Madam Speaker, when I had to break off my speech yesterday to let the House proceed with the Orders of the Day, I was discussing the actual impact of Bill C-88 and, more particularly, clause 9 of the bill.
The wording of clause 9 allows for a very broad interpretation. For instance, the federal government would be able to intervene and impose retaliatory measures even when it is not a party to the dispute.
Although the Bloc Quebecois has always been in favour of free trade and, in fact, we cannot do otherwise but support this concept, when a clause like this one gives the federal government sweeping powers, we must object to adopting the bill as tabled, or at least to the wording of clause 9. In fact, this clause could lend itself to two very different interpretations.
One interpretation could result in the federal government's giving itself powers, because of its obligation under the agreement to have the option to impose retaliatory measures, in the event and only in the event it becomes an aggrieved party. We believe clause 9 does not provide this. In fact, the first part of clause 9 reads as follows:
(1) For the purpose of suspending benefits or imposing retaliatory measures of equivalent effect against a province pursuant to Article 1710 of the Agreement, the Governor in Council may, by order,-
So the federal government may intervene and impose a variety of measures, which I will not read in their entirety, but will simply summarize: suspend rights or privileges, modify the application of any federal law; extend the application of any federal law to a province or take any other measure it considers necessary.
As it stands, we could interpret the meaning. In the case where a party is found to be in the wrong, under the terms of article 1710 of the agreement, the federal government, whether it is a party to the dispute or not, will be entitled to impose retaliatory measures against the party in question. As we saw yesterday, the parties may be a province, the federal government or any third party with close ties to either the province or the federal government.
We also pointed out yesterday that, because of its spending power, the federal government was already meddling in many areas or activities that are strictly provincial in jurisdiction and already had considerable latitude because of the way the parties were defined. Because of the considerable latitude it already enjoys under the definition of "federal government", it would be superfluous to add more here and permit the federal government to intervene even when it is not an aggrieved party. We believe this interpretation is contrary to the intent of the agreement.
The agreement does not, in fact, provide that the federal government may impose retaliatory measures against an injuring party. It could do so only if it was recognized as an injured party in this dispute.
The second possible interpretation of this provision, and the one with which we might agree, is that if the federal government wanted to retaliate against a party at fault pursuant to article 1710 of the agreement, it could do so only as the injured party in the dispute.
If this is what this provision means, we might agree. However, since the wording may be ambiguous and leave room for interpretation, we would like to clarify this paragraph by amending it so that if the federal government is recognized as a party injured by a measure imposed by another party in violation of the agreement, the governor in council may, by order and pursuant to article 1710 of the agreement, take the measures as listed in clause 9. This is our first comment regarding clause 9.
Another point I wish to raise is that the range of retaliatory measures of which the federal government may avail itself pursuant to clause 9 of the bill is much too broad.
By giving itself the power to modify or suspend the application of any federal law with respect to the province, to extend the application of any federal law to the province, or to take any other measure deemed necessary, the federal government is granting itself inordinate retaliatory powers that may affect the entire population of a province. The problem is that the federal government's legislative power affects all Canadians and that it already imposes laws on the provinces. These powers are denied to the provinces and we think in this case that, once again, this article could allow the federal government to impose its will on the provinces.
The federal government's retaliatory powers should be strictly limited to the trade areas already defined in the agreement. So, if we agreed on these restrictions, the federal government could no longer retaliate in social areas and go after the Canada social transfer, for example.
For the Bloc Quebecois, this is another way of looking at this article, which we regard as very important.
Finally, I would like to point out another controversial aspect of this bill. Clause 14 of this bill deals with the powers of appointment.
The governor in council may, by order, appoint any person to fill any position that may be necessary or advisable, in the opinion of the governor in council, for carrying out the purposes of the agreement.
Again, as in many other areas, the Bloc Quebecois thinks that these appointments should be ratified by the House of Commons instead of simply requiring an order of the governor in council. As in the case of appointments to several important boards, which are ratified by the House of Commons, we feel that-in this case involving billions of dollars in interprovincial trade subject to this act, this agreement-it is very important that all appointments be made public and subject to some scrutiny by the House. In fact, we ask that these appointments be made or suggested by the governor, but that they be systematically ratified by the House of Commons.
Those are the three points I wanted to raise with respect to clause 9.