Hélène Laverdière

[Foreign Affairs, September 20th, 2017]

Mr. Speaker, we heard some serious allegations about Saudi Arabia using Canadian-made weapons against civilians.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs launched an investigation and promised that she would take action if it was confirmed. However, later, the Saudi ambassador to Canada himself confirmed the allegations.

When can we expect the results from the minister's investigation, and what actions will she take now that the allegations have been confirmed by the Saudis themselves?

[Stanislav Petrov, September 20th, 2017]

Mr. Speaker, this week we learned of the passing of Stanislav Petrov.

Stanislav Petrov was on duty at a Russian nuclear early warning centre in 1983 when computers wrongly detected incoming missiles from the U.S. He decided they were a false alarm and did not report them to his superiors. Had he not done so, we might have had a nuclear war by mistake, by accident.

What happened that day illustrates the danger and utter absurdity of the atomic bomb and the arms race, a madness that continues to this day. That is why we need to continue to work towards nuclear disarmament.

Canada's absence today at the United Nations, at the signing of the nuclear weapons ban treaty is shameful. The world deserves better.

Thank you, Stanislav Petrov.

[Foreign Affairs, September 19th, 2017]

Mr. Speaker, tomorrow, the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons opens for signature at the United Nations. More than 120 countries have approved the treaty, but not Canada. Tomorrow as well, on Parliament Hill, a huge treaty will be unveiled and open for signature to all those who believe in nuclear disarmament.

My question for the Prime Minister and all Liberal members is the following: will you join the thousands of Canadians who will be signing the nuclear weapons ban treaty tomorrow?

[Questions Passed as Orders for Returns, September 18th, 2017]

With regard to all operational contexts in which members of the Canadian military have been involved since September 11, 2001, up to the present and with respect to all military orders, directives, instructions, etc., whether binding or non-binding, interim, provisional, or final, related to persons in the care, custody, or control of members of the Canadian military and to all persons with whom members of the Canadian military come into contact but who are judged as being in the care, custody, or control of armed forces, security, and intelligence forces, and police forces of another state: (a) what were the numbers, titles and dates of all Canadian Forces Theatre Standing Orders and the identity of the issuing official; (b) what were the numbers, titles, and dates of all Fragmentary Orders and the identity of the issuing official; (c) what were the numbers, titles, and dates of all International Security Assistance Force orders of a similar nature issued in relation to the conflict in Afghanistan and the name of the issuing official or entity which issued them; and (d) what were the numbers, titles, and dates of any orders of a similar nature issued by American, Iraqi, or other forces, including Kurdish authorities in northern Iraq, that apply in any way, directly or indirectly, to Canadian soldiers who come into contact with detainees while serving in Iraq and the name of the issuing official or entity which issued them?

[Questions Passed as Orders for Returns, September 18th, 2017]

With respect to the characterization of persons in the care, custody or control of the Canadian military as “PUCs” and “Persons Under Control”, or use of like categories, whether or not such terms were or are used officially or unofficially: (a) does the government accept the accuracy of the finding of a Canadian military Board of Inquiry (BOI) on the subject of the “14 June 2006 Afghan Detainee Incident” [BOI June 2006 Incident Report], in its report of May 4, 2010, (para 30, part II) that the term “PUC” was in “widespread use” amongst Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan in 2006; (b) in relation to a BOI June 2006 Incident Report observation (para 30, part II), stating that “[T]he B Coy MP [B Company Military Police officer] testified that he was directed during ROTO 1 [rotation/deployment 1] to always use the term “PUC” and to avoid the term “Detainee.””, who directed this Military Police (MP) to systematically use “PUC” and to avoid “detainee” and for what reasons was this MP so directed; (c) in relation to a BOI June 2006 Incident Report finding (para 30, part II), stating that “When made aware of the term the TFA Advisors (LEGAD and PM) endeavoured to remove it [“PUC”] from the tactical reporting lexicon, as it had no legal foundation in detainee policy.”, (i) when and how were the Task Force Afghanistan (TFA) Advisors “made aware of the term”, (ii) for what period did “PUC” appear in tactical reporting, (iii) did its use in tactical reporting end, and if it ended, when did it end and was this the result of the initiative of the TFA Advisors; (d) in relation to the same report finding as in (c), was any person in position of strategic command in the Canadian Forces, including Generals Rick Hillier, Walter Natynzyk, Michel Gauthier and David Fraser, at any time aware of the use of the term “PUC” and if so, what actions did one or more of them take in relation to its use; (e) does the government accept the BOI June 2006 Incident Report finding that persons characterized by Canadian soldiers and commanders during one or more periods in 2006 as “PUCs” were transferred to Afghan authorities without also being characterized as “detainees” with the result that there was no triggering of the record-keeping and reporting (including reporting to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)) connected to official detainee policy and to the 2005 Transfer Arrangement with Afghanistan, and if so, what is the number of such PUCs transferred without record or reporting to the ICRC; (f) in relation to the observation in the BOI June 2006 Incident Report (para 33, Part II), that, in relation to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation published Canadian military reports from the field that 26 persons were “captured” on May 17, 2006, by Task Force ORION, those 26 were transferred to the Afghan National Police without ever being processed as detainees, were those persons treated as PUCs by TF ORION; (g) in relation to question (m) of Order Paper Question Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session; filed by Craig Scott, MP) that asked the government to set out how 11 captured persons referenced at page 96 of a book by the commanding officer of Task Force ORION, Ian Hope-Dancing with the Dushman: Command Imperatives for the Counter-Insurgency Fight in Afghanistan (Canadian Defence Agency Press, 2008)--were processed, were these 11 persons processed as “detainees” with attendant record-keeping and reporting or were they instead treated as “PUCs” and transferred to Afghan authorities on that basis, with no attendant record-keeping or reporting to the ICRC; (h) in view of the statement in a report by the Directorate of Special Examinations and Inquiries (DESI), in “Directorate of Special Examinations and Inquiries Investigation—Passage of Information, Final Report (14 June 2006 Afghanistan Detainee Incident)”, document number 7045-72-09/26, that it was “of very significant concern …that a number of TF ORION War Diary records for the period 13 May--17 June 2006 could not be located”, have some or all of those war diary records since been located; (i) if some or all of the war diaries referenced in (h) have been located, do they shed light on the use of “PUCs” or like designations as a way to avoid labelling a captive as a “detainee”; (j) in relation to point (o) in Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session)--“were there persons under the control of Canadian forces who were transferred to Afghanistan, but who were not treated by Canada as covered by the provisions of the 2005 and 2007 Canada-Afghanistan Memorandums of Understanding on detainee transfer and if so, on what basis were transfers of such persons not deemed covered by the agreements?”--that the government did not then answer in the affirmative, would the government now like to change its answer; (k) in relation to point (p) in Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session)--“were there persons under the control of Canadian forces who were transferred to Afghanistan but whose existence and transfer was not made known to the International Committee of the Red Cross and if so, on what basis was the Red Cross not informed?”--that the government did not then answer in the affirmative, would the government now like to change its answer; (l) in relation to point (n) of Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session)--“at any period and if so, which periods, [were] there …one or more categories of persons who Canada passed on to either Afghan or American authorities but who were not categorized as detainees, and did such categories have a designation, whether formal or informal?”--why did the government not reveal the existence of “PUCs” as an informal category; (m) in relation to, inter alia, the government answers to points (n), (o), and (p) of Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session), does the present government consider that the former government deliberately sought to mislead or even deceive the then Member of Parliament who submitted Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session); (n) inclusive of points (n), (o), and (p) of Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session), are there any answers to this question that the present government considers were incorrect or untruthful; (o) in relation to a September 19, 2016, letter from Mr. Craig Scott, former MP for Toronto–Danforth, to the current Prime Minister in which Mr. Scott presented reasons as to why he “believe[d] it to be likely that the Department of National Defence crafted its answer to Order Paper Question Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session) in order to avoid revealing” the existence of persons who were transferred to Afghanistan without being recorded or reported to the ICRC as “detainees”, has that letter resulted in any inquiries by or on behalf of the Prime Minister and if so, of what sort and with what result; (p) when on December 8, 2009, then Member of Parliament the Hon. Ujjal Dosanjh asked a question to former Chief of Defence Staff Walter Natynczyk in the latter’s appearance before the Standing Committee on National Defence in which Mr. Dosanjh quoted from a Globe and Mail article in which a Military Police officer’s field notes used the term “PUC”, did the government conduct any other investigation into why “PUC” had been used apart from the ordering of Board of Inquiry and Chief of Review Services investigations into aspects of the underlying incident and if so, what was the result; and (q) in relation to findings in BOI June 2006 Incident Report (para 12, Part II), stating that “Although BGen [David] Fraser did not become familiar with TSO [Theatre Standing Order] 321A until arriving in Kandahar…, its underlying principle of transferring detainees to ANSF was made clear to him before departing Canada. Direction provided to him verbally by the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) [General Rick Hillier] emphasized that Afghan detainees were to be transferred to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) as far forward in the field and as rapidly as possible; indeed, that their transfer from CF to ANSF custody was to be measured in terms of “minutes to hours.”, does the government consider that this constituted an instruction by General Hillier to circumvent the formal “detainee” system with a “PUC” practice?

[Questions Passed as Orders for Returns, September 18th, 2017]

With respect to the characterization of persons in the care, custody or control of the Canadian military as Persons Under Control (PUCs) or use of like categories, whether or not such terms were or are used officially or unofficially: (a) in relation to a statement by Donald P. Wright et al. in A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation--ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) October 2001-September 2005 (Combat Studies Institute, 2010), at p. 221: “Detainees in Coalition hands in Afghanistan were referred to as persons under control (PUCs) instead of EPWs or detainees,”, does this reference to “Coalition” apply to the Canadian military, including special forces in any part of the 2001-2005 period in question; (b) in relation to a claim by Ahmed Rashid in Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation-Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia (Penguin, 2009), at pp. 304-305: “In spring 2002, …CIA lawyers further twisted legal boundaries by establishing a new category of prisoner: Persons Under Control, or PUC. Anyone held as PUC was automatically denied access to the ICRC, and even his existence was denied...PUCs were flown around the world to different locations on private jets belonging to dummy companies owned by the CIA.”, is the government aware of whether this is an accurate statement of one use to which the category of “PUC” was put by the United States; (c) in relation to an observation in Center for Law and Military Operations (United States Army, Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School), Lessons Learned from Afghanistan and Iraq: Volume I - Major Combat Operations (11 September 2001--1 May 2003) (August 1, 2004) [Lessons Learned]: “[P]ersons detained were either classified as ‘persons under control’ (PUCs) or simply as ‘detainees.’… Persons captured on the battlefield were initially brought to the classified location to establish their identity and determine if they met the criteria for potential transfer to Guantanamo. During this phase, detained personnel were classified as ‘PUCs’.”, is the government aware of whether, during such windows of time, CIA agents or persons working for the CIA would sometimes take custody of PUCs from the US Army before they could be officially designated as “detainees” by the Army; (d) in relation to a claim in Chris Mackey and Greg Miller, The Interrogators: Task Force 500 and America’s Secret War Against Al-Qaeda (Back Bay Books, 2004), at pp. 250-251: “In June [2002]…our [US Army] command in Bagram …came up with a whole new prisoner category called “persons under U.S. control”, or PUCs. The whole idea was to create a sort of limbo status, a bureaucratic blank spot where prisoners could reside temporarily without entering any official database or numbering system.”: is the government aware of whether or not this US Army PUC category was created in concert with and used by the CIA as a way to secure custody of PUCs while they were still in a “bureaucratic blank spot”; (e) in relation to the observations in Lessons Learned that “the term ‘PUC’ did not develop until the [US] XVIIIth Airborne Corps arrived in Afghanistan” in 2002, did Canadian Forces, including special forces, ever conduct joint operations with the US’ XVIIIth Airbone Corps in which captives were taken; (f) is the government aware of whether the commanding officer of the US’ XVIIIth Airborne Corps, Lt. Gen. Dan McNeill, was a direct source of, or conduit for, the notion of “PUC” and if so, whether Lt. Gen. Dan McNeill was working in concert or tandem with the CIA in introducing this term into the Afghanistan theatre; (g) after General Walter Natynczyk was seconded to command 35,000 US forces in Iraq during the US’ Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq from January 2004 to January 2005, did he bring any knowledge of the use of PUC practices or a PUC system from Iraq to the Canada-Afghanistan context when he became head of the Canadian Forces’ Land Force Doctrine and Training system in 2005 and when he was appointed Vice-Chief of Defence Staff in 2006, and if so, was such practices introduced in any way to this doctrine and training system; (h) prior to August 2015 by which time the first Canadian Forces troops had arrived in Kandahar, were there meetings between Canadian Lt. Gen. Michel Gauthier and US Under-Secretary of Defence for Intelligence Steve Cambone or any other officials in the US Department of Defense or in the Pentagon in which they discussed, inter alia, Canada aligning or otherwise coordinating its policy and practices in Kandahar with those of the US, including in relation to detainees, as a condition of the US agreeing that Canada be assigned Kandahar; (i) prior to August 2015 by which time the first Canadian Forces troops had arrived in Kandahar, were there meetings between Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier and any officials in the US Department of Defense or in the Pentagon in which they discussed, inter alia, Canada aligning or otherwise coordinating its policy and practices in Kandahar with those of the US, including in relation to detainees, as a condition of the US agreeing that Canada be assigned Kandahar; (j) prior to August 2015 by which time the first Canadian Forces troops had arrived in Kandahar, were there meetings between any Canadian Forces officers apart from Generals Gauthier and Hillier in which they discussed, inter alia, Canada aligning or otherwise coordinating its policy and practices in Kandahar with those of the US, including in relation to detainees, as a condition of the US agreeing that Canada be assigned Kandahar; and (k) is the mini-biography of Mr. Gauthier on The Governance Network’s website correct in saying Gauthier “[l]ed Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, responsible for all CF operational missions abroad, the Canadian mission in southern Afghanistan” and if so, did this include authority over policy and decisions related to the transfer of captives to other states?

[Questions Passed as Orders for Returns, September 18th, 2017]

With regard to cooperation between the Canadian military and the United States (US) military and intelligence agencies in Afghanistan and Iraq and to findings of the Canadian military Board of Inquiry report of May 4, 2010, on the subject of the “14 June 2006 Afghan Detainee Incident”: (a) when did Canada decide to no longer transfer persons in the care, custody, or control of members of the Canadian military to members of the US military; (b) were there any omissions or exclusions from the scope of this decision at the receiving end, such as US intelligence agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or did the decision apply to transfers to any agent or actor acting on behalf of the US government; (c) at the transferring end, did this decision apply to all members of the Canadian military, including special forces and intelligence officials, and if not, to whom did it not apply; (d) for what reasons was this decision taken; (e) was this decision taken after legal advice had been received on whether it would be lawful to continue to transfer to the US and if so, was the government advised that it would be unlawful to continue the transfers; (f) what was the date of the last transfer before the decision came into effect; (g) did this decision apply to persons who would or could be characterized as Persons Under Control (PUC) by the US Army, units within the US Army, or the CIA, considering that this is a term that the Canadian military Board of Inquiry report of May 4, 2010, referred to as an “American Army Term”; (h) were there any instances of this decision not being implemented, and thus of persons being transferred to the US military or another US agency in situations in which members of the Canadian military themselves characterized a person as a PUC, considering that the same Canadian military Board of Inquiry report of May 4, 2010, observed that the term PUC was in “widespread use” within the Canadian military in Afghanistan; (i) is the government aware of any instances in which persons who were determined not to be “detainees” were transferred on the battlefield or elsewhere to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) personnel, including the Afghan National Police, the Afghan National Army, the National Directorate of Security, and any paramilitary or like organizations working for or alongside the foregoing, to then learn that the person was re-transferred by ANSF personnel to members of the US military, CIA, or private US actors cooperating with the US Army or CIA; (j) is the government aware of any instances in which persons treated by Canada as “detainees” were transferred to ANSF personnel and then re-transferred by ANSF personnel to members of the US military, CIA, etc., especially before the 2007 Transfer Arrangement between Canada and Afghanistan took effect; (k) was this decision conveyed to the US government and if so, what reasons were provided and how did the US government respond; and (l) was this decision ever reversed or revised and if so, on what terms, when, and for what reasons?

[Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship, June 20th, 2017]

Mr. Speaker, the Prime Minister says all the right things about welcoming refugees to Canada.

The problem is what he does. He refused to suspend the Canada-U.S. safe third country agreement. The Immigration and Refugee Board is underfunded and riddled with vacancies. Nothing has been done to deal with the 24,000-case backlog. That is just the beginning.

On this World Refugee Day, will the Prime Minister pledge to walk the talk?

[Business of Supply, June 8th, 2017]

Mr. Speaker, my question will be very brief.

Last year, at their party convention, the Liberals passed a resolution that was basically the same as our motion.

Can my colleague figure out why the government and the members on that side would turn their backs on their own party members?

[Business of Supply, June 8th, 2017]

Mr. Speaker, I listened to my colleague with interest. When it comes to the Liberal government, there is a lot of talk, but little action. My colleague speaks about a rules-based multilateral system. I have two questions for him.

First of all, is my colleague aware that article VI of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, of which Canada is part, requires that Canada participate in good faith negotiations on nuclear disarmament? It would follow, then, that Canada is in breach of a convention it has ratified.

There has been a lot of rhetoric about international co-operation, and the government claims to very proud of Canada's initiative. However, while 130 other countries are ready to work on the convention, yesterday, the Prime Minister stated that what they were doing was useless. Maybe he said that because this is not a Canadian initiative?

Does my colleague believe that these 130 countries will want to do the government any favours when the time comes to vote for a seat on the UN Security Council?