Joe Clark

[Iraq, February 3rd, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, Secretary of State Powell will brief the Security Council on Wednesday respecting new intelligence reports on Iraq. My question for the Prime Minister is precise and I am not asking him to reveal the contents or the details of intelligence briefings.

My question is, has Canada been given intelligence information that establishes a clear link between the regime in Iraq and the al-Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001?

[Points of Order, January 31st, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, I simply want to reserve my right to review an exchange in the House today between the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Agriculture and the hon. member for Lotbinière—L'Érable.

The issue in question has to do with the admission by the parliamentary secretary that a document published by Agriculture Canada states one thing in French, one of our official languages, and a different thing in English, one of our official languages.

The question of respect for the Official Languages Act is fundamental to the House of Commons. The fact that the parliamentary secretary would know that there was a diversion, would use that actually as a defence, would defend that diversion in the House of Commons, may well give rise to a question of order. I simply want to reserve the right to look at the record and--

[Iraq, January 31st, 2003]

The foreign minister has now, as he said, had an opportunity to meet with U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell. Does he expect that Secretary Powell, when he meets with members of the Security Council on Wednesday, will present concrete new evidence of the material failure by Iraq to comply with the UN's requirements to eliminate all of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction?

[Iraq, January 31st, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, my question is for the foreign minister.

The government has now had more time to consider the joint statement by the eight European leaders. I expect the minister shares my view that the European statement is a strong endorsement of the United Nations process, so I repeat my question of yesterday to which the acting prime minister gave no substantive response.

Would Canada have signed the statement of the eight European leaders, and if not, why not?

[Iraq, January 30th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, there is a difference between prudence and invisibility. On issues of great international import, the government is invisible. Parliamentary rules do not allow me to characterize it otherwise.

The Prime Minister has spoken of his influence on the advice Prime Minister Blair has given to President Bush. The Prime Minister has not been invited to Camp David, where Mr. Blair is going today.

In the interest of ensuring that Canada and this Parliament have the most current information and assessments available, would the Prime Minister invite Mr. Blair to stop over in Ottawa and make himself available for a discussion on Iraq with this Parliament?

[Iraq, January 30th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, I have a very simple question for the acting prime minister. It is about the joint statement of the heads of government of Spain, Portugal, Italy, Denmark, the Czech Republic, Poland and the United Kingdom, outlining a common position on Iraq. I am sure the Deputy Prime Minister and his officials have read the statement. Would Canada have signed that statement?

[Iraq, January 29th, 2003]

Mr. Chairman, we cannot through our failure to act give Saddam Hussein permission to use the weapons at his disposal to commit atrocities toward children and innocent civilians throughout the world.

The former leader of the NDP has just said that Saddam Hussein is a threat that cannot be ignored. There is a reason why he is a threat. It is not just because he is not a nice man, it is because he is a truly dangerous one and probably a man in possession of weapons of mass destruction.

That is why thought must be given to a reaction. A threat like this cannot be ignored.

[Iraq, January 29th, 2003]

Mr. Chairman, one did not need to send inspectors to Kuwait to know the Iraqis were there. The question was very clear. It was easy to mobilize support.

[Iraq, January 29th, 2003]

Mr. Chairman, that decision in fact is to be taken by the 15 member nations of the Security Council. In a sense, the discussion about whether we need one or two resolutions is to some degree artificial if what we are seeking is a unanimous decision of the Security Council. If significant members, particularly members with vetoes in the Security Council, will not accept the mandate of the first resolution, then a second will be necessary. That is simply a practical reality to the United Nations having to act.

The Minister of the Environment has gone. He asked me about immunity. Obviously if there were to be something done with respect to asylum, that very difficult question of immunity would have to be looked at. No one would want to, but it would be preferable to holocaust.

[Iraq, January 29th, 2003]

Mr. Chairman, the minister should not trivialize everything. I believe that it is an important part of the issue now, as it was in the gulf war, to see if there are opportunities for asylum. We raised the question and as foreign minister I raised the question with other countries then.

Would Canada accept Saddam Hussein and offer asylum? No, we would not.

The minister, a former member of the Department of Foreign Affairs, pretends to shrug, pretending not to know why I would answer that way. He knows perfectly well the difficulty of arranging asylum and he knows that it can be done. If news reports are to be believed, there were in fact active discussions regarding asylum in northern Africa in the days prior to the conclusion of the gulf war. It is an option that is worth considering. Canada, with our influence, or at least the influence we used to have in the developing world, is a country that could play an active role in trying to see if that option is open.