Jean-Marc Jacob

[Supply, March 23rd, 1995]

Madam Speaker, I would like to comment on what the hon. member for Calgary West said.

He indicated in his remarks that the Bloc Quebecois was very open to defence cuts as long as there are not made in Quebec's back yard. I would like to tell him that for nearly 15 years, Quebec has been hit by every new set of defence cuts. I would also like to point out that a study commissioned by Canadian Forces General Addy at National Defence Headquarters and just released in December 1994 shows Quebec's distinct disadvantage over the past 15 years.

Even a 20 per cent reduction in overall DND infrastructures, except in Quebec, would not correspond to Quebec's population or contribution to the budget. I have had enough of this "not in our back yard" business, because we have been at a disadvantage for 15 years.

[Supply, March 23rd, 1995]

Just a short comment, Madam Speaker. There has indeed been much restructuring within the Canadian Forces. I wish to point out to the parliamentary secretary that in December 1994, the Auditor General and a few generals appeared before the supply and services committee-on which I sat-to talk about the awarding of certain contracts. I asked then Auditor General Peter Kasurak, who deals with national defence data, if it was conceivable that better management could save close to $1 billion. I asked him to give me a yes or no answer. He said yes.

Therefore, I think that there are still improvements to be made and that is what the departments should try to do.

[Supply, March 23rd, 1995]

Madam Speaker, I will answer the hon. member for Saanich-Gulf Islands, perhaps with a grin. I do not claim that the minister can be lumped in with the bureaucracy of the Canadian Armed Forces, except on a level of responsibility, because everyone and anyone knows that ministers are responsible for the decisions made in their departments. Regarding this issue, I would like to refer you to the Auditor General's 1992 report, which pointed out several administrative problems and bureaucratic shortcomings in his critique of the national defence administration.

The Auditor General repeated the exercise in November 1994, pointing out several shortcomings in the Canadian army. In this sense, I think that the minister should be held responsible for not having trimmed the bureaucracy enough and fixed the administrative problems at National Defence, and for having missed out on potential savings in his last budget. Instead, he went full tilt in the direction of closing or reducing bases, but nowhere is there any evidence that he really intends to address the problems within the administration, which employs approximately 70,000 military staff with 30,000 civilian support staff to back them up at the Department of National Defence.

When I see a member of the armed forces getting paid more to do the same job as a civilian, I wonder about the administration, or, rather, its efficiency. That is why I was saying that there are many problems with the administration of the Canadian Armed Forces and they are brought up very rarely. Very often, we hear members of the government say that all is well in the army, that there is no problem and they never criticize the army.

In closing, I would just like to quote an English newspaper article on the armed forces, which was run about four or five months ago. The journalist said that "armed forces know no master".

[Supply, March 23rd, 1995]

Madam Speaker, I said civilianization and not civilization. I will explain what I meant. When I talk of civilianization, I mean that there are civilians working at National Defence, but there are also members of the military who work from 9 to 5. I have nothing against that.

I would like to remind the parliamentary secretary that Canada's peace missions, generally brilliantly conducted, use less than 10 per cent of the total potential of our armed forces. We did indeed go to the former Yugoslavia with the parliamentary secretary and we saw soldiers working 24 hours a day. They did an excellent job, and I congratulate them on it.

However, we must remember that, within the Canadian Armed Forces, there are barely 9,000 privates and more than 32,000 corporals and sergeants. I will spare you the number of colonels, lieutenant colonels and generals. Only privates, corporals and sergeants go out in the field. These people, I grant you, do excellent work, and I admire them. I have been able to see this for myself, on site.

What I would like to say, however, is that, when people do civilian work from 9 to 5, whether they push pencils or complete forms,-I might make an aside here to point out that the Auditor General said the army should remodel its administration due to the many forms required for a decision to be made-this is what I meant when I said that, when pencil pushers or 9 to 5 civil servants are sent on a mission, on the seas, in the air or elsewhere, they should be paid a bonus, because they have lost, if you will, all their training, since they have become clerks and not soldiers.

[Supply, March 23rd, 1995]

Madam Speaker, from the outset, I want to say that I will keep to the motion tabled by the hon. member for Saanich-Gulf Islands. I intend to support this motion so long as it meets the demands of the Bloc Quebecois. In this regard, I indicated my approval at the Minister of Defence's announcement of the establishment of the commission of inquiry and I congratulate him for setting it up. I also congratulate him on his choice of commissioners.

However, as I indicated to the press, I find the mandate of the commission relatively limited and I will explain why. We would clearly tend to support a request by the hon. member for Saanich-Gulf Islands to broaden the commission of inquiry's mandate. However, before I go on to explain, I would mention that I was listening earlier to the Minister of Defence praising and very clearly applauding the fine actions of the Canadian military over the years. He expressed surprise that members of this House tended to frequently criticize the army and find fault with it without perhaps knowing much about it.

I would like to respond to the Minister of Defence by saying that, unfortunately, at times, the better one knows a subject, the more one tends to criticize. The reason is that, like everyone who has spoken on this matter, I believe the armed forces have performed courageous feats of arms and have a reputation for pride and courage earned on a number of occasions.

However, some people try to hide behind the fine reputation of the armed forces. In my opinion, they must be weeded out, like bad apples.

For a number of months, I believed that the Minister of Defence really intended carrying out what we might call a purge at the Department of National Defence. But when I heard him talk this morning, I was a little less sure and was disappointed to see that he does not intend to take the issue any further than he has.

To prove my point, I traced back the development of the Airborne Regiment in Petawawa since it was founded in 1968. From the very beginning, it has welcomed infantry soldiers from three other regiments. Now I will get into how military tradition and reputation shaped the regiment.

Normally, it is the officers and commanding officers who mold a regiment to their image for a specific mission. One of the Airborne Regiment's first commanders was General Vernon, who served in the years 1975, 1977 and 1978.

In the early 1980s, many problems were reported around the base at Petawawa. I regret, by the way, that the hon. member who represents the base did not give us any examples. In fact, police reports show that many brawls and fights were caused by members of the Airborne while they were under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

I will continue reciting the regiment's evolution. The pranks and escapades which have occurred there from day one were

never any secret. By the way, on a few occasions, they were even brought to the minister's attention here in the House.

The Petawawa base is not only home to the Airborne Regiment, but also to other members of the military and other soldiers who are not necessarily part of the Airborne's second commando. On this base, people have been seen marching around carrying white supremacist flags or wearing Ku Klux Klan armbands and there have even been disgraceful scenes, skirmishes and fist fights, in the officers' mess, to the full knowledge of the commanding officers of this base. I found no evidence whatsoever that anyone of rank was ever reprimanded.

For the sake of troop morale, it would be a little difficult for officers to lay blame on one soldier in particular when they themselves were not always innocent. As I said earlier, and I stress, a regiment generally is the reflection of the officers who command the soldiers and who train them for certain operations or missions.

In light of the mission it was to undertake, the Airborne Regiment is an elite, overtrained regiment with superior physical and mental endurance.

When we learn of incidents like those that occurred in Somalia-it is important to underline that some events occurred before the Airborne was deployed-, what I find disturbing about the board of inquiry set up by the minister is that these events will probably be overlooked, as I understood from the board of inquiry's terms of reference.

The board's mandate is limited to the deployment of the regiment in Somalia, before departure, during the mission and afterwards. But the regiment did not spring up overnight. It evolved over the years.

I wish to remind you that one of the individuals accused of misconduct in Somalia, Captain Rainville, had previously been responsible for an incident at the Citadelle in Quebec City, which had been reported by that city's municipal police. He held a command post in Somalia, and after he returned, there was a military police investigation, weapons were found at his home, and he was fined. When he appeared before a court-martial, the Citadelle incidents, which demonstrate this individual's violent and aggressive behaviour, were never brought up.

I think that these things should not be forgotten. When the regiment was deployed in Somalia, it was under the command of Colonel Morneault. Again, some documents show that Colonel Morneault recommended that the Airborne not be sent to Somalia because it was not yet ready. According to Colonel Morneault, the regiment's training and its moral or psychological strength were such that it was not yet fit to participate in such a mission.

What did they do for Colonel Morneault? They dismissed him. They went ahead and sent the regiment to Somalia. One of the first incidents in Somalia occurred in early January 1993. In January 1993, the military hierarchy was notified of leadership problems and of cases of misconduct within 2 Commando in Somalia. In particular, Major Seward, who was first fined for accidentally discharging his weapon and later served a written reprimand for promoting too aggressive action against the Somali.

Curiously enough, when HQ officials tour Somalia with former deputy minister Fowler a month or two later, in February or March of 1993, no problem was found, in terms of leadership or misconduct. On March 4, five or six days after HQ officials left, the famous video of a Somali man being killed and another one tortured was shot.

I have great trouble understanding that seasoned individuals in a position of authority, such as generals and deputy ministers, never realized there was something wrong with these regiments. It might be very difficult to admit that the very people who command and give our troops a sense of what is expected of them were unable to detect the problem, although it had been pointed out to them prior to their visit. The incidents occurred one week after their visit.

My point is that all that the Airborne's history says is that every commanding officer of the regiment was a good officer. The minister mentioned earlier that Lieutenant-Colonel Kenward, recipient of the Order of Merit, was among those who commanded the platoon, at the very time of the unfortunate incidents.

I find it strange that the commission of inquiry is limited to specific events and not allowed to investigate the actions of the officers who shaped this regiment and were followed.

It is also unfortunate that ultimately the only ones penalized by the dismantling of the Airborne are the soldiers sent back to other regiments, while the commanding officers have been reassigned to headquarters here, in Ottawa, with more or less unspecified duties.

This is why I support the motion tabled by the hon. member for Saanich-Gulf Islands. The minister should act, considering the many instances of spending-which could almost be qualified as ridiculous-within the Department of National Defence. Let me just give you the example of General Mike Vernon, the force commander in Ontario, who spent something like $562,000 on furniture for his office. Again, his superior officer covered up the whole thing.

We find out such things when members of the armed forces write to the official opposition critic for national defence issues, such as this corporal who wrote: "Be careful not to confuse the effect and the cause. All these stories of suicide in the armed forces, crimes in Somalia and hazing in the Airborne Regiment are only the symptoms of a greater problem. The reality is that the Canadian Forces, and particularly the combat units, are demoralized". There have been references to the poor leadership displayed by some commanders, etc., 2 Commando in Somalia, and 1 Commando.

When, within an army which a majority of people respect as a whole, non-commissioned officers point out very obvious problems, it is because a real malaise exists. There has been a lot of talk about the morale of the troops. I am trying to put myself in the shoes of a private. Several of them told me that it is difficult for them to accept the fact that an officer lives in a house valued at $650,000, and that the minister tells me that it is because this officer must act as a host for foreign visitors or generals. But generals here in Ottawa live in smaller houses than the one Lieutenant General Scott Clements lives in, in Winnipeg. The discrepancy between the treatment of combat troops and that of senior officers is probably one of the major causes of low morale in the armed forces.

When we consider, as the hon. member for Saanich-Gulf Islands pointed out, that some seamen tried to go on welfare because they had trouble making ends meet, and when we hear some officers say that you do not join the army to get rich, and we then look at the behaviour of senior officers and the way they sometimes waste money, it is easy to understand why the morale of the military is very difficult to maintain and why these people have lost all motivation. If the department will not or cannot clean up its act and get rid of some of its people, I do not think the situation can improve.

To continue my speech, it is very often said, and the hon. member for Saanich-Gulf Islands and the minister mentioned this as well, that the Department of National Defence has suffered many successive budget cuts. This is followed by some obvious questions: How are they going to play their role? How are they going to get equipment? How will they be able to carry out their mission?

Initially, I found these arguments persuasive, but when we examined the National Defence budget, the Auditor General pointed out several items-infrastructure management, for instance-where the Department of National Defence could easily have saved between 100 and 125 million dollars through better management. If we look at communications, between 325 and 400 million dollars could have been saved on total procurement over a period of three years. Almost every time the Department of National Defence orders or draws up an estimate for the purchase of materiel or equipment or labour, there is always a cost overrun.

Two days ago, we were talking about the CSE in the House, and I gave examples of estimates where the cost overrun had been as much as 120 per cent on equipment purchased by the Department of National Defence. I think the department should start by cleaning up its management procedures and eliminating certain individuals who are no longer performing as they should.

I may add that in the Canadian Forces, there are senior officers and non-commissioned officers who would gladly see the end of the situation that exists within the forces and get rid of certain individuals they have identified, but not publicly, because it would hurt their careers. I think it is very sad that some people will not take this responsibility because it might have an impact on their careers. I would say that the Canadian Forces suffer from two evils that are eroding them from within. First, the military bureaucracy. Nearly one half of the forces are in their offices from 9 to 5 and must be paid a premium when they are on a mission. Are they still soldiers?

Second,-and this is not flattering for politicians-the politicization of the Defence Staff. Because it would hurt their careers, they make no major decisions and will not criticize one of their colleagues or subordinates because that might hurt the individual or his or her career. When we have reached that stage, I think the rot is widespread, but there are still some very good people in the armed forces.

A recent poll conducted nation-wide revealed that 48 per cent of Canadians are starting to have doubts about the quality and value of our armed forces, since the latest revelations concerning national defence. I think it is up to the government to improve the self-esteem of the Canadian Forces by extending the mandate of the commission of inquiry to cover all individuals who in some way have tarnished the reputation of the Canadian military.

[National Defence, March 22nd, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, given that the minister undertook to bring all of the despicable events at Petawawa to light, are we to understand that the initiation rites and the display of the flag symbolizing white supremacy and the banner of the Klu Klux Klan openly and with the knowledge of senior officers constituted preparation for the mission to Somalia and will therefore be investigated?

[National Defence, March 22nd, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Minister of Defence.

Yesterday, the Minister of Defence announced the creation of a commission of inquiry on the deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia. However, despite repeated requests from the official opposition, the minister refuses to broaden the commission's terms of reference to include other troubling events that have occurred at the Petawawa base.

How does the minister explain that the commission's terms of reference cover only the deployment of the Airborne Regiment in Somalia and that they contain no other provision regarding other events that have occurred at Petawawa and that have considerably sullied the reputation and the honour of the Canadian Forces?

[Communications Security Establishment, March 21st, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, on March 14, I asked the Minister of National Defence about the dwindling enrolment in the Saint-Jean Royal Military College. His reply, which surprised me, was extraordinary because of its contradictory nature.

In fact, in the first part of his reply, the minister says that the state of the economy is causing enrolment to decline. A farfetched argument which does not jive with reality or with the history of Canada's three officer cadet colleges, because during an economic crisis the proportion of enrolment requests for officer colleges compared with the number of requests to become a soldier changes. As usual, the minister is trying to compare apples to oranges.

In the second part of his reply, the minister really went too far by blaming the weak enrolment on the official opposition and the Government of Quebec.

I think it is time to render unto Caesar what is Caesar's. I will explain. On February 22, 1994, the Minister of National Defence announced that the Saint-Jean Royal Military College and the Royal Roads of Victoria would be closed under the pretext of savings, although, of all three colleges of the kind, the Saint-Jean Royal Military College was the least expensive to run.

The day after, on February 23, the minister shed crocodile tears over the closure of Royal Roads and the Saint-Jean Royal Military College and said that it was necessary to close them for the good management of national defence. If this really were the case, neither the Government of Quebec, which was Liberal then, nor the official opposition could have had any influence whatsoever on this decision. The decision to close the Saint-Jean Royal Military College was and still is entirely in the hands of the Minister of National Defence. He should stop playing

childish political games and assume full responsibility for the decision he and his government have made.

The defence minister and the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs are really laying it on thick when they try to blame the Quebec government and the Bloc Quebecois. Many English-speaking officers have already pointed out that it was a bad decision. Those who make a bad decision and are not mature enough to accept responsibility for it blame others, as the minister is doing.

Furthermore, the minister contradicts himself in his March 14 responses. In his first answer, he says that recruitment is down because the economy is buoyant, adding that "the normal group of people who would be attracted to the armed forces has found other options". In his second answer, he says that "because of the uncertainty surrounding the disposition of the site of the former college at St-Jean, the advertising-was delayed a number of weeks-[but] recruitment is picking up".

The buoyant economy given as one of the reasons for declining enrolment in his first answer does not appear in his second answer. This buoyant economy must have been very fragile since it only lasted two minutes. For example, the Minister of National Defence also says, at the end of his second answer, and I quote: "Twenty seven per cent of members of the armed forces are francophone and fully 24 per cent of all senior officers are francophone". A senior officer is not a corporal or a sergeant, but a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, a brigadier-general, a major-general, a lieutenant-general or a general.

Only 14.7 per cent of generals and 21 per cent of colonels are French-speaking. I wonder where the minister's figure of 24 per cent comes from, unless he is referring to non-commissioned officers. This shows once again that the minister says what he pleases, without bothering to check the facts.

In conclusion, the minister is inviting me to visit the department and the Headquarters here in Ottawa, and see for myself that people work in French as well as in English. I ask the minister to stop making fun of French-speaking Canadians by uttering such nonsense. I did visit the department on several occasions and what he says is not true, nor is it true as regards the Kingston College, which is not bilingual and which will not become so.

[Communications Security Establishment, March 21st, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, as someone said earlier, the member for Bellechasse withdraws his amendment and subscribes to the amendment presented by the member for Scarborough-Rouge River, which we, members of the Bloc, intend to support, as I have already said.

Listening to the speech made earlier by the parliamentary secretary to the Minister of National Defence, I asked myself a few questions on the meaning of what the member said about the CSE being accountable to the Department of National Defence at the administrative level and to the clerk with respect to its role and its latitude, so to speak. I find it a bit strange that we count on the Department of Defence to monitor the administration of the CSE.

I made the effort to do some research in the Defence budget and I will give you a few examples which are very obvious when we find out that it was the Department of Defence which monitored the CSE.

I noted a case concerning the acquisition of a Secure Telephone System-Phase 1 for which the estimate was established at $8,824,000. When the acquisition was made, the cost rose to $14,151,000, 61 per cent higher. It was the role of the Department of Defence to monitor the CSE's administrative costs.

Here is another example. From April 1 to March 31, 1993, money was invested in a Restricted Access System for which the estimate was initially established at $23 million. When the acquisition was made, the system's cost shot up to $51 million, 117 per cent over budget. And it was still under the administrative responsibility of the Department of Defence.

One more example. On March 31, 1994, work was finished on an integrated teleinformatics network, approximately 75 per cent of which was for the use of the CSE. The projected cost was $41,650,000, but it ended up costing the modest sum of $78 million. That was also a project under the administrative control of the National Defence.

I have many more similar examples of purchases of highly sophisticated electronic surveillance or telephone equipment, software, etc. Like many other stakeholders in this issue, we have determined that the CSE was to serve the Department of Foreign Affairs, the RCMP and also the Department of National Defence, that its main function was to collect information from communications outside Canada, but that it was not ever supposed to collect information from communications happening within Canada. However, the official opposition signalled several cases where it had done so and the Prime Minister denied it at first. Afterwards, he said that orders had been given so that it would never happen again and that was corroborated by the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence.

The Minister of Defence also said that the CSE was under his trusteeship, and that of his deputy minister, and that no other form of control was necessary since we knew very well what was the role of the CSE, the Communications Security Establishment, and that in no way, shape or form could there ever be some

eavesdropping into communications between Canadians or within the boundaries of Canada. And now, a Liberal member presents a motion for the review of the CSE operations and the Bloc Quebecois and the Reform Party support it. I support this motion wholeheartedly and I will even add that, in my opinion, this motion is a very positive statement that should lead to the monitoring of the CSE operations. That is very important.

I would also like to add that this is only a motion.

Will we take the discussion further and really pass legislation to monitor the actions of the Communications Security Establishment? As I was illustrating with some examples, on the administrative level, I am not sure that the monitoring by the Department of Defence is adequate.

I have quoted four or five examples where spending of millions of dollars had almost doubled on three occasions, and more than doubled on a fourth one. When this motion is unanimously passed in the House, it will be important to follow it up and to pass legislation which will allow for the management of the administrative aspect as well as the specific role of the CSE. We will then be able to monitor its interference in Canadian communications in order to insure that it does not intrude in the private lives of citizens, parliamentarians, business executives or other prominent people who may be asked to make decisions and whom the CSE could follow closely and sometimes monitor or report on, providing information which, under our Canadian system, is not acceptable.

In conclusion, I would like to say that we support this motion. However, I would like to indicate that, unfortunately, we will have to return, in this motion, and probably in this bill, to the administrative deficiencies within the Department of Defence which the Auditor General has raised on several occasions.

When we see in the budget of the defense department that the costs allocated to the CST may vary between $200 and $255 million because Defense budgets contain some sophisticated material which will be used by the CST and for the communications of the defense department, I believe that a separation of some sort between these two elements should be integrated in the bill which will follow this motion. This will allow for a better control of the CST spending which, I believe, is sort of lost and not well administered by the Department of Defense since in the maze of acquisition of certain material too modern or ultramodern, it is impossible to say if the material is used at 100 per cent by the CST or at 20 per cent by the Department of Defense for the Navy or the Air Force.

I have read the last five year budgets and I had some difficulty understanding in each case what was linked to the CST. I believe that situation should be clarified in order to avoid that a budget be assessed at $200 or $250 million and be confronted, after an evaluation for the acquisition of material, to increases of more that 112 to 117 per cent at the time this material is acquired.

[Low Level Flights, March 20th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, the Innu held a protest on Parliament Hill last Saturday to denounce the recommendations of the environmental assessment panel reviewing low level flights in Labrador and Northern Quebec.

The Bloc Quebecois joins the Innu in denouncing the contradictory recommendations of the panel who admits in its report the need for further study of the impacts on the health of human and animal populations, yet recommends that twice as many

flights be allowed, thereby jeopardizing the fragile balance of the Arctic environment.

This review offhandedly casts aside the legitimate concerns of those who face daily the stress caused by such flights. Under these circumstances, the Canadian government must flatly reject this report and start a new scientific process which, this time, will take into account the demands of the environmentalists and the local people.