Lost his last election, in 2008, with 29% of the vote.
Age of Consent April 26th, 2002
Mr. Speaker, we have taken leadership on this side of the House and we have set up a consultative process that has been ongoing for two years. As recently as February of this year we continued further to now set out, with our officials, to bring back recommendations so that in fact we will be able to go forward. If there are legislative proposals that will work we are going to implement them and make sure that our children are protected.
Divorce Act April 25th, 2002
Madam Speaker, I am pleased to address Motion No. 329 which calls on the government to act immediately on the recommendations in “For the Sake of the Children”, the December 1998 report of the Special Joint Committee on Child Custody and Access. The motion further suggests that the Minister of Justice should be condemned for failing to propose amendments to the Divorce Act on the basis of the report. There are important points to note in responding to the motion.
First, the motion does not acknowledge that the Government of Canada has already responded to the report of the Special Joint Committee on Custody and Access in “Strategy for Reform” which was tabled in May 1999 and that much of that strategy has already been implemented. It is worth noting that the special joint committee's recommendations were directed not only at the Government of Canada but also at provincial and territorial governments, as well as judges, relevant professionals and even the divorcing parents themselves.
Second, in criticizing the Minister of Justice for failing to propose amendments to the Divorce Act, the motion fails to appreciate the complexity of the legal issues. It also fails to acknowledge one of the most challenging aspects of family law, that many of the problems facing divorcing families are, in reality, only partly legal in nature and cannot simply be legislated away by Divorce Act amendments.
There are no easy answers. Indeed, one of the reasons the committee's report “For the Sake of the Children” is so important is precisely that it underscores this very point. There are no easy solutions to the wide variety of complex and controversial issues facing divorcing families.
Let us examine what has clearly come to be considered the main recommendation of that report, the recommendation on shared parenting. I quote:
This committee recommends that the terms “custody and access” no longer be used in the Divorce Act and instead that the meaning of both terms be incorporated and received in the new term “shared parenting”.
On the surface it may appear to be an easy amendment to simply replace the terms “custody and access” in the Divorce Act with the new term “shared parenting”. If we look closely at what the report actually says about shared parenting, we will find it anything but simple.
In view of the diversity of families facing divorce in Canada today, it would be presumptuous and detrimental to many to establish a one size fits all formula for parenting arrangements after separation and divorce. By the new term “shared parenting”, the committee intended to combine in one package all the rights and responsibilities that are now embodied in the two existing terms “custody and access”, and leave decisions about allocating the various components to parents and judges.
There is other very clear wording in the committee report confirming that this recommendation was not intended to mean that the Divorce Act should adopt a legal presumption that would impose shared parenting on all families.
Many witnesses, including individual fathers, fathers' groups and shared parenting advocates, recommended strongly that the act be amended to include a presumption in favour of joint physical custody, meaning an arrangement in which children would spend roughly equal amounts of time with each parent and where decision making would also be shared.
The committee was interested in testimony about the benefits of joint custody for both parents and children when it is agreed to voluntarily and works effectively. This type of arrangement generally involves joint decision making by parents, at least respecting important issues such as schooling, religion and medical care, with significant periods of time spent in the care of each parent.
However, legislation that imposes or presumes joint custody as the automatic arrangement for divorcing families would ignore that this might not be suitable for all families, especially those families with a history of domestic violence or of very disparate parenting roles.
In other words, while the report recommends that shared parenting be incorporated into the Divorce Act, it makes it clear that the recommendation does not mean that the Divorce Act should be amended to include a presumption of shared parenting. To the contrary, it specifically says that it should not.
The problem is that the meanings and interpretations of the term custody have been the subject of much confusion and debate. Different variations of the terms, such as the role of custody, joint custody and shared custody, are sometimes used but are not always understood. Simply substituting shared parenting in the Divorce Act would not resolve the current confusion and debate about the parental roles and rights. In fact, because there are differing meanings and understandings related to the word shared this could potentially promote even more conflict and litigation.
While it is true that there are problems relating to the meaning of the term custody in the Divorce Act, it is also clear that the current provisions of the Divorce Act allow for the very type of shared parenting concept that the committee appeared to be promoting. When it can work effectively and is agreed to voluntarily the Divorce Act says that custody and access can be granted to one or more persons. It provides that the best interests of children must be the only consideration and that children should have as much contact with each parent as is consistent with their best interests.
The reality is that the committee's recommendation to amend the Divorce Act to incorporate shared parenting, contrary to what the private member's motion suggests, is not simple or clear cut. It is not only reasonable but is also responsible that the Minister of Justice and the Department of Justice carry out all the required legal analysis and consultations necessary to interpret this recommendation, especially given its complexity and importance.
It is critical to acknowledge that the federal and provincial governments have specific constitutional powers with respect to family law. While federal laws govern the cases of divorce, the provinces have legislative responsibility for custody and access in cases where the families choose to separate rather than divorce or where the parents have never been married. The provinces also have the constitutional authority to establish rules of civil procedure, including the court procedures, respecting the Divorce Act matters within their jurisdiction.
Making changes to the federal Divorce Act would have serious implications for the provinces and territories and cannot be rushed. It would require, at minimum, provincial and territorial support and, ideally, their co-operation and commitment to develop co-ordinated corresponding provincial and territorial reforms.
The overall objective is to assist all separating and divorcing families across Canada. The provinces have jurisdiction for the administration and delivery of court services. For many parents court based and community services provided by the provinces are the most important things that help them resolve the issues to reach agreements.
The motion fails to recognize that the federal government has been providing a great deal of assistance by funding and promoting these services, which include parenting education programs, dispute resolution services such as mediation, and counselling services. The Department of Justice has been working closely with the provinces and territories to ensure that these essential services are in place when parents and children need them.
I cannot support Motion No. 329 because it fails to appreciate the complexity of the extremely emotional and divisive issues that divorcing parents face. It focuses only on the Divorce Act amendments and does not acknowledge that there are many other problems which in reality are only partly legal in nature and cannot be simply legislated away. It also ignores the important joint planning and collaborative work that the federal government has done with the provinces and territories to develop and improve court based and community services to help separating and divorcing families.
Question No. 131 April 24th, 2002
(a) The Canadian Firearms Centre’s, CFC, proposed budget allocation for fiscal year 2002-03 is $113.5 million.
(b) The CFC line item cost projections for 2002-03 are as follows:
Vote 1--Operating Expenditures: $97.3 million
Vote 5--Contributions: $10.4 million
Statutory--Employee Benefits: $5.8 million
(c) The cost projections by department and agency that will receive funding through the Canadian Firearms Centre in 2002-03 are as follows:
Department of Justice--CFC: $109.5 million
Solicitor General--RCMP: $3.0 million
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency: $1.0 million
(d) The total cost of the program since inception in 1995 is:
From 1995-96 to 2000-01 the net cost of the program incurred by the Department of Justice--CFC is $484.1 million. This consists of $551.5 million in gross expenditures minus $23.1 million in C-17 expenditures minus $44.3 million in net revenue.
As of March 31, 2002, period 12, the net cost of the program incurred by the Department of Justice--CFC for fiscal year 2001-02 is $88.6 million. This consists of $102.9 million in gross expenditures minus $14.3 million in revenue.
(e) The projected annual costs for the next 10 years are as follows:
i. For 2002-03 the net costs are projected to be $101.2 million (this consists of projected gross expenditures of $113.5 million minus $12.3 million in revenue);
ii. For 2003-04 the net costs are projected to be $59.8 million (this consists of projected gross expenditures of $95.0 million minus $35.2 million in revenue);
iii. For 2004-05 the net costs are projected to be $44.8 million (this consists of projected gross expenditures of $80.0 million minus $35.2 in revenue);
iv. Funding has not yet been finalized for fiscal years 2005-06 through 2011-12, but is expected to continue to decrease.
Supply April 23rd, 2002
Mr. Speaker, the hon. member raises questions that obviously make us reflect on where we are in our society and how we try to cope with the problems that society generates through its advances.
When we look at the issues of artistic merit, we also have to look at the areas of trying to balance the freedoms that are set out within our charter of rights and freedoms with the interests of society. One of the interests of society of course is to figure out ways to protect our children. It is very important that we continue to work with and develop ways and means of protecting our children over the course of time as the situation changes.
There is no question that the government believes that we are making advances in the area of child pornography and that we are diminishing its ability to flourish within this country. Through the transnational nature of the entities that are created, we are concerned that if we do not get Bill C-15A passed with the section dealing with Internet luring and the international transport and export of pornography we will fall behind.
We have been a leader and we wish to continue to be a leader in fighting pornography. I wish to encourage members of the opposition to make certain that they support Bill C-15A so that we can minimize any future transactions that may occur in the international scene of the Internet. We must take those steps now.
Supply April 23rd, 2002
Mr. Speaker, I will be splitting my time with the Secretary of State for Children and Youth.
I am pleased to participate in this important debate. I welcome the opportunity to have this discussion to confirm the government's commitment to taking the necessary measures to safeguard our children. The government remains committed to strengthening the criminal law's protection of children from sexual exploitation and all forms of victimization.
Canadians agree that child pornography is one of the most horrible forms of child sexual exploitation. Parliament has ensured that Canada's laws against child pornography are among the toughest in the world. Our law is very clear in prohibiting the creation of child pornography. The criminal code prohibits the making, printing, publishing or possessing for the purpose of publication any child pornography. Our laws strike at the heart of the trade in child pornography. The criminal code prohibits the importing, distributing, selling or possessing for the purpose of distribution any child pornography.
Let us be clear: our criminal code prohibits the possession of child pornography. The supreme court upheld criminalizing possession. One of the reasons parliament criminalized is that we must reduce the market for child pornography and consequently reduce the abuse of children that child pornography often entails.
Our law defines child pornography quite broadly. It is defined as a photographic, film, video or other visual representation that shows a person who is or is depicted as being under the age of 18 years and is engaged in or is depicted as engaged in explicit sexual activity. It does not matter whether or not it was made by electronic or mechanical means. Child pornography can be a photograph, a movie or a computer file. Our law ensures that it is all illegal.
Our law is not restricted to defining child pornography as depicting explicit sexual activity, as is proposed in the motion before us today. The law prohibits any visual representation, the dominant characteristic of which is the depiction for a sexual purpose of a sexual organ or the anal region of a person under the age of 18 years. In addition, the criminal code states that child pornography includes any written or visual representation that advocates or counsels sexual activity with a person under the age of 18 years. That would be an offence under the criminal code.
Our laws against child pornography are among the toughest in the world. The government is committed to being vigilant, both domestically and internationally. The nature of the computer networks and the child pornography rings through which this illicit material is traded crosses borders and requires international co-operation.
The G-8, for example, has consistently acknowledged the economic and social benefits arising from new technologies, but has also recognized that it must combat the use of such technologies for criminal purposes. Canada, along with its G-8 partners, has been active in countering the sexual exploitation of children on the Internet. Perhaps the most far-reaching international legislative initiative in this regard is the Council of Europe's cybercrime convention, which Canada signed in November 2001. The convention has now been signed by 33 countries, including all the members of the G-8 except Russia.
The cybercrime convention, which targets a broad range of computer related crime, addresses child pornography specifically in connection with computer systems and contains provisions to criminalize various aspects of the electronic production, possession and distribution of child pornography. The convention harmonizes laws to help shut down the international production and exchange of child pornography. We have not yet ratified the convention, but we can be proud that our existing law is already consistent with the child pornography provisions in the Council of Europe's cybercrime convention.
Our laws against child pornography are tough and have been upheld by the highest court in the land. The offence of possessing child pornography was challenged last year as being contrary to the freedom of expression and security of a person guaranteed by the charter.
On January 26 last year the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of the prohibition of the possession of child pornography. However the court decided that the guarantees protected by our constitution required the recognition of two exceptions where the prohibition's intrusion into free expression and privacy was most pronounced and its benefits most attenuated.
The first exception of excluded material consists of written materials or visual representations made and possessed by the accused for personal use. This exception refers to so-called works of imagination. We must keep in mind two things. First, there are no children involved in the production of these works. Second, although such works of the imagination can be possessed, they cannot be distributed, given away or traded in any manner.
The second exception consists of any visual recording made by the accused or in which the accused is shown provided that: the sexual activity is not unlawful; all parties consent to the making of the representation; and the representation is made exclusively for the person who made it or the person shown in it.
We must understand what this means as well. A person cannot have lawful sexual activity with children, so a person cannot create and possess images depicting such behaviour. The supreme court further stipulated that with respect to the narrow range of lawful sexual activity between 14 and 17 years of age, the individuals involved must consent to the visual recording and the resulting representations are excluded for their use. Although the individuals involved can possess the representations, they cannot give them away, trade them or distribute them.
The highest court in the land found a balance that was consistent with our charter of rights and freedoms. The supreme court upheld the law that parliament enacted. It is possible to amend the law but any changes have to be very carefully crafted to ensure that we prevent harm to children and also retain the constitutional protections that ensure we are free and democratic society.
The government has proposed amendments in Bill C-15A that succeed on both these fronts. Protecting children is a priority in Canada. We continue to fine tune our law to counter the new ways criminals exploit communications technologies to facilitate pedophile activities.
Bill C-15A will amend the criminal code to prohibit transmitting, making available, exporting and accessing child pornography. It will also prohibit possessing child pornography for the purpose of transmission, making available or exportation. These provisions will be particularly helpful in combating child pornography on computer systems, whether it is transmitted by e-mail or accessed through the Internet.
The passage of Bill C-15A should not be delayed any further. A commitment was made to speed the passage of these provisions when Bill C-15 was split. It is now time to honour that commitment. Bill C-15A will provide new ways to strangle the trade in child pornography. It will make our law better so that parliament can fulfill its commitment to protect children.
Clearly this government is dedicated to protecting children. We will take and make every effort to find the ways and means to deal with those who would take electronic technologies and attempt to advance them in a way that is inconsistent with our belief in the way our children should be protected.
An act to amend the Criminal Code (cruelty to animals and firearms) and the Firearms Act April 22nd, 2002
Madam Speaker, a number of statements have been made by hon. members during the last week of debate. I am pleased to have an opportunity to come forward today and give clarification to the issues.
First, I will talk about the status of animals as property. One of the members indicated that animals are treated as property under the criminal code. The hon. member said moving the cruelty provisions out of the property section of the criminal code would confer elevated status or even rights on animals.
As a matter of constitutional law the provinces rather than the federal government are responsible for property and civil rights. There is nothing in Bill C-15B which would in any way affect legislation or common law rules regarding property, many of which have been developed by the provinces.
The ability of humans to own animals is well entrenched in our common law. There is nothing in Bill C-15B which would change the property status of animals. Moving the provisions from one part of the code and putting them in another would not change the status of animals. It is completely misleading to suggest the status of animals would be elevated.
It is extremely important to emphasize that the law states that society has an interest in protecting all animals, whether owned or not, from the infliction of unnecessary pain, suffering, injury or criminal neglect. This is not new. It has been in the criminal code since 1953. Cruelty provisions in one form or another have been in the code since 1892.
The important changes in Bill C-15B regarding animal cruelty are twofold. They would increase penalties. They would also reorganize the provisions to allow for both the mental and physical aspects of offences regarding intentional cruelty and criminal neglect.
Second, I will discuss the notion that Bill C-15B would hamper pest control and industry in general. There has been a great deal of discussion in the House today about this. It has been said that Bill C-15B would prevent farmers from poisoning or killing pests. The tests for liability under Bill C-15B would not be changed even though the provisions would be reorganized and updated. The provisions with regard to killing or poisoning animals without lawful excuse would remain. Lawful excuse would be retained because the killing of animals for food, pest control and so forth has long been recognized by common law and continues to be recognized by case law, statute, regulations, codes of conduct and so forth.
It is equally inaccurate to state that farmers would not be able to kill injured animals to end their suffering. The tests for liability under Bill C-15B would not be changed. Bill C-15B would not make illegal any practice which currently meets the requirements of the law against unnecessary pain, suffering or criminal neglect.
Third, I will talk about the test for negligence. One member has stated that under Bill C-15B the test would be for civil negligence. This is not true. Subclause 182.3(2) specifically defines negligence as a standard of criminal negligence. It says the behaviour of the accused must constitute a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person in similar circumstances. The Supreme Court of Canada has expressly stated that in any situation where the possibility of imprisonment exists a standard of criminal as opposed to civil negligence is a constitutional requirement.
Fourth, I will talk about people's alleged vulnerability to vexatious prosecutions. A number of members have complained that Bill C-15B would make industry more vulnerable to vexatious prosecutions by animal rights activists. At the same time they have complained that the proposed screening mechanism of Bill C-15A would expose those accused to the costs of hiring a lawyer.
We cannot have it both ways. The criminal code currently has a number of safety mechanisms which allow the prosecutor to intervene and if necessary, stay a prosecution which is commenced by a person other than a peace officer or a public officer.
Bill C-15A extends this protection to a much earlier stage in the process to a point in time before the potential accused is even charged. The process is not a preliminary hearing. It is a screening process where a judge or a designated justice must be satisfied that there is sufficient reason to proceed before the accused is even required to attend court.
This process forces the prosecutor to assess the strength of the case at the first opportunity and to recommend to the judge or justice that the matter proceed if and only if there is sufficient reason to do so. One important consideration that the prosecutor will consider in making his or her recommendation to the court is whether or not it is in the public interest to proceed, a very important point.
Next I would like to deal with the argument that has been brought forward concerning section 429 and its absence. The argument that the reason subsection 429(2) defences have not been argued in cruelty cases is that their very existence precludes the crown from prosecuting.
The Canadian Criminal Lawyers Association in its testimony before the committee confirmed that removing the cruelty provision from part XI of the criminal code would not diminish any defences available to accused persons. All defences in subsection 429(2) which could possibly be relevant to animal cruelty cases and available under subsection 429(2) are equally available under subsection 8(3) of the criminal code.
It is simply wrong to indicate that the existence of defences acts as a bar to prosecution . Case law has clearly confirmed that there is no onus on the crown to disprove all relevant defences as part of its case. Once the crown has proven all elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused bears an evidentiary burden to raise a doubt about one of the elements of the offence. If the accused does so, then the crown must disprove the defence beyond a reasonable doubt. That is very important.
The last issue I would like to deal with is the definition of animal. Under the current cruelty provisions, animal is not defined. At the present time the courts are free to interpret the word animal in accordance with its everyday meaning, resulting in an interpretation broad enough to include most, if not all, members of the animal kingdom and certainly including many invertebrates. A definition is included in this legislation for the sake of clarity.
From a scientific perspective, vertebrates are generally viewed as having sufficiently developed nervous systems to allow for sense and pain perception. They are therefore as a group all given the protection of the law. But some invertebrates have a developed nervous system and therefore also may have the capacity to feel pain.
It would be arbitrary to permanently and absolutely deny protection to some animals because they happen to be classified as invertebrates. Bill C-15B creates a mechanism that allows the crown to proceed in appropriate cases. The burden of proof which must be met by the crown is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
There are three jurisdictions in Canada which have a definition of animal in their respective statutes which is broader than the definition found in Bill C-15B. To date there is no indication that the definition of animal used in these jurisdictions has resulted in inappropriate use of the legislation.
I am very pleased to have had this opportunity to correct some of the information that has been brought forward during the debate.
Age of Consent April 22nd, 2002
Mr. Speaker, on age of consent there is a common misunderstanding of the criminal law treatment of this issue.
Since 1890 the age of consent for most purposes has been set at 14. The age is 18 however where the relationship is exploitive, such as in the case of prostitution, child pornography, or where there is an existing relationship of trust or authority. Any non-consensual sexual activity regardless of age is sexual assault. However, there is concern that the motion tomorrow by the opposition may in effect reduce the age of consent from 18 to 16 and we are against that.
Question No. 115— April 19th, 2002
For the last five years, the Department of Justice, DOJ, has been working on the Indian residential schools, IRS, litigation. However, only in the past three years has it kept detailed data on the overall work on these files as the significance of this litigation became apparent. Therefore, we are presenting comprehensive information from the last three fiscal years. Prior to this, IRS litigation formed part of the general litigation the Department of Justice conducted on behalf of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and no separate records were kept with respect to the number of full time equivalents, FTEs, working on IRS litigation.
The number of employees working on IRS litigation is based on actual utilization of time spent on IRS files rather than on number of employees since most lawyers work on numerous files throughout the year. One full time equivalent, FTE, is composed of 1,300 billable hours of work per employee per fiscal year.
Table 1: No. of employees working on IRS files in the DOJ (based on FTE utilization)
Table 2: Hours worked on IRS files for DOJ (The actual number of hours worked on IRS litigation is recorded through timekeeping.)
Note A: 2001-02 is as at February 28, 2002.
Question No. 114— April 19th, 2002
The national strategy on community safety and crime prevention is a fairly recent initiative. Phase II of the national strategy, launched in June 1998 at $32 million per year, built on the recommendations and the four years of consultation and policy work of the former National Crime Prevention Council. The objectives of the national strategy are:
(a) to promote the integrated action of key governmental and non-governmental partners to reduce crime and victimization;
(b) to assist communities in developing and implementing community-based solutions to problems that contribute to crime and victimization, particularly as they affect children, youth, women, and Aboriginal people; and
(c) to increase public awareness of, and support for, effective approaches to crime prevention.
In approving resources for phase II of the national strategy, the Treasury Board Secretariat required that a mid-term evaluation be completed by March 2001 and a summative evaluation be completed by November 2002. The mid-term evaluation focused on the organizational structures that have been built in support of the national strategy and made a number of recommendations for improvement. The upcoming summative evaluation will focus more on the results that are attributable to the work of the National Crime Prevention Centre, NCPC, in its support of the national strategy. In short, the evaluation will assess the extent to which the NCPC has moved toward the achievement of its objectives.
In the summer of 2000, a mid-term process evaluation of phase II of the national strategy was conducted to determine whether the design and implementation of the national strategy would support the attainment of its objectives and its five long term impacts. Key stakeholders and the mid-term process evaluation of phase II identified the need for a gradual, strategic expansion component to the national strategy. The findings of the evaluation specifically stressed the need for improvement in the following five areas if the national strategy is to be successful in reaching high risk groups and vulnerable communities: more comprehensive support structure; stronger policy, research and evaluation capacity; expanded and strategic use of partnerships; greater focus on sustainability; and effective public education and promotion.
As a result of recommendations made in the mid-term evaluation, the NCPC underwent an organizational review during the summer of 2001.
All projects funded under the crime prevention investment fund, one of the strategy’s five funding programs, undergo rigorous, third party evaluations. Through this research and development crime prevention fund, we will learn what is promising, what works, what does not and in what context. Evaluators are required to conduct process evaluations, outcome evaluations and collect costing data to be used by the NCPC to carry out a benefit-cost analysis of selected crime prevention projects. It should be noted that virtually all of the third-party evaluations are still on-going today as they typically last four years in duration; notwithstanding, the NCPC has received promising interim results for many of the project evaluations.
In June 2000 a study entitled an Evaluation of Crime Prevention Community Mobilization Projects in Selected Communities Across Canada was completed. Although the sample size of projects reviewed and analyzed was small and the focus of the study was on process evaluation, several key findings emerged. It was found that project evaluations tended to report on activities, client satisfaction with these activities, e.g., services, workshops, or communication information, and future program or service needs. In some regions, such as Nova Scotia, representatives of the Department of Justice realized that community groups varied in their level of expertise in carrying out evaluations and produced a hand-out providing guidance on how to identify project outcomes, in particular impacts on client groups and partnerships established. To attempt to address these and other issues associated with evaluation, the research and evaluation section of the NCPC will be releasing a publication this spring pertaining to the development of logic models and theories of change. It is hoped that this document will assist community groups and organizations in developing their projects and logically linking up proposed crime prevention activities to anticipated short, intermediate and long term outcomes.
Crime prevention through social development, CPSD, is a community based, long term approach to preventing crime and victimization that recognizes the complex social, economic and cultural processes that contribute to crime and victimization. Because CPSD focuses on the social development end of the crime prevention equation, it can take time, i.e. years, for the crime prevention benefits to accrue. Notwithstanding, we are very confident that projects and interventions, which have resulted in measurable reductions in levels of crime and victimization and in improvements to community safety, can be identified.
Many problems of crime and victimization are common worldwide. As a result, it should be noted that Canada can also learn from the promising, model and best practices of other countries. Scientific evidence to date already shows that some prevention programs work, some do not, some are promising, and some have not been tested adequately. NCPC works hard to keep abreast of this information and to subsequently share what is learned for the purpose of guiding our policy frameworks and project funding decisions.
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2001 April 18th, 2002
Mr. Speaker, I rise on a point of order. There have been discussions with all parties within the House and if you seek it, I believe you would find unanimous consent that we see the clock at 5.44 p.m. so that we might begin private members' business.