Pierrette Venne

[Gun Control, November 15th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, last week end, the Minister of Justice declared that he intended to present a bill to tighten gun control in Canada.

Does the Minister of Justice undertake to simplify the regulations on the storage, display and transportation of firearms and to make them coherent so that ordinary people can finally understand and comply with them?

[Unemployment Insurance Act, November 2nd, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to start by thanking hon. members for their interest throughout this debate on Bill C-218. I particularly want to express my thanks to members who have solidly supported a cause that is just and democratic, a cause that is reflected in Bill C-218.

However, we cannot close this debate without responding to certain claims that repealing paragraph 3(2) (c) of the Unemployment Insurance Act would inevitably increase the likelihood of abuse and fraud and lead to a sharp increase in UI claims.

I refer more specifically to what was said by the hon. member for Yorkton-Melville who, on April 21, expressed his apprehensions about Bill C-218. The hon. member's fears are clearly ill-founded. The hon. member seems to think that paragraph 3(2) (c) of the Unemployment Insurance Act is a punitive provision. The sole purpose of this section is to discriminate against a substantial part of the population that contributes to the fund and pays premiums but is treated unfairly and inequitably when the time comes to claim benefits. These individuals, who may have paid unemployment insurance premiums throughout their working lives, are denied the benefits to which they are entitled because a public servant at the Department of National Revenue has decided that their employment is not insurable and that as a result, they cannot receive these benefits.

I referred earlier to concerns that were expressed by the hon. member for Yorkton-Melville. I think he can take some comfort from sections 73 and 74 of the act and from the powers of investigation conferred under sections 92 to 106 of the same act. The purpose of such provisions is to deter potential offenders. The Unemployment Insurance Act already incorporates procedures to curb abuse and prevent fraud. Stiff penalties are already provided for with respect to anyone who would dare to contravene the act. This means that, as it stands and regardless of paragraph 3(2)( c ), the act already has teeth and can bite.

Opponents of this bill also quoted some interesting statistics, showing that, on average, 85 per cent of benefit claims are found to be admissible after review. Opponents of Bill C-218, and the Minister of Human Resources Development in particular, maintain these are very satisfactory results. The parliamentary secretary is glad that the vast majority of benefit claims are not fraudulent.

How can he allege that the very existence of paragraph 3(2)( c ) is justified? How can we claim that the act as it now stands is fair and equitable to 85 per cent of those who must wait months and even years before a decision is made as to whether or not their jobs are covered by UI?

These people, the majority of which are women who help run the family business, are honest people with no intention of committing fraud. Yet, they are treated like cheats until they can prove otherwise.

The member for Calgary North added insult to injury when she said in the House on September 20:

If a woman works for her husband in a small business, then she must be prepared to convince Revenue Canada that she is in fact in a true employee-employer relationship [-]

It is very wrong that in 1994 women in family businesses must still have to prove that they are really working, as though their work were not real and these women were only foils for their husbands. It is this kind of archaic thinking that underlies the philosophy of the present law and denies working wives and dependants the same protection and benefits as the rest of the population.

This is an opportunity to say loudly and clearly in this House that we cannot close our eyes and give our tacit consent to such an unfair and unjust law. I therefore ask hon. members to vote for Bill C-218 and above all to think of all those who are still waiting for a decision from a revenue department official.

[Gun Control, October 24th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, despite the Prime Minister's promise at the convention of the Liberal Party of Canada last May, despite the promise repeated many times in this House by the Minister of Justice, Quebecers and Canadians are still waiting for more effective gun control legislation. We knew that this government was inclined not to take action and susceptible to the harmful and hidden influence of lobby groups. But we did not know that this government saw the representations of some major lobby groups as more important than people's safety.

Last week's events in Ontario add to the sad list of victims of this lack of effective gun control.

Last weekend, the Prime Minister tried to appear reassuring by saying, "The sooner the better". When? Quebecers and Canadians have been waiting for a whole year.

[Criminal Code, October 19th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, in 1976, the federal government amended the Criminal Code to make it consistent with its parole legislation and policy. It replaced the death sentence, which had just been abolished, by life sentence for murder.

The Liberal philosophy, to which the hon. member for York South-Weston would never have subscribed, was inspired at the time by the general principles of humanism. In 1976, the criminal was looked upon first and foremost as a victim of society in general, of his social group in particular and even of himself. His crime was above all a social act. Irrespective of the harm done, criminals were treated like the casualties of the system, individuals who had to be saved even at the expense of common sense.

We must now recognize that such noble principles overlooked certain realities. The system had come to consider all criminals, that it to say individuals convicted by a court for an offence against a criminal law, as the first victims of their actions. Our parole legislation is a product of this thinking.

Once the judicial drama is over, you deal with the real stuff. As soon as the court has passed sentence, the correctional system takes charge of the individual behind closed doors, whether in an institution or in an in camera sitting of the parole board. Regardless of the work of the court, the correctional administration undertakes to assess the criminal and to establish how much of the sentence he or she will actually serve. And all of this under the cover of a big word: rehabilitation.

The entire system is predicated on this concept that the public does not look upon favourably, an argument put forward by criminologists, these crime philosophers. In a word, the concept of rehabilitation is defined as an act of pity on the part of society towards criminals perceived no longer as individuals responsible for their faults but rather as victims of an ill-accepted social environment.

Therefore, crime no longer being a real crime, the criminal is no longer a real criminal, and a quiet reintegration into society is supposed to serve the public interest.

Even if the court feels that an individual is beyond redemption, Parole Board and correctional system officials will, in their ivory tower, decide to set that person free when he should have been kept in jail.

Even if they admit that an individual is the sole responsible for his crime, these so-called rehabilitation experts firmly believe that criminals can be rehabilitated. It is time we set the record straight.

Our criminal law is based on the responsibility of the individual. I realize that many hold less pragmatic views on the Canadian criminal law, but let me say to these philosophers that, in our judicial system, positive law still takes precedence over moods, which is certainly a good thing. Consequently, an individual who has committed a murder will be handed down the mandatory sentence provided by the law and by the law only. That is the reality.

The general public thinks that murderers are jailed for at least 25 years. This is what the law provides. However, along with our common law system, a new law full of subtleties, nuances and surprises has developed. The public does not know about it, because this new law is, more often than not, applied in an absolutely discretionary manner by crown agencies. There is now such a thing as correctional law.

If I were cynical, I would define correctional law as the set of written or implicit rules which allow criminals to serve the shortest possible sentence in the best conditions. Behind its functional aspects, correctional law refers to the allocation, by public authorities, of maximum resources to reduce the sentences handed down by the courts.

Our so-called correctional law is based on a set of laws and regulations more elaborate than our criminal law. We have developed a very sophisticated administrative legal system for the benefit of criminals.

Criminals who go to jail enjoy the protection of a true charter of rights and freedoms for convicted offenders. In fact, the correctional system abides by the following principle: the sentence is now calculated based upon the duration of the total reduction. The prisoner knows about this.

All the efforts made by the prisoner, often with the help of correctional officers, aim at changing the length of his sentence. It is a well-known fact that prisons are full of converted and born-again Christians just waiting for parole.

A life sentence should mean imprisonment until the death of the inmate, but the average citizen has come to understand that, by some work of fiction, it now means a minimum of 25 years before parole. But this is where he is wrong. In fact, a life sentence can mean 25, 15 or 10 years depending upon the inmate's eligibility for parole. And this is when the average citizen lets you know that he has had enough.

So, I understand how frustrated the hon. member for York-South-Weston feels, but I do not think that the minor amendment he is proposing will change anything in the system. I even think that striking down section 745 of the Criminal Code would do more harm than keeping it.

What we find appalling in the parole system is the philosophy behind it, the costs and the aberrations, but mostly the discretion given to the sentencing courts, despite all the information it has about the crime and the criminal.

Actually, the sentencing court is in the best position to evaluate the individual and the crimes he has been found guilty of. The sentence is contemporaneous with the offense.

Do you really believe that, 15 years after the sentencing, a civil servant would be in a better position that the court to determine if the decision was justified? Or that because of changes in his personal outlook, the criminal no longer deserves the punishment imposed for acts for which he remains responsible, despite the passage of time? Tell that to the relatives of murder victims.

In these circumstances, whether a sentence is exemplary is very much a matter of opinion. In the end, the principle of immutability and the usefulness of sentences as a deterrent should prevail over all the nebulous theories of liberal criminology.

Under its existing provisions, the Criminal Code provides for a judicial review mechanism, which seems appropriate.

In every case where the inmate has served 15 years of his sentence after being found guilty of murder, he will have to convince a jury that he should be released before his ineligibility period expires. If he is not successful, he will have to serve his full sentence.

Personally, I am more inclined to trust the judgment of six or a dozen ordinary citizens than that of a commissioner of the National Parole Board, whose qualifications are strictly based on his political past.

The statistics I obtained from the Department of Justice tend to confirm my opinion and put into context the relatively small number of individuals concerned by section 745.

Since the 1976 amendments and up to March 31, 1994, only 128 inmates across Canada were able to apply for a judicial review under section 745. Only 71 actually applied, and 43 requests were heard.

Before looking at the conclusions, we should remember we are discussing the cases of about fifty people. We are looking at legislation that is aimed at a very small group. I want to make it very clear that I do not understand the relevance of the bill standing in the name of the hon. member for York South-Weston.

As for the outcome of these hearings, I think we can conclude that the system works quite well. As a matter of fact, of the 43 applications heard to date, and again I repeat that this number covers the 28 years since the introduction of section 745, 11 were turned down, 13 have led to a partial reduction of the number of years of imprisonment without eligibility for parole and 19 have been successful.

Thus it seems to me that the system is working relatively well. This is why I think we should end the discussion immediately since we are discussing situations so rare that I feel I am wasting my time.

Must we remind the House that in case of murder the rule is still life imprisonment?

Finally, section 745 allows any inmate guilty of a murder of either category, first or second degree murder, to apply for a reduction in the number of years of imprisonment without eligibility for parole. The bill proposes to abolish this section.

In other words, imprisonment without any possibility of parole.

I will conclude by saying that by abolishing section 745 we would be replacing a necessary evil by a mandatory evil. I nevertheless congratulate the hon. member for his initiative but I must tell him and the House that I will not support the bill.

[Gun Control, September 26th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, on hearing what some Liberal members are saying, I wonder if the Minister of Justice is not giving in to pressure from the gun lobby. The great majority of Canadians and Quebecers favour stricter gun control, especially for military weapons and handguns.

Given the consensus on this issue in Quebec, I would like to remind the minister that if the (Quebec) National Assembly had exclusive jurisdiction over the Criminal Code, effective gun control legislation would have been passed long ago. How many lives would have been saved if Quebec already had such legislation in force?

Representatives of associations of women, victims of violent crime, emergency physicians and big-city police from Quebec and Canada are all in favour of better gun control. Is the Minister of Justice listening to the people?

[Gun Control, September 22nd, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, if the Minister of Justice still recognizes the need to strengthen controls on the circulation and possession of firearms, why does he not tell us today, right now, how he intends to do so, instead of

making us wait, diverting our attention and letting us think that he is faltering?

[Gun Control, September 22nd, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Minister of Justice.

Lobbies of gun owners and manufacturers have stepped up their pressure on the government to go back on its election promise regarding firearms. Just today, these lobbies are holding a major demonstration on the Hill in order to sway the minister.

Will the minister abide by the commitment made in the red book and resist pressure from gun owners and manufacturers, and undertake unequivocally not to water down his party's promise to tighten up control of the circulation of handguns and semi-automatic weapons?

[Criminal Code, September 20th, 1994]

So that might have been a nervous tic I noticed.

In addition, this would allow the courts of each province to clear thousands of minor cases or summary proceedings through admissions of guilt, thus sparing the taxpayer enormous legal costs. This is a laudable attempt to reduce public expenditure and contribute to administrative efficiency and I congratulate the Minister of Justice.

However, the bill seems to be trying to cover too many bases.

In fact, in order to attain the stated objectives, it is not necessary to subject co-operative suspects to publicity not imposed on those electing to be tried in a court of law. Thus, for example, the police will always have a suspect's fingerprints and photograph on file. And this file will be open, with the appropriate authorization, to various parties, including insurance companies, government departments and agencies, the courts and the general public so that the interests of justice may be served.

There is a large measure of naïveté here. We must ask ourselves what will motivate a suspect to co-operate with the police if his file can be accessed for two years by just about anybody and he is still subject to criminal proceedings, despite his desire to settle the matter once and for all through an alternative measure.

It should be obvious to the Minister of Justice that those who drafted this bill have never seen a suspect in their life, or have never witnessed the plea bargaining that takes place on a large scale just outside our courts of law.

For these alternative measures to be attractive and the program to work, the file must travel a private, administrative route, without publicity, eventually reaching the offices of the provincial ministers of justice, after all conditions have been faithfully met by the offender.

It is wishful thinking to believe that a suspect will co-operate with the police for the pleasure of repenting twice and having a file that resembles that of a criminal who has already been sentenced.

The bill also consolidates a number of sentencing principles which are, for the most part, laid down in our case law and applied by our courts across the country.

The need for a codification of guiding principles regarding sentencing is obvious. Most of the applicable criteria and factors have become standard with time. They have been used and considered in criminal cases since the first Criminal Code of Canada was published. While the common law tradition gives preference to case law over written law, it may be a good idea to set some general guidelines to be followed by the courts in their consideration of the circumstances of each case. The criteria proposed in the bill, including the statement of principles, are not restrictive but cover a range of actions wide enough to apply to most cases.

There is nothing very novel about this. I would point out however that in the part dealing with the purpose and principles of sentencing, the bill very vaguely refers to the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society. I do hope that these words make sense to the people of Canada and that they will mean something to the courts because, as far as I am concerned, they simply reflect good intentions that the legislative background of the Liberals does not uphold. I would be inclined to believe that such principles could even lay the foundations for political courts. It all depends on what partisan view the power takes on a "just, peaceful and safe society".

Was it not just, peaceful and safe in the eyes of the Nazis to exterminate the Jews? What kind of just society do we have in mind now in terms of sentencing? That of the 60s? Is it through sentencing that we achieve just society status? Does the Minister of Justice leave it up to his predecessors, the illustrious instigators of Canadian liberalism, these great humanists who in 1970 had no other means to create their just society but mass imprisonment under the War Measures Act?

It all depends on one's perception of what constitutes a just society. From this flows the question: can a just society be achieved through sentencing?

This is the kind of wording you come up with when you do not have a clue what to do to look good in an enactment. Everyone is for virtue and against evil; everyone wants a just society. I simply wonder about this need for preserving a just society through sentencing in the country best liked in the world by its citizens.

This is hardly surprising on the part of the Liberals, always inspired by the model of generosity that was the former boss of the present Prime Minister, himself closely connected to the decision center in 1970. But this unfortunate legislative slip that the Liberals themselves must be embarrassed about must not prevent us from recognizing that this bill also contains innovative ideas that should be favourably considered.

For example, the principle of mitigating or aggravating circumstances is introduced in positive sentencing law. Aggravating circumstances include all aspects of an offence which reflect bias, prejudice, breach of trust and abuse of power.

Let us take for example the therapists recently convicted of sexually abusing their female patients. These professionals who were then in a position of authority abused their patients' trust. I would have liked a better French translation for the expression "position of trust" found in the English version but I imagine the courts will take this into account.

Offences committed within a therapist-patient relationship would come under this provision and the courts would be authorized by law to impose sentences more in keeping with this type of offence.

Finally, again with respect to the purpose and principles of sentencing, it is deplorable that the bill tries to sneak through the back door the concept of a parallel system of justice for Aboriginals. It is so well hidden that it is almost necessary to read Clause 718.2( e ) twice to discover this enormity hidden under nine sneaky words, and I quote:

718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles:

We have ( a ), ( b ), ( c ), ( d ) and e ) all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.

The French text fails, unintentionally no doubt, to point out like the English text that the said sanctions would exclude imprisonment.

Why should Aboriginals, who make up less than 2 per cent of Canada's total population, benefit from a legal system different from that which applies to all other Canadians? Why should an Aboriginal convicted of murder, rape, assault or of uttering threats not be liable to imprisonment like any other citizen of this country? Can we replace all this with a parallel justice, an ethnic justice, a cultural justice? Where would it stop? Where does this horror come from?

Why should Aboriginals, who are adamantly opposed to the distinctiveness of Quebec society-which is still subject to all Canadians laws without exception-, who claim full Canadian citizenship, who take full advantage of the generosity of our welfare state and who enjoy tax exemptions and benefits, be treated differently from other Canadians when they commit crimes? If such is to be the case, I ask that all criminal laws applicable to the Quebec nation be transferred to the exclusive jurisdiction of Quebec's National Assembly.

Other aspects of this bill deserve special attention. Not because it proposes reforms but because these reforms are incomplete, when we had an opportunity to correct some clearly unacceptable shortcomings of our criminal justice system.

The government seems concerned about the fate of victims in criminal trials. It seems to care, but its intentions are expressed so timidly that we cannot take them seriously. Indeed, the bill adds nothing that could reassure Canadian society that this government wants to protect victims.

I agree with all those who tell you that it is time to forget about the fate of unfortunate criminals and think of the victims, it is time to punish crime and compensate the victim, it is time to silence the criminal and listen to the victim. This talk about rehabilitation puts us to sleep or revolts us when we see that victims are obviously pawns in criminal proceedings, mere witnesses tossed about as the court case drags on and called at the whim of the Crown's lawyers.

We must finally see that the victim is the key person in the criminal trial when the crime involved a violation of the person or his property. The victim is the one who was assaulted or lost property, so the criminal's sentence should depend on the victim. The victim should be what drives the criminal justice system and gives society the opportunity to impose just sentences on criminals in order to prevent them and their kind from making more victims.

Countless pressure groups in all provinces denounce lawmakers for their laxity in treating victims of crime. It is time to think of the victims of crime.

Despite the public outcry, the calls for redress and the continuous pleading from these thousands of women, men and children who are victims of horrible acts, what does the bill give us on this score? A timid concession made very condescendingly, probably in the name of archaic common-law principles. That is why a victim's written statement on the damages suffered can be read during sentencing. If the public prosecutor wants to consider the loss or damage incurred, he can ask the judge to impose a financial penalty that would have the effect of a judgement rendered by a civil court.

All the groups dedicated to the protection and support of victims, mainly women, will tell you that such measures are quite simply insignificant and insultingly inadequate. They are insignificant in that they are trifling and ridiculous because they will have no real effect on the outcome of the trial and the judge's decision. What should be done, and I ask the House to set partisanship aside, is more radical.

That the victim has the right to examine the accused and the witness; that the victim may object to the admission of evidence and has the same right to contest the evidence as the prosecution and the defence; that the victim may make representations on sentencing and, if necessary, appeal the verdict and the sentence.

I may refer to the French penal system where the victim may take part in the proceedings. We see this in cases involving non-political crimes, and we saw this at the trial of the Nazi criminal Barbie for crimes against humanity, where survivors and parents of victims who had died took an active part in the trial.

Under this system, the victim is able to play an effective and active role in the proceedings. I am convinced that when the victim is able to take part in the proceedings on the same terms as the Crown and the accused, instead of being a mere witness, at the mercy of parties who do not share the victim's involvement, the outcome will not be the same.

I am not saying that the trial is all about the victim. It is not. I have no intention of introducing a concept in our criminal law that would be entirely alien. I am simply saying that the victim is one of the parties concerned, on the same terms as the Crown and the accused. There is no rule of law that justifies excluding the victim, and we cannot afford to do so if we are to rehabilitate the victim's status in a judicial system that still lets many criminals escape or diminish its authority; a system that most Canadians see as a sinister farce in which criminals and their lawyers "get away with murder".

I know that is not true and that the vast majority of offenders are found guilty or plead guilty. I do not deny that, but I have a problem with the way criminals are treated by the system.

What is the use of finding a rapist guilty of rape if he only gets six months? I find that outrageous, Mr. Speaker. Let the victim take part in the proceedings and, mark my words, there will be some major changes.

I will conclude on this note, Mr. Speaker, and I want to say that I am pleased nevertheless with this very prudent attempt which I see as a sign of progress, considering this government's generally conservative approach to criminal law and criminal proceedings.

I would have liked to take this opportunity to say that personally, the whole field of criminal law should be turned over as soon as possible to the provincial legislatures, but I will have plenty of opportunities in the course of this session. The usual unavoidable overlap between bureaucracies will provide a splendid excuse.

I also want to say that the Minister of Justice can count on my full co-operation in preparing legislation that would change the status of the victim in criminal proceedings. It is a matter of great concern to me, and I believe we urgently need to address these issues. I would ask all groups and individuals who share my concern to get in touch with me.

[Criminal Code, September 20th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, before stating my position on Bill C-41, I would like to point out both in my own name and on behalf of all voters in the sovereigntist federal riding of Saint-Hubert the resounding victory of the Parti Quebecois in the elections. The party was voted in with a much higher global percentage of votes than the one allowing

the Prime Minister of Canada to claim to be governing on behalf of all Canadians in Ottawa.

I speak as a sovereigntist member of Parliament and, whether we debate Bill C-41 or any other issue, the laws of this country entitle me to do so as a member of the Official Opposition in accordance with the mandate I was given by nearly 60 per cent of the voters in the federal riding of Saint-Hubert. I did not hide my stance. Must all those who strive to disprove the logic and legitimacy of our position be straightened out at the beginning of this new session? My sovereigntist beliefs do not interfere with displaying all the judgement and competence required to carry out my duties as Official Opposition critic for matters under the jurisdiction of the justice minister.

To those who, contrary to all rules of democracy, dispute our right to sit in this Parliament as the Official Opposition, I say this: my voice and that of my 52 colleagues joins the chorus of the 77 sovereigntist members elected in Quebec. Sovereigntists now account for about 70 per cent of the total deputation in both Quebec City and Ottawa.

May those who dispute our legitimacy and continue to doubt that our constituents voted for our program stifle their fantasies. The voters in Quebec like anywhere else in Canada vote according to their beliefs and with their heads, contrary to what the Prime Minister would have the rest of Canada believe.

This Prime Minister, whose party barely managed to muster one third of the vote in Quebec and a little over 40 per cent in the rest of the country, has no qualms of conscience about claiming to have been elected by all of Canada, while in fact more than half of his caucus comes from Ontario, where 45 per cent of the vote "from coast to coast" was concentrated.

I maintain that the legitimacy of the Parti Quebecois in Quebec and that of the Official Opposition in this Parliament is stronger than that of the federal Liberals. I would add that the Prime Minister would never have won the latest elections in Quebec and that Canadians should be aware of who speaks for Quebec from now on.

In my analysis of Bill C-41, I speak for all the people of Quebec and the 60 per cent of voters from other provinces who did not vote for the Liberals. The Parti Quebecois is now in power in Quebec, with nearly two thirds of the seats in the Assembly. It was voted in with 53 per cent of the francophone vote and massive support from the community which says "no" to stupor and lethargy and refuses to be bogged down in the status quo.

If the Prime Minister did not want to hear any more about the Quebec issue and if he thought that the pitiful attempts of Meech and Charlottetown would end the debate, he now realizes, after the September 12 election held in Quebec, that he was fooling himself as well as Canadians.

Just as I am about to do regarding Bill C-41, the Bloc Quebecois will always fulfil its role of Official Opposition loyally in this Parliament. As long as Quebec remains an integral part of Canada and as long as Quebecers pay their share of taxes to the federal revenue minister, the Bloc Quebecois will play its opposition role and fulfil the mandate it was given by Quebecers on election night, October 25, 1993.

I now open the debate on Bill C-41 as the official opposition critic on justice. I will never give up my responsibilities and my convictions in this House for the sole reason that my opinions on the future of this country differ from those of the Prime Minister of Canada and his regional caucus.

It is with these principles in mind that I now turn my attention to Bill C-41. The Minister of Justice will be pleased to learn that I have no hesitation in saying that this legislation is a positive one, even though the minister did not make the full necessary reform to protect the rights of victims.

I see that all of Part XXIII of the Criminal Code is amended to make way for new measures to deal with offenders through an appropriate reform of the sentencing process. Thus the bill introduces a measure similar to the procedure we find in the Young Offenders Act, to deal with suspects who admit their guilt by using alternatives to judicial proceedings. According to the bill, alternative measures designated under a provincial program may be substituted for the usual trial, conviction and sentencing proceedings.

Our courts, especially our criminal courts, have a huge backlog of cases that never go to trial because they are constantly postponed. The courts are dealing with an ever-increasing number of criminal cases, mostly cases that should be tried on summary conviction.

Visit the courts when they are in session, and you will get a good idea of the frustration felt by witnesses, victims, investigators and, in fact, all those who are faced with the inefficiencies of an outdated system that puts a heavy financial burden on governments and taxpayers.

Our current criminal procedure requires the presence of the accused and witnesses at every stage of the trial, even in the case of a guilty plea.

In most cases where there is so much evidence that a preliminary hearing is a waste of time and a trial an unnecessarily costly

exercise for the government, although compulsory for the accused, the case could have been dealt with by administrative means.

By proposing alternative judicial proceedings to deal with cases where suspects are prepared to co-operate, the minister has opened the way to some very interesting changes in criminal proceedings.

If efficiency is the goal, I think that will be achieved. However, I can imagine how some people will react. They will say this is another case of criminals getting off scot-free and legislation that is more intent on encouraging crime with these ridiculous measures than on punishing criminal behaviour. I suppose some people might have that impression.

I would be the first to say that the law should concentrate, first of all, on preventing and punishing crime. We must pass laws to protect society. That should be our only objective. The rehabilitation of offenders comes later, when society has all the instruments it needs to protect itself.

That being said, I suggest that those who may tend to react hastily take a very careful look at this bill. In section 717(1)( a ) they will see that provincial jurisdictions may designate the type of offences to which the legislation will not apply when they set up their program.

In other words, provincial governments will be able to develop a program of alternative measures according to their perception of the priorities and views of the majority.

I am very pleased to say that if this bill is passed, it would restore much of the initiative in this area to the provinces. It will give the provinces greater flexibility to implement these measures in line with the interests of the local community, as is the case for alternative measures programs under the Young Offenders Act.

Is the Chair signalling?

[Corrections And Conditional Release Act, September 20th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, the Solicitor General had been promising major amendments to the current legislation in order to crack down on adults who commit crimes against children. In particular, the government said it would take extremely harsh measures in view of the demands of

a society totally disgusted with the courts' failure to deal with child molesters.

Like all Canadians, I was expecting a massive overhaul of the current legislation. It seems, however, that the Solicitor General does not have the same perception as the vast majority of Canadians on this point. It seems that the government has chosen to continue to favour administrative justice, which is arbitrary and secretive, over the courts. Clearly the Liberal Party does not want to toughen the act with regard to with rapists and child abusers.

If I understand this bill correctly, individuals serving a two-year sentence following assault on children, will be referred to the Parole Board which will determine whether they can be paroled at the time legally set or whether they should be kept in jail until the end of their sentence or subjected to special control measures.

People should not be led to believe that the amendments proposed by the Solicitor General could be used to keep these individuals in jail after the end of their sentence.

You should not think either that this is tougher for abusers and pedophiles or that it would apply to all sexual offenders.

All the Solicitor General is doing is proposing to give the Parole Board the discretionary power to parole before the end of their sentence individuals guilty of sexual crimes against children.

This measure already exists for violent offenders and drug dealers; we are merely adding pedophiles.

Two observations before I move on to more legal aspects. Sexual crimes against children are probably the most horrific, the most despicable and the most repugnant crimes that a court can find an individual guilty of.

It is not without reason that nearly every crime of that nature is punishable by maximum penalties going from a 10-year prison sentence to life.

When an adult sexually assaults a child, he destroys the person within the child, the child's vision of the world as well as his or her trust in mankind. Such crimes are no less serious when the victim is an adult, but the latter is already equipped with a psychological immune system that might help him or her get over the pain and suffering. The assaulted child dies inside.

I feel no sympathy, no mercy for molesters; I despise and loathe these cowards who take advantage of a child's innocence to satisfy their narcissistic drive. Until proven otherwise-the burden of proof rests on the criminal's shoulders-I do not believe that rehabilitation is possible. I do know that in certain rare cases there appears to be a change in behaviour, at the cost of tremendous personal sacrifices and after a painful process. But certainly not as a result of some ridiculous prison therapy criminals agree to with the sole objective of improving their chances to get paroled.

Crimes of a sexual nature against children deserve the maximum sentence; those which leave them injured, mutilated or harmed in their physical or moral integrity should result in a life sentence for the offenders.

This brings me to publicly question once again the professional competence of the members of this inept organisation, namely the Parole Board.

I do not question the need for a parole monitoring body or its usefulness. Every western nation relies on such government agencies responsible for closely monitoring criminals in the community at large, until the end of their sentence.

However, I am extremely sceptical about the professional competence of the Parole Board members who are all political appointees.

This body has become the haven for the friends and survivors of defeated governments or governments reaching the end of their mandates, whichever the case. The good faith of these people in carrying out their duty is not at issue, but I cannot help but notice that the lack of professional hiring criteria sheds a cloud of doubt on the credibility of their decisions.

And yet, the Solicitor General has decided to entrust this board with the authority to release criminals convicted of abusing or raping children.

The board's job would amount in fact to reviewing the sentence imposed by the court. If at least the Solicitor General had given authority to the court to impose a prison sentence without parole in the afore-mentioned cases, we would be closer to a reform. But such is not the case.

The court already has the power to give very harsh sentences to child abusers. Every sexual crime involving children is punishable by penalties that the court should not hesitate to pass.

The court already has in hand all the elements necessary to determine the sentence. We will discuss later, probably at the end of the day, the amendments that Bill C-41 brings to sentencing principles. The court will have all the facts at hand and will be able to evaluate all the factors relevant to the case, including elements of the pre-sentence report describing in detail the personality of the accused.

I believe that by simply giving the courts the power to order that the sentence imposed be served completely before a criminal can be released, we could have achieved what the bill seeks to do.

I am against giving this new quasi-judicial role to an organization which has neither the stature nor the competence to assume such responsibility towards society. We must give the courts all the necessary latitude to reach the legislation's goals. Those were my comments, Mr. Speaker.