only two women out of the nine judges appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada. They represent 22.2 per cent of these judges, while women account for 52 per cent of the Canadian population.

As of March 1, 1995, women made up only 10.3 per cent of the judges appointed to the Federal Court and the Tax Court of Canada, accounting for 8 out of these 60 judges. I could go on and on with the deplorable data concerning the Canadian women's place in the judiciary, but it would feel like preaching in the wilderness.

It is up to the Minister of Justice to appoint more women judges at the federal level. He is duty bound to review the questionable selection process where potential women candidates must have an impressive number of years of litigation practice, when we know that most women cannot consider that kind of practice because of their parental responsibilities. Such a criterion is not applied at the provincial level. It is hard to imagine how a mother could sit at a trial for three intensive weeks. Yet, it is acceptable for a father to be in the litigation practice and to devote all of his time to his work.

Men's schedules do not change much when they become fathers and have young children. However, this is not the case for women, especially those with preschoolers. Whatever their profession, mothers of toddlers are the most likely to change their work schedules.

For example, 95 per cent of career women, including women judges, work full-time, compared with 68 per cent of women who have preschool children and a similar job. Almost one third of women with preschool children and an irregular work schedule indicated that they had chosen such a schedule mainly to be able to take care of their children.

The selection process used does not reveal how a candidate is chosen and should therefore be abolished. Openness is a necessity, not a luxury.

If the process were more open, the Minister of Justice could no longer hide behind vague excuses like the lack of qualified candidates. If the requirements are the same for men and women, they automatically create inequities since, in general, women do not practise the profession in the same way that men do.

Treating both sexes the same way is creating inequities. The low representation of women among judges is in no way a reflection of their availability since in Quebec they now represent almost a fifth of the Bar membership eligible for the bench, that is, people who have been practising law for at least ten years. Furthermore, with the increased numbers of women who have entered the legal profession since the early eighties we can expect that the number of women eligible for appointment will increase rapidly in the next few years.

I ask the Minister of Justice: Will we see an increase in the number of women appointed to the bench proportionate to their representation among the most experienced members of the legal profession? Time will tell.

[Divorce Act, March 13th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, here we are in the second hour of debate on the bill tabled by my colleague from the Reform Party. The aim of this bill is to amend the Divorce Act, by simplifying the procedure for grandparents to obtain legal custody of their grandchildren.

At the moment, grandparents wishing to obtain custody of their grandchildren must submit an initial application to the courts for leave to debate the legal custody of their grandchildren.

Grandparents are currently treated like any other interested person. All persons other than a spouse must first obtain leave from the court to apply for a custody order. Grandparents have no special status in divorce proceedings, and the aim of a preliminary application is to verify the claims by the grandparents and to decide if it is in the best interest of the child for them to intervene.

Bill C-232 would eliminate the need for grandparents to make this preliminary application and would enable them to become a party to the dispute in the same way as the spouse.

I would first like to say to this House that I am deeply saddened by the number of cases in which grandchildren lose contact with their grandparents following a divorce. Divorce proceedings are extremely stressful, and the break up of the nuclear family is traumatic for children. It can have the effect of altering their personality or behaviour. Children losing contact with their grandparents, in addition, face further hardships.

Children kept from their grandparents by mean parents, who use them to take revenge on one another, become the innocent victims in a form of hostage taking. They become the bargaining

chip of parents whose meanness is matched only by their self-centredness. Nobody wins in this sort of game.

In this light it is therefore easy to understand why my colleague's bill elicits such sympathy. At first glance, it seems to resolve the problem of the additional trauma children must face when their parents divorce. However, despite appearances and its commendable objectives, it creates more problems than it solves.

Let us take a good look at Bill C-232. The proposed amendments aim to make it simpler for grandparents to request custody when parents divorce. In fact, grandparents would no longer be required to obtain leave of the court to present a request for custody of their grandchildren. Bill C-232 amends section 16 of the Divorce Act and places parents and grandparents on the same footing when it comes to custody requests. Six people will be involved from the outset instead of two.

This six-way struggle could become an eight-way or sixteen-way struggle, since the Divorce Act does not define "grandparents".

What about de jure grandparents? Does the term "grandparents" include both biological grandparents and grandparents by right? What about a single mother who marries the father of a child, which she later adopts, and therefore gains a share of parental control? Can the single mother's parents be considered the child's grandparents under the Divorce Act? What about remarriage after a divorce where custody is shared?

Take the example of the parents of Julien and Laurence. These children have four biological grandparents. Their parents divorce. The two parents remarry spouses who each have a child, Isabelle and Christine respectively. Isabelle and Christine each have four biological grandparents. If joint legal custody is given to Julien and Laurence's parents, these children will become part of two reconstituted families.

If one of the new couples divorced, no less than eight grandparents would be able to obtain custody of the children. If both couples divorced, twelve grandparents could be involved, I kid you not. Julien and Laurence's four grandparents could each demand custody of their grandchildren by way of two distinct divorce proceedings. Just imagine the legal wrangling.

If its main goal is to foster relationships between grandparents and their grandchildren, Bill C-232 is ineffective. It simplifies the procedure for grandparents but complicates the issue when both parents retain custody and there is no reason to take it away from them. In fact, with respect to their access to information regarding the education and welfare of the child, grandparents are given more rights at the time of the divorce than during the marriage. It is as though they have acquired parental authority, without the spouses being deprived of it.

The children will be subjected to a more complex dispute involving a greater number of parties. Everyone will make their pitch, claiming to act in the best interests of the child, but it is still the child who suffers.

With respect to parental authority, this is an exclusive power of the provinces under section 92 (13) of the Constitution Act of 1867. This concept of civil law is the prerogative of Quebec.

In granting more rights to grandparents, in interfering with the concept of parental authority at the time of a divorce proceeding, this bill represents an out and out encroachment on the jurisdiction of the provinces. It looks like Bill C-232 is trying to accomplish indirectly what direct action has failed to accomplish.

The common law provinces have no legislation explicitly protecting personal relations between grandchildren and their grandparents. The other provinces have been concerned with protecting the relations between a child and his parents. This is a laudable goal, but it is not enough.

Quebec, on the other hand, has enacted legislation promoting harmonious relations between grandparents and grandchildren. Article 611 of the Civil Code of Quebec allows grandparents who are denied such relations to make an application to the court for a decision on the terms and conditions of their relations with their grandchildren. Such an application can be made at any time. The spouses can be engaged in divorce proceedings or not. The application can be made even if the parents have never been married.

Article 611 of the Civil Code is the real solution to the problems created when there is interference in the personal relations between grandchildren and their grandparents. In Quebec, the recourse of grandparents is clear if the dispute is about a deterioration in harmonious relations attributable to the parents. Notwithstanding its honourable intentions, Bill C-232 is no more than a stopgap solution to the failure of certain provinces to bring in legislation in the area of civil law.

There is another aspect of Bill C-232 that concerns me. Clause 1(2) gives grandparents the right to make inquiries, and to be given information, as to the health, education and welfare of the child.

If this amendment was made to the Divorce Act, the grandparents of children of divorced parents would have the right to be given information that the grandparents of children of non-divorced parents cannot obtain.

Furthermore-and we think this is very serious-section 1(2) of the bill directly encroaches on Quebec's jurisdiction over the protection of medical and school information. Quebec already has its own Act Respecting Access to Documents Held by Public Bodies and the Protection of Personal Information.

Following her consultations with legal experts, my Reform colleague admitted in this House on November 25, 1994 that this provision of the bill, and I quote: "-may also contravene privacy acts or rights of the child-"

She went on to say: "Therefore while procedurally it cannot be removed at this time, I trust when the bill gets to committee this clause can be deleted".

I must congratulate my colleague on her honesty. She admits she was wrong about the impact of her bill and tries to compensate by hoping that the Standing Committee on Justice can improve it. Unfortunately, it is not Bill C-232's only shortcoming. I cannot support a flawed bill.

In closing, I wish to reiterate my position on the fate of children whose parents are divorcing. I find it appalling to see some parents relentlessly prolonging the suffering of the young victims of such circumstances.

The governments of common law provinces should make laws facilitating relations between grandchildren and their grandparents, as was done in Quebec, which is a pioneer in family rights.

[Petitions, March 1st, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, I have a petition signed by my constituents, more precisely from the town of Saint-Hubert, that I would like to table today, in the hope of obtaining a favourable response.

The petitioners ask the government to abandon its plan to introduce voice mail for seniors. The petitioners point out that seniors are naturally more at a loss when faced with voice mail technology. That is why I hope that the government will take into consideration the requests of seniors, who have a right to receive services that are geared to their needs.

[The Budget, February 28th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, will the Minister of Finance commit to rapidly announcing adjustment measures to help these civilians find new jobs?

[The Budget, February 28th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Minister of Finance.

Faced with new spending cuts, the Minister of National Defence announced yesterday that the headquarters of the land component of the armed forces and the facilities at Saint-Hubert would be closed. According to the newspaper La Presse , because of this decision, 400 people will lose their jobs, half of those civilians.

After closing the Saint-Jean military college last year, how can the Minister of Finance justify the decision to shut down these facilities and the base at Saint-Hubert, while we know that Quebec is under-represented when it comes to armed forces facilities and spending, and is getting at least $650 million less per year in this area than it should?

[Firearms Registration, February 22nd, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, the Minister of Justice stated on Monday that he was certain the legislation respecting firearms registration could be enforced in aboriginal territories just like everywhere else in Canada.

Since even Statistics Canada census takers claim they cannot carry out their work in aboriginal territory, how can the minister maintain that it will be so easy to register all firearms in Canada?

[Gun Control, February 20th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, will the Minister of Justice guarantee that the measures proposed in his bill will be applied Canada-wide, without exception, including on aboriginal territory?

[Gun Control, February 20th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, for the bill on gun control which was tabled by the Minister of Justice last week to have its desired effect, it will have to be coupled with more aggressive measures to fight gun smuggling from the United States.

Will the Minister of Justice tell us whether he personally asked the Solicitor General and the revenue minister to have police and customs officers escalate the war on gun smuggling?

[Young Offenders Act, February 20th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, the subject before the House today is the third reading of Bill C-37, an act to amend the Young Offenders Act and the Criminal Code.

This bill was tabled by the Minister of Justice on June 2 last year. The Bloc Quebecois was frank and forthright in its criticism. During the first debate, I said that I would not vote for a bill that tries to punish crime by creating criminals. I moved that the House decline to give second reading to Bill C-37, the purpose of which is repressive. Unfortunately, my motion was defeated.

Bill C-37 is part of the Liberal government's policy on youth crime. This strategy has two components. Bill C-37 is the phase one of the proposed reform, while phase two is to be a comprehensive review of the system by the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs.

On June 6, 1994, the Minister of Justice said that he had asked the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs to undertake a comprehensive review of the Young Offenders Act and of the youth justice system in Canada in general. He went on to invite Canadians to take part in the discussion on the subject.

The Minister of Justice should have requested the review before tabling this bill. I have already said that the Minister of Justice is a minister of consultation, and in this particular case, he is the minister of indiscriminate consultation. Whether these consultations are held before or after a decision is made is irrelevant, since they will have no effect on his decision.

The minister proposes to change some important aspects of legislation that subsequently will be the subject of a comprehensive review by the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs. The Minister of Justice has put the cart before the horse. At this rate, the Liberal government's strategy will produce a law lacking any consistency it may have had.

The Minister of Justice was in such a hurry to table a bill in response to increasing pressure from some members of his own caucus and from the Reform Party that he forgot to apply the most elementary principles of logic, according to which changes should not be made until one has a full understanding of the problem. The Minister of Justice panicked. He decided to amend legislation without realizing what was involved.

The Young Offenders Act has been amended before. On May 15, 1992, a major amendment on sentencing came into effect. This amendment increased the maximum sentence in youth court for a young person convicted of murder from three to five years. Today, the Minister of Justice wants to increase sentencing. They would be increased to seven years in the case of second degree murder and to ten years in the case of first degree murder. Furthermore, the minister is going after a very specific group of young offenders-the 16 and 17 year olds.

They will now have to prove, if they are accused of violent crimes, that they should be tried in youth court, otherwise, they will be sent to the court that would normally have jurisdiction-adult court. This reversal of the burden of proof means, in other words, that an adolescent may no longer be considered as such,

depending on the type of crime he has committed. In addition, his criminal liability increases, not as a function of his age, either, but as a function of the crime.

However, the preamble to the Young Offenders Act seems clear, and the one to Bill C-37 is even more so. This section provides that young persons should not in all instances be held accountable in the same manner or suffer the same consequences for their behaviour as adults. How do we explain this nonsense? On the one hand, it is agreed that degree of responsibility should be measured in terms of age, on the other, 16 and 17 year olds are being treated like adults.

Does the minister have some hidden statistics to which only he has access? Do they indicate a disturbing increase in violent crime among 16 and 17 year olds? If the answer is yes, let him show them to us, because he needs a lot of justification for proposing such a bill.

The approach of the Minister of Justice is similar to that of the members of the Reform Party. He supports the member for New Westminster-Burnaby, who stated the following in the House and I quote: "The juvenile justice system in its operation should mirror the adult system as much as possible if it is to be understandable by the community and develop general deterrents".

What is the point of having an act for young offenders when a third of those it targets could be treated as adults? We might just as well propose revoking it. At the rate things go, this could well happen in the very near future.

I shiver at the idea of a single system touted by the Reform Party. If we listen to the member for New Westminster-Burnaby, we should label young offenders in kindergarten. On June 6, he made the following statement: "Violent patterns in children are identifiable at the kindergarten level. By identifying young offenders before they graduate into the teen world of crime set before them, we drastically reduce the number of young adults we are forced to deal with six years down the road. This is social engineering at its best". I wonder where he took his courses on social engineering.

The minister did not bother to check the impact of the 1992 amendments. He did not concern himself with statistics on young people and criminality. He did not take the time to examine how all those involved were applying the Young Offenders Act. If he had, he would have understood that many of the problems stem from how the act is being implemented, and not from the act itself. But no, the minister once again caved in to pressure. The winds of hysteria made the Liberal reed bend.

Bill C-37 is premature. It cannot answer questions that have never been asked. The justice committee proposed some amendments following its study. Most of the 28 amendments it adopted were minor, and regarded style, terminology and concordance of the texts in both official languages. Some of them were more substantial, however. I do not intend to dwell on these points, but they are worth mentioning, if only to define what we are debating today.

To start, the first amendment removes aggravated assault from the list of offences leading to automatic transfer to adult court. In this way, we eliminate the danger that prosecutors lay heavier charges than the evidence available at the time would support. Without the amendment, a young person could almost automatically be transferred to adult court but be found guilty of a lesser crime which would not have merited such a transfer. That was only the lesser of the evils, since automatic transfer in principle remains intact.

The second amendment pertaining to transfers allows for parents to be heard before their child is transferred to adult court. This becomes one more element for the judge to consider. The committee also agreed that in regard to proceedings brought before a judge and jury, the Young Offenders Act is applicable to young persons. Measures of the Young Offenders Act will therefore take precedence over provisions of the Criminal Code in regard to protecting privacy. The amendment emphasizes the young person's right to legal representation when absent from proceedings as a result of poor conduct or when his competence to stand trial is being assessed.

These are significant amendments proposed by the committee. Since these amendments do not in any way alter the repressive nature of this bill or change the transfer procedure to adult court, all the while retaining the severity of sentences, I cannot believe that we are now debating an improved version of what was presented to us last June.

The Liberal government has tried to smooth things over by suggesting a few amendments at the report stage. In committee and in this House, we have stressed a great many times the procedural problems created by Bill C-37.

By increasing sentences for murder, the minister has given no thought to the confusion he will create. Section 11(f) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms stipulates, and I quote, "Any person charged with an offence has the right to the benefit of trial by jury where the maximum punishment for the offence is imprisonment for five years or a more severe punishment".

Thus, the justice minister would increase the sentences for first and second degree murder without considering for a moment that a young person normally subject to the Young Offenders Act, which does not allow for trial before a judge and

jury, in fact has the right to a trial before a judge and jury under the Canadian constitution.

There is no provision for bridging the gap between the Young Offenders Act, which governs the appearance in court and the request for bail, and the Criminal Code, which governs crime proceedings in which the accused can choose to appear before a judge alone or before a judge and jury, while a magistrate under the Criminal Code will oversee the preliminary hearing if there is one.

The minister's feeble response to this nonsense and legal vacuum was to propose a hasty amendment at the report stage. This amendment details the Criminal Code provisions that will apply to preliminary hearings, when young people accused of murder are transferred to youth court.

No one at the Department of Justice had a stroke of genius. Although the amendment was intended to improve a lame bill, it creates more problems than it solves. Once the young person chooses or is deemed to have chosen a judge and jury trial, the preliminary hearing will be held before the youth court. Fine, but when does the defendant make the choice? When he appears before the youth court or after the preliminary hearing, when he can still choose to be tried before a judge alone?

What about the young person who is transferred to adult court? Will the preliminary hearing still be held before the youth court and will he then be summoned to appear before the adult court?

Given the undeniable seriousness of the offences listed in the section on transfer to adult court, the young person will be held in custody while awaiting trial. However, the young person is entitled to a bail hearing, which would allow him to be free on bail until legal proceedings are over.

Before which court and when will the bail hearing be held? If the election occurs when the accused appears in court, as is often the case, will the bail hearing be held before a higher court? As we can guess, the young person may well find himself in several jurisdictions even before being summoned to trial. He could appear before the youth court, have his bail hearing before the adult court, return to the youth court for his preliminary hearing, elect a judge and jury trial, and be summoned to appear before a superior court of criminal jurisdiction.

If you have followed me so far, you will understand why this bill and its amendments are nothing but hogwash to create a situation that only judges will be able to untangle, judges who should not have to take on a responsibility that falls to the legislator in the first place.

But when the legislative power does not do its job, then we have no choice but to defer to the judiciary, with the risks this may involve. Instead of the legislator, you now have jurisprudence deciding procedure and substantive law.

Bill C-37 is typical of the kind of bill moved by a government that is reactionary and repressive. This is the coercive approach this government is taking to respond to pressures from a misinformed public and a right wing group that manipulates it.

Bill C-37 cannot be justified either in terms of substance or in terms of the purposes it is claimed to have. Far from providing the appropriate remedy, it promises on the contrary to be a major source of procedural problems. It increases the costs to the provinces and substantially changes the role of rehabilitation centers in Quebec.

We do recognize, on this side of the House, that the rate of juvenile crime is cause for concern. Crime creates fear and jeopardizes the quality of life in our neighbourhoods and our cities. But it seems to us that the way juvenile crime is perceived is quite far removed from the reality around us.

Reformers and some Liberal members are blind to this reality. To justify their repressive stance, they cite extreme cases that reflect in no way present trends.

The inflammatory remarks made by the hon. member for New Westminster-Burnaby on June 6 have certainly made many people jump. He said, and I quote: "We will be Her Majesty's loyal, constructive opposition with advocacy for improvements to Bill C-37 based on what the community wants". And he went on to say: "Reformers are the true opposition -Let the people speak and Reformers will bring their voice to this House".

Not only do Reformers not know how many seats they have in this House, but they crow over the idea of being the only sensible representatives of the electorate.

Instead of caving into pressure from his colleagues and their confederates in the Reform Party, the Minister of Justice should take a closer look at the report by criminologist Julian Roberts, which was commissioned by his own department.

Professor Roberts' study was about the public's perception and knowledge of crime and justice. This criminologist concluded, for instance, that crime is a serious problem in Canadian society that gives rise to a great deal of concern and controversy about the kind of preventive policies we should implement. However, before determining whether the public supports those policies, we must establish what the public really knows about crime and criminal justice.

Professor Roberts wondered about the general public's perception of the Young Offenders Act. His remarks are an eye opener: "Canadians have a very negative opinion of the legisla-

tion but are not very familiar with its provisions and impact. They do not understand the underlying principles or the specific provisions of the legislation and probably see it as another example of clemency being shown by the criminal justice system. The public and certain criminal justice professionals are wrong to think that the crime rate can be reduced by harsher sentencing".

One of the avowed objectives of Bill C-37 is to provide better protection for the public, and the means chosen to achieve this is to extend sentences for young offenders. What the Minister of Justice is proposing is the exact opposite of what all studies on the subject recommend. Those studies were done, in fact, by his own department. It is surprising, to say the least, that the minister should go the route of repressive measures to deal with crime, if only to impress the public. No one in Quebec is impressed.

Dealing with crime is not just a matter of sanctions or legal procedures. Bill C-37 is an exercise in futility. There are no statistics to justify a legislative change of this kind. Since the bill deals more specifically with young persons of 16 or 17 who have committed serious crimes, one would expect the statistics to show a disturbing increase in the crime rate among this population.

Nothing could be further from the truth. A review of the records held by youth courts since the Young Offenders Act came into effect reveals that the percentage of cases heard by the court which involve this population has not varied.

Another example of statistics the Minister of Justice appears to be ignoring is to be found in a document on homicide in Canada put out by the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics. It reveals that 35 young people between the ages of 12 and 17 were charged with homicide in 1993. This includes first and second degree murder, manslaughter and infanticide. The figure represents a 40 per cent reduction over 1992. Only 6 per cent of the individuals charged with homicide in 1993 were young people as against 9 per cent in 1992.

How can we justify increasing the sentences for first and second degree murder, and in such a draconian fashion, when the trend is decreasing? How can we justify such a repressive approach? Is the aim of the exercise to impress?

Nowhere does the literature indicate any effect of lengthening sentences on deterring or fighting crime. For example, robbery is liable to a sentence of life imprisonment, but statistics indicate that the percentage of robberies remains stable. The minister, however, is increasing the maximum sentence for first degree murder from five to ten years and the maximum sentence for second degree murder from three to seven years. This increase and the new provisions on parole eligibility are creating some rather extraordinary situations.

It should be noted right off that the starting date used to determine the length of detention varies according to whether a young person is tried in adult court or in youth court. Thus the confusion is compounded.

The most ludicrous situation is as follows: a 15-year old found guilty of first degree murder would be eligible for parole after five years in prison if judged in adult court. Yet this same 15-year old, if judged in youth court, would have to serve a six year prison term before being paroled.

In spite of the new measures regarding transfer, a young person in this position would do well to keep quiet, in the hope of being transferred to adult court. Ironically, he could be released sooner that way.

On the subject of transfer, the justice minister has drawn up a list of offences for which the offender may be transferred to adult court. It is odd that the justice minister has not increased sentences for such offences he himself calls serious. This list of offences seems entirely arbitrary to me and entails the real danger that crown prosecutors might be tempted to increase the severity of the charge for the sole purpose of reversing the burden of proof.

As I have already indicated, the Standing Committee on Justice has dropped aggravated assault from this list. The danger remains for other offences, however, such as in cases of aggravated sexual assault.

I would like to stress at this point the inconsistency of the bill as pertains to multiple offences. Such situations are very common, unfortunately. Consider for example a young person charged with both murder and robbery. On the count of murder, the burden of proof in respect of transfer rests with the young person, and on the other charge, with the crown. How does the justice minister envision the application of this procedure? No solution is to be found anywhere in this bill.

Will there be a joint inquiry exclusively in regard to transfers? If so, who would begin producing evidence? The young person in the preceding example might find himself in two separate jurisdictions in respect of the same events. This situation could lead us to make contradictory decisions. Imagine for example if he were acquitted in one jurisdiction and found guilty in the other.

If the minister had bothered to properly analyze the amendments he is proposing, he would have realized that the mere act of reversing the burden of proof coupled with the increase in sentences would turn the whole system upside down.

Bill C-37 ignores the fundamental differences between Quebec and the rest of Canada. Once again, the federal government is trying to impose legislation Canada-wide, without taking into consideration regional differences and systems already in place. The fact that the Minister of Justice does not acknowledge that our system is distinct is not so bad, but he adds insult to injury

when he proposes a bill whose administration falls under provincial jurisdiction and whose reforms will have to be paid for by the provinces.

If the Minister of Justice had done things right and had undertaken a general study of the penal system for young people before amending the law, he would have noticed that Quebec does things differently. He could have improved his reforms by copying Quebec. The Quebec Bar Association presented a thorough paper to the Standing Committee on Justice, which summed up the situation in Quebec.

In an eloquent passage from the paper, the association said: "Young offenders in Quebec can take advantage of an alternative measure which entails referring the file to the youth protection branch. An agreement can be proposed and alternative measures imposed, such as reimbursement of the victim or community work. In fact, close to 47 per cent of all cases take this route. All other cases in Quebec are heard by the youth court. Once the order of the court is issued, the health and social services network carries out the sentence. Quebec's choice of sending these young offenders to institutions reporting to the Ministry of Health and Social Services illustrates its policy in this area, the ultimate goal being medium and long term rehabilitation rather than a repression oriented panacea which would probably only protect society in the short term".

That is how things are done in Quebec. I can already hear Reform members accuse us of being too soft and encouraging juvenile delinquency. They should know that the juvenile delinquency rate in Quebec is the second lowest in all of Canada. If passed, Bill C-37 would disrupt all Quebec institutions now focused on rehabilitation.

Extending sentences for murder would mobilize rehabilitation resources for longer periods. Quebec institutions will focus more on protecting society by putting young offenders away instead of rehabilitating them. On the other hand, youth court trial applications by 16 and 17-year-olds who have committed violent crimes and appeals of decisions to dismiss such applications will result in additional delays, during which the young person will be held temporarily in a rehabilitation centre. This is compounded by the delays caused by holding a trial before judge and jury.

Did the Minister of Justice try to find out if institutional resources are prepared to accommodate these new clients? I remind him that Quebec has chosen to place these young people in the care of the protection and rehabilitation system. Quebec's Youth Protection Act is a model piece of legislation which reflects a forward looking policy and should be copied by the other provinces. This approach was favoured long before the federal Young Offenders Act was implemented. The rehabilitation centre network took over the facilities used as youth correctional centres a long time ago.

Today, the Minister of Justice is bluntly asking Quebec to change its policy. He is asking Quebec to backtrack and convert these rehabilitation centres into ordinary prisons.

Quebec uses a different approach and methods. Convincing results show that we are on the right track and should be held up as an example. Faced with a complex problem, we opted for a multidisciplinary approach and methods that have proven effective. All in all, the Minister of Justice should have had a better look at the Quebec experience before proposing his reform.