Kevin Lamoureux

[Committees of the House, May 2nd, 2024]

Mr. Speaker, I rise on a point of order. If you seek it, I think you will find unanimous consent for the following motion.

I move:

That the membership of the Standing Committee on Procedures and House Affairs be amended as follows: Mr. Carr (Winnipeg South Centre) for Mrs. Chagger (Waterloo).

[Canada—Newfoundland and Labrador Atlantic Accord Implementation Act, May 2nd, 2024]

Madam Speaker, we are prepared to have this pass on division.

[Ways and Means, May 2nd, 2024]

Madam Speaker, we would request a recorded vote.

[Government Response to Petitions, May 2nd, 2024]

Mr. Speaker, we request a recorded vote.

[Government Response to Petitions, May 2nd, 2024]

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to Standing Order 36(8)(a), I have the honour to table, in both official languages, the government's response to 10 petitions. These returns will be tabled in an electronic format.

While I am on my feet, I move:

That the House do now proceed to orders of the day.

[Privilege, May 1st, 2024]

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in response to the question of privilege raised on April 29 by the hon. member for Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan regarding the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China. I would like to offer some clarification as it is critically important that members have the facts about and chronology of this matter.

I submit that the facts of the situation clearly demonstrate that the government acted without delay to notify the House and Senate of suspicious spear phishing activity that targeted parliamentarians. I would also state that, since this incident occurred, the government has given clear direction to intelligence agencies that when there are threats of interference, influence or intimidation against any member of the House or the Senate, these agencies are to engage the affected member in an expeditious manner.

I will now draw the attention of members of the House to the facts and chronology of events that occurred respecting the matter raised by my colleague across the way.

In January 2021, the Canadian centre for cybersecurity informed the House of Commons administration about suspicious spear phishing activity targeting individuals with parl.gc.ca and senate.gc.ca email accounts, beginning on January 22, 2021, and continuing into March 2021.

A series of reports were shared with the House of Commons about the activity. Only technical details were available and shared at this time.

On June 29, 2022, the FBI shared a report with the Communications Security Establishment, detailing cyber-threat activities targeting members of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, including parliamentarians.

On June 30, 2022, the Communications Security Establishment shared all relevant technical information about the cyber-threat activity with security officials in both the House of Commons and the Senate, including the names of the impacted parliamentarians.

As there is a separation between the executive and the legislative branches of government, the Communications Security Establishment determined that it was appropriate to defer to the House of Commons and the Senate, as owners and managers of their IT networks and parliamentary email addresses, to address the threats. At the time this took place, it was felt that this was the appropriate procedure to follow in order to respect the independence of the legislative branch from the executive branch.

I cannot speak to what the House of Commons or Senate administration did with the information provided to them by the Communications Security Establishment, as this is for them to explain. I can only explain the actions of departments and agencies of the Government of Canada. I would therefore assert that there is no prima facie question of privilege in this instance, as the Communications Security Establishment properly shared the information that they were provided, including the names of the parliamentarians, with the House of Commons and Senate administrations.

I would like to point out that, since that time, procedures have evolved, and MPs have made it clear that they would like to be notified directly when they are targeted. Therefore, in May 2023, the then minister of public safety issued a ministerial directive requiring that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service will, where possible, inform parliamentarians of threats to their security.

As stated in my opening remarks, had this threat been raised today, I can assure members that the directive would have been followed and that security agencies would have proactively provided information on the threat to parliamentarians.

With a view to protecting our democratic institutions and representatives, our government takes matters of foreign interference and foreign influence extremely seriously. I can assure the House that our government will continue to take serious steps to address threats against our beloved country and the institutions that serve and represent our citizens.

[Motions for Papers, May 1st, 2024]

Mr. Speaker, I should have also requested that all notices of motions for the production of papers be allowed to stand.

[Questions Passed as Orders for Returns, May 1st, 2024]

Mr. Speaker, finally, I ask that all remaining questions be allowed to stand.

[Questions Passed as Orders for Returns, May 1st, 2024]

Mr. Speaker, furthermore, if a revised response to Question No. 2007, originally tabled on January 29, and the government's responses to Questions Nos. 2420 to 2423, 2425 to 2427, 2429 to 2431, 2433, and 2435 to 2437 could be made orders for return, these returns would be tabled in an electronic format immediately.

[Questions on the Order Paper, May 1st, 2024]

Mr. Speaker, the following questions will be answered today: Nos. 2418, 2419, 2424, 2428, 2432 and 2434.