Joe Comuzzi

[Pearson International Airport Agreements Act, April 26th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, I would very much like to comment on that and I am pleased to hear the member say that we do not need a royal commission.

His question is so timely. We had a meeting this morning of the steering committee on transport. The Reform Party had I think two representatives there and we agreed unanimously that what we want the transport committee of the House of Commons to do is go into as much detail as we possibly can, to get as much information as we possibly can, to put it out on the table as fast as we can so that through this medium people in this House and people in this country will know exactly what kind of process was ongoing to strike that kind of deal that interfered with the rights of Canadians.

I hope that we can all learn a lesson on this side and on the member's side that we should never, if we represent the people in this country properly, allow ourselves to get into that kind of negotiating process again. I would be very upset if I saw anyone in this House get into that type of process of negotiation with such lobbying and such influence that it would be embarrassing to be a member of this government.

I welcome that question. The information that the member is requesting will be forthcoming through the Standing Committee on Transport and his membership in his party.

[Pearson International Airport Agreements Act, April 26th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, perhaps I did not make myself clear at the outset of my intervention today. I am not defending anything that went on in the past. I feel as my colleague does that there were a lot of things that went on with respect to the privatization concept that may one day be exposed.

I do not think that is our job today. I think our responsibility here today is to get on with the problem of deciding if there is compensation to a party, Pearson Development Corporation. Leave the problems of the workings of government and how they evolved for another day so it does not hamper what we want to do immediately. I have nothing to hide nor does this government have anything to hide with what we have done.

If there is anyone who wants to hide anything I would suggest to my colleagues that the previous government should be answering to how it got us into this position at Pearson Development Corporation up to this point.

All we are trying to do, and I impress this upon my friend, is clean up a mess. A royal commission, I suspect that is what my friend is alluding to.-What is a royal commission? A royal commission is four, five or half a dozen independent people who have not perhaps been exposed to the problem before. They are funded. What is the price of a royal commission today? The last one I saw on transportation policy came out to be $22 million. Do we need that type of venture today? Do we need that type of inquisition in order to tell us something that we already know? Are we prepared to spend that kind of money? We will have a report in 18 months or 24 months-that is what it takes to have a royal commission now-on something we already know.

I understand. I sympathize. I appreciate the comments the member just made but I am saying let us get on with the job. Get this thing over with and not only work here for Pearson International Airport, but work on behalf of every airport in this country.

[Pearson International Airport Agreements Act, April 26th, 1994]

A real monopoly in Canada's main hub, the largest airport and our pride and joy in Canada. That move was just unconscionable.

We in the government kept expressing our displeasure at what we saw happening at the Pearson airport complex. We stated throughout the election, including when we were approaching October, that the Pearson privatization was not a rational, logical proposal for the public interests of Canada.

What was proposed for all other airports in the country was to put every one of them under what we called local airport authorities. That vested the local airport in each of our communities under a local control made up of non-profit oriented business people, men and women who would operate the airports in the best interests of their communities. That was not a bad idea and we supported that legislation.

We asked the government of the day why, if local airport authorities were all right for Vancouver, Edmonton, Calgary, Winnipeg, Mirabel, Dorval and other airports in the country, they would not be good for Pearson International Airport.

The reason was simply that we were having a difficult time getting along with all of the jurisdictions that surround Pearson airport at the municipal level. That did not wash.

The second reason was that Pearson was such a strong international airport that it could not be left to the control of a local authority, although that did not apply to Dorval, Winnipeg, Edmonton, Calgary or Vancouver. The whole concept never ever made any sense.

Those who knew about it most were those who eventually evolved from Paxport into Pearson Development Corporation. In June, July, August and September 1993 the issue became hotter and hotter on the political stage. Time does not allow me, Mr. Speaker, to give you some insight into the lengthy meetings with the lobbyists.

Former ministers of the government were getting into the bargaining process with the Pearson Development Corporation and the Department of Transport. When the lobbyists found out that it was slipping away they entered into a contract knowing full well that if there was going to be a change in government, the Pearson deal was going to be cancelled. That was the first move this government made and I am thankful that it was.

That brings us to where we are today. My colleagues in the House and I suspect that within the next four to eight weeks the Pearson deal will be cut, finished once and for all, and we can get on to doing the things that are necessary at Pearson airport not only for the benefit of metro Toronto and southwestern Ontario but for the benefit of the travelling public in Canada as a whole.

When we get rid of this problem and through to the eventual climax, we must look at the contractual arrangement that was entered into. A contract was signed on October 7 or October 8, 20 days before the election. That in itself was unconscionable. We talked today in the House about awarding compensation. Our minister, who is much more generous than a lot of us on this side of the House, said the government is not going to pay for lost profits and lobbying fees but it will look at out of pocket expenses in so far as the proposals were concerned.

Are we looking at the cost of making the proposals by the British Airport Authority which made an excellent proposal but was not given the opportunity to bid with any degree of certainty?

If we look at Pearson Development Corporation it is only just, equitable and right that we look at what the British Airport Authority did in trying to present its best proposal to the House and to the government of the day. We must also look at the other proposals that were made and see what costs were borne by them. That is just, that is equitable and that is right.

To be exclusive in looking at compensation for out of pocket expenses for Pearson Development Corporation alone is not the right thing to do. We should take in the whole gamut of all those who spent considerable time and expense in developing proposals.

In conclusion, I trust that in the next four to eight weeks my colleagues on all sides of the House will be happy to get this problem over with as quickly as possible in order to get on with the decision as to whether we need a north-south runway at Pearson and deal with the problems associated with two extra east-west runways. Let us get on with the problem of what is going to happen to terminal 1. Should it be refurbished? It is a very good airport and accommodates eight or nine million people a year very comfortably.

In so far as transportation requirements are concerned in the country, we have to start to get on track. We are being superseded by communities that are not even half the size of Toronto. We are falling backward because we are failing to act and failing to do what is necessary in not only airport transportation but in passenger rail service and finding an economical way of getting our goods to market so that we can be globally competitive.

I implore all of my colleagues on all sides of the House, let us get down to business, let us get Pearson over with as fast as we can, let us get on with making Pearson a world class airport that we can all be proud of. I know the government with the support of our people on the other side will work toward this very fundamental, vital role for this airport that will be to the benefit of all of us.

[Pearson International Airport Agreements Act, April 26th, 1994]

Then Paxport disappeared, the one that was operating with favour. Where did it resurrect itself? Pearson Development Corporation. All of a sudden, having been given assurances by the government of the day that there would be competition at the airport in Toronto, as the government was getting close to awarding the tender we found that there was going to be no competition at Pearson International Airport. In fact the three terminals, terminal 3 which was called Trillium, terminal 2 and terminal 1, would all be under the direct control of Pearson Development Corporation.

[Pearson International Airport Agreements Act, April 26th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to discuss Bill C-22 today. The essence of the bill is to put a fence around the problems surrounding the development of Canada's largest airport for the last number of years. It not only puts a fence around the problem in delineating a timeframe but it also goes on to speak about the type of compensation, if any, which is to be allowed to the successful bidders.

In the minister's statements today, lobbying fees, other costs and loss of profit are not going to be considered in the eventual solution to this problem.

It is interesting and I say with pride that there has been some continuity in the Liberal Party. From its inception we have opposed the concept of privatizing Pearson airport, even when we were sitting on that side of the House.

On June 12, 1989 in the recommendations of the federal caucus task force on the future of Pearson International Airport, my colleague who spoke a few moments ago stated in part: "It should never be allowed that Pearson be privatized. It should always remain as a viable and important part of the infrastructure of Canada. It should always be used for the public policy and in the public interest of all Canadians". That was in a report made by my colleague as far back as 1989.

This problem had its genesis when the government of the day decided it should privatize a new terminal that was being built at Pearson. As a result of that process a private consortium was allowed to build what we now know as Trillium or terminal 3.

To this day, as hard as we worked when we were in opposition to find out the terms of that contractual arrangement between the owners of Trillium and the government of the day, we were not made privy to that very important document that allowed the first privatized terminal at Pearson airport.

We were told at the time that the reason for the privatization of terminal 3 was that Canadians did not have the means by which to expand airport facilities in that area. That had some semblance of accuracy. However we failed to realize at that time that terminal 1 could have been made into a more efficient airport with the expenditure of a few million dollars for modernization.

As they got on with the building and prior to the opening of terminal 3 we were advised that there was a move afoot to privatize terminals 1 and 2. The reason was that the government wanted, and this is a very important concept, to provide a competitive factor at Pearson International Airport in order to keep in balance the privatized interests that were operating at terminal 3 and terminals 1 and 2 under another entirely different corporate structure. This was to bring some balance for the best interest of the consumer who was travelling in and out of that airport. That was the reason it came forward with the privatization concept of terminals 1 and 2.

We had some concerns about the privatization concept. As a result of that the Liberals while on that side of the House entered into another task force proposal. That was done on September 12, 1990, one year after the first proposal. We found that the contract for terminal 3 had been entered into but there had not at that time been any designation of any airline that would use that airport.

I will quote from some of our findings of that task force. Please recall that in 1990 the airlines, as they are today, were experiencing severe financial difficulties. Part of the findings were that the airlines in the country, particularly Canadian, faced the dilemma that operationally it could not use terminal 3. At the same time Canadian could not afford to move into that airport. It would have been a financial disaster. That came from one of the leaders of the Canadian airline industry at that time.

We found as a result of that study in 1990, and these feelings were expressed in the House just prior to the opening of Trillium, that the cost of flying into terminal 3 would be prohibitive to the average Canadian consumer. Those of us who sometimes travel at government expense perhaps do not not

realize the cost of travelling as much as we should. However the cost of going into terminal 3 would have been prohibitive to the average Canadian wage earner in the country flying with his family or wanting to see the rest of Canada.

We knew that exorbitant rental fees were being charged. After terminal 3 opened there was almost a rebellion by everyone renting space in terminal 3. The costs of leases to the airlines and the the retailers were passed on to the travelling customer.

If terminals 1 and 2 are privatized, price increases can be expected for every consumer. Terminal 3 will set the pattern for terminals 1 and 2 should privatization be allowed. Either way, whether it is privatization with one consortium of terminal 3 and privatization by another corporate citizen of terminals 1 and 2, there will be one inevitable conclusion: The cost of travelling into Toronto, the largest airport in the country, will increase substantially. Those were our findings. Those were our recommendations. The government carried on, although we were sincere in trying to get it to change its mind.

Let us see what happened after that. All of a sudden people showed up at some of our offices, including I am sure the office of my colleague who just spoke, saying: "We want to show you our proposal". This was long before the government asked for proposals for the privatization of terminals 1 and 2.

In 1991 people came to my office and said: "We would like to show you our proposals for terminals 1 and 2". I told them the government had not asked for proposals. The answer was: "Yes, but we are anticipating that this government is going to ask for proposals for privatization".

Finally, I believe in March 1992, the government asked for formal presentations for proposals for the privatization of terminals 1 and 2. As a result three proposals were made. The first proposal was by the then owners of terminal 3. That was not met with much favour because of the competitive factor that we wanted to maintain between terminals 1 and 3.

A very good proposal was submitted by the British Airport Authority which operates the airports in England and other places on the continent. It had some very good ideas that I think we should incorporate into what we are trying to do at Pearson today. However its proposal was shortlived. It did not meet with favour.

The third proposal was from a company called Paxport. Paxport always seemed to have the inside track for whatever reason. Eventually, as these proposal were being discussed, Air Canada made it known that Paxport made a proposal that interested it most and since it was operating exclusively out of terminal 2, Paxport was the proposal it would entertain.

Going back to the original statement, competitiveness was always a factor in the privatization of terminals 1 and 2. The Paxport proposal was looked on with favour by Air Canada. Eventually something else happened.

Terminal 3 was taken over by a corporation called Pearson Development Corporation. The previous owner sold out interest to Pearson Development Corporation.

[Transportation, April 25th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, we hear today that Canada's recovery and renewal are based on the new electronic highway. That may be so but we cannot forget that Canada was built by our farmers, by our miners, by our fishermen, by our forestry workers and by our manufacturers mainly in the automobile business.

That is where the majority of jobs were, that is where the majority of jobs are today and that is where the majority of the jobs will be in the future.

This government can assist all of those industries by getting their products to the global market by a fast economical and Canadian transportation system.

Is it not time that we develop a transportation policy for Canada that will change these goals and get all Canadians back to work?

[St. Lawrence Seaway, April 20th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, my question is for the parliamentary secretary for transport.

The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence seaway is a viable economic route. It is economic and it is friendly to the environment. Unfortunately there is predatory and very unfair pricing by the railroads of Canada when competing against commodities being shipped by the St. Lawrence seaway and into the St. Lawrence seaway system.

The railways in the country do that by and large by the almost one billion dollars a year they receive in subsidy.

When will the government stop this abuse of this transportation subsidy? When will it maximize the return to the farmer where it should be? When will it create a level playing field for all modes of transportation in the country in which to compete?

[Points Of Order, April 12th, 1994]

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I remind the Minister of Canadian Heritage that if he is going to North Bay to look for the World Nordic Games he won't find them.

[World Nordic Games, April 12th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Minister of Canadian Heritage.

In March 1995 Thunder Bay will host the World Nordic Games. Our community, through the great work of all the volunteers, has worked very hard for the last four years to make sure that this event is an international success. The city and the province have also committed over $8 million, but unfortunately the federal government has failed to even come close to this amount, in fact less than a quarter.

Since the games are less than a year away, I ask the minister how much he is going to commit financially today to the Nordic Games, when will he make that commitment, and when will he announce what services will be provided so that the people who are involved in this process can get on with their job of making it a success?

[Budget Implementation Act, 1994, April 11th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, I rise after my friend who talked about 60 Minutes and As It Happens . There is some confusion here.

I am wondering if my colleague and friend from Edmonton Southwest would mind if I would change channels for a moment and talk about something he discussed about unemployment insurance.

His comments were, and I am sure my hon. colleague would like to correct this, that hundreds of thousands of people are milking the system in Canada who are on UI. I am sure he would like to rephrase that statement because although we acknowledge that there are some abuses in the UI system and there are ways we should correct the UI system, when we have the number of people we have in this country collecting UI while they are looking for other jobs they are very honourable and very fine Canadians who are out looking for work.

I enjoyed very much the personal experience that my colleague had the opportunity to bring to the attention of this House but I would like him to correct if he would the misconception that there are hundreds of thousands of people in Canada who are milking the UI system.