Guy Caron

[Improving Trade Within Canada Act, November 24th, 2011]

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the hon. member for his question.

The question is not necessarily whether this is going to help or hinder. It is a question of balance. Once again, we are more likely to find a possible problem at the heart of the Agreement on Internal Trade in the future, the possibility of using the agreement to determine, for example, that Quebec's supply management and marketing practices could be disputed by a province that is not necessarily involved in dairy production, but is aiming to enter the market by trying to pass off its product as a milk substitute. As far as the agricultural sector is concerned, the Agreement on Internal Trade makes it hard for one province to apply rules on labelling, marking, marketing, etc. It is because of the potential abuses of the agreement that we do not see eye to eye with the Conservatives and the interpretation of the agreement.

There have not been any abuses yet, but that does not mean they could not happen in the future. The bill mentions that fines could be imposed on provinces and territories that contravene a panel decision. That could convince a province not to further protect sectors that are essential to Quebec and its regions.

[Improving Trade Within Canada Act, November 24th, 2011]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the hon. member for Western Arctic for his question.

The issue that he raised also exists in my riding, which is considered to be a remote region, since it is far from large centres. I think that the hon. member for Gaspésie—Îles-de-la-Madeleine, whose riding is close to mine, could say the same. These are particular situations. Because these regions are remote, the trade reality is not the same as it is in large cities like Toronto, Calgary, Vancouver, Montreal or Halifax.

The reality is different because the level of competition is not the same. If we want to promote emerging or developing local trade in the regions—which, until now, was less developed but which is trying to expand—we must also be able to rely on local initiatives. It is in that sense that the agreement may be problematic. Resorting to fines like this one, even though they are less heavy and have some cap, can become problematic for some regions—and I am thinking of the Northwest Territories, where the hon. member hails from—for the future ability of the territories to develop their own economic policies. I fully agree with my colleague on this issue. I have the same problems in my riding and those problems also exist further east in Quebec.

[Improving Trade Within Canada Act, November 24th, 2011]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to address Bill C-14, An Act to amend the Agreement on Internal Trade Implementation Act and the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, which proposes amendments.

I am pleased because, regardless of what members opposite may say, the NDP supports the removal of domestic trade barriers, the expansion of internal trade and also labour opportunities and mobility. More specifically, we support the parts of this bill that will facilitate the movement of Canadians from province to province to get work. So, we think that some aspects of this bill are worthwhile.

As the hon. member knows, the Agreement on Internal Trade is an agreement between the provinces and the federal government that was signed in 1994 and came into effect in 1995. Since then, it has been amended several times. We are currently addressing the content of the 10th amendment. An 11th amendment has since been proposed and negotiated. We must recognize—and this is the point that I tried to raise in my question to the hon. member—the importance of striking a balance in a free trade agreement like this one, because this is really what it is.

It is a free trade agreement that is more similar to the one negotiated under NAFTA than to those that were ratified at the World Trade Organization. It is also obvious that an agreement like the Agreement on Internal Trade results in a loss of sovereignty for the provinces. That is the foundation of the accord. The provinces have signed it, and they have accepted it. However, the fundamental issue has to do with balancing that loss of sovereignty. I will elaborate on this later on.

We should also expect that agreement to harmonize standards between the provinces which, in many cases, may be a good thing. However, a lack of balance in this regard could trigger relatively serious problems for certain sectors. Indeed, it could create obstacles to a province's ability to legislate on the environment, workplace safety and other issues that may not constitute a trade barrier as such, but may have to do with specific concerns in the province involved.

There have been cases under the Agreement on Internal Trade. There was one that pitted Ontario against Alberta and British Columbia concerning substitutes and dairy blends. In fact, Ontario banned the sale and manufacture of various products that resemble or imitate products made out of milk or milk ingredients. The 2004 panel formed to talk about this issue found that Ontario's Edible Oil Products Act contained measures that were not compliant with the Agreement on Internal Trade. The 2004 panel found that the measures were discriminatory, that Ontario’s dairy products constituted a like product and that Ontario gave them better treatment.

The panel also found that the measures interfered with the right of entry and exit, as the Edible Oil Products Act restricted or prevented the movement of goods and related services between provinces and created an obstacle to trade. After the report of the panel formed under the Agreement on Internal Trade was issued, Ontario had until February 1, 2011, to comply.

I want to know whether Ontario was denied its ability, not to protect its dairy sector, but to establish a distinction between the consumption of dairy products and edible oil products, which are different but try to imitate dairy products or milk itself.

Ontario still claims that protecting its dairy sector, not from a commercial point of view but from the consumer's point of view, is a legitimate objective. This also raises another question about supply management. We know that supply management in Canada affects the Maritimes, but it mostly affects three provinces: Ontario, British Columbia and, naturally, Quebec. Quebec and Ontario alone account for 50% of dairy production in Canada.

These two provinces are strongly committed to fully protecting the supply management system. What does the Agreement on Internal Trade say?

The chapter on agriculture allows parties to adopt or maintain measures concerning supply management systems that are regulated by the federal and provincial governments as well as measures concerning marketing boards governed by the provincial governments, which are not technical specifications.

According to the agreement, a technical specification is a technical rule or standard, a sanitary or phytosanitary measure or a compliance evaluation procedure. Based on that definition, is supply management protected? We are not entirely sure.

A technical specification is a technical rule, a document or a legal instrument that sets out characteristics of goods or their related processes and production methods, including applicable administrative provisions, and compliance with it is mandatory under the law. It may also deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a good, process, or production or operating method.

What is the point of supply management then? Can we protect the milk market? Perhaps, but we cannot regulate its manufacturing process, labelling, production method or characteristics in order to keep people from skirting the system by using analogs.

I am raising the issue of supply management because an agreement such as the Agreement on Internal Trade will surely have ramifications in terms of the free trade agreements we negotiate overseas. All of the rules that we want to apply to internal trade here are closely followed by our international trading partners. They can see the potential for loopholes and could ask for elements that were protected or were not on the negotiating table with the Government of Canada in the past.

As with any free trade agreement, it is crucial that there is a clear framework regarding the responsibilities of the parties. It is even more important to have the flexibility to protect sectors that are central to the economy of the parties, such as supply management. And this issue also brings up the question of programs that promote eating local. This is not a public health issue or a consumer protection issue. According to the Agreement on Internal Trade, it might therefore not be a legitimate objective.

Will these policies be challenged under the Agreement on Internal Trade because they give local products a higher profile? We are in favour of introducing exceptions so that the groups created under the Agreement on Internal Trade to judge cases can consider some of these exceptions. Once again, these exceptions are not there to impede commerce or to cause problems in terms of interprovincial trade. We are more in favour of a real response to the specific needs of several provinces.

Many of the concerns raised by the government and these groups warrant our attention and, accordingly, the NDP would like to call expert witnesses in committee in order to get some clarifications on the potential impact of such a bill.

As I pointed out, it is important to understand that the Agreement on Internal Trade is similar to NAFTA in terms of its structure. One of the things about NAFTA that worries us—and it still worries us because NAFTA is still in effect—is chapters 11 and 19, particularly the provisions on investor states. Those provisions allow investors to sue foreign states directly. Thus, an American investor can sue the Canadian government or the Mexican government for anything it considers a constraint on its ability to do business in a country or its ability to make a profit in that country. Of course, some exceptions exist in NAFTA, but they seem pretty weak.

This brings me to the measures that were the subject of the question I asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Industry. We are talking about companies that launch lawsuits against certain governments for reasons that are not necessarily trade-related, but that aim to prevent a given country from enacting completely legitimate, pertinent legislation, in this case, on the environment.

I will give two examples. Dow AgroSciences sued Canada for $2 million because Quebec prohibited the use of pesticides manufactured by that company. We all agree that pesticides are a basic environmental issue that has been around for at least 40 years. A number of products sold by various companies are recognized as being harmful not only to the environment, but also to the health of people who live close to areas where these pesticides are used.

Dow AgroSciences has tried, and continues to try, to sue Canada for $2 million because of the ban. This is not the only such suit. The Crompton company has also sued Canada for $83 million because some municipalities have banned the use of the pesticide lindane. These two examples clearly show the weakness or the lack of balance in investor-state provisions when it comes to the state's ability to protect public health.

The Agreement on Internal Trade contains provisions that allow a person or a business to sue another province for decisions, regulations or laws that it deems to be contrary to its interests and to its ability to do business in that province. These aspects are dealt with in the agreement in effect negotiated between the provinces and the federal government. We will continue to talk about these aspects and any provisions of international or domestic agreements that do not uphold environmental rights or workers' occupational health and safety rights. We want the provinces to always have the opportunity to regulate their environment and to protect the health of their people.

We are in favour of the Agreement on Internal Trade to a certain extent, as long as it addresses all the points that I just raised. We want the bills related to the Agreement on Internal Trade or to international agreements to avoid encouraging policies that force deregulation or privatization on the provinces and territories. We want these bills to avoid pushing the federal or provincial government to have power of attorney over certain interests of an industry or major investor.

We also want to prevent the bills from seriously reducing a government's ability to buy products from local suppliers. That is an element that is very important, particularly when it comes to the strategy for economic recovery. We want to avoid limiting the provinces' and territories' ability to help their provincial companies and industries as part of an employment or economic recovery strategy, or preventing them from doing so.

In any free trade agreement, there must always be a balance between the various interests. Bill C-14 includes provisions that are encouraging in some respects. I mentioned the legal action taken against Canada under the North American Free Trade Agreement. At least, this bill limits the potential impacts of such legal action. We are talking about economic impacts of approximately $5 million for a fairly large province like Ontario, Quebec or British Columbia. On a per capita basis, the maximum fine would be less depending on the size and population of the province to prevent what is often frivolous legal action from being brought against the provinces and to produce what I call the litigation chill effect and avoid things like the $83 million dollar case that I just mentioned. There are even cases that involve several billion dollars. Yet, I feel encouraged that a limit such as this one was imposed.

Another one of our concerns about this bill pertains to the composition of the panels, to those who are presented by the parties to hear a specific case.

Of the five members who can be presented by the two parties involved, only one must be an expert on Canadian commercial law. The other four individuals may have other expertise not necessarily related to the case at issue. We think that is a problem, and it should be corrected.

The other problem is that only one of these five individuals must be bilingual and be able to work in French and in English. Why only one? This means that if there is one bilingual individual in a group and the other four members do not speak French, the discussions will take place in English. If we were dealing with different commercial laws, we could have required, for example, that a good proportion of members be bilingual and able to carry discussions in French and in English. However, I do not see the justification for having only one bilingual person on either side, just like we fail to see why only one individual should be an expert on Canadian commercial law.

Therefore, the NDP will definitely support this bill at second reading, so that we can discuss it in committee and correct some flaws, such as a certain lack of balance. We notice a lack of definitions or limitations that could apply to some people, businesses or provinces to prevent the possible use of the investor-state provisions. These provisions can sometime have a chill effect and result in a province being reluctant to make undertakings, to agree or to legislate, even for the good of its citizens, on environmental issues or on their own stimulus measures. I am thinking of municipalities among others.

That is why we want to take a closer look at this bill. We will have a chance to do so in committee. I really appreciate this opportunity to present our views on this legislation.

I will be pleased to answer any questions.

[Improving Trade Within Canada Act, November 24th, 2011]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague who presented the government's proposal. The Agreement on Internal Trade has been around for 17 years and allows for the free movement of persons, goods and services. The NDP is in favour of increased co-operation among the provinces with respect to internal trade.

Where we have some concerns is with the agreement itself. I am not necessarily talking about the bill, but about the agreement that the bill would amend. In terms of structure, it is rather similar to NAFTA, in the sense that it allows people or businesses, for example, to take a province to court if they deem it necessary. The problem with NAFTA, as we have seen in the past, is that a company can use this provision, not necessarily to win a legitimate case, but to create what we call a chilling effect on a province that might use its legislative power for environmental causes, for example.

What does my colleague think about the Agreement on International Trade with respect to the possibility of creating a chilling effect by giving investors the opportunity to take a province to court?

[Telecommunications Industry, November 23rd, 2011]

Mr. Speaker, as usual, the government is saying that increased competition will lower prices, but international experience shows that the correlation between the number of competitors and price levels is very weak, especially in the telecommunications sector.

Telecommunications are part of Canada's strategic infrastructure and this government is prepared to hand part of it over to foreign interests based on uncertain expectations in terms of pricing.

Instead of threatening the domestic ownership of such crucial infrastructure, why does the government not directly help protect consumers from industry abuses, as Quebec did with cell phone contracts?

[Telecommunications Industry, November 23rd, 2011]

Mr. Speaker, reports today say that the government is moving to allow more foreign ownership in our telecommunications industry. The Telecommunications Act states that one of its very purposes is to promote the ownership and control of Canadian carriers by Canadians.

When is the government going to stop making foreign corporations its priority and instead put Canadian consumers first?

[Senate Reform Act, November 22nd, 2011]

Mr. Speaker, the answer is yes, absolutely. I think that if the question is clear, then so is the answer. That is what is missing right now.

Our current system dates back to 1867, and even further than that since we adopted the British system. That system no longer suits today's realities. It is a flaw of the House of the Commons that a party can form a majority government with less than 40% of the votes.

In that sense, proportional representation would be much more modern. There are a number of types of proportional representation. We can sit down and discuss the merits of each. Nonetheless, I think that proportional representation is an inevitable solution for the House. We should get on with it.

[Senate Reform Act, November 22nd, 2011]

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the hon. member for her question.

The big problem is that we would have a Senate whose members would be elected or appointed according to different rules. In some cases, there would be more legitimacy and the senators themselves would have a greater sense of legitimacy in certain situations. In that sense, this will create a dysfunctional Senate.

Indeed, my colleague is right when she says that the Prime Minister would still have the latitude not to follow the recommendations that come out of the plebiscites. That is a big problem. This bill creates a type of hybrid, a type of monster, and we will not necessarily know the extent of it until it happens. We are not interested in testing out that experiment. We would like to see how Canadians feel about this issue and have a party that advocates the abolition of the Senate, which is what the NDP promises to do.

[Senate Reform Act, November 22nd, 2011]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for the question.

This question applies more to the politics of the entire country than to individual ridings. I could go and see the 85,000 people I represent in the riding of Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques and ask them the question. However, without a real debate, the kind of broad debate we can have during an election, for example, it is really hard to know exactly what the people think.

This issue regarding the Senate is not at the forefront of the minds of my constituents right now. They have more important economic and social concerns. So if we were to ask them about the Senate, this issue would not be at the top of their list. In fact, many do not even know the role of the Senate. They do not necessarily follow the debates that take place there. If we want real public consultation, it should not necessarily be done riding by riding, but rather by referendum. Thus, the issue could dominate the mass media and we would then be able to see various viewpoints from a broader perspective than we otherwise could through individual conversations.

[Senate Reform Act, November 22nd, 2011]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise in the House to speak to Bill C-7, An Act respecting the selection of senators and amending the Constitution Act, 1867 in respect of Senate term limits.

The NDP's position was clearly stated at the beginning of this debate. Since 1930, we have been in favour of abolishing the upper chamber for various reasons. This is a position that I believe is unanimous in New Democrat circles and that periodically comes up and is always reaffirmed at our conventions and meetings.

There are specific reasons for that, but first I would like to mention that we are not the only ones. The provinces are also in favour of flat out abolishing the Senate. Ontario, Nova Scotia and Manitoba have clearly spoken out in favour of doing so. With respect to Bill C-7 in particular, we know that Quebec has already looked into the possibility of contesting its constitutional validity in court.

What we have in front of us now could be considered a partial reform. It is not real reform of the Senate, but rather a modification of certain aspects. For example, the aspect that has to do with Senate terms. Right now, senators are appointed to the age of 75 or until the death of the senator, and that term would be reduced to nine years. Although the NDP is unanimously in favour of abolishing the Senate, there are some differences of opinion on the Conservative side, particularly among Conservative senators who have already shown some reservations about limits to their terms. Those senators were appointed recently. All members are aware that since the Conservatives took power in 2006 they have appointed 27 Conservative senators, which has given the Conservative Party a majority in the Senate.

We could talk about what the Liberals did before, and we may or may not agree with them. The fact remains that when there was a Liberal government, it was still possible that a non-Liberal senator would be appointed. That was the case in the past. The Liberals even appointed an NDP senator. Unfortunately, we asked her to give up her NDP designation because we do not support the Senate and are proposing that it be abolished. At least former Liberal governments provided some balance. But we are not seeing that same kind of balance with the Conservative government.

We talk a lot about the Senate being a chamber of sober second thought, a place where a different kind of reflection takes place, in comparison to the House of Commons. The members of the House of Commons know that all provincial senates have been abolished. No province has had a Senate since 1968. As far as I know, there have been no significant issues with passing laws at the provincial level since that time. Provinces do not have senates and, to be honest, they do not seem to be missing them. No provinces are requesting or calling for a provincial upper chamber. In looking at the provincial situation, I think that the NDP's position on the Senate is completely legitimate and is far from the Conservative position of wanting to keep the Senate. However, the Conservatives want to reform it. It is interesting to see how the Conservative opinion on the Senate has evolved.

There has been much talk—particularly during the era of the Reform Party and the Canadian Alliance—of the need for a triple–E Senate. Such a Senate, by its very nature and essence, would bear a much closer resemblance to the U.S. Senate as we know it, and that creates a few problems. If the bill were adopted as it stands, similar problems would arise. I will come back to the U.S. model, but I would first like to discuss two specific problems with the bill and the manner in which it provides for the election of senators at the provincial level, who would then be appointed by the Prime Minister.

The first problem has to do with legitimacy. If the provinces have no consistent process for the election of senators—and since the term being used is plebiscite rather than election—it would create a situation whereby, in certain provinces, no senators would be elected or selected in this way. That raises a problem of legitimacy. Those senators elected under one process might believe—and this would undoubtedly be the case—that they have greater legitimacy than those who are simply appointed by the Prime Minister without being subject to the procedure established by the provinces.

That would be problematic since the members of the Senate would not share the same understanding of the institution.

The second problem—and this is where the U.S. example is relevant—is that the Senate currently wishes to be perceived, if it does serve a purpose, as a place for sober second thought in response to bills adopted by the House of Commons. This sober second thought theoretically serves as a counterbalance to an overly populist reaction in the House and is intended to please a certain segment of the electorate without necessarily improving in any way on what the bill proposes.

In its current form—and I think that this has been evident over the last five years during which 27 new Conservative senators were appointed—there is no longer any sober second thought. The Senate no longer plays this role. The Senate, just like the House, polarizes political debate. I believe that the debate and political discourse in the House since 2006 have been much more polarized than in any previous era or decade. That is how things look nowadays in the Senate.

The Senate was intended to be a forum in which senators could adequately reflect upon the impact that bills may have on various facets of Canadian and Quebec society. The Senate no longer plays this role. Two bills have demonstrated this, including one we thought was particularly important. I refer to Bill C-311 on climate change and the establishment of clear standards and targets in terms of greenhouse gas emissions. The House of Commons and its committees held several debates. It was not the first time this bill had been introduced. The purpose of the bill was to ensure that Canada honoured its international commitments. After a number of attempts, the House of Commons finally adopted the bill. The unelected Senate, however, simply opposed the will of the House of Commons, in other words, the elected representatives of the Quebec and Canadian public. The objective was to polarize rather than to be effective. The Conservative government did not condemn this action as it should have, and undoubtedly would have, had a Liberal-dominated Senate stood in the way of one of its bills. When this occurred in the past, Conservative members led the charge in condemning the abuse of power of an unelected chamber pitting itself against the House of Commons.

My colleague from Winnipeg North raised the question: do Canadians and Quebeckers still want a Senate? It is an interesting and very relevant question, in my opinion. I propose therefore, as have a number of my colleagues, to ask Canadians and Quebeckers if they still want a Senate, and whether they believe the upper house still fulfils its role. Quite recently, in July, a poll was taken across Canada to determine whether Canadians wanted to vote on the existence of the Senate. Seventy-one per cent of Canadians, including Quebeckers, want a referendum in which they can vote on the issue. It is high time that we had this debate. In the same poll, 36 % of Canadians were in favour of abolishing the Senate. This is a significant increase compared to the previous year. It reflects public discontent with the role the Senate has played in recent years and the partisan appointments made by the Prime Minister.

Experience has clearly shown us that abolishing the provincial senates did not drastically affect how the provinces operate. In fact, a number of experts and constitutional jurists would say without a doubt that this perhaps even made it easier for the provinces, because there was no longer an unelected chamber able to interfere and undermine the will of publicly elected representatives. There is not a single province that would revisit the past and choose to bring back an unelected chamber.

We must be very careful about the Senate's mandate and about the direction we are currently taking to avoid having what we see in the United States. The suggestion was made by our colleague from the third party, and had already been made by the NDP. Let us have a real debate, let us include the Canadian public and let us have a referendum on this subject. Our position is clear: we are and will always be in favour of abolishing the Senate.