Paul MacKlin

[Protection of the Unborn Child, May 23rd, 2002]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak to the motion brought forward by the hon. member for Yorkton--Melville.

The motion calls for the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights to review the current definition of a human being in subsection 223(1) of the criminal code. The motion raises the issue of the point at which a fetus becomes a human being and whether the current definition of human being complies with the United Nations convention on the rights of the child.

I cannot support the motion. The views of Canadians diverge significantly on the rights of the fetus. The very question raises a whole host of issues with moral, social, economic, health and legal implications. Achieving consensus on an issue that touches on so many fundamental values in Canadian society is an extremely difficult task.

The hon. member for Yorkton--Melville raises the issue of whether the current definition of a human being is consistent with the United Nations convention on the rights of the child. The United Nations convention on the rights of the child, which Canada ratified, does not address the issue of when a child's life begins. It was not an oversight but rather recognition of the fact that each country must determine the issue for itself based on a balancing of a number of fundamental values.

The Supreme Court of Canada commented on the rights of the fetus in two key decisions: the Dobson decision and the Winnipeg Child and Family Services decision.

In the latter decision, the supreme court questioned whether a pregnant woman could be confined and treated against her will in order to protect the fetus. The court held that child protection was an area of provincial responsibility, particularly if the decision affected provincial child welfare laws. The court also held that any attempt to address the rights of the fetus must be balanced with the rights of the pregnant woman.

We have reached a delicate balance in Canada. The definition of a human being in the criminal code states that:

A child becomes a human being with the meaning of this Act when it has completely proceeded, in a living state, from the body of its mother...”

The criminal code provides a certain degree of protection to the fetus by stating that a person commits homicide by killing an unborn child in the act of birth, under certain conditions. For example, section 238 creates the offence of killing an unborn child in the act of birth. This offence applies even though the child has not yet technically met the definition of a human being.

These provisions properly balance the need to protect the fetus and the circumstances of the pregnant woman, her rights, interests, and claim to protection in Canadian society. Any change to the definition of human being in the criminal code could have the effect of criminalizing abortion.

When the provision of the criminal code dealing with abortion was struck down by the supreme court in January 1988, parliamentarians endeavoured to find a basis of agreement that respected differing opinions and constitutional guarantees. Members will recall that Bill C-43, an act respecting abortion, was defeated in the Senate on January 31, 1991, on the basis of a 43:43 vote.

The absence of a criminal law on abortion does not mean that a legislative or legal vacuum exists. The delivery of abortion services is currently regulated by provincial governments who are responsible for the delivery of health care services, and by the standards set by the medical profession itself.

The majority of Canadians are satisfied with this division of regulatory responsibilities and that abortion is regulated as a health and medical matter, and not a criminal matter.

Motion No. 392 clearly touches upon some of the most fundamental moral, social, economic, health and legal questions. These questions often come down to our own fundamental and personal values. It is the responsibility of the government to examine these fundamental questions and strive to achieve some balance between the competing views.

This is what parliament and the provincial legislatures have done since 1991 on the issue of abortion. This is precisely the same approach of the government on the issue of when a child becomes a human being. We believe that a majority of Canadians are comfortable with this approach. We have balanced the rights of the fetus with the rights of the pregnant woman. We have done so in a way that is consistent with our international obligations. We have also committed not to criminalize a woman's right to make choices regarding her physical and mental health.

Given the delicate balancing that was required to get to where we are today, I cannot support opening up the definition of a human being in the criminal code. For these reasons I am unable to support the motion.

[Criminal Code, May 22nd, 2002]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak to Bill C-386 introduced by the hon. member for Calgary East, an act to amend the criminal code dealing with breaking and entering. Last May an identical bill, Bill C-290, was debated at second reading and dropped from the order paper.

As was stated when the former bill was debated, the safety and security of Canadians in their own homes continues to be a key priority for the Government of Canada. The government has responded to concerns about home invasions through amendments to Bill C-15A, the criminal law amendment act, 2001 which is currently awaiting royal assent. The amendments to the criminal code indicate that where an offender's conduct is in the nature of a home invasion the court must consider it an aggravating factor when determining the sentence to be imposed.

Bill C-386 would amend paragraph 348(1)( d ) of the criminal code of Canada by providing for maximum penalties:

(i) in the case of a first offence, to imprisonment for life, or

(ii) in the case of a second or subsequent offence, to imprisonment for life or to a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than two years--

Section 348 of the criminal code currently makes it an offence to enter a place with intent to commit an indictable offence, to actually commit an indictable offence, or to have broken out of a place after having committed or intending to commit an indictable offence. The current maximum penalty for committing any of these acts in a dwelling place is life imprisonment. The offence of robbery also carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment.

I suspect most Canadians would be surprised that these offences attract such a severe maximum penalty. Surveys conducted by the Canadian Sentencing Commission in the mid-1980s showed that the public had little knowledge of either the maximum or minimum penalties and many people were surprised by the severity of the existing maxima.

The current maximum penalties for breaking and entering and robbery demonstrate that the government recognizes the conduct is of a serious nature which may have significant impacts on its victims. I might add that I know how it feels to have been a victim of a break and enter since I experienced it in my own home.

The sanctity of an individual's home as a place of safety free from intrusion has been recognized in common law for hundreds of years. It is in part for this reason that the criminal code offences of robbery and break and enter of a dwelling house are both subject to a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Section 718 of the criminal code provides that:

The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute...to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society--

The objectives of sentencing set out in the criminal code include denouncing unlawful conduct, deterring the offender and others from committing offences, and promoting a sense of responsibility in offenders and an acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and the community.

The government shares the concerns of Canadians with regard to the relatively new phenomenon of home invasion robberies; that is, robberies that occur when the home is occupied. Courts across Canada have been imposing stiff sentences for this type of crime that address the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence and highlight the importance of individuals being able to feel safe and secure in their own homes. The government's amendments to Bill C-15A signal that home invasions constitute serious conduct that should be met with significant penalties.

In addition to providing a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, which the criminal code already does for breaking and entering in a dwelling house for robbery, Bill C-386 would provide that a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of two years be imposed in the case of a second or subsequent offence.

Canada has historically utilized mandatory minimum penalties with restraint and has allowed courts the discretion to fashion a sentence that is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the conduct of the offender. It is also interesting to see that other countries are questioning the use of mandatory minimum penalties. The legislature in Australia's Northern Territory recently repealed its mandatory minimum sentences. Courts of appeal in the United States have recently struck down some of California's mandatory minimum penalties as being cruel and unusual punishment.

Judges who have the benefit of being able to consider all the facts and evidence regarding the circumstances of the offence and the offender are well placed to determine the appropriate sentence in an individual case. Those circumstances must be weighed in light of the principles of sentencing. There is no clearly demonstrated need to create a minimum penalty for a second or subsequent conviction for breaking and entering a dwelling house given the high maximum penalty already in the code and the sentencing patterns for this offence.

It is also important to note that courts take into account as an aggravating factor in sentencing the fact that the offender has a previous conviction for the same or a related offence. In fact, the existence of a criminal record is the greatest predictor of a longer sentence length.

With respect to home invasion, the creation of an aggravating sentencing provision in Bill C-15A would encourage judges to use those tough penalties already available which, as noted, many courts have been doing throughout Canada in recognition of the seriousness of the offence and its devastating impact upon its victims.

While I recognize the concerns of the hon. member for Calgary East with respect to the offence of breaking and entering, I do believe that the existing penalty of life imprisonment for this offence and the amendments found in Bill C-15A clearly demonstrate our commitment to providing safe homes for all Canadians.

[Criminal Code, May 9th, 2002]

Madam Speaker, I am very pleased to speak to the provisions in Bill C-292, which is an act to amend the criminal code dealing with the sale of wildlife. If passed, the bill would create a new part in the criminal code, that is part XI.1, and would create three new offences relating to the selling of wildlife. These offences would apply despite the provisions of other federal acts of parliament. However, the bill expressly states that the section setting out offences does not alter the application of any existing aboriginal or treaty rights.

The offences proposed in Bill C-292 would address three activities: the selling of wildlife in whole or in part; the killing or capturing of wildlife for the purpose of selling that wildlife in whole or in part; and finally, possessing wildlife for the purpose of selling wildlife in whole or in part. It is worth noting at the outset that in contrast to the penalty provisions found in the Canada Wildlife Act, the Migratory Birds Convention Act of 1994, the Wild Animal and Plant Protection and Regulation of International and Interprovincial Trade Act and Bill C-5, which is a bill respecting the protection of wildlife species at risk in Canada which is currently before the House, the offences in Bill C-292 are considered to be so serious that they must be proceeded with by way of indictment.

This approach is inconsistent with the classification of offences elsewhere within the criminal code. For example, the offence of sexual assault is classified as a dual procedural offence, which means that the crown may elect to proceed by summary conviction or by indictment. It would appear to be inconsistent from a policy point of view to classify the selling of wildlife as an indictable offence when other offences considered more serious by society are classified as dual procedure offences.

Also, there would be a cost implication to the provinces and territories if straight indictable offences were created. All persons charged with any offences under the act would have the choice of a trial, including the possibility of a jury trial. The maximum penalties available in Bill C-292 range from two years to eight years depending upon whether the offence is a first or subsequent offence and also depending upon whether the wildlife involved is a threatened or endangered species. As an indictable offence, there is no limit to the amount of the fine that may be imposed.

Most members in the House would agree that the goal of discouraging the selling of wildlife and wildlife parts, particularly wildlife which is threatened or endangered, is a laudable one. The question though is whether or not this particular bill is the best way to achieve this goal. This in turn raises a larger question. Are the provisions of Bill C-292 in their essence about the prohibition of morally blameworthy behaviour which is traditionally associated with parliament's exercise of its criminal law power? Alternatively, is Bill C-292 more accurately characterized as a public welfare offence, which is traditionally associated with regulatory offences in a civil context?

It is the position of the government that from a constitutional perspective, Bill C-292 in its pith and substance is concerned with the regulation of wildlife rather than with prohibiting morally blameworthy behaviour. As such, the proposed amendments to the criminal code cannot be supported.

I would like to take this opportunity to briefly outline some of the features of the bill that are traditionally associated with the creation of offences in the regulatory context rather than with criminal code offences.

One important feature of the bill is that it does not apply equally to all Canadians. It expressly exempts from application any person who is authorized pursuant to a federal or provincial permit or licence to commit the acts which otherwise would qualify as an offence, as long as the wildlife involved is not a threatened or endangered species. Exemptions of this nature are extremely rare in the context of the criminal code.

Bill C-292 also permits the Minister of the Environment to exempt from the application of the act “any person or class of persons” in respect of a threatened or endangered species where “in the opinion of the Minister”, and I will underline the word opinion, “the exemption is necessary or in the public interest”. A provision of this nature is at risk of being declared unconstitutional on the basis that the criteria are so subjective and general that they do not provide any real limits on the behaviour to be exempted.

Another feature of the bill, which is not normally found in the criminal code, is that the Minister of the Environment is given the power to designate by regulation an animal as wildlife for the purposes of the act. Another provision would permit the Minister of the Environment to designate a species of wildlife as either an endangered species or a threatened species, provided that the minister had consulted with the Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada. Again, these provisions are more consistent with legislation aimed at the protection and regulation of wildlife than they are with provisions found in the criminal code.

As noted by constitutional law expert Professor Peter Hogg, “A criminal law ordinarily consists of a prohibition which is to be self-applied by the persons to whom it is addressed. There is not normally any intervention by an administrative agency or official prior to the application of the law”.

A final feature of the bill I would like to note is that in the criminal code context, search and seizure powers given to peace officers and public officers are very carefully crafted. This is in keeping with the principle that the state powers of intrusion on the privacy of individuals should be used with restraint. The search and seizure provisions in the bill are not entirely consistent with those elsewhere in the criminal code. I think there has to be a very clear policy reason for diverging from provisions used in respect of all criminal code offences, including the most serious offences.

Finally, I think the interests of justice are served by a consistent and co-ordinated approach to the subject areas within the legislative competence of the federal government. Some of the provisions of Bill C-292 overlap those in the current wildlife legislation and also those in Bill C-5. This is problematic to the extent that discrepancies exist between these various pieces of legislation.

In view of the constitutional competence of the provincial governments to regulate the use of wildlife on provincial lands, I would urge those jurisdictions that are experiencing problems with the sale of wildlife or wildlife parts to work with their respective governments to address this problem in a regulatory context. This approach is preferable to that in Bill C-292, which incorporates into the criminal code mechanisms that are more often seen in regulatory offences.

In conclusion, the provisions of Bill C-292 cannot be supported because they are potentially in conflict with other federal legislation and are inconsistent with other provisions of the criminal code.

[Lisa's Law, May 7th, 2002]

Madam Speaker, it is a pleasure to hear such an inspired speech by the hon. member for Red Deer.

Occasionally I understand the House does in fact have a special way about it and does capture all the members within the House and I think maybe we have the essence of that happening today.

Bill C-400 deals with an important issue. I certainly welcome the opportunity to confirm to the hon. members of the House the government's commitment to safeguard our children and to examine all measures that can better do this.

The government is strongly committed to protecting children from all forms of victimization and recognizes the need to continuously make efforts to strengthen protection in all appropriate ways.

The intent of Bill C-400 is admirable. It is clearly wrong to force a child to visit in jail the person who is serving a term of imprisonment for victimizing him or her even if, or perhaps especially if, that person is a parent of that child. Nor should a child be forced against his or her wishes to visit a sex offender parent in jail.

It is also important that all attempts be made to prevent another situation like the one Lisa Dillman faced. Her ex-husband was a doctor serving a six year sentence in a federal penal institution after being convicted of drugging and sexually assaulting an adult female patient and a 13 year old girl, as the House has heard.

As the custodial parent, Ms. Dillman was ordered by a judge in Saskatchewan to facilitate access visits between her children and their father after he chose, despite his incarceration, to legally enforce the access provisions contained in the court order.

As members have heard, it was a terribly distressing situation for Ms. Dillman and for the children, and it should be prevented from happening again.

That is why I believe it is important to examine Bill C-400. Its objective is to prevent this type of situation and to protect children from inappropriate access visits. The government is open to looking at all proposals that have this objective.

As I understand it, Bill C-400, as presented to the House, proposes to amend section 16 of the Divorce Act. It would add a new subsection 9.1 that would deem that any custody and access order made under the Divorce Act would contain a provision that would suspend a non-custodial parent's child access rights while he or she was serving a term of imprisonment for certain criminal code offences, unless, and a very important unless, the custodial parent consented to that access.

The bill specifically refers to an offence under any provision of the criminal code of which the child was the victim. In addition, 10 additional specific criminal code offences are identified, whether or not the child was a victim. These are the offences of sexual interference, sexual touching, sexual exploitation, incest, child pornography, parent procuring sexual activity, corrupting children, sexual assault and sexual assault with a weapon.

Those are all serious sex offences. As I noted earlier, the government is strongly committed to examining ways to protect children from all forms of victimization.

However, I have to wonder why these specific offences were chosen. I also have to ask if this is in fact the most appropriate list. Do not get me wrong, I completely support the objective ensuring that no access order under the Divorce Act would be used to require children to inappropriately visit a parent in jail.

However, if the intent of the bill is to protect children from the trauma of visiting an offender in jail, why not expand it? Why not bring in other offences? In certain cases maybe the offence of murder would be an appropriate situation where one would not want the convicted parent to have access to the child.

This matter needs to be looked at fully by the committee.

It is also important to remember that the practical effect of the bill would be to impose an automatic suspension of access rights in those cases unless the custodial parent gave consent. These access rights would be suspended while the access parent serves the term of imprisonment. The suspension would be achieved through a deeming provision.

How would the deeming provision legally work in practical terms? Would the access rights automatically resume after the period of incarceration? Would a suspension apply retroactively to an already existing access order? Would access remain suspended if the offender parent gets out on parole but arguably is still technically serving his or her sentence?

I would also note that the way the bill is worded, the provision does not provide for any flexibility or discretion and does not refer to any consideration of whether the automatic suspension of access would be, in the classic case, in the best interests of the child. Will this amendment legally stand up under the charter of rights and freedoms? I do not know the answer. Could there be an alternative way to create legally a presumption against enforcing an access order in those cases where it would be inappropriate? Would the onus be squarely on the offender to show why access would be in the best interests of the child?

My point is that I strongly support the intent and objective of Bill C-400 and it is for this very reason that I believe it is important that it be examined carefully if and when it goes to the standing committee for review.

As I started speaking today, I thought of today as being a very special day. It is a day to sit back and reflect on the reflections of the member for Red Deer on this situation. I personally believe it is very important that this matter receive the full consideration of the justice and human rights committee and that we look at this in the most positive light for the benefit of all those who find themselves in this situation, as did Ms. Dillman.

[Gun Registry, May 2nd, 2002]

Mr. Speaker, they just do not get it. This program is a public health and safety program. It is designed to protect the public and it is doing a marvellous job.

A recent poll suggested that it is supported by 76% of the population and it is supported for a good reason.

[Tax Credit, May 1st, 2002]

Madam Speaker, I would like to make sure that we go back to basic principles here. The member has to appreciate that we are talking about a public health and safety issue.

The public support is quite enormous. In the most recent poll that I have seen, over 76% have suggested that they are very much in support of the program. They are concerned about firearms being in the hands of those who should not have them. It clearly has been shown that we can reduce domestic violence by taking firearms out of the home.

To date over 4,000 potential licensees have either had their licences revoked or refused. Screening is a very important part of the process to make sure that we protect the families we consider so dear.

The hon. member has to appreciate that the public support is behind this program for a good reason. This is not a program that is directed at hunters nor is it some ill thought out plan. It is a positive and beneficial program.

[Tax Credit, May 1st, 2002]

Madam Speaker, I thank the hon. member for Saskatoon--Humboldt for the opportunity to provide some context for his comments.

In his question the hon. member stated that the federal government's important public safety initiative, the Firearms Act, was passed in 1994. To clarify, Bill C-68 was actually introduced in the House on February 14, 1995 and received royal assent December 12, 1995.

Let us also be clear that the public safety program is much more than a gun registry. It is a multifaceted practical approach that addresses the prevention of firearm death and injury, and crime deterrence.

The screening of all gun owners, tracking of firearms and minimum sentencing help deter, prevent and prosecute firearm crime. That is why Canada's law enforcement community recognizes and supports the firearms program as an important public safety initiative.

In fact, information on firearms and their owners is a critical tool in police investigations. It allows firearms to be traced back to their original owner. It enables police officers to take preventive action, such as the removal of firearms when they are responding to volatile situations. It sometimes provides a system of tracking firearms and their owners that helps identify and crack down on the illegal movement of firearms.

The premise of the hon. member's question is flawed. It assumes that the introduction of a bill equals its immediate implementation. The hon. member should well know that the firearms program is not yet fully implemented.

Canadian firearms owners were required to be licensed to possess and acquire firearms as of January 1, 2001. That is the licensing process. All licensed firearms owners must register all their guns by the end of this year. Only next year will comprehensive licensing and firearms registration be fully in force. Only in the years that follow will we be able to analyze and attribute any change in firearm violence.

Let us look at some facts. Assume for a moment, as the hon. member has, that 1994 is a valid starting point. In 1994 according to the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, there were 196 firearm homicides in Canada. In 2000, which is the last year for which statistics are available, there were 183. There was a decrease of 13 homicides, and not the 3% increase the hon. member's question suggested. In fact, the number of firearm homicides in 2000 was significantly lower than the 200 homicide average for the previous 10 years, that is, between 1990 and 1999. I should add that the overall homicide rate in Canada is at its lowest level since 1967.

This is good news. It can only get better with the continuous screening of all applicants and licence holders to ensure that they pose no risk to their community, to their family or to themselves.

Our government's commitment clearly is public safety. The hon. member for Saskatoon--Humboldt and his colleagues opposite would ask us to ignore the deadly reality of domestic violence. That is as wrong as the premise of the hon. member's question.

I thank the hon. member for the opportunity to bring these facts to the attention of the House.

[An Act to amend the Criminal Code (cruelty to animals and firearms) and the Firearms Act, April 30th, 2002]

Mr. Speaker, I rise on a point of order. If my ears are right, this is the second speaker from the opposition who has indicated they want a vote on the matter. It is appropriate. Let us have the division. Let us go forward now.

[An Act to amend the Criminal Code (cruelty to animals and firearms) and the Firearms Act, April 30th, 2002]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the opportunity to address hon. members on the occasion of the consideration of an amendment to the motion to proceed to third reading.

It is time for the House to respond to the expectations of Canadians. Legislation that updates animal cruelty provisions and provides enhanced penalties for animal abusers has been before the House in one form or another since December 1, 1999. That is two and one-half years during which there have been numerous opportunities for organizations from a broad spectrum of interests to come forward and make their views known.

They have shared their views with the Department of Justice, with members of parliament, with the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, with the media and with other members of the public. There has been a full comprehensive debate on the issue of the changes that must be made to modernize the animal cruelty provisions. I want to take this opportunity to thank rural caucus members for their extensive contributions to the debate and the shaping of this legislation.

During the two and one-half years, the former minister of justice listened very carefully to the concerns of all Canadians, including industry. In fact, to be absolutely clear about the fact that criminal liability for intentional cruelty and criminal neglect had not been changed, the former minister of justice made several accommodations to critics of BIll C-17 when the animal cruelty provisions were reintroduced as Bill C-15 after an election was called and Bill C-17 died on the order paper. The accommodations did not change the legal test for liability but provided further clarification about the elements of the cruelty offences.

I would like to take this opportunity to briefly review the changes that have been made already to the animal cruelty amendments since Bill C-17 was introduced in the House two and one-half years ago.

Critics of Bill C-17 were concerned that the opening paragraph of the intentional cruelty offences did not set out an express mental element. Even though not required as a matter of law, the section was changed when it was reintroduced into Bill C-15 and retained in Bill C-15B to expressly require that the intentional cruelty offences must be committed either wilfully or recklessly.

The negligence provisions in Bill C-17 were also modified when they were reintroduced in Bill C-15. These modifications were made despite the fact that the Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence made it very clear that they were not necessary as a matter of law. Nonetheless, in the interests of providing further clarification, subsection 182.3(1) was modified to include the word “negligently” as well as the word “unnecessary”.

The result is that the wording was changed from “by a failure to exercise reasonable care or supervision of an animal, causes it pain, suffering or injury” to “negligently causes unnecessary pain, suffering or injury to an animal”. This modification was made even though proof of criminal negligence requires that the prosecutor must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the actions of the accused constituted a marked departure from the standard of care a reasonable person would exercise in similar circumstances.

Another modification between Bill C-17 and Bill C-15 was to accommodate the concern of hunters that the use of the word “when” in the trap shooting offence might be interpreted as restricting the ability of hunters to conduct penned hunting. It should be noted that in the current animal cruelty offences, the word “when” is used in the English version of the criminal code, whereas “au moment de” is used in the French.

The offence in Bill C-15 was modified to indicate that the prohibited conduct related to shooting animals “at the moment” they were liberated. This wording provides greater consistency between the English and French versions of the criminal code.

A definition of negligence was also added to the negligence offences in section 182.3 to make it absolutely clear that a criminal standard of negligence rather than a civil standard was required.

A further change between Bill C-17 and Bill C-15 was to move the animal cruelty offences out of the part of the criminal code dealing with sexual offences and public morals and into a separate part of the code that deals with animal cruelty offences alone. This change addressed the concerns of critics that it was inappropriate to group animal cruelty offences with offences against persons.

After Bill C-15 received second reading on September 26 of last year, it was referred to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights with a direction that the committee split the bill into two parts. Bill C-15B contains the provisions regarding cruelty to animals and firearms.

The committee heard from a wide variety of groups with diverse views on the issue of animal cruelty. At the committee hearing the Criminal Lawyers' Association confirmed that removal of the animal cruelty provisions out of the property section would not cause accused persons to lose any available defences. The association did indicate that if there was a desire to make this absolutely clear, one of two options was possible: either to make an express reference to subsection 429(2) of the criminal code which outlines the defences of legal justification, excuse or colour of right; or to specifically confirm application of the common law defences set out in subsection 8(3).

Again, in the interests of accommodation and to reassure critics of the bill, the government introduced a motion adopted by the committee to confirm application of subsection 8(3) of the criminal code. To add clarification to the negligence provisions, the committee adopted a government motion to specify the mental element of “wilfully or recklessly” for the offence of abandoning an animal in paragraph 182.3(1)(b) of Bill C-15B, as well as the mental element of “negligently” for the offence of failure to provide suitable and adequate food, water, air, shelter and care for an animal.

One would have thought that following a suggestion of the Criminal Lawyers' Association, as well as further clarification of the negligence offences, would have caused opposition critics of the bill to agree that all accommodations that could be made without changing the test for legal liability had been made.

Unhappily, with the notable exception of the New Democratic Party, this does not appear to be the case. Critics among opposition parties want more. Meaningful accommodations have been made as a result of extensive representations over two and one-half years.

It is time for the House to act. It is time for the House to answer the expectations of Canadians and to move the legislation forward.

[Age of Consent, April 26th, 2002]

Mr. Speaker, clearly we are not doing consultations for just the sake of nothing. We are here trying to react to the public concern, but we have to consult with provinces and territories because there are so many laws that interrelate with respect to the age of consent. It is important that we follow a good, bona fide process with our partners. We are doing that and we are going to continue to do that.