Madam Speaker, while the government is sympathetic to the humanitarian objectives of the motion before the House, we cannot support the proposition that Canada seek the removal of U.N. sanctions on Iraq in the absence of Iraqi compliance with U.N. obligations.
Canadian policy toward Iraq has been motivated by the government's concern both for the humanitarian situation and for the security challenges Baghdad continues to pose for the region. This balanced approach must continue to guide our actions on the Iraq file.
We do not dispute the fact that sanctions have had a profound impact on the people of Iraq. It is the prescription called for in the motion with which we disagree. The call to lift sanctions is an appealing response to the situation, but it neglects not only the security risks of such a unilateral step but also the measures that have been and continue to be instituted with increasing success to minimize the civilian impact of the Iraq sanctions regime.
The approach that Canada and the international community have brought to the design and implementation of the Iraq sanctions regime has been focussed, from the outset, on both the security and humanitarian dimensions of the problem. While the international community has been justifiably determined to put an end to Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs, equal attention has been paid to the need to mitigate the humanitarian impact of sanctions.
Resolutions 661 and 687, which set up the sanctions regime after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and extended it following Kuwait's liberation, exempted food and medicine from the embargo. When, because of Iraqi obstruction, it became clear that Iraqi disarmament would take longer than the few weeks or months originally anticipated, the UN tried to establish an oil for food program which would enable Iraqi oil revenues to be used for humanitarian purposes. UN resolution 706 creating the oil for food program was passed in 1991.
For its own political reasons, the government of Iraq rejected UN resolution 706, delaying the implementation of an oil for food program for nearly five years. The result was a catastrophic degradation of Iraqi society. When the Government of Iraq relented in 1995-96 and finally accepted the oil for food program, it was already far too late to avert a collapse in Iraqi health and living standards.
However the oil for food program did help in ending the Iraqi decline and it was continually modified over the years in an effort to improve its effectiveness.
This effort culminated in December 1999 with the passage of UN Security Council resolution 1284, which brought even more sweeping changes to the humanitarian program in Iraq.
These changes included a lifting of the oil ceiling, which allowed Iraq to sell unlimited quantities of oil, and the development of pre-approved lists of items that would not need to be reviewed by the sanctions committee.
These so-called green lists have been expanded continually and now cover medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, agricultural equipment, educational materials, water and sanitation equipment, housing materials, oil spare parts and agricultural items, effectively lifting UN sanctions on these items.
However, Iraq rejected resolution 1284 and has, where possible, blocked the implementation of a number of its key humanitarian provisions.
Despite Baghdad's efforts to weaken the program, there is little doubt that the impact of the oil for food program and the changes brought about by resolution 1284 are having a positive impact in Iraq, as UN secretary general Kofi Annan indicates in his report of March 2, 2001.
With funding for the humanitarian program at $5 billion to $7 billion every six months, the UN secretary general noted, “Iraq is in a position to address urgently the nutritional and health status of the children of Iraq”.
Whether Iraq will in fact realize and make full use of its revenue potential to address the needs of its citizens, however, is an entirely different question. It has already been mentioned here in the House that Saddam Hussein preferred building houses for himself to looking after the needs of the people.
Efforts by Baghdad to impose illegal surcharges on oil contracts slowed Iraqi exports through most of 2000, prompting the UN secretary general to worry in his report whether sufficient funds will be available to meet the humanitarian targets in Iraq.
At the same time, concern continues to grow regarding Baghdad's willingness to spend the humanitarian funds that are available in a timely manner.
For example, as of January 31, Iraq had contracted for only 21% of the medical items contained in the distribution list for the last phase of the program, which had expired at the beginning of December.
By March, the figure had climbed to only 48%. Education sector contracts were less than 50% of the allocation, while oil spare parts contracts amounted to just over 10%.
It appears that this lax attitude towards the program on the part of the government of Iraq will continue in the current phase, as Baghdad was more than two months late submitting the distribution list for phase nine, which began on December 6, 2000.
As a result, by March 31, nearly three months later, there were no contract applications for health, electricity, water, sanitation, education or oil spare parts. This is despite the fact that with around $3 billion currently sitting uncommitted in the escrow account in New York the financial resources for these items are clearly available.
The money is there, and the Iraqi government is not using it. It is very clear that the international community has tried to mitigate the humanitarian impact of sanctions from the very beginning. This process continues under the aegis of the United States, in an effort to better target the Iraq sanctions regime by easing the import of civilian goods into Iraq, while tightening the restrictions on military related items.
While the details surrounding this effort are still being developed within the UN Security Council, the initiative appears consistent with the approach Canada has long advocated. Canada will contribute what we can to this process to ensure that the security goals and humanitarian needs in Iraq are indeed addressed with equal vigilance and priority.
Better targeting of the Iraq sanctions regimes may seem an inadequate response for those who see a full lifting of sanctions as the only solution to the Iraq situation, but the fact remains that sanctions must continue to be applied in Iraq because the disarmament job is not complete.
From the earliest days through eight years of UN inspections, Iraq offered far less than what Baghdad had pledged and the ceasefire arrangements demanded.
Obstruction, deception and outright lies were daily occurrences, as Iraq was trying to save key elements of its weapons programs.
The crucial question regarding disarmament efforts is, if Iraq, as it claims, has honoured its obligations and is not in fact rebuilding its weapon programs, as a number of recent reports have claimed, why is it not allowing arms inspectors to verify its statements on site?
Lifting the sanctions now, while Iraq continues to fail to meet its obligations to the UN, would send a dangerous message on the weakness of the international system in the face of a ruthless and rebellious regime. The international community cannot accept Iraq's intransigence and its refusal to comply with its obligations toward the UN.
There is little doubt that left to itself Iraq would again constitute a serious threat to its neighbours and to the security of the entire Gulf region. The country is run by one of the world's cruellest regimes, with a disastrous human rights record.
The Government of Canada is sympathetic to the objectives which underlie the motion. While the international community has tried with increasing success to mitigate the worst effects of the sanctions and make their humanitarian provisions Saddam-proof, the Iraqi people have suffered too long. Ultimately sanctions must be lifted but the option put forward in the motion is not the way.
Unilateral actions are not the answer. There is a process in place to achieve the common goal of removing sanctions and it begins and ends with Iraq's compliance with its international obligations.
Security demands require that sanctions remain in place until Iraq meets its obligations, but this does not mean that the people of Iraq need to bear the full burden. The instruments are in place to address the pressing needs of Iraq's civilian population, and efforts are underway to make them more effective.
Pressure must be brought to bear to force the Government of Iraq to both use the humanitarian tools that are available to their full potential and abandon its long established policy of sacrificing the well-being of its population to achieve its political and military objectives. Baghdad can ensure the return to normality in Iraq by complying with its UN obligations, and Canada should do what it can to move Iraq in that direction. This motion, by rewarding Iraqi intransigence, does the opposite.